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GOODWILL, DETERMINISM AND JUSTIFICATION*

1. THE THESIS OF DETERMINISM: NAGEL VERSUS STRAWSON

In daily life we meet and engage with other people. We are confronted with their ways of life, their values and their projects. To a certain extent we take into consideration these other people, their well-being, their ways of life, their values and their projects. We try to avoid harming them when we enter a crowded place, we try to be decent to most of them and we try to be a good friend to some of them, and so on. Because we are capable of doing this, we are capable of exercising different degrees of ill will or goodwill towards them. We can insult someone we dislike, we can 'forget' a friend's birthday out of malice, and so on. People react to this displayed degree of ill will or goodwill with attitudes and feelings of resentment, moral blame, moral indignation or gratitude.

According to P. F. Strawson, this range of the so-called reactive attitudes and emotions constitutes the tissue of our everyday practice of moral responsibility. (Strawson 1962, p. 67). Elaborating on the indispensability¹ of these attitudes and emotions Strawson argues against those who contend that the thesis of determinism — a thesis which he claims not to understand — is relevant to our daily practices of moral responsibility. He accuses those who think that it is relevant — those who discuss the (in)compatibility of determinism (which excludes freedom) and moral responsibility (which presupposes freedom) — of intellectualism. What sort of 'freedom' is excluded by determinism on the one hand and presupposed by moral responsibility

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¹ In what way the reactive attitudes and emotions are indispensable is not altogether clear. Cf. Russell (1992). Russell distinguishes between Strawson's rationalistic strategy (we have no reason to repudiate our practices of moral responsibility) and his naturalistic strategy (we are incapable of repudiating our practices of moral responsibility). He argues that the latter implies that the former is mistaken and misguided. Russell (1992), p. 291.

on the other hand and whether this is the same freedom, is the main issue in the elaborate discussions between (in)compatibilists. The object of Strawson's concerns, though, is more general. He states: "The existence of the general framework of reactive attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls for nor permits an external rational justification." (Strawson 1962, p. 78) Hence, Strawson claims that no one needs a discussion about the incompatibility or compatibility of determinism and responsibility. Our practice of moral responsibility just exists.

According to Thomas Nagel, Strawson misunderstands the genealogy of the thesis of determinism. Contrary to Strawson, Nagel argues that the thesis develops naturally out of the ordinary conditions of our moral judgments. (Nagel 1979, p. 174). Elaborating on the phenomenon of moral luck, Nagel argues that the thesis of determinism and the corresponding need to justify our practice of moral responsibility 'as a whole', develops out of the individual judgments of moral responsibility that we make in daily life. In everyday life we do not hold an individual morally responsible for what is not under her control. If determinism is true nothing is under our control. Hence, if determinism is true then how can we justify that we hold one another morally responsible?²

Nagel believes that this slide from internal to external criticism is at least as natural and inevitable to our human condition as the framework of reactive attitudes and emotions to which Strawson appeals. (Nagel 1986, p. 125) Even if one does not share Nagel's conviction that the external stance (the objective view) is natural and inevitable for us as human beings, there are good reasons to take his criticism of Strawson seriously. As Paul Benson remarks, we should be extremely careful not to confuse a genuine boundary on legitimate rational criticism with a stubborn refusal to entertain alterations in what is familiar. (Benson 1990, p. 8). An argument as that of Strawson that derives its force from the 'inevitability of natural reactive attitudes and emotions' is suspect. On the other hand the topic of moral responsibility strongly suggests the idea that there must be a genuine boundary on legitimate rational criticism. How can we allow serious doubt about the existence of something that is so crucial and central to our daily practice as moral responsibility is?

² According to Nagel indeterminism doesn't make our practices of responsibility intelligible either, but that is for the purposes of this paper not important.

