

David Carr/Christian Lotz (Hrsg.)

**Subjektivität –
Verantwortung –
Wahrheit**

Neue Aspekte
der Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls

Sonderdruck

2002



PETER LANG

Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften

INHALT

EINLEITUNG

- | | |
|--|----|
| Christian Lotz (Seattle)
Neue Aspekte der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls? | 11 |
| David Carr (Atlanta)
New Aspects of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology? | 19 |

SUBJEKTIVITÄT

- | | |
|--|----|
| David Carr (Atlanta)
Husserl's Paradox. On the Ontological Status of the
Transcendental Subject. | 23 |
| Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Graz)
Praxis der Subjektivität. Zum Verhältnis von
Transzendentalphilosophie und Hermeneutik. | 37 |
| Shigeru Taguchi (Tokio)
Individuation und Ich-Gemeinschaft. Das Problem der
Vielheit der ichlichen Individuen bei Husserl. | 57 |
| Dan Zahavi (Kopenhagen)
Anonymity and First-Personal Givenness.
An Attempt at Reconciliation. | 75 |

TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MONADODOLOGY ON HUSSERL AND MAHNKE

Michael Shim, Stony Brook

INTRODUCTION

The following¹ proposes an interpretation of Husserl's sustained exegetical commentary on Leibniz' metaphysics from 1922 (Hua XIV 298-300), with reference to textual and historical resources. The leading historical index for the following interpretation is a minor contribution to Leibniz scholarship from 1917 by Dietrich Mahnke, a work with which Husserl was intimately familiar. Textual references are to works by Husserl which would have been available to Mahnke— i.e., the *Logische Untersuchungen* and *Ideen I*— as well as relevant notes and lectures from the period in question. Husserl's brief manuscript from 1922, I claim, can be read as a *critique* of the Mahnke interpretation that attempts to provide a more expansive and thorough-going phenomenological explication of Leibniz' doctrine of universal harmony. Thereby, Husserl offers some important clues as to how he himself understands his own uses of the terms "monad" and "monadology." The phenomenological reformation of Leibnizian Monadology must be understood as a *methodological* reconception with internal reference to Husserl's own theory of *intersubjectivity*.

Though generally unrecognized for his familiarity with the history of philosophy, it is nevertheless well known that Husserl had extensively read the works of Leibniz. According to his report delivered at the 1966 International Leibniz Congress, H.L. van Breda notes three distinct phases of Leibniz' influence on the development of Husserl's phenomenology.² The first period (1887-1897) is concentrated on Leibniz' conception of logic and "mathesis universalis." The second period (1897-1905) is oriented around Leibniz' *Nouveaux essais*, which, van Breda claims, served as a counter-weight to Husserl's preoccupation with

¹ I would like to thank Donn Welton, who reviewed an earlier version of this paper and offered helpful comments and criticisms.

² Van Breda's chronology is determined by a survey of collections and individual works by Leibniz in Husserl's personal library, which Husserl had— at various periods in his life— heavily (as evidenced by the extensive marginal notes taken) worked through.

the empiricists during this period.³ Finally, between 1910 and 1925, it is Leibniz' "Monadology" that is the focus of Husserl's interest, leading to and guiding Husserl's recourse to the *monadic* re-conception of the *concrete ego* and the development of his *theory of intersubjectivity*. In the last footnote to this report, van Breda notes that in Husserl's personal library are also included some 40 works of secondary literature on Leibniz, of which only four had been closely worked through by Husserl. All four of these works are by Dietrich Mahnke.⁴

Like Husserl, Dietrich Mahnke had begun his academic career as a student of mathematics. Due to exposure to Husserl's lectures at Göttingen, Mahnke decided to devote himself to philosophy instead, specializing in Leibniz. In July of 1922, Mahnke defended his Dissertation under Husserl at Freiburg. The title of the dissertation is "Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik," published in the *Jahrbuch* in 1925. In this work, Mahnke attempts to develop a theory of "objektiver Perspektivismus" (Mahnke 1925, 13/317) which he claims Leibniz' "Harmonik" secures through a synthesis between a universally valid mathematics and a multiplicity of subjective metaphysical perspectives. In Leibniz scholarship, the work is dated, but is of historical interest since it criticizes a number of Leibniz interpretations current at the time— most notably, those of Russell, Couturat, Cassirer and Dilthey. In terms of phenomenology, the work offers itself as a significant early attempt to clarify and solve traditional metaphysical problems with recourse to phenomenology. Perhaps the single most phenomenologically significant passage in the entire work reads as follows: "Wenn es außerhalb der rein logischen Mathematik überhaupt apriorische Evidenzen und nicht nur aposteriorische Erfahrungen gibt, so kann es sich nicht um begriffsanalytische, sondern nur um intuitiv-synthetische handeln, wie Husserls Phänomenologie sie in der deskriptive Eidetik der reinen

³ Van Breda suggests that Leibniz' critique of John Locke may have played a decisive role in the shaping of Husserl's anti-psychologism of this period. Van Breda goes so far as to claim, "Das Studium der Neuen Abhandlungen könnte wohl für ihn die Geburtsstunden gewesen sein für seine eigene Philosophie der Reflexion, die seit 1913 in seinen veröffentlichten Schriften so breit vertreten ist..." (Van Breda 1971, 142).

⁴ I am grateful to Prof. Rudolf Bernet at the Leuven archive for permission to cite from Husserl's marginal notes in his copy of Mahnke's *Eine Neue Monadologie*, HA Signature BP 168: hereafter, BP 168/page nos. I am also indebted to Sebastian Luft at the Leuven archive who provided me with additional reports regarding Husserl's worked-through copies of Mahnke's works.

Erlebnisse gewinnt"⁵ (Mahnke 1925, 43). This passage crystallizes the core phenomenological thesis first introduced in Mahnke's 1917 book. In 1926, Mahnke completed his Habilitation in Freiburg; then in 1928, he received a call to take over Heidegger's position at Marburg.

