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ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND ATTITUDE EXPRESSION

ABSTRACT. In the classic *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish advocated the idea that to perform an illocutionary act often just means to express certain attitudes. The underlying definition of attitude expression, however, gives rise to serious problems because it requires intentions of a peculiar kind. Recently, Wayne Davis has proposed a different analysis of attitude expression which is not subject to these difficulties and thus promises a more plausible account of illocutions. It will be shown, however, that this account is too weak since it does not exclude cases where the utterer merely *pretends* to perform an illocutionary act. Davis' analysis also calls into question a weaker doctrine widely held among speech act theorists by suggesting that, in order to perform an illocutionary act, it is not even *necessary* to express mental states.

1. INTRODUCTION

By our actions, we frequently express attitudes, that is, we express (or give voice to¹) beliefs, desires, love, hate, disgust, and so on. When I nod my head in answer to the question whether David Beckham is a good football player, I express the belief that Beckham is a good football player. When I say to my brother 'Open the door, please', I give voice to the desire that he open the door. And by screwing up my face after hearing a song of Phil Collins, I express disgust for that song.

Expressing an attitude is different from manifesting it, evincing it or making it known. The latter verbs are factive because they imply that one *has* the attitude in question. By contrast, there is a common reading of 'express' in which a person can express an attitude without possessing it. A case in point is lying: in making his statement, the liar gives voice to a belief he does not have. Expressing an attitude is compatible with feigning that one possesses it.

In some articles (1988, 1992a, b) and his latest book *Meaning, Expression, and Thought* (2002), Wayne Davis offers an analysis of attitude expression. It is his starting point in a more ambitious programme, the Gricean programme of defining speaker meaning, i.e., what a speaker means in uttering something, in terms of intention, and then sentence and

¹ I use the expression 'give voice to' just for the sake of livening up my way of expressing without claiming that it has exactly the same meaning as 'express'.



word meaning in terms of speaker meaning (cf. Grice 1968). Please notice that it is only the general shape of the programme to which Davis subscribes, not the way Grice himself carried it out. Unlike Grice, Davis does not take speaker meaning to require audience-directed perlocutionary intentions, such as the intention to induce a belief in an addressee or the intention that he act in some way. According to Grice (1957: 217–219), an utterer *S* means that *p* only if *S* intends an addressee *H* to believe that *p*. In Davis' view, for a speaker to mean something (in its inclusive and cognitive sense) is just to express a belief, which implies neither that the speaker has the belief nor that he wants someone else to acquire it (cf. Davis 1992a: 75; 2002: § 2.3).

My aim is different from Davis'. I am interested in whether the notion of attitude expression can be used for analysing what speech act theorists, adopting an expression introduced by John Austin (1962: Ch. VIII), termed *illocutionary acts*, such as assertions, promises, orders, questions, apologies and so on. It is quite plausible that asserting something consists, probably among other things, of expressing a belief in it, and that promising to do something entails that one gives voice to the intention to do it. These strong connections between certain illocutionary acts and expressed attitudes raise the question whether a significant class of illocutions can be considered as nothing more than acts of expressing attitudes.

My paper consists of five parts. Section 1 shortly presents what I call the *basic idea* of Kent Bach's and Robert M. Harnish's theory of (a certain class of) illocutionary acts: the idea that a necessary and sufficient condition for performing these acts is to express mental states. In section 2, I include the definition of attitude expression underlying this idea and put forward some problems for the resulting account of illocutionary acts. Since these problems might stem, not from the basic idea, but from Bach's and Harnish's proposal for attitude expression, I switch over to Davis' analysis of that concept in section 3.² In section 4, Bach's and Harnish's basic idea is combined with Davis' analysis in order to examine whether the basic idea can be saved by complementing it with a different account of expressing attitudes. We will see, however, that analyses of the resulting kind are too weak because they do not exclude cases where the utterer merely pretends to perform the illocutionary act at issue, such as when he makes a certain kind of joke. Section 5 extends the challenge of Davis' analysis by confronting it also with a weaker doctrine widely held among speech act theorists: to perform an illocutionary act, it is still *necessary* to express mental states. (I confine my attention to assertions as a paradigm

² There are further analyses in the literature (cf. Kemmerling 2002a; Alston 2000: 109), but examining them as well would lead to an excessively long paper.

of illocutions, presuming that my remarks can be easily modified to apply to other types of illocutionary acts.)

