

**William P. Alston: *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning*  
Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London 2000  
(Hardcover, £ 29.95)**

Mark Siebel

(*Grazer Philosophische Studien* 62 (2001), 247-259)

1 The Problem of Meaning

By virtue of which fact does the German sentence 'Rosen sind rot' mean *roses are red*, rather than *grass is green*? More generally, what is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is one of the central questions within philosophy of language.

A widespread answer to it is that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it is true. 'Rosen sind rot' means *roses are red* because it is true iff roses are red. But, apart from the notorious difficulties with that answer, there is something unsatisfactory about the truth-conditional story. For truth conditions do not emerge from nowhere. Whatever the merits of such a theory are, it does not get to the bottom because it does not answer the question of what sees to it that a sentence has the truth conditions it has. To answer that question, we have to address the *use* of linguistic signs. It is the way in which an expression is used in a community, its pragmatics, from which its semantics arises. A wholly satisfactory theory should tell us something about that. It should include the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning is use.

Use, however, includes a huge variety of aspects, and it is questionable whether all of them are relevant to meaning. '2 + 2 = 5' is perfectly fit for irritating someone because of its obvious falseness ('What the hell is he trying to tell me?'). But this way of using the sentence appears to play no role for the question of what it means. It is only some uses which determine its meaning.

A famous approach to specifying on which aspects of use linguistic meaning depends is Grice's Program. Grice (1968) suggested to analyse sentence meaning in terms of speaker meaning (i.e., what a speaker means in uttering sentences) and speaker meaning in terms of intentions. The intentions which define speaker meaning do not aim at effects like irritation, but at belief acquisition (or action) plus understanding. In "informative" cases, U means that p, by uttering S, iff U utters S with the intention that a hearer H believe that p by means of recognizing that this is what U intends (cf. Grice 1957). That is, although the utterance might be made with further intentions, they have no influence on what the speaker means and thus no influence on the meaning of the uttered sentence.

The Griceian Program was carried out by different philosophers in different ways. The most well-known attempt is Schiffer's in *Meaning* (1972). Schiffer takes a detour through illocutionary acts. His starting point is Grice's analysis of speaker meaning, which he modifies in a number of ways. Afterwards, he defines illocutionary act performance in terms of speaker meaning, and then sentence meaning in terms of illocutionary acts. Very sketchily, his idea is that a sentence has a certain meaning in a group iff it is mutual knowledge amongst the group

members that it is to be uttered if one performs a certain illocutionary act, i.e., means certain things by the utterance.

Although Schiffer already referred to Lewis' book *Convention* (1969), it was Bennett, in *Linguistic Behaviour* (1976), who really wedded Grice's account of speaker meaning to Lewis' theory of conventions. Bennett left illocutionary acts alone by the wayside and went directly to linguistic meaning. According to him, a sentence means that p iff there is a Lewisian convention to the effect that it is uttered only if one thereby means that p. Some years later, Meggle drew up that account in a strictly formal way.<sup>1</sup>

Recently, Davis (2001) presented a variant of the Griceian Program which, above all, differs in the foundation. Unlike Grice, Schiffer and Bennett, he does not take speaker meaning to require audience-directed perlocutionary intentions, such as the intention to induce a belief in an addressee or the intention that he act in some way. In Davis' view, for a speaker to mean that p is just to express the belief that p, where this amounts to doing something with the intention to indicate thereby that one has the belief.

## 2 Alston's Solution

In a number of articles and his 1964 book *Philosophy of Language*, William Alston worked towards a theory of sentence meaning which has some affinity to Grice's Program. It is now completed in *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning*.

Alston shares with the authors mentioned above the tenet that linguistic meaning arises from what speakers intend to achieve with their utterances. Note that all of these theories thus differ dramatically from von Savigny's account in *The Social Foundations of Meaning* (1988), which is an attempt at spelling out the 'meaning is use' slogan without reference to intentions.<sup>2</sup> More specifically, Alston comes close to Schiffer's idea by claiming that a sentence's having a certain meaning consists in its potential for performing a certain illocutionary act with it, where illocutionary acts are linguistic utterances made with certain intentions.<sup>3</sup> In contrast to Schiffer, however, and in conformity with Davis, he denies that the crucial intentions aim at an influence on an addressee's thoughts or actions. They are rather intentions to subject the utterance to certain rules.

*Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning* consists of two parts: 'The Nature of Illocutionary Acts' (Chs. 1-5), laying down a theory and a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and 'An Account of the Meaning of Sentences' (Chs. 6-9), developing and defending the identification of sentence meaning with illocutionary act potential. Ch. 1, 'The Stratification of Linguistic Behavior', presents Alston's pre-theoretical explanation of what illocutionary acts are. An illocutionary act is an act which can be specified by an *oratio obliqua* report giving the content of an utterance. 'Content' is here to be understood in a broad sense, covering both what is commonly known as propositional content and illocutionary force. "[T]he con-

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Meggle 1997 (1st ed. 1981) and 2002 ("Habilitationsschrift" from 1984). His logic of speaker and expression meaning is outlined in Meggle 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Savigny 1983 for a condensed presentation.

<sup>3</sup> For a proposal which also views meaning to arise from illocutionary act performance, but takes neither intentions nor conventions to be essential for illocutions, cf. Kemmerling 1997 and 2001.

tent”, Alston says (p. 15), ”includes anything that U seeks to communicate, anything a hearer (H) must grasp in order to understand what the speaker is saying.”

What converts a linguistic utterance into an illocutionary act and makes it thus different from, e.g., testing a microphone? In Ch. 2, ‘Perlocutionary Intention Theories of Illocutionary Acts’, Alston subscribes to the idea that it is the speaker’s attitudes which do this job, but he rejects the specific answer given by Schiffer. By offering an impressive variety of examples, he shows that perlocutionary intentions are not necessary for illocutionary acts.<sup>4</sup>

In Ch. 3, ‘The Nature of Illocutionary Acts’, Alston works toward his own theory by critically examining Searle’s famous analysis of promises in *Speech Acts* (1969). He argues that both Searle’s analysandum (”sincere and non-defective” promises) and some of the conditions stated are misguided, but credits him for using the crucial concept. Searle remarks in passing that, even if a promise is insincere because the utterer does not intend to do what he promised, he *takes responsibility* for having that intention. Alston makes this notion the key concept in his account. In his view, the hallmark of illocutionary acts is that the speaker, in making his utterance, takes responsibility for certain conditions. The relevant concept of taking responsibility – briefly, R’ing – is explained by presenting six definitions, no less, supplemented by a lot of further clarifications. The definition Alston takes to be most fundamental, however, is in terms of rule subjection:

In uttering S, U R’s that p =<sub>df.</sub> In uttering S, U (intentionally) subjects his utterance to a rule which implies that it is permissible for U to utter S only if p.

Thus, Alston’s theory amalgamates conventionalist and intentionalist elements. To perform an illocutionary act, there must exist rules to which the utterance can be subjected. ”Speaking a language”, as Searle (1969, 12) has said, ”is engaging in a [...] rule-governed form of behavior.” But the individual speaker’s intentions determine to which of these rules he subjects his utterance.

In Ch. 4, ‘Types of Illocutionary Acts: Commissives, Exercitives, Directives, and Expressives’, Alston puts his idea to use by analysing the four basic kinds of illocutionary acts mentioned in the title solely in terms of R’ing. As to exercitives, he deviates in an important respect from the examples given by Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* (1962).<sup>5</sup> Adjourning a meeting, hiring, firing and so on, Alston claims, go beyond the realm of illocutions because they require some of the R’ed conditions to be satisfied. To adjourn a meeting, the utterer need not only take responsibility for his having the authority to terminate it, he must in fact *have* that authority. Hence, in Alston’s opinion, the illocutionary act involved is merely *declaring* the meeting adjourned. Generally, exercitives are *purportings* to produce a conventional effect. The speaker R’s that he has the authority to produce it,

---

<sup>4</sup> Alston does not discuss a further competitor: the account of Bach and Harnish in *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts* (1979). They agree with Alston as to the fact that one can perform illocutions without having the intention to produce belief or action. Instead, they view a huge variety of them, named ”communicative illocutionary acts”, as acts of expressing attitudes. However, ‘express’ is here a technical term defined by recourse to a reflexive intention, which gives rise to some problems (cf. Siebel 2001).

<sup>5</sup> In contrast to Alston’s testimony, Austin does not mention the following examples. But he probably would have agreed that they are exercitives.

that the conditions for the exercise of that authority are appropriate and that he brings about the effect by his utterance.