The aim of this paper is to offer such a genuine boundary on legitimate rational criticism. To this purpose I will investigate an interpretation of Strawson's contention that determinism is irrelevant to our daily practice of responsibility that does not suffer from a premature or unwarranted rejection of external criticism. The success of the enterprise is limited for I will show that this interpretation does not refute Nagel's contention that determinism is relevant to our practice of responsibility. Which leaves us with two contradictory claims: (1) determinism is relevant to our daily practice of responsibility and (2) determinism is not relevant to our daily practice of responsibility. This contradiction discloses an ambiguity in the concept 'responsibility' and the related idea of 'our practice of responsibility'. On the one hand 'responsibility' is a formal and primitive concept (and as such independent of the thesis of determinism); on the other hand it is a substantial and normative notion with specified conditions (and, depending on the content of these conditions either compatible or incompatible with determinism).

I will not concern myself with the overall conclusions that should be drawn from this observation, because my argument depends on certain assumptions that could prove to be unwarranted when properly addressed. I will assume, for instance, the tenability of Strawson's interpretation of the concept of responsibility as constituted by the framework of reactive attitudes and emotions. Likewise, I will assume that the condition of responsibility that Nagel elaborates on is incompatible with determinism.

Hence, my aim is to say something about determinism and the need to justify our daily practice of responsibility in as far as they are constituted by the reactive attitudes and emotions (such as moral blame, resentment, moral praise and moral indignation) and granted that they are in some way natural and inevitable.

First of all, I shall argue that the condition that Nagel endorses to establish the relevance of the thesis of determinism will not be accepted by those who endorse a 'Strawsonian framework'. By 'Strawsonian framework' I refer to the idea that our practices of responsibility are constituted by a framework of natural and inevitable human reactions to the good- or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed by their attitudes and actions. (Strawson 1962, p. 67).

Secondly, I will argue that even within a Strawsonian framework we need a condition to distinguish between occasions on which the reactive attitudes and emotions are appropriate and those on which they are not.

Thirdly, I will investigate whether the notion of goodwill could serve our purposes as a condition.

Fourthly, I will argue that the condition of goodwill can serve our purposes as a condition of responsibility if we assume the existence of a moral community that acknowledges (a) certain norms and values and (b) certain people as capable of determining, or engaging in normative conflicts concerning, these norms and values.

I will also argue that the Strawsonian framework does not provide the arguments to decide which moral community exists; that is, (a) which norms and values (should) regulate our community and (b) which people are capable of determining- or engaging in normative conflicts concerning, these norms and values. Hence, the thesis of determinism is relevant to our practice of responsibility if there are people who accept a condition of responsibility that is incompatible with determinism.

Finally, I will argue that the thesis of determinism is irrelevant to the existence of a moral community in the sense that there will always be (a) norms and values that regulate our daily practice and (b) people that are capable of determining, or engaging in normative conflicts concerning, these norms and values.

2. THE CONDITION OF CONTROL

According to Nagel the problem of determinism is not the result of 'the imposition of an arbitrary external requirement', but simply follows from the nature of moral judgment itself: not to hold people responsible for what they did not do. (Nagel 1979, p. 184) According to him we all adhere to the 'control principle': "People cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault or for what is due to factors beyond their control." (Nagel 1979, p. 174) However, much of what we do is influenced by, dependent on, or caused by, things that are not under our control. We are not completely in control of the kind of person that we become; we are born with a certain personality and with certain traits. Likewise we are not completely in control of the circumstances that we face or of the formative circumstances of our pasts. Nor are we completely in control of the ways in which our

actions and projects turn out. People, therefore, are subject to moral luck. This fact normally does not undermine our treatment of others and ourselves as appropriate subjects of moral judgment.

On closer examination, though, the external influences that are not under the control of the agent expand and thereby eventually erode all moral assessment;³ the area of genuine agency shrinks until it becomes an "extensionless point." (Nagel 1979, p. 177 and p. 183) If determinism is true everything is equally determined by events in the past in conjunction with certain laws. Which laws these are depends upon the kind of determinism that one endorses. The most common form in which determinism is discussed nowadays is that of 'physical determinism' as it is defined in van Inwagen's Consequence argument: if determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and that what happened in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, nor is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (Van Inwagen 1983, p. 16).