2. BACH'S AND HARNISH'S BASIC IDEA

In their book *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Bach and Harnish advocate an account of illocutionary acts which views a huge variety of them, named "communicative illocutionary acts", as acts of expressing attitudes.³ In sharp opposition to Stephen Schiffer's *Meaning* (1972: Ch. IV), their basic idea is that the point of many illocutions is not so much to influence other people's thoughts or behaviour, but to give voice to one's own thoughts.⁴ Consequently, they suggest that these illocutionary acts should be individuated by the attitudes they express. Whether an utterance is an assertion, a promise or an order depends on which attitudes are expressed by it (cf. Bach and Harnish 1979: xv, 39).

Bach and Harnish offer an extensive list of illocutionary acts and the attitudes which they hold to be characteristic of them because expressing those attitudes is necessary and sufficient for performing an act of the corresponding type. For example, asserting that 17 is a prime number is, so Bach and Harnish (1979: 42) claim, to give voice to both the belief that 17 is a prime number and the intention to induce in someone the same belief:

S asserts that $p \leftrightarrow S$ expresses (i) the belief that p and (ii) the intention to get an addressee H to believe that p .

Whether the speaker really *has* these attitudes does not become relevant until we also want to know if his assertion was, as Bach (1981: 147) says in another paper, *standard* or *non-standard*. It is a standard statement if the utterer in fact possesses these attitudes; and it is non-standard if he merely expresses them without having all of them.

3. BACH'S AND HARNISH'S DEFINITION OF ATTITUDE EXPRESSION

The crucial question now is: What is it to express an attitude? Since this notion is charged with an important theoretical task, we have to scrutinize whether it is able to cope with it. And in order to do that we have to

³ The illocutions which are not meant to function in this way, such as marrying and christening, are termed "conventional illocutionary acts".

⁴ Cf. Alston (2000: Ch. 2), and Carr (1978) for an extensive criticism of Schiffer's Grice-like, i.e., perlocutionary, account of illocutions. See also Siebel (2002a: § 1).

clarify the intended meaning of ‘express’. William Alston (1991: 71), e.g., reminds us of the fact that it is imprudent just to adhere to its everyday use because it is often used as a factive verb. Presumably, Bach and Harnish would agree because they point out that they mean something very specific by ‘express’ which is made explicit by the following definition:

For *S* to *express* an attitude is for *S* to *R-intend* the hearer to take *S*’s utterance as reason to think *S* has that attitude. (Bach and Harnish 1979: 15; cf. Bach 1987: 152)

At first glance, the intention given in the definiens entails that *S* intends *H* to believe that *S* has the attitude. After all, why should the speaker intend to give his addressee a reason to think (which means here: believe) something if he does not intend him to believe it? Bach and Harnish (1979: 57f.) make it clear, however, that they do not want to be understood in that way. The utterer need not intend the hearer to take the utterance as a *sufficient* (or *conclusive*) reason. He may be satisfied if it is believed to be an *insufficient* reason, i.e., a reason which is outvoted by better reasons for the opposite assumption that he lacks the attitude (cf. Recanati 1986: 221; 1987: 185f.). Moreover, since one can intend to provide a reason for something which does not obtain, giving voice to a mental state does not imply that one is in that state.

