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Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath

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Notes

  1. McGrath (forthcoming).

  2. Stefanucci and Proffitt (2009).

  3. Kunda (1990).

  4. This type of case is discussed in Silins and Siegel (forthcoming), and Siegel (forthcoming).

  5. Qualia are supposed to be aspects of experience that characterize our experience, independently of how the external world seems to us. But exactly analogous points hold for experiences construed as relations to sense-data, where these are mental objects that we perceive, and thereby perceive the external objects that cause them.

  6. Pryor (2001). On rational support that experiences provide for contents that are distinct but closely related to their own, see Silins (2011).

  7. Eberhardt (2004) provides experimental evidence that something this association is widespread.

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Acknowledgement

Thanks to Stew Cohen, Jennifer Gottlieb, Nicholas Silins, Declan Smithies, Scott Sturgeon, and especially Matthew McGrath for discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Susanna Siegel

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  1. Susanna Siegel
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Siegel, S. Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philos Stud 162, 749–757 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0057-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0057-7

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