Hence, if determinism is true, then none of us is morally responsible for anything we do: our actions are ultimately out of our control. Of course this is only true under the assumption that determinism is incompatible with individual control as such, which is itself controversial.⁴ I will not discuss this though, for those who accept a Strawsonian framework will be inclined to reject control as a necessary condition of moral responsibility, anyway. They will claim that it is not control as such, that determines our reactive attitudes and emotions, but the amount of ill will or goodwill that the agent displays toward us or a third party.

They will argue that the condition of control has an impact on our practice of moral responsibility only because the degree of control usually tells us something about the attitude of those to whom we

³ Actually Nagel states: *most* moral assessment. Nagel (1979), p. 176. Nevertheless, if he is not prepared to state that it eventually erodes *all* moral assessment, then the threat of determinism would disappear on his own account as well.

⁴ See for instance Fischer (1994), p. 132 who, following the work of Frankfurt, develops a notion of 'guidance control'. The existence of guidance control (x steers the car to the left because she wants to go to the left) contrary to that of 'regulative control' (x steers the car to the left but could have steered it to the right) does not depend on the falsity of the thesis of determinism. See also Dennett (1984), chapter 3.

react. If someone was 'not in control' of an action it is very likely that she did not mean to do what she did; that she did it 'only by accident' or 'only because she was coerced'. If someone acted accidentally or under coercion we will excuse her, not because she lacked control but because the lack of control indicates a lack of ill will.

If, on the other hand, someone was in control we have no reason to assume that someone meant something other than what her action suggests. Mostly people do what they intend to do, and do it *because* they intend to do it. Hence, control has an impact on our daily practice, but not necessarily because control in itself is a necessary condition of responsibility. If we accept that our practice of moral responsibility is constituted by the framework of reactive attitudes and emotions — which we do for the purposes of this paper — this can at least be argued for. Consider, for instance, someone who takes great joy in our personal misfortune. What we seem to resent in this case is that person's bad attitude towards us, regardless of her ability to control her perverse delight. (The example is David Cockburn's, (Cockburn 1995, p. 417).)

If the degree of control affects our moral reactive attitudes only in as far as it conveys something about the attitude of those to whom we react, the problem of moral luck seems to vanish. It seems to vanish because our reactions and emotions are determined by the quality of a person's will and the quality of a person's will is not affected, at least not essentially, by luck.⁵

3. THE DEMAND FOR A CONDITION

Even if we reject Nagel's Condition of Control, though, we still need to explicate a condition of responsibility and show that it is compatible with determinism. For how can we conclude that determinism is irrelevant to our daily practices if we do not know whether the condi-

⁵ At the end of this paper I will conclude that this assumption as well as the assumption that we do not care about someone's ability to 'control her perverse delight', is premature. That is, I will argue that the acceptance of a Strawsonian framework does not determine these issues and, therefore, leaves room to question these assumptions or to argue for the opposite. Before concluding this, though, I will first investigate how far the Strawsonian framework can bring us in deciding the issue of the relevance of determinism for our daily practice of responsibility. Therefore, I start with abandoning the condition of control in favor of the idea that it is not control but the degree of ill-will and goodwill to which we react.

tion that in fact regulates it, is compatible with it? Even if we accept the general framework of reactive attitudes and emotions as natural and inevitable, we distinguish between occasions on which our reactions are appropriate and those on which they are not.

We often are mistaken in our judgment that someone did something wrong and we excuse people accordingly. If we discover that someone didn't turn up at an important meeting because her train was late, we will stop blaming her for being late. Likewise, we sometimes make mistakes in the assessment of a bad acting agent as a fully accountable subject, either at the time of her action or more generally. We tend to excuse or be lenient towards people if they did something wrong under exceptionally severe personal circumstances (for instance, she didn't turn up at an important meeting because her marriage just broke down). Likewise we tend to go easy on — if not to excuse — people who are psychologically incapacitated or morally undeveloped. If the person that didn't turn up at the important meeting is a child rather than an adult we will probably worry about rather than resent her.

