Higher-Order Evidence: New EssaysMattias Skipper, Asbjø Steglich-Petersen We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted bymotivated reasoning or by other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for oragainst the truth of theirs contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due tothe pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life, for example in the form of disagreement. But is has also become clear that higher-order evidence lies at the heart of a number of central epistemological debates, spanning from classical disputes between internalists and externalists to morerecent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. Many of the controversies within these and other debates stem, at least in part, from conflicting views about the normative significance of higher-order evidence.This volume brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a wide range of interrelated issues about higher-order evidence. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Formulating Independence | 13 |
HigherOrder Uncertainty | 35 |
Evidence of Evidence as HigherOrder Evidence | 62 |
Fragmentation and HigherOrder Evidence | 84 |
Predictably Misleading Evidence | 105 |
Escaping the Akratic Trilemma | 124 |
HigherOrder Defeat and Evincibility | 144 |
HigherOrder Defeat and the Impossibility of SelfMisleading Evidence | 189 |
HigherOrder Defeat and Doxastic Resilience | 209 |
Return to Reason | 226 |
Whither HigherOrder Evidence? | 246 |
Evidence of Evidence in Epistemic Logic | 265 |
Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself? | 298 |
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Common terms and phrases
affect agent allow apply argue argument assessment assume bearing body of evidence chapter Christensen claim commitments Comparative concerning conclusion conditional confident correct credence defeat depends disagreement discussion doubt Enkratic entails epistemic Epistemology evidence of evidence evidence supports evidential evincibility example expected fact false first-order evidence frame give given higher-order defeat higher-order evidence hold idea independent initial instance intuitive irrational justification kind knowledge least less light logic misleading normative one's evidence opinions Oxford University Press particular peer Philosophical plausible position possible present principle probability problem proposition provides puzzle question rational rationality requires reason reflect regarding relation relevant reliability requires respect response result rules seems sense simply situation sort sufficiently suggest supports believing Suppose theory Thesis total evidence Transfer true truth uncertainty valid warranted