Commissives are viewed in a similar fashion. They are also merely purportings, namely, purportings to produce an obligation on oneself to do something. Here, U R's that an addressee has some interest in U's performing the action, that U intends to perform it and places himself under an obligation to perform it. On their own, Alston emphasizes, these R'ings do not imply the obligation. It is generated by a non-linguistic convention in our society which rules that, if someone takes responsibility for placing himself under such an obligation, he *is* obligated. Hence, since promises and bets seem to imply an obligation, Alston treats them, like adjourning a meeting, as not being purely illocutionary.

In contrast to commissives, directives involve R'ing that one lays an obligation on the *hearer* to do something. In the case of an order, the R'ed obligation is rather strong, whereas, in the case of requests, it is weaker because of its disjunctive character: the hearer either ought to do what he was asked for, or he should give an acceptable reason for not doing it. Again, the actual *engendering* of the obligation is not taken to be a necessary condition of directives. In ordering H to clean the room, U merely *takes responsibility* for laying on H the obligation to clean it. More generally, the performance of illocutionary acts always changes the normative status of the utterer because he takes on a liability to being incorrect in case of the R'ed conditions not being satisfied. But, in contrast to Austin (1962), illocutions do not necessarily bring about the conventional effects specified in the R'ed conditions. An utterance can be a commissive (or a directive) to  $\phi$  without placing on the speaker (or the hearer) the obligation to  $\phi$ .

Expressives, like apologizing or thanking, are separated from other illocutions by being nothing but R'ings that one is in a certain psychological state. Apologizing for stepping on someone's shoes, e.g., means to express sorrow for that, which is to take responsibility for its being the case that one feels sorrow for it. Moreover, illocutionary acts are viewed as being performable in soliloquy. If, as it is normally the case, they are part of interpersonal communication, the R'ings are supplemented by the speaker's intention that an audience recognize that he R's the conditions in question.

What about assertives, such as insisting, replying and so on? In Chs. 3 and 4, we are merely told that asserting that p requires taking responsibility for its being the case that p. But that, Alston argues, cannot be the complete story because, if R'ing that p were sufficient for asserting that p, a speaker performing a non-assertive speech act would state of every condition he R's that it obtains. In Ch. 5, 'Assertions and Other Assertives: Completing the Account', Alston tries to solve this difficulty by adding the following constraint: we assert that p only if we *explicitly* say that p. That is, there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the semantic elements and their combination in the uttered sentence (or the one for which the uttered expression is used elliptically) and the elements and their combination in the asserted proposition. When I, by uttering 'Close the door', order someone to close the door, I take responsibility for the door's being open. But I do not assert that it is open because the sentence 'Close the door' contains no word for being open.

Special modes of assertion are then distinguished with the help of further R'ings, such as R'ing that one has firsthand knowledge in the case of reporting. Again, if it turns out that a verb entails more than taking responsibility, Alston does not consider it to be a pure illocutionary act term. If reporting requires the

utterer to *have* firsthand knowledge, then the illocution involved is merely *purporting* to report.

Ch. 6, 'The Problem of Linguistic Meaning', opens Part II of the book. This chapter lays out the notion of meaning at issue by presenting six axioms. The "main clue to the nature of meaning" is supposed to lie in Axiom 2, which Alston takes to be inflatable into the stronger "Use Principle":

An expression's having a certain meaning consists in its being usable to play a distinctive role in communication.

The crucial task remaining then is to sort out the special roles relevant to meaning. As I said in the first section, the fact that ' $2 + 2 = 5$ ' can be used to irritate someone appears to be semantically irrelevant.

Unsurprisingly, Alston's suggestion is to take as relevant the usability to perform illocutionary acts. The meaning of a sentence is its *illocutionary act potential*:

A sentence's having a certain meaning consists in its being usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type.

For example, 'Rosen sind rot' means *roses are red* because it can be used to assert that roses are red.

After criticizing Bennett's perlocutionary account of sentence meaning, Alston tackles the main difficulty in his own theory. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the meaning of a sentence and "the" illocution performable by it, even if we confine ourselves to something like a standard performance. A sentence can even be standardly used with the same meaning to perform illocutionary acts of numerous kinds because its meaning by itself does not determine the overall content of the utterance. As to illocutionary force, 'Barolo is expensive' can be uttered with the same meaning either to recommend that wine or just to state a fact. As to propositional content, although 'The door is open' does not change its meaning from utterance to utterance, what different speakers assert by it is not the same if they refer to different doors.

