combatting corruption. Notably absent from these proposals is any significant discussion of mechanisms with strong coercive force. This is interesting, and a bit surprising, for several reasons. I was, in particular, surprised to find no discussion, or even mention, of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or the similar Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Each of these, though more limited in scope than the UNCAC, provides for significant criminal penalties for companies that engage in corrupt activities in foreign countries and seems to reduce corrupt activity by firms located in relevant states.

We might draw a larger moral here. As Brock notes, in many instances corruption places those involved in it in a collective action problem (79–81). This often has a prisoner's dilemma–like structure, where each party would be better off without corruption, but no party can improve their situation unilaterally. In such cases it is not clear that agreements without significant sanctions behind them can break the dilemma. As Hobbes long ago noted, covenants without swords are mere words. Further, moral suasion and calls on people and institutions to do better are even less likely to improve the situation, given that, in these cases, it is not a lack of morality that leads to the problem. Consider the epigram at the start of this review. It may seem immoral for a doctor or teacher (or even a shop assistant) to demand an "illicit" payment to do what their job requires. But when the salaries of those figures would otherwise not cover their own modest living expenses, it is unclear, at best, that appeal to morality will or even should motivate them. Of course, not all forms of corruption fit this picture. Many sorts are clearly immoral or based on greed. But even in those cases it is unclear to me that the types of remedies called for by Brock will have a strong impact. And the situation may be even worse, given that codes of conduct can sometimes have the perverse result of leading to more corruption. Such codes tend to make regulatory structures more complex, as new compliance burdens are imposed. As people find it harder, more time-consuming, and more expensive to navigate the increasingly complex regulatory scheme, both the incentive to pay and the ability to extract "facilitation payments" increase.

Where does this leave us? Brock is correct that corruption is an important problem and that global justice theorists have not given it the attention it deserves. And many of her proposals are worth taking seriously. I am significantly less optimistic, I think, that the problem can be solved, or even greatly reduced, by the means suggested in the book, or perhaps by any means that are at our disposal, but be that as it may, the topic is ripe for further work, and Brock is to be commended for bringing it to the table.

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Collins, Stephanie. *Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. 208. $80.00 (cloth).

At this point in social ontology, there is a respectable movement toward acknowledging the existence and potential responsibility of social agents such as groups, corporations, organizations, and so on. Despite the potential spookiness of thinking

of organizations like Amazon or the state of Australia as agents, there is something deeply plausible about our talk and practices around holding firms responsible or blaming a state for historical injustices. Many scholars have pursued this idea, and Stephanie Collins had solidified her position within this vanguard with her previous book, *Group Duties*, along with many recent articles (Stephanie Collins, *Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019]).

For proponents of group/corporate/organizational agency, however, there is a looming problem. These proponents take corporations like Amazon to be responsible, for instance. But Amazon clearly bears relations to many different parties—employees, shareholders, customers, managers. And some of these people seem potentially responsible and indeed liable when Amazon acts wrongly. So, how are we supposed to think about not just when and why Amazon is responsible but when and why and which of these individuals are also responsible? (And to what does their responsibility amount?) This is a hard set of questions, and one way in which a kind of skepticism can seep in is for someone to say that there is no answer to them, or at least no answer that can be feasibly determined in real-world cases. Some have even suggested that just this kind of slipperiness could be manipulated to offload individual responsibility onto organizations (Manuel Velasquez, "Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do," *Business and Professional Ethics Journal* 2 [1983]: 1–18).

As a proponent of corporate agency myself, I always assumed that this issue was important but in principle solvable. Still, I didn't have a solution for it (even though I was constantly confronted with it in conversation). And the literature's general silence on this topic perhaps suggested that there was nothing concrete to be said, that these questions couldn't be answered. It is in view of this awkward position, then, that Stephanie Collins's new book, *Organizations as Wrongdoers*, is such a welcome contribution. In this book Collins offers a picture for how to think about not just the responsibility of organizations but who exactly count as among the members of those organizations, how those members can be implicated in organizational wrongdoing, and when and how members can be liable for this wrongdoing (even when they are not implicated).

To reach these results, Collins begins in part 1 with an exploration of the metaphysics of organizations and their members. Chapter 1 shows how to reify organizations, and chapters 2 and 3 are spent considering the right metaphysical relationship between organizations and their members, as well as exploring the implications of this relationship. After distinguishing organizations from nearby social phenomena, Collins advances and defends a view on which organizations are real entities, distinct from any individual or collection of individuals. They are multiply realizable, are casually efficacious, and are arguably agents, taking on board either functionalist or interpretivist requirements of agency. As entities, Collins argues for the hylomorphic view on which organizations are realized structures, with the members as the material parts that realize abstract structures.

These views are plausible and close to how several other proponents of group agency will construe the metaphysics of groups. More novel, however, is how Collins articulates the requirements on organizational membership. She develops three conditions: (1) Members are committed to the organization, not in the sense that

they have any particular mental states in favor of it, but in that they treat the decisions of the organization as presumptively decisive in determining their conduct. (2) Members have input in the organization in the sense that there are established mechanisms for members to influence the decision-making of the organization. (3) Members enact the decisions of the organization, where the members' conduct is attributable to the organization. Collins goes on to show the value of these conditions in plausibly articulating conceptions of membership in the context of corporations and states.