Mahnke's interpretation of Leibniz' philosophy is through and through phenomenological; and no doubt, for Mahnke, Husserl was and remained the single most influential figure in his philosophical development.⁶ At the same time, as can be gleaned from the letters between them, Mahnke's is an interpretation received with enthusiasm by Husserl. And of the four works by Mahnke familiar to Husserl, the single most important cannot be considered the above mentioned dissertation; instead, it is a shorter piece by Mahnke published in 1917 entitled *Eine Neue Monadologie*.

After just a cursory examination of the work, Husserl claims of Mahnke's *Monadologie* that "[sie] ist mir ganz und gar verständlich, ja sie ist, wenn ich nach diese Sätzen mich orientiere, ganz und gar auch die meine... Ich selbst bin eigentlich Monadologe."⁷ But it was not until the Semesterferien of 1919 that Husserl undertook a concentrated and systematic reading of the short work; upon the completion of which, Husserl writes to Mahnke: "Wie merkwürdig. Vielfach ist es mir, als ob sich ein Stück meiner Seele mit meinen Gedanken abgezweigt u. in der Ihren sich fortentwickelt hätte" (HuaDok III, 422). What Husserl probably found so attractive in Mahnke's book is an application (albeit a fairly rudimentary variant) of his phenomenological method in a comprehensive reconstruction of the late Leibniz' monadological metaphysics, precisely that

⁵ Mahnke himself is apparently referring to "Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis," (G IV/422-26) Leibniz' famous epistemological treatise from November of 1684, published in the *Acta eruditorum*. According to Leibniz, Descartes' epistemological criterion of "clara et distincta" can be further elaborated and refined by a hierarchization, from merely clear to "intuitively adequate" or apodeictic. The only examples, for Leibniz, of adequate and intuitive knowledge for finite sentients are precisely tautological identity propositions, insofar as they are not further reducible. Mahnke's claim is that the phenomenological reduction enables precisely the epistemological augmentation of the ideas of concrete individua in *Wesensschauung* to count as epistemologically compatible with mathematical propositions.

⁶ For instance, in "Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik," Mahnke devotes each chapter to an explication and critique of various different interpretations of Leibniz's philosophy current at the time. Though Husserl's phenomenology is itself not included as one of the chapters, Mahnke's criticisms of his contemporaries almost invariably takes refuge in Husserl's phenomenological paradigm: e.g., against Couturat, pp. 42/346f.; against Cassirer, p. 61/365; against Dilthey, pp. 180/484f., etc.

⁷ Husserl an Mahnke, 5.1.1917, HuaDok III 407f.

part of Leibniz' philosophy that Husserl had become interested in again during this period. Yet there is no indication to suggest that Mahnke's interpretation was regarded by Husserl as anything phenomenologically ground-breaking, as any kind of progress in phenomenology itself. Instead, Husserl probably saw in Mahnke's book his own words echoed in the context of a *phenomenological* exegesis of Leibniz' monadological metaphysics.⁸

As the title itself suggests, Mahnke's work is a paragraph-by-paragraph commentary on Leibniz' own "Monadology," but with reference to more contemporary philosophical perspectives—above all, needless to say, to that of Husserl's phenomenology. It is divided into 7 chapters, of which the phenomenologically most relevant are chapters 1-3, and paragraph §82 of chapter 6 that unify the foregoing under a phenomenological paradigm. (Chapters 4 and 5, as we will later see, will prove to be of *negative* relevance. There is no evidence to suggest that Husserl read any of chapter 7.) As a piece of exegesis, Mahnke's work takes numerous liberties, emphasizing certain aspects of Leibnizian metaphysics congenial to his own purposes in exchange for having to suppress other aspects that may not have been so conducive. In terms of phenomenological relevance, however, the work proposes a fundamental thesis, one Mahnke will preserve in the "Universalmathematik": Leibniz' principle of universal harmony asserts an inextricable connection between mathematics and metaphysics, despite the latter's inherently subjective (and, thus, relative) orientation. What establishes "harmony" between the mathematical paradigm of objectivity and the paradigm of subjective-relative—indeed, even partially "irrational"—cognition is the invariant structure of consciousness, as obtained under the phenomenological reduction.

Mahnke's *Monadology* is—as to be expected in a phenomenological interpretation—centered on paragraph §30 of the Leibnizian original, which is worth citing in its entirety: "It is also by the knowledge of necessary truths and by their abstractions that we rise to *reflective acts*, which enable us to think of what is called *I* and to consider this or that to be in us; it is thus, as we think of ourselves, that we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God himself, conceiving of that which is limited in us as being

⁸ Husserl could not have overlooked the footnote on pages 14-5 of the *Neue Monadologie*, where Mahnke writes: "Im voraus muss ich darauf hinweisen, dass die philosophischen Forschungsergebnisse dieses meines hochverehrten Lehrers für mich fast überall den Ausgangspunkt meiner eigenen Gedanken gebildet haben, auch wo ich in anderer Richtung als er fortgeschritten bin."

without limits in him. These reflective acts provide us with the principal objects of our reasonings" (*Mon.* §30).

The most significant passage in Mahnke's corresponding paragraph reads as follows: "Wenn *mehrere Menschen*, die durch *ihre gemeinsame intentionale Welt* der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen und Strebenziele *mit einander verbunden sind*, sich *ineinander einzufühlen* verstehen, so erwächst aus ihren getrennten Seelen eine höhere geistige Einheit ... Wir dürfen deshalb auch dem höheren Gesamtbewusstsein der Menschheit keineswegs die Erlebniseinheit einer individuellen Seele zuschreiben, sondern nur den Charakter eines *objektiven Bewusstseins*, das alle Einzelseelen *wegen ihrer Geistesgemeinschaft* auf dem Gebiete des wahrhaft Gültigen sich zugrundeliegend fühlen" (*NM* §30: my italics).

