The Nature of Legal Interpretation: What Jurists Can Learn about Legal Interpretation from Linguistics and PhilosophyBrian G. Slocum Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world. It engages and intrigues us. Our everyday use of language is quite effortless—we are all experts on our native tongues. Despite this, issues of language and meaning have long flummoxed the judges on whom we depend for the interpretation of our most fundamental legal texts. Should a judge feel confident in defining common words in the texts without the aid of a linguist? How is the meaning communicated by the text determined? Should the communicative meaning of texts be decisive, or at least influential? To fully engage and probe these questions of interpretation, this volume draws upon a variety of experts from several fields, who collectively examine the interpretation of legal texts. In The Nature of Legal Interpretation, the contributors argue that the meaning of language is crucial to the interpretation of legal texts, such as statutes, constitutions, and contracts. Accordingly, expert analysis of language from linguists, philosophers, and legal scholars should influence how courts interpret legal texts. Offering insightful new interdisciplinary perspectives on originalism and legal interpretation, these essays put forth a significant and provocative discussion of how best to characterize the nature of language in legal texts. |
Contents
Introduction Brian G Slocum | 1 |
Chapter 1 The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation Brian G Slocum | 14 |
Chapter 2 Philosophy of Language Linguistics and Possible Lessons about Originalism Kent Greenawalt | 46 |
What Goes Right What Goes Wrong Lawrence M Solan | 66 |
Chapter 4 The Continued Relevance of Philosophical Hermeneutics in Legal Thought Frank S Ravitch | 88 |
Chapter 5 The Strange Fate of Holmess Normal Speaker of English Karen Petroski | 105 |
Chapter 6 Originalism Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis Lawrence B Solum | 130 |
Chapter 7 Getting Over the Originalist Fixation Francis J Mootz III | 156 |
Chapter 8 Legal Speech and the Elements of Adjudication Nicholas Allott and Benjamin Shaer | 191 |
Chapter 9 Deferentialism Living Originalism and the Constitution Scott Soames | 218 |
Chapter 10 Deferentialism and Adjudication Gideon Rosen | 241 |
Comments on Rosen Scott Soames | 272 |
Contributors | 283 |
List of Cases | 285 |
| 287 | |
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