Strawson distinguishes these two classes of excuses — the lack of ill will or the lessened accountability — and argues that neither can be generalized in such a manner that could make the thesis of determinism relevant to our daily practice. (Strawson 1962, p. 65). He argues as follows. The reasons not to hold someone responsible in practice are embodied by the excuses or exemptions. The thesis of determinism, if intelligible at all, is a general thesis. Hence, the truth of determinism would only entail that no single individual is morally responsible, if it is a generalization of the acknowledged excuses or exemptions.

When we generalize the first type of excuse — i.e. the excuse that someone didn't mean ill — we get something like 'a Reign of Universal Goodwill', a reign that could hardly be said to be 'threatening' to our practice of moral responsibility. A generalization of the second group of excuses would make 'abnormality' the universal condition, which, according to Strawson, is incoherent. (Strawson 1962, p. 68). That it is incoherent, however, is contestable. To assert that 'we' 'normal human beings' are in fact 'abnormal' and that all 'normal circumstances' are actually 'exceptional' seems incoherent, but not if we specify to what 'normal' refers.

Imagine, for instance, that a severe genetic mutation affects our brains in such a way that we all become morally undeveloped and mentally incapacitated. (The example is Paul Russell's (Russell 1992, p. 299).) What is at this moment called 'abnormal' (i.e. being morally undeveloped and mentally incapacitated) will then become the common 'normal' situation. Likewise it is not impossible that circumstances will become so exceptional (for instance due to a war) that there will be no people left that are morally responsible for their actions, measured by the conditions we use at this moment.

The appearance of paradox and incoherency disappears once we realize that 'normal' refers to 'the universal condition' in the same way that 'here' refers to 'this place'. Claiming that abnormality could become the universal condition must be compared with claiming that we are not 'here', while pointing at a photograph of better places. Hence, if the conditions for responsibility that regulate our daily practice are not intelligible if determinism is true, than there is a sense in which abnormality is the universal condition if determinism is true. Therefore, we need to explicate the conditions of responsibility. Without specifying these conditions, we cannot conclude anything about the relevance of the truth of determinism to our daily practice. (Cf. Russell 1992, p. 301).

Many elegant, contemporary answers have been developed to answer the question what the necessary conditions of responsibility are, all more or less focusing on a notion of 'normal human beings' who possess certain evaluative, reflective powers.⁶ I will not discuss these answers here. Instead I will investigate whether the notion of goodwill is suitable as a condition of responsibility, a condition that does not depend upon the refutation of determinism for its intelligibility. Hence, let us define anyone who is capable of exercising ill- or goodwill as an appropriate subject of the moral reactive attitudes and emotions, and let us define a specific occasion for blame, resentment or indignation as one in which someone actually exercised ill will.

4. THE CONDITION OF GOODWILL

Although we are all sensitive to the attitudes of others towards ourselves and those we care for, we do not have exact, precise and incon-

⁶ See for instance Wallace (1994; Wolf (1990) and Benson (1987).

testable standards for the attitudes (and corresponding behavior) that we expect one another to take. There are many different and complicated factors involved. First of all, our expectations depend upon the specific relationships we have with other people. We expect different things from a friend than from a neighbor. Secondly, the specific expectations we have depend upon the norms and values that regulate those relationships or that we think should regulate those relationships. Some people expect different things from someone *they* call a friend, than others expect from their friends. What is understood as (a display of) ill will, therefore, is subject to different variables and different possible normative disagreements.

This corresponds with the existence of different (at least superficially) but each in itself coherent frameworks of reactive attitudes and emotions. A group of children, for instance, will *en masse* blame the one who snitched on someone to the teacher, regardless of how true the fact or information conveyed was. This can result in conflicts with their parents because among adults lying, not snitching, is regarded as wrong. Apparently those 'we' do not hold fully responsible for their behavior and actions (in this case: little children) blame, resent and are grateful to one another 'on their own terms'.

Likewise the courts may refuse to admit a confession as evidence, on the grounds that the police obtained this confession by threatening to beat the accused. The accused's accomplices, who are compromised by the confession, however, would probably feel that the accused made a reprehensible choice and acted badly. Although 'coercion', according to the court in question, relieves the confessor of responsibility for her confession, the accused's accomplices would blame their mate all the same. According to them, their mate ought to have accepted a beating rather than betraying them, and therefore they would hold her morally responsible for her confession. (The example is Frankfurt's, (Frankfurt 1988, p. 26).) Apparently, there are people who share a different framework of norms and values, as well as different conditions of responsibility.