But what does the ‘*R*’ in ‘*R-intend*’ mean? It stands for ‘reflexive’ and signalizes that the intention which constitutes attitude expression is of a very special type. Unfortunately, Bach and Harnish do not offer an explicit account of *R-intentions* which can be used to translate their definition of attitude expression into a definition without that technical term. But from the remarks which precede the quotation above we can distil the following account.⁵

As Bach and Harnish see it, Grice (1957: 220), in his famous ‘Meaning’, introduced reflexive intentions in their sense by saying that a speaker meant something by an utterance if he “intended [it] to produce some effect [r] in an audience by means of recognition of *this intention*” (my emph.). An intention of that type appears to be reflexive in the following sense: its content includes an element referring to the intention itself because its content says, among other things, that *it* (the whole intention) be recognized. Now, Bach and Harnish agree with that idea, but, regarding illocutionary acts, they do not want to adopt the effects *r* proposed by Grice, namely, e.g., belief or action on the hearer’s side. Such effects, they say, need not be achieved for an illocutionary act to be successful. Instead, they suggest that *r* consists in the hearer’s taking the utterance as a (sufficient or insufficient)

⁵ Cf. Bach and Harnish (1979: 12–15), Bach (1987: 152). It was Bach himself who helped me along.

reason for believing that the speaker has certain attitudes. Thus, their definition of attitude expression is analogous to the way they interpret Grice's analysis of speaker meaning, except that the specified effect is different:

In uttering x , S expresses the attitude $A \leftrightarrow S$ utters x with the intention that an addressee H , by means of recognizing this (entire) intention, take the utterance as a reason to think S has A .

A minor question here is whether the above-mentioned interpretation of Grice is adequate. Since Grice (1957: 219) introduces the first occurrence of the 'by means of recognition of this intention' formulation by "Shortly, perhaps, we may say", this could be interpreted as meaning that this formulation is merely an abridged version for the three interrelated conditions which were previously elaborated bit by bit. In his later article 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions', he presents a definition which explicitly mentions them:

' U meant something by x ' is true iff, for some audience A , U uttered x intending:

- (1) A to produce a particular response r
- (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
- (3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2). (Grice 1969: 92)

If this is the correct interpretation, then 'this intention' in the abridged version does not refer to the entire intention but just to its first part. What has to be recognized by the hearer is not that the speaker intends (1)–(3); he is to recognize merely the primary intention (1) to produce the response r . This might be called reflexivity in a weak sense because (2) contains a reference to a part of the intention. But since there is no element referring to the whole intention, it is not the kind of "overall" reflexivity (= self-referentiality) meant by Bach and Harnish.

However, this does not call into question their theory because, even if it was based on a misinterpretation, the theory itself could surely be true. So, what about the proposal I distilled from their remarks about R -intentions? What about the account of illocutionary acts to which it leads?

Some people will disagree with it right from the start because they hold that it is not (only) the speaker's state of mind but (also) the outer context plus conventions which determines the kind of illocutionary act. And they might add that an intentionalist theory cannot explain where the rights and obligations come from which are involved in many illocutions (e.g., promising to do something seems to entail that one is committed to doing it). I do not want to interfere in this old struggle "intentionalism vs. conventionalism" because that would be going too far, to say nothing of

the muddle in that terrain. My criticism is rather that even an intentionalist should not be content with the proposal above. Let us grant him the claim that an utterance's belonging to a certain type of illocutionary act exclusively depends on the intentions with which it is made. Then we still have to examine whether the *R*-intentions in question fill the bill.

There are four reasons to be sceptical about them. First, it is quite hard to get a grip on self-referential intentions. Like Kemmerling (2002b), I must confess that I have severe difficulties with grasping the definiens at issue because I cannot imagine myself having such an intention. Moreover, the content of it includes an element which refers to the intention itself. But what does that element look like (cf. Recanati 1986: 227–233)? How does it single out the intention and nothing but it? By identifying features, i.e., properties which are exclusively possessed by the intention? But what could be these features? And do we have them in mind when we perform illocutionary acts? Or does the intention include a counterpart to the indexical expression 'this intention', i.e., something like a "mental demonstrative"? But what ensures that it refers to the intention, provided that it does not involve identifying features? The fact that it stands in an appropriate causal relationship to it? But how to spell out 'appropriate' without circularity? – All in all, self-referential intentions provoke a huge variety of delicate questions.