II

In order to adequately understand Mahnke's introduction of obviously inter-subjective considerations in his commentary on Leibniz' prioritization of the reflective method in metaphysics, we must take a close look at much of Mahnke's foregoing interpretative steps. To begin with, Mahnke's paragraph §4 proposes to explain the indestructible simplicity of the Monad in terms of "ewig gültige Lebensgesetze" which endure all contingent alterations in experience. Despite the importation of phenomenological issues, Mahnke's claim is in conformity with Leibniz' own earlier conception of "harmony," as introduced in a letter to Magnus Wedderkopf from May, 1671 as well as in *De summa rerum* from 1676. In this period, harmony is simply conceived as that which enables the greatest quantity of diversity from a minimal simplicity. The paradigm example in this case are mathematical ratios: i.e., 2:4 and 4:8—ad infinitum—have in common the same ratio, for which no further reasons can be given, thus the ratio itself is *primitive*; regardless, this minimally simple ratio enables an infinite multitude of numerically diverse relationships that are always explicable by reduction to the primitive ratio (*L* 146-7, 157ff.). Mahnke is suggesting a comparison in epistemological strength between mathematical ratios and the "eternally valid laws of life."

Though universal, the "eternally valid laws of life" also constitute the transcendental grounds of contingent diversity, without which there would be no sense in speaking of a multiplicity of subjects at all—and, thus, no sense in speaking of either substantial or monadological unity at all. Therefore, the subjective relative "Qualitäten" cannot be overlooked. Following Leibniz, for whom each Monad is restricted to a very specific "*pointe de vue*" through the diversity in

the sequence of "representations" (Leibniz' own metaphysical translation of propositional *predicates*), the subjective qualities particular to an individual Monad— such as "Empfindungen, Phantasieen, Gefühle, Begehungen, Strebungen, Handlungen, usw"— are what distinguishes one Monad from all the rest (NM §8). All these subjective-relative qualities, Mahnke claims, follows from "*einem inneren Prinzip, aus immanenter Kausalität oder Motivation, da äussere Ursache ja keinen Einfluss auf ihr Inneres haben kann*" (Ibid., §11).⁹ In classical metaphysics, *spontaneity* is a term for *self-causality* as opposed to transcendent causality. Naturally, for Leibniz, all *phenomenal* causality is resolvable to a representation of a Monad, which is the generative basis for all its representations: thus, all phenomenal causality is reducible to substantial spontaneity. As made explicit in §15, the internal principle of motivation dovetails nicely with Leibniz' doctrine of *appetito*, which Mahnke proposes to translate as "Streben."¹⁰

Despite the diversity in the individuating sequences of representations, all Monads share a set of "laws" that pertain universally to phenomenologically *reduced consciousness* (NM §7). In the corresponding paragraph, Leibniz asserts the famous "no windows" claim, staking for each Monad an autonomous sphere of spontaneity and auto-affection. Leibniz' own arguments in *Monadology* §7 preserve those first introduced in "Primae veritates," the prototype of the *Discourse*: since the "first truths" are tautological identity propositions,¹¹ a *true* predicate must be analyzable into some identity relation with the *subject* of that predicate.

⁹ By "immanenter Kausalität oder Motivation," Mahnke is clearly referring to a Husserlian usage. In *Ideen I*, the most explicit statement in contrast to causality is given in a footnote to §47: "Es ist zu beachten, daß dieser phänomenologische Grundbegriff der Motivation... (... als Kontrast zum Begriffe der auf die transzendenten Realitätssphäre bezogenen Kausalität), eine Verallgemeinerung desjenigen Begriffes der Motivation ist..." (Hua III 89fn.: my italics). (It should also be noted that Husserl's "generalization" of the concept of motivation stakes a distinction between his transcendental-phenomenological usage and the usage current among the adherents of psychologism of the time.)

¹⁰ The corresponding paragraph in Leibniz' "Monadology" reads as follows: "The action of the internal principle which brings about change or the passage from one perception to another can be called appetition. It is true that appetite need not always fully attain the whole perception to which it tends, but it always attains some of it and reaches new perceptions" (Mon. §15). In §13, Mahnke insists again that a Monad must necessarily assume in its unity an individuating multiplicity, precisely in reference to the aforementioned Leibnizian conception of mathematical harmony.

¹¹ Because tautological identity propositions are unique in their epistemological irreducibility: i.e., no further reason can be given why they are true; thus they are true with a priori certainty and necessity.

In §7, Mahnke follows Leibniz' step in sounding the propositional *subject* on a metaphysical register; however, rather than convert the subject into *substance*, Mahnke converts it into *consciousness*.¹² With obvious reference to §4, the "Chaos" of subjective diversity in "representations" are resolved into the invariant structural "laws" of consciousness.

As to be expected, Mahnke proposes an explication of these "laws" of consciousness with conspicuously hard recourse to Husserl's phenomenology. Mahnke proposes the characterization of the "Erleben einer Monade" in terms of *intentionality*, as given in adumbrated perception. Thus, Mahnke claims, the essential unity of the Monad is, above all, an "intentionale Einheit" (NM §16). For Mahnke, this unity is obtained through the invariance of the intentional structure itself: like mathematical ratios, consciousness *as* consciousness of something for consciousness obtains despite the infinite diversity of particular perceptual experiences, exemplified by the "infinite continuum" of unfolding perspectives in adumbration. It is from this *necessary* phenomenological opposition between the structural invariant of intentional consciousness and the infinite multiplicity of contingent *gegenständliche* perspectives, that the intentional unity of consciousness is elevated to "einem Reiche ewiger Ideen oder objektiv geltender Begriffe, auf die die ruhelose Folge der Veränderungen als auf ihr wahres Ziel hindeutet" (Ibid.). Thus, in §26, Mahnke says: "die Monade [kann]... als Intention auf eine Idee [dargestellt werden]." On the basis of this idealization, Mahnke claims that the intentional unity of consciousness *qua* Monad stands on the same level with the "Einheiten der Natur" *qua* world, "die den gleichzeitigen Perzeptionen der getrennten Monaden als die in ihnen gemeinte wahre Ojektivität identisch gegenübersteht" (NM §16).