The possibility of different but each in itself coherent frameworks of reactive attitudes and emotions, between people who take into consideration one another and share certain norms and values (hereafter: a moral community) poses a problem. Normally, we do not accept children or the morally undeveloped and mentally ill as fully morally res-

possible beings.⁷ Neither do we regard our excuses and exemptions (in this case: coercion) as only conditionally valid, that is, only valid in a certain moral community. Hence, either Strawson's contention that our practice of moral responsibility is constituted by the framework of reactive attitudes and emotions is not tenable — a contention which we rejected for the purposes of this paper — or there are at least two concepts of responsibility efficacious in our daily practice, i.e. one that refers to someone's status as an appropriate subject of the reactive attitudes and emotions and another that is more substantial.

The substantial concept of responsibility would then refer to: (1) normal adult human beings who are responsible in contrast to deviating human beings who are not, or are less responsible (for instance, children); and (2) normal adult behavior for which we are responsible in contrast to deviating human behavior for which we are not responsible (for instance, coerced behavior). This would bring us back to the need for a description or analysis of 'normal human beings' and 'normal human behavior', which was what we tried to avoid by elaborating on the notion of goodwill.

Is there no concept of responsibility left that can apply equally to all these frameworks of reactive attitudes and emotions, and that will also explain the apparent diversity? Let us try to define the concepts of 'ill will' and 'goodwill' without going into, or determining any of the specific normative disagreements that are possible. We can define 'ill will' as: 'not taking into consideration or harming those with whom you live', and 'goodwill' as: 'taking into consideration or doing good to those with whom you live', leaving open who exactly 'those with whom you live' are and what exactly 'taking into consideration and doing good' means (thus leaving open who people should take into consideration and to what degree, as well as what this 'taking into consideration' should boil down to).

Goodwill, thus, should not be confused with the common sense use of the term 'to mean well'. It is possible that people in an urban setting understand being friendly to their neighbors — which, by

⁷ In as far as they are capable of exercising ill will or goodwill and in as far as we believe that they exercised ill will or goodwill we *do* in fact accept children, the morally undeveloped and the mentally ill as morally responsible for what they do. But we do not accept that children, the morally undeveloped and the mentally ill are *as* morally responsible as 'we' so called normal human beings are; nor that they are 'between themselves' as morally responsible as 'we' are between 'ourselves'.

stipulation, is 'meant well' — as a display of ill will because they understand it as 'interference' which does not correspond with the value they attach to 'minding one's own business'. Nor should goodwill be confused with the Kantian notion of a Good Will.

Ill will on the other hand, is much like the common sense use of the term as 'malevolence'. So when 'ill will' is defined as 'not taking into consideration others' this does not mean *not* paying attention to other people's values, attachments, projects and so on: really harming or hurting, really 'not taking into consideration someone' depends as much on information about the concrete other as really pleasing them does.

Now suppose that people react to each other as morally responsible beings on the basis of some 'reciprocal recognition'.⁸ With their reactions and emotions of moral blame, resentment and praise they express themselves as a participant of a certain moral community while they at the same time address the other person as a participant of that moral community.⁹ This corresponds with the importance Strawson attaches to the distinction between the 'participant attitude' and the so-called objective attitude.¹⁰ The latter is the attitude to which we resort when we are dealing with a mentally disabled person or a young child. According to Strawson we do not treat the mentally disabled and very young as appropriate subjects of our moral reactive attitudes, but regard them instead as objects of moral concern, treatment or manipulation. What this objective attitude leaves no room for is a certain reciprocity - a reciprocity that seems to be characteristic of the 'full blown' participants of a moral community. (Strawson 1962, p. 66)

⁸ Compare this to Nagel remarks: "We are unable to view ourselves simply as portions of the world, and from the inside we have a rough idea of the boundary between what is us and what is not, what we do and what happens to us [...] We apply the same essentially internal conception of the self to others." Nagel (1979), p. 185.

