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Explanatory Rationalism and Contingent Truths

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Quentin Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008

Abstract

This paper extends the orthodox bounds of explanatory rationalism by showing there can be an explanation of why there are positive contingent truths. A positive contingent truth is a true proposition that entails that at least one contingent concrete object exists. It is widely thought that it is impossible to explain why there are positive contingent truths. For example, it is thought by Rowe that ‘God created the universe’ is a positive contingent truth and therefore cannot explain why there are positive contingent truths. I show, however, that the reasoning behind this orthodox view is unsound and that it is possible to explain why there are positive contingent truths.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Rowe, William, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 103ff.Google Scholar

2 Ibid. p. 103.

3 Ibid. p. 106.

4 Ibid. p. 106.

5 Bennett, Jonathan, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Hackett Pubs., 1984), p. 115.Google Scholar

6 It is also possible to explain why there are positive contingent truths on naturalistic assumptions alone, in terms of a wave function law of nature. See Quentin Smith, ‘The Wave Function of a Godless Universe’ in Craig, William Lane and Smith, Quentin, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)Google Scholar.