Second, they give rise to a mereological difficulty.⁶ Let us abbreviate the content of a particular reflexive intention by '*X*': *S* expresses the attitude *A* iff *S* intends *X*. This intention is supposed to be identical with the intention that an addressee *H*, by means of recognizing that *S* intends *X*, take the utterance as a reason to think *S* has *A*. Intentions, however, are individuated by their content. That is, intending *p* is identical with intending *q* only if '*p*' and '*q*' specify the same content. Hence, the content given by '*X*' should be identical with the content given by '*H*, by means of recognizing that *S* intends *X*, takes the utterance as a reason to think *S* has *A*'. But how could they be identical? After all, the former content seems to be a proper part of the latter because the sentence specifying the latter contains '*S* intends *X*' as a proper and semantically relevant part.

Third, the intentions proposed by Bach and Harnish are *audience-directed*: the speaker intends *an addressee*, among other things, to take the utterance as a reason to think the speaker has the relevant attitudes. For that reason, their theory runs into trouble with respect to soliloquy. Like Alston (2000: 44f.), I think we can perform illocutionary acts by talking to ourselves. If the speaker directs the illocution towards himself, he must, according to Bach and Harnish, have the intention to provide *himself* a

⁶ Davis pointed that out to me.

reason to believe he has the attitudes in question. But this sounds rather odd. In normal cases, i.e., if the utterer does not suffer from a Freudian kind of self-deception regarding these attitudes, he knows already whether he possesses them or not. So, why should he intend to give himself a reason for the assumption that he has them?

Fourth, the proposal above is not the last word on attitude expression. Bach and Harnish (1979: xivf.) emphasize that *R*-intentions are “intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized” (cf. also Bach 1987: 148). Is this constraint implied by the proposal? I would rather say no; and Bach (in personal communication) suggests in this spirit that we should better write ‘by means of recognizing that this intention is intended to be recognized’ instead of ‘by means of recognizing this intention’. However, the requirement entails anyway that *S* expresses an attitude *A* only if *S* has the quite complicated intention that an addressee *H* recognize that *S* intends him to recognize that *S* intends the utterance to provide him a reason to think *S* has *A*. Consequently, intentions of that kind should be necessary for the performance of illocutionary acts as well. But I doubt that young children are capable of having intentions of such an enormous complexity, whereas there is no bar to let them perform illocutionary acts. Bach and Harnish seem to make demands too great on the psychological abilities of persons who perform such acts.

However, these criticisms do not call into question what I named the basic idea of their theory of illocutions. The trouble might not lie in the general claim that they are actions by which the speaker expresses mental states, but rather in Bach’s and Harnish’s specific definition of attitude expression. Perhaps, the basic idea can be maintained by backing it with a different account of expressing attitudes. Therefore, I pass over to Davis’ analysis of that notion, which does not rest on audience-oriented reflexive intentions and thus does not give rise to the problems above.

4. DAVIS’ ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDE EXPRESSION

Like Bach and Harnish, Davis takes attitude expression to be an action which is done with the intention to give a hint that one has the attitude. In his view, expressing an attitude implies the intention to *indicate* that one possesses it. But, in contrast to Bach and Harnish, Davis holds this intention not to be necessarily directed towards an audience. The utterer need not intend to indicate the mental state *to* anyone (cf. Davis 1992a: 81; 2002: § 4.1). Consequently, and again in opposition to Bach and Harnish, a person can express an attitude even if he does not want someone (to

recognize that he is) to take his utterance as a reason for believing that he has the attitude. Thus, soliloquy appears to be unproblematic.

On the whole, Davis' first condition for attitude expression is Bach's and Harnish's original definiens minus the 'R' in 'R-intends' and minus the addressee (cf. Davis 1992a: 77–79; 2002: §§ 3.3, 3.6):

S expresses the attitude *A* → *S* performs a (publicly observable⁷) action by which he intends to indicate that he has *A*.

That condition is not meant to be sufficient for giving voice to an attitude. In order to show that it is merely necessary, Davis asks us to consider the following scenarios:

(A) Stu is trying a new dish prepared by a friend. Upon tasting the food, Stu immediately contorts his face and spits it out in an attempt to perfectly fake a reflexive response, making his friend think he found the dish to be awful. (B) When asked 'How is the food?' Stu contorts his face and spits out the food in an obvious imitation of a reflexive response. (Davis 2002: § 3.4; cf. 1992a: 78f.)