At this point, Alston introduces the notion of a *matching* illocutionary act type. The meaning of a sentence is its matching illocutionary act potential, where, intuitively, the matching type is the one containing exactly as much content as the sentence. The type I which matches the meaning M of a sentence is defined by being "the most inclusive type such that an addressee, just by knowing that U is uttering a sentence with meaning M and intends to be making a straightforward, direct use of that sentence, can thereby know that U intends to be performing a token of I" (p. 186). For example, although I might assert, by uttering 'The door is open' on a certain occasion, that *my office door* is open, the matching type is asserting that *a certain door* is open. For that is all a hearer can infer from the fact that I wanted to make a straightforward, direct use of the sentence. To figure out to which door I referred, he must have additional knowledge about the context of my utterance.

The requirement of straightforwardness and directness is supposed to rule out figurative, parasitic and indirect uses. Utterances in a play and ironical utterances are taken as parasitic; and requesting someone to leave by uttering 'The door is over there' would be an indirect use.

In Ch. 7, 'Illocutionary Act Potential and Illocutionary Rules', Alston forges a link between his conception of illocutionary acts as acts of rule subjection and his

theory of sentence meaning. It is a sentence's being governed by a certain *rule* which supplies it with its potential to perform the matching illocutionary act. Such rules, *illocutionary* rules, determine under which conditions it is right (correct, permissible) to utter the sentence.

But what do these rules look like? For two reasons, the rule for an indicative sentence *S* which means that *p* cannot be as strict as 'S may be uttered iff *p*'. First, there are uses, like testing a microphone, metaphorical speech and speaking a line in a play, where the utterance might be completely in order without satisfying the given condition. Second, an ambiguous sentence is subject to different conditions, none of them, in itself, being necessary for correct utterance. Alston handles the former difficulty by giving the rules the following shape: 'S may be uttered in the literal, first-order, communicative use of language iff *p*.' The qualification 'literal, first-order' is just a *façon de parler* for 'straightforward', ruling out figurative and parasitic uses, while 'communicative' is to preclude things like microphone tests. In the case of ambiguous sentences, Alston suggests to supplement that pattern as follows: 'S, when used to mean that *p*, may be uttered in the literal ... use iff *p*.'

But there remain two challenges, ellipticity and singular reference, of which I present only the latter. 'The door is open' can be correctly used to state of any door that it is open. Hence, the corresponding rule must not refer to a particular door. On the other hand, it should determine for each and every utterance which door is relevant. But that is no problem, Alston says, because we can take both desiderata into account if the condition required by the rule is: there is exactly one *x* such that (i) *x* is a door, (ii) the speaker refers to *x* by his utterance, and (iii) *x* is open.

Ch. 8, 'The Status of Illocutionary Rules', deals with the problem that nearly no illocutionary rule is explicitly formulated, agreed to and taught. What does it mean, then, that these rules are in force? And what could be (intentionally) subjecting utterances to them, which, in contrast to just acting in accordance with a regularity, seems to require that the speaker knows the rules? An unformulated rule's being in force, Alston replies, consists in there being (a disposition to) incorrectness judgements when it is violated. Furthermore, we are allowed to ascribe knowledge of the rule if the thinker has a stable disposition for making the corresponding cognitive discriminations, i.e., judgements to the effect that something is right or wrong.

Ch. 9, 'The IA Potential Theory of Meaning and Its Alternatives', concludes the book by presenting pros of Alston's and cons of ideational, referential and truth-conditional approaches. Furthermore, Alston tries to show that his theory has a high initial plausibility and is able to answer additional questions. For example, what is it to know the meaning of a sentence? Alston's account suggests that it is to know the illocutionary rule governing its use.

### 3 Difficulties with Alston's Account

So much about the book and its location within the area of meaning theories. No doubt, Alston provides many strong arguments against his rivals and covers himself against numerous objections. Nevertheless, I think he makes his own theory appear in too favourable a light. Here are my main reservations, ordered by the strength in which they threaten the general project.

(1) Without further remarks about the relevant notion of propositions, Alston's theory of assertives is up in the air. Assertions are taken to require a one-

to-one correspondence between the elements of the sentence and the elements of the proposition expressed. But, in the light of a quite common account, propositions are often more fine-grained than sentences. For example, since prime numbers are defined as numbers which have exactly two divisors, the proposition expressed by '3 is a prime number' would be *3 is a number which has exactly two divisors*. Consequently, it would be impossible to assert this proposition by uttering that sentence because the latter does not contain a constituent corresponding to *divisor*.

