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Toward a Direct Realist Account of Observation

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Abstract

The concept of observation is central to science, but there are several ways that this can be understood. My aim is to criticize the account of observation presented by Alan Chalmers in What is This Thing Called Science? and provide an alternative based on direct realist approaches to perception. This issue, the nature and objectivity of perceptual knowledge, is one of the oldest in philosophy. Chalmers adopts a simple form of indirect realism, according to which the real objects of perception are our experiences or sensations. I believe this is a misleading way to understand observation in science. There are many important philosophical issues that relate to observation, such as: How are observations justified? and What do we observe?, however space does not permit extensive discussion of these topics.

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Sievers, K. Toward a Direct Realist Account of Observation. Science & Education 8, 387–393 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008646124889

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