In both cases, Stu acts as if he spontaneously reacts to the food's awfulness. He simulates an unintentional reflex which indicates that he takes the food to be awful. But, Davis says, only in scenario (B), where the simulation is intended to be overt, Stu expresses the belief that the food is awful. In (A), he tries to hide that his behaviour is intentional because he wants his friend to think that the dish is so horrible that one cannot help but spit it out. Although Stu intends his behavior to indicate that he has the belief, he does not express it (and hence does not mean that the dish is awful) because his action is an attempt at feigning an involuntary indication of it. For that reason, Davis adds the following condition:

S expresses the attitude *A* → By his action, *S* does not intend to covertly simulate an unintentional indication of *A*.

I am not sure whether this condition is always satisfied when someone gives voice to an attitude. I agree to the intuition that, in case (A), Stu does not express the *belief* that the dish is awful. But what about his expressing *disgust* for the dish (or perhaps a weaker kind of unease)? Surely, if the simulation remains covert, his friend will not *recognize* that Stu has the intention to provide an indication for his disgust because he will think that Stu does not act intentionally. But his assumption that Stu's behaviour is merely a reflex is wrong. So might be his conclusion that Stu does not express disgust. Note, for example, that one can use the German translation

⁷ For the sake of brevity, I suppress that addition in what follows.

'Er drückt (seinen) Abscheu aus' for describing case (A). But if Stu gave voice to disgust, then Davis' additional constraint would be unnecessary for such emotions. For expressing disgust would then not exclude that the agent intends his imitation to be covert.

However, I do not want to make a fuss about that issue. Whether the second condition is necessary or not, Davis' account is not subject to the difficulties of Bach's and Harnish's. The intention required by it is fairly simple, involves no reflexivity, raises no mereological paradox and allows for soliloquy. Davis provides a notion which is helpful in analyzing illocutionary acts. It will become clear that, even if we agree to the second constraint, the resulting account is too weak.

5. COMBINING DAVIS' ANALYSIS WITH BACH'S AND HARNISH'S BASIC IDEA

My starting point was Bach's and Harnish's basic idea to take illocutionary acts such as asserting and promising to be acts of expressing attitudes. As I said, according to Bach and Harnish, asserting that p consists (i) in expressing the belief that p and (ii) in expressing the intention to induce in someone the same belief. If we now use Davis' definition of expressing an attitude instead of their own, and, just for the sake of brevity, leave out his second condition, then we get the following analysis of assertions:

S asserts that $p \leftrightarrow S$ performs an action by which he intends to indicate (i) that he believes that p and (ii) that he intends an addressee H to believe that p .

Is this analysis less problematic than the original one by Bach and Harnish, i.e., the one in which attitude expression was defined by recourse to R -intentions? Whereas the latter was too demanding, the analysis above fails because its conditions are too weak to exclude certain *simulations*, *imitations* or *pretences* of illocutionary acts. A speaker who merely simulates (imitates, pretends to make) a statement does not make it. Nevertheless, he may intend to indicate that he has the attitudes which are characteristic of it.

First, what about utterances of actors playing for a movie? When, in front of the camera, Samuel Jackson says to Harvey Keitel 'Aside from how it looks, the car's cool', he does not assert that the car is all right but just imitates the assertion. But how to avoid the conclusion that he expresses the mental states in question? Obviously, he satisfies Davis' second condition because he does not intend to simulate a reflexive response. What

he wants to imitate is an intentional action. Does he intend to indicate the attitudes at issue? Why not?! He wants to do his job very well, such that the cinemagoers get the impression of a real life scene. They are to be under the illusion of watching a real person making a real statement. Since Jackson wants to simulate a standard statement – a statement resting on the belief that the car is all right and the intention that the person to whom he speaks also acquire that belief –, there is thus a strong motive for him to indicate these attitudes: if he does not give an indication of them, he will not achieve the intended effect on the cinemagoers.

