

to as 'Gödel's theorem' is a terminological matter for which we have seen good authority on both sides. I completely agree with Mr. Benes that no one in his right mind would say that  $\exists$  is a psychological law. From this and the fact that I said that Gödel's theorem is a psychological law follows only an alternation: either I was not referring to  $\exists$  when I said that; or I am not in my right mind. Mr. Benes' 'argument' appears to consist solely, in the absence of internal evidence from my article and in apparent ignorance of established usage in the literature, in arbitrarily choosing to affirm the less charitable of the two alternatives.

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#### CORRIGENDUM

Having been unable to read the proof sheets of my recently published article, "Some Remarks on 'Synonymity' and the Language of Semanticists" (*Philosophical Studies*, Volume V, Number 1, pp. 1-5), I have only now had the chance to note that the printed text contains, among other typographical errors, one which materially affects the validity of my argument. On page 3, lines 21-22, one should read: "Consequently, we may assume that the two tokens "rouge" and "ROUGE" are the same"; and not "Consequently, we may assume that the two tokens 'rouge' and 'ROUGE' are the same."

D. S. SHWAYDER

Rhodes, Greece  
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