It seems to me that Mahnke is implying the following set of arguments. The Monad thinks concepts and ideas as *universal* in *analogy* to the invariant structure of its own intentional consciousness, despite empirical encounters with almost nothing but contingent diversity of perceptual data. This argument conforms

¹² This is a fairly heavy-handed exegetical move, which must be viewed as presupposing a phenomenological agenda. For Leibniz himself, what qualifies as the substantial reference of a propositional subject need not be conscious at all—at least not the sense of sentience. Mahnke's apology for his own specialized interpretative move is given in §14, where Mahnke says that the Monad views everything else in the universe in analogy to its own structure of consciousness, if the Monad in question is capable of apperception or reflective introspection. This apology, on the other hand, is not at all too liberal, and reflects numerous passages that make such suggestions throughout the period of the *Nouveaux essais*. Cf. Letter to Sophie Charlotte, 1702: (G VI/502).

with Leibniz' monadological metaphysics. The true reference of a propositional subject *qua* individual substance is determined by an infinite cluster of predicative qualities¹³ or representations. Through reflective introspection, a sentient Monad can discern from within itself invariant and universal structures, which it analogically imparts to all the other Monads in the universe. For Leibniz there is only one universe or world, which all the Monads that constitute this one universe *express* or reflect from their own particular perspectives. However, each Monad is "like a little world which expresses the great one" (*DM* §16), since it generates its own representations without causal interaction with any other substance (except God); thus, each Monad may regard itself as an adequate solipsist "as if there were only God and itself in the world" (*L* 337). What guarantees *objectivity* (of the universe), then, is the *pre-established* correspondence of these representations between diverse Monads with their respectively diverse points of view (*DM* §14, §32). Mahnke's phenomenological contribution to this line of monadological thinking is that the objectivity of the world is congruent with the objectivity of *ideas* as abstracted in the eidetic phase of the phenomenological reduction. Mahnke writes: "Diese objektive, *intentionale Welt* ist identisch dieselbe für alle Monaden, nur dass jedes Individuum die meisten darin enthaltenen Begriffe in seinen Erlebnissen kaum veranschaulicht findet und darum nur symbolisch meinen, nicht eigentlich erkennen kann, während ein Begriff, nämlich der eigene, in seinen aufeinander folgenden Momenten durch die Perceptionen immanent verwirklicht wird, *selbst freilich in seiner ewigen Einheit auch wieder erlebnistranszendent bleibt*" (*NM* §16: my italics).

Immediately followed by: "Jene ideelle Welt des Geltenden vollends kann nur dadurch 'bestehen,' dass die *Erlebnisse realer Monaden sie intendieren und in ihr die Einheit für ihre Mannigfaltigkeit finden*. Wenn insbesondere der objektive Begriff einer *Monade* in jener Welt bestehen soll, so muss *diese intentionale Einheit* nicht nur intendiertes Objekt sein, sondern es müssen *den sämtlichen Perceptionen einer realen Monade gleichartige*, wirklich erlebte Charakterzüge *immanent sein*, die alle Perceptionen auch als Äusserungen eines and deselben Subjekts aufzufassen erlauben. Der Ideenwelt des Gedankens entspricht ein ideenbildendes Reich des Denkens. Beide schliessen sich als Objekt und Subjekt der Intention zusammen in der *Welt des objektiven Bewusstseins*, dem jede Monade in doppelter Hinsicht als unterbewusstes Differential angehört: einerseits als subjektive Funktionseinheit, wie sie vom eigenen Erleben der Monade in seinem bewusstseinsartigen Zusammenhang verwirklicht wird, *andererseits als objektiver Begriff*, wie er für die

¹³ Precisely what Russell would call an "indefinite description."

ändern Monaden auf Grund ihrer Eindrücke Gegenstand der Intention ist“ (NM §17: my italics).

Between cognitively compatible sentient Monads, what guarantees the *Objektivität* of *Gegenstände* are the *ideas* (concepts of species and generic categories) that can be assented to and shared in common by virtue of the phenomenological method, despite otherwise subjective-relative contingent contents of adumbrative perception (Hua XIX/I 50f., 61, 150, 161, 413; Hua III 9, 12f., 52, 58, 90ff). Since these ideas do not belong to the world of burning trees, etc., but to transcendental consciousness, objectivity must be grounded in *intersubjectivity*. In short, Mahnke is proposing an—albeit relatively primitive—phenomenological intersubjective account of Leibniz’ doctrine of the pre-established harmony. Hence, the following: “... besteht jede sogenannte Wirkung zweier Weltelemente aufeinander *in einer prästablierten Harmonie der immanenten Kausalzusammenhänge* der beiden ausrundeliegenden Monaden und gleicht der Übereinstimmung zwischen den Gedankengängen zweier Gelehrten, die garnicht durch die Fortpflanzung von Schallwellen in einer physischen Welt verbunden zu sein, sondern *nur jeder für sich richtig zu denken brauchen, um beide zur gleichen objektiven Wahrheit zu gelangen*. Wenn *zwei Monaden aneinander angepasst sind*, so bedeutet das, dass beide zufolge *ihres eigenen Lebensprinzips im gleichen Augenblicke Wahrnehmungintentionen auf denselben objektiven Naturvorgang entwickeln*. Die Vermittlung zwischen ihnen übernimmt nicht eine real existierende Aussenwelt, *sondern die intentionale Welt der nicht eigentlich seienden, sondern geltenden Bewusstseinsobjekte, die ihnen, in ihren subjektiven Erlebnissen dargestellt und intendiert, gemeinsam vorschweben*“ (NM §26: my italics).