⁹ Cf. Watson (1987) who understands Strawson's theory primary as an expressivist one.

¹⁰ These attitudes, according to Strawson, are not exclusive of but profoundly opposed to each other. Strawson thinks we can and do sometimes take the objective attitude toward the normal and the mature. Strawson (1962), p. 67. Albeit only temporally. Strawson (1985), p. 34.

But what does it mean to participate in a moral community and what does it mean to regard someone as a full blown participant in a moral community?

5. MORAL COMMUNITIES

As long as we hold someone morally responsible a morally wrong action is subject to explanations and justifications that somehow define our moral community.¹¹ If *x* is morally blamed for *y* she has several options. She can try to make excuses or amends; she can admit that *y* is morally wrong and explain why she acted as she did in the hope that she will be understood, if not excused; or she can admit that *y* was wrong and try to convince us that her personal circumstances were such that she could only have done *y*. If she does not make excuses or amends she can try to justify *y* and claim that under the circumstances it was not 'the wrong thing to do'.

This justification of an action, is only possible for someone we regard as a full blown participant of our moral community; that is someone who is fully morally responsible for what she did. Suppose that someone lied to us and that she defends her action by arguing that she did this for our 'own good'. If we hold her morally responsible for lying, we will argue with her about the value of 'lying for someone else's good'. Moreover, the result of this argument will have an impact on our future relationship. Once discussed and agreed upon the ill will or goodwill expressed by 'lying' or by 'lying to spare someone's feelings' is among us determined.

If, on the other hand, we do not hold someone morally responsible for a certain action we will disregard or ignore her attempts to justify her lie. If we understand someone's lying as compulsive we will not react to her argument that she did it for our 'own good'. We already labeled her behavior 'compulsive', hence as something that does not have a reason, let alone a good one. As a consequence of this her lying and the subsequent justification of it, will not lead to any substantial argument about the value that we attach (or should attach) to honesty or the value that we attach to trying to spare someone's feelings, and so on. Nor will the justifications of those we regard as morally undeveloped, mentally retarded, or too young lead to any

¹¹ Cf. Smith and Pettit (1996); reprinted in this volume.

substantial arguments; that is, not to the same degree and in the same manner as our own actions and values do.

To be regarded as a responsible human being — i.e. as someone who *is* able to take others into consideration and as someone whose actions and behavior express an ‘opinion’ on the best way to do this — on the one hand makes us prone to the reactive attitudes and emotions, and on the other enables us to engage in the normative conflicts. These are two sides of the same coin.

We excuse our teenage daughter for her bad behavior, not because her reflective capacities are not fully developed yet, nor because she is not ‘in control’ of her actions, but because she is in her ‘teens’. We believe that she is going through a difficult phase and that her actions express an ‘inner struggle’, not a lack of goodwill towards us. By the same token, though, we might question whether her actions express ‘real and important’ norms and values, a hesitancy for which she will probably (and maybe rightly) resent us.

Likewise, we can excuse someone who is always late, not because we do not care about punctuality, but because we have come to understand the behavior of this particular person as ‘pathological’. In this case her failure to be on time is no longer understood as expressing any value or any attitude at all. By the same token she risks being told that the meeting will start half an hour earlier than it actually will, as well as being ignored in negotiations over the time the next meeting will be held.

The excuses, explanations and justifications that we demand from and give to one another define our moral community. They establish, change and modify the norms and values that regulate our daily practice as well as the relationships we have with each other and the expectations we form on the basis of these. Correspondingly, they establish, change and modify what is regarded, understood and experienced by a particular community as ill will or goodwill. Hence, in one respect the notions of ill will and goodwill can not be used to decide the issue about the relevance of determinism for our daily practice of moral responsibility.