Having filled out a conception of the metaphysical relationship between organizations and their members, as well as the criteria for membership, part 2 discusses the responsibility of organizations as such. Chapter 4 argues that organizations can be blameworthy on three different understandings of what blame targets (one's choices, one's attitudes, or one's character). Chapter 5 addresses perhaps what Collins takes to be the most significant challenge to organizational responsibility—the question of how they can be morally self-aware. In response to this challenge, Collins shows how members can be aware of organizational wrongdoing, and she argues that this awareness can be attributed to the organization itself. When the member is performing their role in the organization and taking on the rational point of view of the organization, they can recognize the organization's wrongdoing in the first-person perspective, which just is what it is for the organization itself to be morally self-aware. Collins takes it that organizations can have the capacity for this self-awareness (and to a greater or lesser degree), and this suggests that they have what it takes to be blameworthy.

Taking for granted blameworthy organizations, Collins is finally in place in part 3 to consider the responsibility of members for organizational wrongdoing (in chap. 6) and how to think about the liability of members (in chap. 7). To this end, chapter 6 offers a taxonomy of ways in which members can be implicated in organizational wrongdoing (as a special case of ways of being implicated in wrongdoing generally). Members can enact the wrongdoing themselves or be complicit in a variety of ways, they can count as problematically endorsing a shared goal that the wrongdoing foreseeably furthers, or they can omit to act against the wrongdoing.

With this in hand, Collins turns to consider one's liability to bear certain burdens as a member of an organization guilty of wrongdoing. Plausibly, and as a payoff for chapter 6, we can see how such liability can come down to how one is implicated in the wrongdoing (and can perhaps be greater or lesser depending on this). However, and interestingly, chapter 7 largely concerns the circumstance in which an organization has engaged in wrongdoing, yet the members in question are not implicated (e.g., in the case of historical injustices). In this case, Collins argues (successfully I think) that the members can be liable to incur certain costs, and she brings out several other considerations that can recommend liability (such as benefitting from the wrongdoing, or having the capacity to act to correct it). Although weighing all of these factors can be challenging, Collins offers us good reason to be ultimately optimistic about being able to apply this framework to the task of adjudication of individual member liability in particular contexts.

Overall, the book offers a wonderful baseline for conversations around apportioning responsibility both to organizations and to their members. And it

opens up many interesting further lines of inquiry. For instance, I found myself wondering whether the notions Collins lays out in taxonomy of implication (enactment, endorsement, omission) are all causal. Collins seems to understand some forms of enactment causally, and she accepts causation by omission. But some people don't think complicity is necessarily causal, and it's not clear that endorsement as she lays it out is a causal notion.

I also found myself wanting to hear more about how Collins understands commitment. As Collins portrays it in chapter 3, this condition is extremely thin. It reads as if commitment just involves taking oneself to be subject to the decisions of the organization. And if that's the view, this interestingly sets Collins up to endorse certain views within political philosophy on the question of who should count as among the *demos* (the so-called "boundary problem"), which is often taken to come down to subjection. At the same time, being committed to following a group's decisions does seem stronger than purely presumptively abiding by them. If it's not, then it's less clear how being committed provides a basis for being implicated in organizational wrongdoing (which Collins takes to be critical for being an endorser).

Instead of continuing to engage in these fascinating issues, though, I think it's more important to ask a hard question about the methodology of Collins's book. Methodologically, the book feels as if it is going to establish certain metaphysical truths and then use these truths to determine the answer to these thorny questions around the attribution of responsibility. After all, the subtitle of the book is "From Ontology to Morality." That is indeed the order of the book, and I think this is what is intended. However, I'm not confident that this is the theoretical order of the book, or should be.

The book does begin, after differentiating organizations as entities, by arguing for realism about them. And it does argue for a particular metaphysics of organizations, which it then uses in the next two parts of the book. Nevertheless, it at times feels as if Collins is guided primarily by the moral results desired even as she explores these metaphysical issues. She says expressly, "The goal of this book is to provide a conceptualization of organizations that enables us to fit them into our moral, social, and political practices of responding to wrongdoing. The aim is to provide a kind of 'possibility proof' for such a conceptualization" (60–61). This seems to clearly frame matters as morality-first. We have many social practices that involve taking organizations to be blameworthy and blaming them, and what is being given is a metaphysical picture that vindicates these practices. At several other points, this kind of reading seems suggested. Earlier on, Collins says that "a final reason for realism about organizations is that they are agents" (20). This is a metaphysical claim being made on the basis of agency, which Collins then takes to be demonstrated by instantiating certain functional roles and being interpreted in that way (by us). Or, much later, in discussing the significance of the capacity of moral self-awareness, Collins offers five reasons for why blameworthiness presupposes this capacity (117). These are not reasons why blameworthiness in fact requires such self-awareness; it is just presupposed by our practices.