In order to attain the same objective truth, two or more Monads need only to *think correctly*. This “richtig zu denken” should enable a correspondence of otherwise subjectively diverse motivations (“*immanenten Kausalzusammenhänge*”), which in turn allows the sharing between them of what is both universal yet belongs individually to each—namely, the invariant structure of intentional consciousness (“*Lebensprinzip*”). Correct thinking, as formulated in this passage, seems to require leaving the natural attitude of naive doxic investment in the existence of a *transcendent* world (“*Aussenwelt*”)—into the attitude of a universally valid consciousness for which the world is given *as* intended. Thereby, as Mahnke later writes, the Monads are “durch eine intentionale Harmonie miteinander verbunden” (NM §58). In short, according to Mahnke, what *explicitates* Leibniz’ universal harmony—which, as a *principle*, is a *presupposed hypothesis* in Leibniz’ metaphysics—is the phenomenological method.

By *explicate*, I do not mean *explain*— if by explain, in the present context, one means offering an answer to *Why* there should be universal harmony; attempts to answer such a question— for both Leibniz and Mahnke— commit one to mysticism. Rather, the phenomenological method demonstrates decisively, by its descriptive exposition of the invariant structures of consciousness, *how* such a harmony obtains *despite* incalculable diversity in perceptual contents and subjective *Qualitäten* that constitute “points of view.” According to Husserl himself, what grounds logical propositions cannot be subjective-relative (i.e., psychobgistic) since the objects of logical cognition are *ideal*. Ideality, in this sense, means *objectivity* or universal shareability of discursive *meaning*— insofar as the sentient candidates are also linguistically compatible with one another. If there were no such objective *ideas* in this sense, we would be committed to a skepticism, since no objective elements in discursive commerce would be permissible; instead, we would be faced with a babelic exchange of idiolectic false cognates. Since, therefore, objectivity simply means *intersubjectivity*— or, better, intersubjective *validity*— a normative standard for qualification as cognitively *compatible* is required. The normative standard of intersubjective compatibility that phenomenology offers is universal consciousness strictly as obtained through the *epoche*.

Turning back to Leibniz, we must point out a paradox in his monadological metaphysics that Mahnke, it seems to me, is attempting to resolve by recourse to a phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. For Leibniz, every Monad expresses the one and the same universe. However, the universe is nothing more than an hierarchical aggregate of substances, i.e., nothing more than the sum total of all the Monads. Further, each Monad is essentially *nothing more than the sum total of its perceptions*. Thus, in reflecting the one and the same universe, each Monad is simply reflecting the totality of the Monads— which is to say, the totality of all the representations that make up the monadological universe— *including itself!* Objectivity in the Leibnizian sense of universal harmony, therefore, means nothing more than the correspondence *of perceptions* between Monads. Since each Monad includes itself in its representation of the universe, no Monad can adequately represent the universe in its totality as including itself— except that Monad which is not a part of the universe it is representing.¹⁴ Thus, Gurwitsch correctly points out that Leibniz’ philosophy is “*eine besondere Variante von Transzendentalphilosophie zu deuten, deren Eigenart darin besteht, daß sie auf den unendlichen Geist Gottes als ihr Subjekt bezogen ist*” (Gurwitsch 1974, 5).

¹⁴ According to Leibniz, by virtue of the fact that God is the only Monad which lacks a body: NE 114, 155.

At this level, it seems to me, Mahnke is caught between two *not* inextricable sets of philosophical commitments. One is a commitment to Leibniz' recourse to a hypothetical divine functionary who guarantees universal correspondence, with hypothetically absolute adequacy in both necessary form and contingent content; the other commitment is to transcendental phenomenology, with its eidetic reduction of empirical contingency and transcendental reduction of intentional consciousness. Mahnke himself responds to this tension by equivocation between the two sets: to wit, by an equivocation between God and Husserl. Thus, the following passage from §82—"Die einzige metaphysische Einheitslehre, die sich mit der universellen Anerkennung aller wesensverschiedenen Weltregionen vereinigen lässt, ist der phänomenologische Bewusstseinsmonismus oder objektive Begriffsidealismus"—is preceded and followed by exultations of God's metaphysical service. We now turn to Husserl's brief exegetical commentary on Leibniz' monadological metaphysics from 1922, written around the time of Mahnke's doctoral defense.

Beilage XL of *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II* (Hua XIV 298-300) ends with the following note: "Zusammenstellung wohl nach Mahnke, aber weitergehend" (Ibid., 298 fn.). In his editorial footnote, Iso Kern concedes it is difficult to discern precisely to which text by Mahnke Husserl could have been referring. Given the time frame, since Mahnke's defense was scheduled in July of 1922, Kern ostensibly assumes the reference is to "Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik;" thus, Kern writes: "Evtl. enthielt er bereits neben dem historischen Teil [of "Universalmathematik"], der allein veröffentlicht wurde, eine systematische Darstellung" (Ibid.). This is, no doubt, partially true. But since the systematic historical exposition of "Universalmathematik" is virtually a repetition of *Eine Neue Monadologie*, which is the text of Mahnke's Husserl was most familiar with, the primary reference of Husserl's commentary is most likely to the 1917 text rather than the dissertation itself. The reason why Kern finds it difficult to determine the text of relevance is that Husserl's commentary, with regard to Mahnke, is *almost entirely critical*; thus to Husserl's endnote, we must place emphasis on "*aber weitergehend*."

The two main points of critique that Husserl is directing against Mahnke are the following: 1. Mahnke's own interpretative view of Leibniz' mind-body parallelism thesis Husserl found systematically inconsistent and phenomenologically incoherent; 2. Husserl must have found Mahnke's equivocation between theology and phenomenology unsatisfactory. Thus Husserl places emphasis on his own theory of "Einführung," in order to better explicate universal harmony in terms of intersubjectivity. These two points of critique are closely connected

with one another, since Husserl appears to be highlighting the theoretical shortcomings of Mahnke's conception of the body to critically assess the limitations of Mahnke's theory of intersubjectivity.

For Leibniz, the difference between parallelism and universal harmony may be characterized as one between, respectively, retail and whole-sale versions of the same theory: parallelism is a *specific form of harmony*. Accordingly, the "parallel" thesis between mind and body cannot be one interjected between two *substances*, since *extension* in general is always reducible to the *phenomenal* effect of an infinitely dense emanation of *non-extended* substantial *force*.¹⁵ With regard to Mahnke's reconstruction of this parallelism-thesis in Leibniz, Husserl appears to be suggesting that Mahnke bought the retail version without properly explaining the whole-sale account that sets the price.