It could be objected that such utterances do not indicate the attitudes in question because the actor is obviously just playing, which cancels the presumption that he provides evidence for these states. Since Jackson knows this, and thus knows that the chances of indicating the attitudes are against him, he does not intend to indicate them. I do not have very strong intuitions here, but it appears to me that ‘indicate’ is a rather weak word. To indicate that p just means to give a hint that p ; and I am under the impression that you can give a hint even if it is obvious to everyone that it is misleading. So, how to exclude that Jackson intends to indicate the attitudes which are characteristic of an assertion?

But acting is a notoriously difficult case. Fortunately, there are better examples, namely, jokes (probably, bad jokes) where the speaker wants to irritate his audience by acting as if he seriously advocates a politically incorrect opinion. Let us assume Bertrand and his friends are involved in a conversation about homosexuality. While most of the people proclaimed that they take homosexuality to be a very natural thing, Bertrand sat silently in his chair. Suddenly, he interrupts the conversation and says in a serious voice: ‘Look, the Pope says that homosexuality is abnormal. So it is abnormal’. After his friends turn around to look at Bertrand and react rather indignantly, he starts to grin and says: ‘Hah, I pulled your leg! I was just kidding’.

Bertrand did not assert that homosexuality is abnormal. He just acted as if he was making an assertion with that content. He wanted his audience to believe that he claimed homosexuality to be abnormal. But after waiting for his friends’ indignant reaction, he makes it clear by the smile on his face and what he says that they falsely alleged that he asserted such a politically incorrect thing. They realize that he was taking them for a ride. It was one of these jokes which are just like Bertrand because he likes to irritate people.

Nonetheless, Bertrand’s utterance satisfies the definition of assertions under examination because Bertrand intended to indicate the attitudes which are characteristic of an assertion. He intended to indicate that he be-

believes homosexuality is abnormal; and he intended to indicate that he wants his audience to believe this, too. For he wanted to convince his friends that he made a standard assertion with the content that homosexuality is abnormal, i.e., an assertion which is accompanied by the characteristic attitudes. Furthermore, my scenario is not of the kind Davis wants to rule out by his second constraint on attitude expression because Bertrand, like Samuel Jackson, does not want to imitate any *unintentional* behaviour.

Harnish has suggested (in personal communication) to view my example as a case in which the speaker in fact makes a statement but withdraws it afterwards. But, first, there seems to be nothing wrong in describing Bertrand as *merely acting as if* he asserts that homosexuality is abnormal, which *implies* that he does not make that statement (although, of course, his utterance gave the opposite impression because he uttered a declarative sentence in a serious voice). Second, when someone withdraws a statement, there is a strong reason to assume that he either does not believe anymore what he asserted or was lying. In the case of Bertrand, however, we have no reason for that assumption. He makes it clear that he was just kidding; and this fact does not indicate that he either changed his mind on homosexuality or was lying.

Moreover, even if there are qualms about my particular examples, everyone would have to agree that there is a difference between pretending to perform an illocutionary act and performing it because a pretence entails that the act is not performed. This is enough to show that, in the sense of 'expressing' at issue, expressing the attitudes which are characteristic of an assertion is insufficient for asserting. It is even irrelevant whether Bach's and Harnish's specific proposal for these attitudes is adequate or not. My challenge is more general. Take any attitudes A_1 to A_n you like and claim that giving voice to them amounts to making an assertion:

- (1) S expresses A_1 to $A_n \rightarrow S$ asserts that p .

Let us ignore cases which do not satisfy Davis' second condition. Thus, according to his analysis of attitude expression, (1) entails:

- (2) S performs an action by which he intends to indicate A_1 to $A_n \rightarrow S$ asserts that p .

The general problem now is: whatever you put in for ' A_1 to A_n ', the consequence is in any case that pretending to make a standard assertion without asserting the corresponding proposition becomes impossible.