People who believe that ‘control’ is (or should be) a necessary condition of responsibility, can defend this within a Strawsonian framework. They can argue that ill will is only truly *ill* will if the agent was free to do otherwise and in control of what she did. They

can argue that there must have been something that the agent could have done other than what she in fact did, in order to justify our moral reactive attitudes and emotions towards her. Hence, they can argue that if determinism is true there are no morally responsible individuals, in the sense that there are no people that satisfy the necessary conditions of responsibility in their moral community.¹²

Nagel, therefore, seems right to insist that the thesis of determinism does matter to our daily practices of responsibility if he believes that control is (or should be) a necessary condition of moral responsibility. In another respect, though, the notions of ill will and goodwill do suggest that the thesis of determinism is irrelevant to our daily practice of moral responsibility. Let me conclude with that.

6. THE IRRELEVANCY OF DETERMINISM

The efficacy of excuses and exemptions is only possible in a community in which we care not only about the attitudes of others towards ourselves, but also about the appropriateness of our own attitudes towards others; a community in which people take into consideration one another and share certain norms and values that define how one should do this. If this formal definition of a moral community is what our 'daily practice of moral responsibility' refers to, then determinism is no threat to it. For even if we are right — to put the point in Nagel's words — to feel impotent, off-balance and affectedly detached from other people when determinism is true (Nagel 1986, p. 112), the feeling of detachment and imbalance that are felt by this person are testimony to the fact that she cares about a lack of justification; hence, that she cares not only about the attitudes of others towards herself, but also about the appropriateness of her own attitudes towards others.

Nagel's urge for 'external criticism' can be acknowledged as an urge for criticism external to the *existing* framework of reactive attitudes and emotions — i.e. the feelings and attitudes with which we are used to react — but not as external to every moral community. If we criticize existing practices, we do so from within another moral community (as it is defined in this paper). This other moral com-

¹² Cf. R. Jay Wallace who argues that the debate between (in)compatibilists is a normative debate about the conditions that would render it fair to hold someone morally responsible. Wallace (1994, p. 85).

munity differs from the existing one, because it does not regard certain behavior as blameworthy (hence, it accepts different values) or some people as full-blown participants (hence, it accepts different people as authoritative), or both.¹³ But this external criticism will not dissolve our moral community, it will at most change it. As Strawson states: "Inside the structure or web of human attitudes and feelings [...] there is endless room for modification, redirection, criticism, and justification." (Strawson 1962, p.78)

If we accept the Strawsonian framework then — although I have not argued that we should — all criticism is internal to our daily practice of moral responsibility. It is possible that some people will come up with persuasive arguments that force us to acknowledge more people or fewer people as morally responsible participants, but unless we believe that determinism excludes all possible ways to display ill will there is no reason to believe that it could render our practice of responsibility — 'as a whole' — unfair. First of all, there is little wrong with a framework of human interrelations, attitudes and feelings that is tied to the demand to take into consideration the existence, values and feelings of the people with whom we want to live or are living with. Secondly, given that we have reactive attitudes, that we hold ourselves and others morally responsible, and that we do justify our behavior and are prone to these justifications (they alter our reactive attitudes), we know that at least one moral community exists, whether or not determinism is true.

7. CONCLUSION

If the natural framework of moral reactive attitudes is constituted by our natural reactions toward the attitude of other people, it can only be changed and altered if some of us also care about the appro-

¹³ The reverse is also intelligible as we have seen in the case of the teenager daughter. Some conflicts are about people who want to be regarded as full-blown participant in a moral community. Conflicts between well-meaning parents and their adolescent children are exemplary examples of this. The children want to be accepted as equals in defining what ill- or goodwill consist in. In these cases too, the criticism is in a way 'external', external to the accepted framework of moral reactive attitudes, but not external to the framework of moral reactive attitudes in 'general'. These children blame their parents for considering their children's values less important than their own. Again the criticism is given from within a moral community, albeit a different one than the one existing.

priateness of their own attitude toward others. Hence, the demand for a justification of our practice of responsibility only makes sense from within a moral community. At the same time, the notions of ill- and goodwill depend upon the existence of a specific moral community that is regulated by norms and values that determine what should count as ill- and goodwill. Hence, if one believes that it is only fair to hold people responsible for an act if they were free to do otherwise or if they were 'in control', this practice is in fact threatened by determinism, in the sense that it should be changed thoroughly before it is justifiable again.*

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