As witnessed from the marginal notes to Husserl's copy of *Eine Neue Monadologie*, Husserl homes in on this discussion of parallelism in Mahnke, then points out Mahnke's systematic inconsistencies in formulation. In §60, Mahnke rejects any *causal* interaction between body ("*Körper*") and mind in favor of "psychophysischer Parallelismus zwischen der leiblichen Aussenseite und der seelischen Innenseite jedes Weltelements." This psycho-physical parallelism is defined explicitly in terms of intentionality. Husserl apparently maintains this initial conception of parallelism as at least partially acceptable. Thus, Husserl complains emphatically about what he views as an inconsistency in §62 (BP 168/65), where Mahnke then ostensibly recurs to an endorsement of "materialist" investigations into the "psychical-chemical" processes of the nerves and brain, to which belongs even "die exakte Form meiner *inneren Erlebnisse*" (my italics). For Husserl, this recourse would be tantamount to a materialist causal reduction of immanent consciousness. Thus, Husserl writes at the second paragraph on BP168/65: "Also doch kein Parallelismus. Das ist doch ein Widerspruch." Yet Mahnke continues along these lines in §63, where Mahnke endorses the introduction of "kausal erklärenden Physiologie" into metaphysics. Thus in §69, Mahnke writes: "Die kausalen Ursachen des Lebens sind keine anderen als die gewöhnlichen physikalischen und chemischen Kräfte, die auf den sichtbaren, materiellen Stoff wirken." This theme of "*causal connection*" will be

¹⁵ In Leibniz, the earliest and most explicit statement of this view is from "Theoria motus abstracti seu Rationes Motuum universales a sensu et Phaenomenis independentantes" of 1671 (G IV/228-32). The mature epistemological elaboration in terms of "phenomena bene fundata" is from "De modo distinguendi Phaenomena realia ab imaginariis" of the early 1690s (G VII/319-22).

taken up again and pursued in §79 (BP 168/86), to which Husserl writes: “Also doch nicht wirklich Parallelismus.” Finally in §82 (BP 168/98), Mahnke returns to the phenomenological paradigm and speaks of the parallelism of the soul and body (“*Leib*”) as guaranteed by subjective unity. Accordingly, Husserl writes: “Also doch wieder Parallelismus.” Why would Husserl be concerned with the preservation of *parallelism*¹⁶, admittedly one of the strangest and most implausible results of Leibnizian metaphysics?

As is well known, Husserl will develop a highly technical distinction between two senses of *body*, one in terms of object (*Körper*) and another in terms of the somatic “expression” of consciousness (*Leib*). Correlatively, there are *two conceptions* of parallelism in Husserl. The conception in terms of *Körper* is the conception Husserl endorses in Mahnke: parallelism as the intentional unity of subject and world. The second conception, in terms of *Leib*, is what Husserl finds ill-conceived in Mahnke. Yet, as in Leibniz, this second conception is the genus of which the first is a mere species.

As *Körper*, the body belongs to the “common world” as an object among other objects (Hua XIV 298). It is possible to think of *Körper* in accordance with any garden variety “laws of nature.” Thereby: “Jeder Körper spiegelt das ganze körperliche Universum.” The *Körper* is subject to the laws of gravity, is extended, composed of cells, takes up three dimensions, etc. However, phenomenologically, the *Körper* is relevant only as an object for consciousness. The only difference between *Körper* and other objects of consciousness is that a particular *Körper* belongs uniquely to a particular consciousness. By wearing a corporeal piece of the corporeal universe, I attain parallelism with that corporeal universe, the world of objects: this is the expansion of Leibniz’ mind-body parallelism

The second conception of parallelism may be formulated as the *harmonious execution of “lived-bodily”* (“leibliche”) *acts by another consciousness* with whom I can *empathize* (“einfühle”) as cognitively compatible, i.e. *herself as capable of executing the epoche*. As *Leib*, the body parallels not only the universe of corporeal objects, “sondern das absolute Universum der Monaden” (Ibid., 299). In this particular

¹⁶ I wish to avoid confusion with any other uses of the term “Parallelismus” in Husserl. For example, in *Ideen II*, Husserl claims to have “radically” refuted parallelism (Hua IV, 295), but appears to be referring to Wundt’s conception of parallelism between the natural sciences and the human sciences. What Husserl claims to have refuted is simply any assertion of philosophical equivalence between physiological sciences of the brain and psychology, insofar as (transcendental) psychology also deals with a priori and necessary laws of consciousness (the example Husserl himself furnishes is temporal constitution) for which neurology cannot provide any causal explanations

deployment, one must read "Monaden" strictly as compatibly sapient entities. Otherwise the following would be incomprehensible: "Die Partialorganismen meines Leibes... sind auch Einheiten der leiblichen Funktion, *aber nicht für mich*, sie haben ihr wahres metaphysisches Sein in *anderen Monaden*" (Ibid., 299-30: my italics). Then Husserl adds: "In einer Monade spiegeln sich einzelne andere Monaden 'direkt' durch Einfühlung." Therewith Husserl departs from Mahnke and introduces his own whole-sale explication.

Husserl's explication of universal harmony is centered on "Einfühlung." However, as an explication of universal harmony, it seems to me that Husserl's analysis must be sounded on a *methodological* register rather than restricted to a concrete analysis. In other words, empathy qualifies the analogized agent as capable of executing the *epoche*, and therewith submits herself as *another* transcendental consciousness. During an exchange of reports between two consciousnesses under the reduction, agreement can be attained on the invariant structures of transcendental intentionality. Such agreement and assent on a transcendental register is precisely what makes sense of the phenomenological method as *method*. At least as a *regulative idea*¹⁷ involves the reduction, the replicability of the method by *another agent* who can then *share* the *residuum* and thereby confirm the claim of its *universality*. In other words, intersubjectivity is always already a phenomenological issue *par excellence*. Even etymologically, the choice of the word "*Methode*" is appropriate: the two Greek roots of *method* are *meta-* and *odos*. With regard to Leibniz, we may claim that Husserl's phenomenological method *discovers* an *order* of correspondence *between* the Monads that guarantees *objectivity*. It seems it is in this specific sense that phenomenology can become monadological; or, strictly speaking, as Husserl himself says, "transcendental" monadological (Hua VIII, 190). Yet this methodological conception finds its *Leitfaden* at the concrete level: namely, in terms of *Leib*.

