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Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Brian Skyrms
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Abstract

The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields the martingale property.

Type
In Memory of Richard Jeffrey
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 959 - 968
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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