Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1David Shoemaker, Neal A. Tognazzini Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: · What does it mean to be an agent? · What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? · What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? · What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? · How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? · What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of SelfAlienation | 12 |
2 The Fecundity of Planning Agency | 47 |
3 Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition | 70 |
4 Regret Agency and Error | 95 |
Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency | 126 |
6 ReasonsResponsiveness Agents and Mechanisms | 151 |
7 Responsibility Naturalism and The Morality System | 184 |
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Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1 David Shoemaker,Neal A. Tognazzini Limited preview - 2013 |
Common terms and phrases
ability action agent agent-regret agent’s appraisal appropriate argue avoid wrongdoing behavior beliefs Bernard Williams blameworthy blaming emotions Bratman capacities causal completeness choice claim cognitive commitments compatibilism compatibilist constitutive construal counterfactuals criminal culpable deliberation deserves desires distinct ethical reactive attitudes excuse executive attitudes fair opportunity feel Fischer and Ravizza Frankfurt example freedom Ginet goal guilt Harry Frankfurt honor killings incompatible with determinism insanity insanity pleas insofar instrumentally rational involve Jones judgments kind mechanism moral ignorance moral luck moral responsibility morality system motives narrow construal normative competence object one’s opportunity to avoid otherwise Oxford University Press P. F. Strawson participants person phenomenology Philosophical planning agency possible Potter practical psychological punishment rational reason reasons-responsive regret relevant requires role sanction sense sentiments shared intention shooting Smith significant skeptical someone Strawson sufficient theory thought understand values Velleman volitional Wallace Williams Williams’s wrong wrongdoer