In an apparent departure from Leibniz, Husserl writes in 1920 that "jede Seelenmonade hat unendlich viele Fenster, nämlich jede verständnisvolle Wahrnehmung eines fremden Leibes [Einfühlung] ist solch ein Fenster" (Hua XIII, 473). Then again in 1922: "Eine Monade hat also Fenster, um fremde Einwirkungen aufzunehmen. Es sind die Fenster der Einfühlung" (Hua XIV,

¹⁷ In principle, all sapient beings must be able to execute the *epoche*. The universality of the phenomenological reduction cannot be calculated statistically yet demands universal assent. Despite whatever empirical deviations that may show up in a poll, the other remains transcendently compelled to agree. In this sense the phenomenological method may be regarded as a "regulative idea" in a sense very similar to Kant's from the Third Critique.

295). We must be very careful in calculating this *departure* from Leibniz.¹⁸ First of all, as Husserl insists in *Erste Philosophie*, any sound metaphysics must be grounded in phenomenological bases: in other words, phenomenology is “first philosophy” that makes sense of all *sound* metaphysical propositions (Hua VII 70, 72, 186; also, Hua XVIII, 26f.). Accordingly, if we are to accept Leibnizian metaphysics in any capacity as *phenomenologically* sound, there must be found phenomenological justifications. Second of all, under the transcendental reduction—as clarified by the *primordiale Reduktion*—there is no sense in speaking of *substantial*, i.e., physical *as fundamental*, interaction with transcendent objects. Instead, there are “Motivationen” that intentionally relate the cognitive to the cognized.

With regards to intentional objects, *immanence* signifies *no windows*: thus, the *primordiale Reduktion* to *solus ipse* is always possible, though ultimately *not* justifiable. The reason why solipsism, though possible, cannot be phenomenologically justified is Husserl’s commitment to *objectivity*. Otherwise, none of what Husserl says with regards to universality and absoluteness of the transcendental consciousness would make any sense. However, unlike Frege or Russell, since Husserl’s phenomenology cannot recur to the thinghood or *Gegenständlichkeit* of objects *as referential truth-value*, the phenomenological grounds of objectivity must be sought elsewhere.

Such grounds are first found under the eidetic reduction, then under the transcendental reduction. Under the eidetic reduction, we abstract the ideas of things that sapient *intend* when engaged in *meaningful* and objective discourse. Under the transcendental reduction, these *ideas* are relegated to the functional-*noematic* moment of the invariant structure of transcendental intentionality *qua* consciousness as such. Thus the transcendental reduction, by reducing to a normative standard that qualifies a candidate *as sapient*, *guarantees* the relevance of the eidetic reduction in the determination of objectivity and meaning *for sapient participants* in the transcendental “community” of theoretical agents (Hua IV, 192–200). Phenomenologically, therefore, we do not need windows of causal interaction when it comes to things, since object-reference does not determine phenomenological truth. Insofar as the body of the other is regarded as *Körper*, the body is reducible to just another object in the world. However, given the basis of phenomenological objectivity in the regulative idea of a transcendental com-

¹⁸ Karl Mertens proposes the thesis that, based on this departure, Leibniz’ monadology and Husserl’s phenomenology are irreconcilable (Mertens 2000, 2). For reasons to be given in the following, I find his preclusive judgment too strong.

munity of theoretically compatible sapients, there *must be* windows through which I can *rely* on the Other to confirm my claims. These are the windows of *empathy*. These windows of empathy are the phenomenological or first-philosophical grounds of Leibniz' metaphysical or second-philosophical monadology.¹⁹ And what clues me to the theoretical compatibility of the Other is her *lived body* or *Leib*.

The crucial importance of *Leib* in general for Husserl need not be dealt with here. For our purposes, we need only highlight the intersubjective function of the *Leib*. For Husserl, despite the inextricability of my consciousness and my lived-body, my perception of my own body is "remarkably" inadequate, such that "habe ich nicht die Möglichkeit, mich von meinem Leibe oder ihm von mir zu entfernen, und dem entsprechend sind die Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten des Leibes in bestimmter Weise beschränkt: gewisse Körperteile kann ich nur in eigentümlicher perspektiver Verkürzung sehen, und andere (z.B. dem Kopf) sind überhaupt für mich unsichtbar" (Hua IV, 159). In fact, I can perceive the Other's body *more* adequately than I can perceive my own. More significantly, however, based on my awareness of this concrete limitation *from my own perspective*, I *assume* the Other can perceive my body better than I can—and better than she can her own. That is, I assume the Other is restricted by the same kind of perceptual limitations to which I am restricted. The basis of this assessment would be my evaluation of her somatic design. The inadequacy of my self-perception as lived body motivates me to project onto the Other my perceptual *norms* as well as my perceptual *limitations* in analogy to myself, so that I can *subjunctively* view myself from the standpoint of the Other as I view her from my own standpoint²⁰ (Hua I, 140f., Hua IV, 166-69). I would like to suggest that the summary institution of such cognitive norms and limitations is the *epoché*, the phenomenological *method*.

Just as in the natural attitude²¹ we transfer the perceptual limitations of our somatic design onto the Other, in the transcendental attitude, we project our transcendental Ego onto that concretely encountered Other appresented as cognitively compatible (Hua XIV, 357). Similarly, just as I can subjunctively regard

¹⁹ Thus the windows of empathy in Husserl's monadology is on the proverbial "higher level" than the windows of Leibniz' physical-casual interaction. I cannot see any inherent contradiction in this, as suggested by Karl Mertens: Cf. Mertens 2000; 2, 10.