(2) Alston argues in Ch. 3 that, although taking responsibility for certain conditions is necessary for illocutionary act performance, the satisfaction of the R'ed conditions is not. For that reason, he precludes many acts from that class which are taken by other speech act theorists as illocutions. Adjourning a meeting, hiring and firing are not considered to be exercitives; and commissives and directives are viewed as merely purporting to place an obligation on oneself or the hearer.

To be sure, this claim is not stipulative. It is rather to be understood as a substantial claim about the very concept of an illocutionary act which was established by Alston in Ch. 1. The explanation there, however, does not justify throwing so many acts overboard. According to it, illocutions are what is specified in *oratio obliqua* reports giving the content of an utterance, where "the content includes [(i)] anything that U seeks to communicate, [(ii)] anything a hearer [...] must grasp in order to understand what the speaker is saying" (p. 15). As to (ii), Alston himself has written on the preceding page that he will not base his characterization on talk about saying because it does not fit non-assertive acts. Hence, we are left with (i). But, by uttering 'I hereby adjourn our meeting', the speaker usually seeks to communicate to the participants that he adjourns the meeting. Consequently, Alston's characterization approves of the report's 'She adjourned the meeting' specifying an illocutionary act because it gives the utterance's content, in the sense of determining what the speaker wants to communicate.

The same holds for utterances placing an obligation on someone. Frequently, we seek to communicate by them that we are engaged in obliging. Again, this entails that 'She placed an obligation on herself/him to ...' is a content-giving, and thus illocution-specifying, report as prescribed by Alston. So, his own explanation of what illocutionary acts are allows for counting adjourning a meeting and placing an obligation on someone among them.

(3) In Alston's opinion, knowing a sentence's meaning consists in knowing the illocutionary rule which governs its use. But these rules tell us merely in which circumstances a *literal* and *direct* utterance of the sentence is in order. They say nothing about metaphorical and indirect uses. It can be argued, however, that knowledge of the meaning, in its everyday sense, covers a broader area. Does a person know what 'He's an elephant' means if she does not know that it can be used metaphorically to assert of someone that he is corpulent? Do I know the meaning of 'The door is over there' if I have not yet realized that I can use it to indirectly request someone to leave? A negative answer to these questions would not touch Alston's account if the concept of meaning he wants to analyse were sufficiently restricted. But if you look at the axioms at the beginning of Ch. 6, which are meant to implicitly define the relevant concept, you will see that they do not exclude a more comprehensive reading.

(4) There is an objection concerning, as it were, the reverse direction, namely, the question of whether illocutionary rules do not go beyond meaning. Since the meaning of sentences is supposed to be given by illocutionary rules, the tenable-

ness of that account depends on an adequate explication of the technical term ‘illocutionary rule’. Among other things, it must not be explained in a way which allows these rules to comprise aspects of utterances having nothing to do with meaning. In this spirit, Alston emphasizes that illocutionary rules cannot be simply identified with rules laying down conditions for permissible utterances. Otherwise, the rule of speaking softly in a library would be an illocutionary rule – and thus a rule which has an influence on sentence meaning.

In his final account, Alston differentiates illocutionary rules from other utterance rules by the constraint that “the social rationale of the rule is the facilitation of communication” (p. 272). However, although that move excludes the library rule, it is still too broad because there are many rules facilitating communication without being semantically relevant. To mention just one example, following Grice’s conversational maxim ‘Be brief’ makes communication a lot easier, but it is not a rule which has an effect on meaning.

(5) Alston himself points out that his account of sentence meaning in terms of matching illocutionary act potential is circular. For the definition of matching types makes use of the concept of sentence meaning. Alston thinks, however, that this does not threaten his proposal because he does not aim at conceptual analysis or reductive definition. His theory is rather to be understood as being on a par with the physicist’s “identification of heat with the kinetic energy of molecules”:

“It is more like a hypothesis as to the real nature of what is functionally identified as valence, heat, magnetism, and fragility. And it should be evaluated in basically the same way.” (p. 189)

So, let us evaluate it in this way.

