Abstract
When each state of the world is a maximally specific, consistent description of the world, including the description of the knowledge and ignorance of all individuals, the standard partitional model of knowledge is inconsistent with the assumption that an individual's powers are limited to that of a Turing machine. We show, however, that the epistemic logicS4 is consistent with computational constraints.
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Shin, H.S., Williamson, T. Representing the knowledge of turing machines. Theor Decis 37, 125–146 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079208
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079208