²⁰ Cf. Zahavi 1999, 159-60. Zahavi's interpretation is centered on Hua XIII 252.

²¹ I would like to remind that, in *Ideen II*, the analysis of empathy in sections §45 and §46 is – according to §49 – executed under the natural attitude.

myself from the place of the Other to view my lived body in analogy to my perception of her lived body, I can subjunctively claim *on behalf of the Other* her transcendental Ego, "als ob ich für sie oder in ihnen die phänomenologische Epoche vollzogen hätte" (Hua XV, 364). In other words, the analysis of "Einführung" enables a phenomenological analysis of the *possibility* of the phenomenological method as *intersubjectively transferable*. Since for Husserl the phenomenological method is what guarantees universal harmony, what enables the method itself must strike a higher ground from which the monadology itself must be assessed.

In conclusion, Hua XIV, 298-300 must be regarded not as an interpretation or even a mere elaboration of Mahnke's *Monadologie*; rather, it must be understood as a critical expansion that begins by addressing the shortcomings of the original while breaking paths systematically more consistent with the transcendental phenomenological project as a whole. In Husserl's view, Mahnke's ultimately reductionist conception of the body (*Körper*) commits him to a transcendently ungrounded conception of objectivity. Finding no transcendental grounds for the objectivity of the material processes of the corporeal body, Mahnke is compelled to recur to a mysticism. In contrast, Husserl expands upon Mahnke's *Monadologie* by assigning the body (as *Leib*) an intersubjective function, thereby accessing a concrete venue for analyzing the phenomenological method itself. The whole-sale question that Husserl appears to be asking is: How is method, that which guarantees objectivity qua intersubjective validity, itself possible? In Leibniz' own *Monadology*, I would like to suggest, Husserl simply saw more than his student.

- Tugendhat, Ernst 1970: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. 2. Aufl. Berlin: Walther de Gruyter.
- Tugendhat, Ernst 1994: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*. 6. Aufl. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- van Kerckhoven, Guy 1985: *Zur Genese des Begriffs der „Lebenswelt“ bei Edmund Husserl*. In: *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 29, 182-203
- Verstraeten, Pierre u. Stengers, Isabelle (Hrsg.) 1998: *Gilles Deleuze*. Paris.
- Vongehr, Thomas 1995: *Die Vorstellung des Sinns im kategorialen Vollzug des Aktes. Husserl und das Noema*. München: Hannes Gertner Verlag.
- Wälde, Martin 1985: *Husserl und Schapp. Von der Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins zur Philosophie der Geschichten*. Basel/ Stuttgart: Schwabe
- Waldenfels, Bernhard 1971: *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss an Edmund Husserl*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Waldenfels, Bernhard 1985: *In den Netzen der Lebenswelt*. 2. Aufl. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- Waldenfels, Bernhard 1991: *Der Stachel des Fremden*. 2. Aufl. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Waldenfels, Bernhard 1995: *Deutsch-französische Gedankengänge*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- Waldenfels, Bernhards 1983: *Phänomenologie in Frankreich*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- Welte, Bernhard 1966: *Zum Begriff der Person*. In: Rombach, 11-22.
- Welter, Rüdiger 1986: *Der Begriff der Lebenswelt. Theorien vortheoretischer Erfahrungswelt*. München: W. Fink
- Welton, Donn 1983: *The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Welton, Donn 2001: *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Whitehead, Alfred N. 1995: *Prozeß und Realität. Entwurf einer Kosmologie*. 2. Aufl. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- Wiehl, Reiner 2000: *Subjektivität und System*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1979: *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp
- Zahavi, Dan 1996: *Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Zahavi, Dan 1999 *Self-awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Zahavi, Dan 2000: *Self and Consciousness*. In: Dan Zahavi (Ed.) *Exploring the Self. Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 55-74.

WAHRHEIT

- Dieter Lohmar (Köln) 91
Was ist transzendental an Husserls ‚Transzendentaler Logik‘? Der Weg in die transzendente Phänomenologie über die Kritik der Wissenschaften.
- Christian Lotz (Seattle) 109
Phantasie, Eidetik, Spiel. Überlegungen zur faktischen Herkunft philosophischen Bewußtseins.
- Sebastian Luft (Leuven) 127
Einige Grundprobleme in Husserls unveröffentlichten späten Texten über phänomenologische Reduktion.
- Henning Peucker (Köln) 149
Psychologismen und ihre Kritik in Husserls Philosophie.
- Lina Rizzoli (Mailand) 163
Bedeutung und Syntax. Ausdrucksbedeutung und Referenzgegenstand in Husserls Bedeutungstheorie.
- Donn Welton (Stony Brook) 183
A Contribution to a Phenomenological Semantics.

VERANTWORTUNG

- Lee-chun Lo (Taipeh) 195
Weltteleologie und Gottesidee. Die Bedeutung Gottes in der Phänomenologie Husserls.
- Holger Maass (Leipzig) 211
Ansprechen und Auffordern. Husserls Kommunikationstheorie und das Problem der Normativität.

RÄNDER

Marc Rölli (Bochum) Die Zweideutigkeit der Phänomenologie. Deleuze und Husserl.	227
Michael Shim (Stony Brook) Towards a Phenomenological Monadology. On Husserl and Mahnke.	243
Tanja Stähler (Wuppertal) Die Gerichtetheit der Geschichte. Teleologie bei Hegel und Husserl.	261
Dorothea Wildenburg (Marburg) 'Denkkünsteleien' versus 'Menschenbeobachtung'? Fichte und Husserl.	281
Thomas Wolf (Marburg) Vom SinnesDing zur SinnGeschichte. Narrative Phänomenologie bei Husserl und Schapp.	303

ANHANG

Literaturverzeichnis	325
Siglen	325
Sonstige Literatur	328
Angaben zu den AutorInnen	339
Personenregister	345