By “the identification of heat with the kinetic energy of molecules”, Alston means, I presume, the formula which says how to compute the temperature of an ideal gas from the number, mass and velocity of its molecules. The point here is that this formula is indeed *reductive*. It reduces a property of macro-entities to properties of their constituents. And if it were circular in the way Alston’s hypothesis is, it would not do that job. For that would mean that it does not reduce temperature to something else. In other words, the variables standing for number, mass and velocity of molecules are independent of temperature. Their values can be determined without knowing the temperature of the gas. In contrast, Alston’s matching illocutionary act potential is not, in that sense, independent of sentence meaning.

Let us assume we had a list of the illocutionary acts which can be performed by uttering a sentence S. This list does not tell us the meaning of S. To figure out its meaning, we have to find out which type on the list is the *matching* type because the rest of them do not determine S’s meaning. The matching type, however, is the one which contains exactly as much content as the meaning of S. Thus, to find out the relevant type, we must already know which meaning S has. Otherwise, we cannot recognize whether we singled out the illocutionary act exactly matching the meaning of S. Therefore, evaluating Alston’s theory in the same way as the physicist’s identification amounts to rejecting it.

#### 4 Conclusion

Although the mentioned problems let me tend towards the opinion that, in the end, Alston’s project is subject to severe difficulties, I think that *Illocutionary Acts and*



*Sentence Meaning* is nevertheless a recommendable book. It provides a highly original and ambitious contribution to philosophy of language which is not content with minor points or quick suggestions. Instead, it tries to build a solid bridge between two large fields, speech act theory and semantics, tackling thereby many delicate issues in both of them. The book is well-argued, clearly structured and full of instructive examples, and it spares no effort in dealing with the details. It made quite an impression on me how often the reader's complaints are cleared up in the following paragraphs. Moreover, Alston overcomes numerous problems which, as he rightly criticizes, can be found in other accounts. If someone were to ask me for a list of books one should read if one is interested in these topics, I would place Alston's book in the uppermost region.

Thus, in spite of all the criticism, I would like to perform the illocutionary act of warmly recommending *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning*. Thereby I take responsibility for its being worth examining Alston's account.<sup>6</sup>

## References

- Austin, J. L. 1962: *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford.
- Bach, K. & Harnish, R. M. 1979: *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Cambridge/M.
- Bennett, J. 1976: *Linguistic Behaviour*, Cambridge.
- Davis, W. A. 2001: *Meaning, Expression, and Thought*, to appear at Cambridge University Press.
- Grice, H. P. 1957: 'Meaning', in: H. P. Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge/M. 1989, 213-223; orig. publ. in *The Philosophical Review* 66, 377-388.
- Grice, H. P. 1968: 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning', in: H. P. Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge/M. 1989, 117-137; orig. publ. in *Foundations of Language* 4, 1-18.
- Kemmerling, A. 1997: 'Der bedeutungstheoretisch springende Punkt sprachlicher Verständigung', in: G.-L. Lueken (ed.), *Kommunikationsversuche. Theorien der Kommunikation* (Leipziger Schriften zur Philosophie 7), Leipzig, 60-106.
- Kemmerling, A. 2001: 'Grice Actions', to appear in: G. Cosenza (ed.), *Paul Grice's Heritage*, 69-95.
- Lewis, D. 1969: *Convention*, Cambridge.
- Meggle, G. 1990: 'Intention, Kommunikation und Bedeutung. Eine Skizze', in: Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg (ed.), *Intentionalität und Verstehen*, Frankfurt/M., 88-108.
- Meggle, G. 1997: *Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation*, 2nd, rev. ed., Berlin & New York (1st ed. 1981).
- Meggle, G. 2002: *Handlungstheoretische Semantik*, to appear at de Gruyter, Berlin & New York ("Habilitationsschrift" from 1984).
- Savigny, E. v. 1983: 'Sentence Meaning and Utterance Meaning', in: R. Bäuerle, C. Schwarze & A. v. Stechow (eds.), *Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language*, Berlin & New York, 423-435.
- Savigny, E. v. 1988: *The Social Foundations of Meaning*, Berlin.
- Schiffer, S. 1972: *Meaning*, Oxford.
- Searle, J. R. 1969: *Speech Acts*, Cambridge.

---

<sup>6</sup> Thanks to Christian Plunze and Mark Textor for their very helpful comments.

Siebel, M. 2001: 'Illocutionary Acts and Attitude Expression', manuscript, submitted to *Linguistics and Philosophy*.