To be sure, when I say 'pretences', I mean attempts at deceiving an audience. There may be a weak sense of 'pretend' in which someone can

pretend to perform an action of a certain type without intending an addressee to believe that he performs such an action. But in the strong sense which is relevant here, a pretence of an assertion is an action which is done with the intention to let someone falsely believe that it is an assertion. Consequently, if the speaker, in that sense, pretends to make a *standard* statement, he intends the hearer to think that he possesses the attitudes which are characteristic of a statement. For that is among the things the hearer has to believe in order to come to the conclusion that the utterance is not only an assertion but an assertion of the standard type.

In such a case, the speaker intends his utterance to indicate the attitudes to the audience because he wants that audience to infer from the utterance that he has them. So, for strong pretences, we get:

- (3) S pretends to make a standard assertion with the content $p \rightarrow S$ performs an action by which he intends to indicate A_1 to A_n .

But, together with (2), this implies:

- (4) S pretends to make a standard assertion with the content $p \rightarrow S$ asserts that p .

(4) is rather odd, however, because it should be possible to feign a standard statement with the content p without asserting that p at all. There must be the possibility of an *overall* pretence, which means that the speaker does not only fake the attitudes which are characteristic of the assertion but also feigns the assertion. Combining Bach's and Harnish's account with Davis' analysis of attitude expression, however, does not allow for the latter.

Since this argumentation can be extended to all other types of illocutionary acts, the moral is: if Davis is on the right track, then illocutions cannot be defined as utterances by which the speaker does nothing more than giving voice to mental states. That would be too broad to prevent certain pretences of illocutionary acts from being such illocutionary acts.

6. ATTITUDE EXPRESSION AS A NECESSARY CONDITION?

Some speech act theorists will not be worried by that challenge because they take Bach's and Harnish's basic idea that expression of intentional states is not only necessary but also *sufficient* for certain illocutionary acts to be false anyway. But they should be worried for another reason to be explained now.

Since Searle's early contributions to speech act theory it is a commonplace that, for most illocutionary acts, it is at least *necessary* to

express certain attitudes in order to perform them. According to Searle's widespread taxonomy, there are five basic categories of illocutionary acts: *assertives* (asserting, conjecturing, ...), *directives* (ordering, requesting, ...), *commissives* (promising, vowing, ...), *expressives* (apologizing, thanking, ...), and *declarations* (adjourning a meeting, christening, ...). Apart from declarations, all of them are usually thought to involve the expression of a mental state. In performing an assertive with the content *p*, the speaker expresses the belief that *p*. Performing a directive with the content *p* requires expressing the desire that *p*. A commissive with the content *p* is performed only if the speaker gives voice to the intention that *p*. And for expressives there are different attitudes towards their content; e.g., apologizing for *p* means to express sorrow for *p*.⁸ – In the light of Davis' analysis of attitude expression, however, these widely shared necessity claims must be reassessed as well.

Let us confine ourselves again to assertives. A first problem here is that Searle (1975, 13) and other people count *suggesting*, and even *hypothesizing*, among this class.⁹ For both types of acts, it is doubtful that the utterer always expresses the corresponding belief because, on one reading of these expressions, they include cases where he merely presents a proposition to consider its consequences. In such a situation, it is far from obvious that the speaker intends to indicate that he believes the proposition to be true. For example, when Hilary Putnam put forward the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat in order to argue, by *reductio ad absurdum*, that it is inconsistent, he did not intend to indicate a belief in that hypothesis.

But that is not the only weak point. There is an example which can be used to show that, even in making the *statement* that *p*, the speaker need not express the belief that *p*. In section 1, it was pointed out that, in Grice's view, a speaker means that *p* only if he intends a hearer to believe that *p* by means of recognizing the speaker's primary intention that he is to acquire that belief. To reject that condition, Davis and Recanati refer to the following case:

⁸ Cf., e.g., Recanati (1987: 9, 155, 157), Searle (1969: 65; 1975: 4f., 12-16), Vanderveken (1985: 187; 1990: 117). (In Siebel (2001: § 3; 2002b: § 3), I myself made the mixture of adopting these doctrines without reservation.) Alston (2000: 110f., 120, 125–129) deviates only with respect to assertives. He claims that assertions do not require expression of belief (in his words, taking responsibility for having the belief) and that, for other assertives, expression of various attitudes is necessary only for clear cases. – Note that, for Searle, expressives are the only illocutionary acts whose *point* is to express attitudes. For Bach and Harnish, *all* communicative illocutions have that point.