It's important to be clear about what has priority. If the book is read as providing an independently plausible metaphysical view that can then be used in a normative investigation, this is a respectably realist way to argue. In contrast, finding

our way to a metaphysical view that coheres with and can articulate our practices will be a kind of pragmatism. That doesn't have to be devastating. Many working in social metaphysics today often talk as if they are more open to this sort of pragmatism. And Strawsonians may be open to an approach that takes respect for our responsibility practices for granted. Whichever way is argued, though, it will affect the shape of the argument that needs to be made and the burden of proof for that argument.

If we are looking for a metaphysical picture to vindicate our practices, then Collins's view of organizations as realized structures is a plausible way to go. However, readers will wonder whether we could afford to be more ecumenical. Surely there are nonhylomorphic views that, once the right bullets are bitten, will deliver the same result. And won't this be desired by the many metaphysicians who do not accept hylomorphism in print but do blame organizations in their private lives?

Thinking in this way, it is strange that Collins takes so much time to argue about the location of organizations (in chap. 3). This argument is well-made and follows from her view, and this question has garnered a fair bit of attention lately. But does it matter? We will affirm my responsibility whether we say that my actions are located with my body movements, or can outstrip them, or never go beyond my mind. So, if what matters is our ability to affirm the responsibility of organizations and their members, does it matter where we locate them?

If, in contrast, we are arguing for the correct metaphysical picture and then showing how it fits into certain responsibility practices, this does justify offering a particular view. My concern, however, is that this raises the bar argumentatively much higher than Collins recognizes. For example, Collins argues that organizations are agents by showing how they can satisfy both functionalist and interpretivist views of agency (in chap. 1). (And she does write as if this is taking on a higher burden.) But surely the true opponents to distinct organizational agency do not accept either of these views. Such opponents often dismiss functionalism in the philosophy of mind out of hand, and interpretivism is taken to be even more extreme and less plausible. So, who is being convinced who does not already accept organizational blameworthiness?

I have a similar concern about one of the main claims of the book—that the actions and attitudes (including moral self-awareness) of members of organizations can be straightforwardly attributed to those organizations themselves. For Collins, the actions of members can be attributed to the organization (and so are the organization's actions) whenever members are acting in their capacity as members (91). But while this strikes me as sufficient grounds for attributing these actions to organizations perhaps characterized as the behavior of organizations, I'm less sure that this conduct ipso facto counts as organizational action. Some of it might. But surely, on a realist picture, what matters is whether the organizational behavior itself satisfies outstanding accounts of action. And it might not. When considering this issue, though, Collins does not make the case for organizations themselves acting in all cases in which their members act; instead, she motivates the claim pragmatically, as a vindication of Australia's criminal code. (I will say that this is a practice in the criminal code with which I disagree; Kenneth Silver, "When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law," *Criminal Law and Philosophy* [forthcoming].)

The same issue comes up again in the discussion of moral self-awareness. Collins takes members to be capable of being morally self-aware of the organizational wrongdoing, and she takes this awareness to be attributable to the organization. She admits that not all membership properties will be attributable to the organization, and she lays out plausible and interesting criteria for when those attitudes should be attributed to the organization. Unfortunately, I'm not sure what the argument is for these criteria.

The argument is not made that organizations as entities can instantiate mental states, including the particular state of moral self-awareness (with its attending phenomenal character). Instead, the criteria are motivated by the fact that they sound reasonable insofar as they draw the member and the organization quite closely together. Indeed, being self-aware from the organization's perspective and in one's capacity as a member sounds significant, but why think that it metaphysically suffices to attribute that self-awareness to the organization itself qua awareness? Ultimately, significant for Collins is that doing this vindicates our practices of calling for and acknowledging the publicly espoused self-awareness of important members, who tend to avow this awareness from the perspective of the organization (126–27). If we are proceeding with a metaphysics-first approach, this seems insufficient. But if what matters is what we want and accept as an authentic form of moral self-awareness, then that we can accept a manager's self-awareness on behalf of the organization perhaps does show that organizations are the kinds of things that can be appropriately blamed after all.

Collins says early on that "the metaphysical and moral treatment of organizations has become detached in the literature. This book aims to attach them and to demonstrate why that attachment matters" (3–4). I think that is exactly right and a laudable ambition. What I have tried to show is that how we should do this isn't so obvious. But it is significant, both for the kind of picture that we can offer and for the argumentative burden that we incur in offering it. These domains must be brought together, and this book marks a substantial contribution in this effort.

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Lear, Jonathan. *Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2022. Pp. 176. $29.95 (cloth).

Jonathan Lear's most recent collection of essays covers a lot of ground: from climate anxiety (chap. 1) to the royal wedding of the Duke and Duchess of Sussex ("Meghan and Harry"; chap. 4) and the revenant dead of Gettysburg (chap. 5), all the way to infantile-cum-cosmic gratitude (chap.7). Nonetheless, this daring and thought-provoking collection exhibits a remarkable coherence.

In part, this is due to the book's dual inheritance. It is inspired by the Socratic commitment to continuing philosophical conversation even in the midst of daily life and by the psychoanalytic commitment to allowing even reports of ordinary happenings to unfold without interruption. In both cases, the striking discovery