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THE CORPORATION'S GOVERNMENTAL PROVENANCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2018

Abraham A. Singer
Abraham A. Singer*
Affiliation:
Loyola University Chicago, Department of Management, Quinlan School of Business, 820 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago IL 60611USA. Email: asinger2@luc.edu
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Abstract:

Corporations cannot exist, scholars rightly note, without being constituted by government. However, many take a further step, claiming that corporations are normatively distinct from other market actors because of this governmental provenance. They are mistaken. Like corporations, markets and contracts also require government for their creation. Governmental provenance does not distinguish corporations normatively because our coercive social institutions are pro tanto justified in re-arranging both corporate and non-corporate market activities on behalf of social and political values. The corporation is distinct only practically and prudentially, in that it represents a more proximate instrument for effecting morality in the economy.

Keywords

Political Theory of the CorporationGovernmental ProvenanceNexus of ContractsTransaction CostsPublic and Private
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , July 2019 , pp. 283 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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