Abstract
In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I claim that the argument therefore fails.
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Notes
Cf. DeRose (2002)
In a recent paper, F. Hindriks (2007) has advanced a similar sort of argument for deriving the AK norm from the linkage between belief and knowledge. (cf. pp. 403–404) However, Hindriks’ argument is qualified in that it applies only to situations of normal trust. Given this, Hindriks’ support for the AK norm is qualified as well: “the rule does not apply to all assertions, but only to some [and thus] the knowledge rule is not a constitutive rule of assertion.” (p. 404) Hindriks’ skepticism about the status of the AK rule as a norm of assertion comports well with the criticisms of AK in the remainder of this section and in the following section.
For a related appeal of Stalnaker’s account of assertion, cf. Schaffer (2008). Note, however, that Schaffer endorses the knowledge norm of assertion.
Cf. Lewis (1983): “it’s not as easy as you might think to say something that will be unacceptable for lack of required presuppositions. Say something that requires a missing presupposition, and straightaway that presupposition springs into existence, making what you said acceptable after all. (Or at least, this is what happens if your conversational partners tacitly acquiesce ...)” (Lewis 1983, p. 234)
This is perhaps forgivable in that many of those with whom DeRose has debated this point in the literature have seemed to accept the KA norm. Thus Hawthorne (2004) suggests—following Brandom (1983)—that assertion provides a reassertion license. Such a claim, however, if we are assuming the truth of the AK norm, simply amounts to the KA norm.
Adam Leite, in his (2007), notes that “DeRose does not explicitly defend this claim.” Leite continues, however, by seeming to accept as a justification for the lack of further defense DeRose’s statement that “[the AK norm] is the only rule governing assertion that has to do with asserting only what one is positioned well enough with respect to.” (Quoted in Leite, fn. 5) As should be immediately obvious, however, this is not an argument in favor of the KA norm.
References
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Shieber, J. Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37, 169–181 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9141-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9141-9