⁹ In Siebel (2002b: § 3), I point out that this also leads to a difficulty with Searle's central criterion for classification, namely, illocutionary point.

[The] speaker might [...] realize that recognition of [his primary] intention will play *no role whatsoever* in the production of belief. If I say ‘I’m over here’ in a crowd to let you know where I am, I mean what I say even though I expect you to locate me on the basis of sound alone. (Davis 2002: § 4.3; cf. Recanati 1986: 225; 1987: 190)

I agree completely. But the challenge to Grice can be extended both to standard speech act theory and Davis because nearly the same argumentation applies to the intention to indicate a belief.

We can consider our speaker as not only *meaning* but also *asserting* that he is over there. If his wife shouts ‘Where are you hiding? Behind the tree or in the crowd?’, and he answers ‘I’m over here’, it is not far-fetched to describe him as asserting that he is over there because answering that *p* seems to entail asserting that *p*.¹⁰ Hence, he should express the corresponding belief, which, on the basis of Davis’ definition, implies that he intends to indicate that he possesses it. But since the speaker expects his wife to locate him on the basis of sound alone, there is no reason to assume that he wants to provide evidence for his *believing* that he is over there. He intends to indicate his *location*, but he does not intend to indicate that he *believes* to be in this location.

If he intended to indicate his belief, he would desire to indicate it; and if he had that desire, he would assign the indication of the belief a positive value. In other words, he would prefer to indicate it over not indicating it. But that is not the case because it makes no difference to the speaker whether or not his utterance indicates the belief. He wants his wife to infer where he is solely from the direction where his voice comes from. She is to reason as follows: ‘That’s my husband’s voice. So, he’s in the crowd’. In this reasoning, the speaker’s belief that he is over there plays no role whatsoever; and he knows that it plays no role. Hence, I do not see why he should prefer to indicate it over not indicating it. No doubt, he has no motive for *hiding* his belief either. His preferences are just silent on that question. Therefore, he does not intend to indicate the belief.

Nonetheless, he asserted, and hence meant, that he is over there. Consequently, the intention to indicate the belief that *p* does not appear to be necessary for meaning or asserting that *p*. There is either something wrong with the idea that meaning and asserting implies expressing a corresponding belief, or Davis’ analysis of attitude expression is too demanding. Either way, such scenarios do not only raise a problem for Davis. If speech act theorists do not want to give up the doctrine that assertives entail belief expression, they owe us an explanation of how their concept of expression differs from Davis’.

¹⁰ If you do not agree to that inference, you can take the example as showing, at least, that the assertive *answering a question* does not require expression of a belief.

The same consequence is suggested by cases where a person asserts that she is in a certain psychological condition. Consider Susan who claims that she does not like Tom's dog by saying 'I don't like it. It drools!'. She intends to indicate that she dislikes the dog. But it is far from clear that she also intends to indicate the *belief* that she does not like it. Why should she want to offer evidence for her believing that she is in a certain state when she just wants to make it public that she is in that state? After all, she knows that she can achieve the latter goal without indicating her belief; hence, she has no motive to provide evidence for it. Although there might be further constraints to turn expression of unease into a statement that one dislikes something, expressing the corresponding belief looks like an inessential extra.¹¹

To sum up, although Davis' main aim in presenting his analysis of attitude expression is to have a workable foundation for the Gricean programme, it also has important repercussions on speech act theory. It does not only challenge Bach's and Harnish's basic idea, but also the commonly accepted view that expressing mental states is at least necessary for the performance of many illocutions. So, we should better think over the notion of attitude expression in its connection to illocutionary acts.¹²

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¹¹ Contrast Davis (2002: § 3.6) on "descriptive" expression of emotions. – As to speaker meaning, it is tempting to conclude from such examples that '*S* means that *p*' is more on a par with '*S* intends to indicate that *p*' than with '*S* intends to indicate that he believes that *p*'.

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