Abstract
The consensus in the philosophical literature on joint action is that, sometimes at least, when agents intentionally jointly φ, this is explicable by their intending that they φ, for a period of time prior to their φ-ing. If this be granted, it poses a dilemma. For agents who so intend either severally or jointly intend that they φ. The first option is ruled out by two stipulations that we may consistently make: (i) that at least one of the agents non-akratically believes that, all things considered, the agents ought not to φ, and (ii) that an agent is akratic, if she intends a thing that she believes, all things considered, ought not to be done. But the second option seems to entail the existence of a mental state with multiple subjects, which, in turn, seems to commit us to the existence of a “group mind” modified by that state: an incautious posit to say the least. I resolve the dilemma by noting that ‘They jointly intend’ is indeterminate between ‘They intend, jointly’, which does indeed entail that some mental state is an intention with multiple subjects, and ‘Jointly, they intend’, which entails a weaker claim, viz. that some mental state or states is an intention with multiple subjects. I then sketch an account of how a plurality of mental states, distributed among subjects, might, collectively, do service as their intention that they φ. It makes novel use of notions of participation and of doing a thing jointly with others. A corollary is that either intentions are not attitudes towards propositions, or propositions are individuated more finely than is often assumed.
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Notes
It is a nice question—which I do not here attempt to address—whether agreements are more plausibly modelled on promise exchanges or on joint decisions. See (Gilbert 1996, ch. 13).
I owe the example to Mike Martin.
An innocent enough corollary of (JI) is that when any one agent φs, he (degenerately) jointly φs.
My comments on adverbial, sentential and adnominal ‘jointly’ are influenced by Moltmann (2004). Her topic is ‘together’ and her linguistic intuitions do not chime with mine on ‘jointly’.
I exclude nominal predications, such as ‘My boots are a pair’ and ‘They are baboons’. Adding ‘jointly’ or ‘collectively’ to these seems to me to be always either otiose or incongruous, unless the modified sentence is idiomatic shorthand (e.g. for ‘When they get together they act like baboons’).
Re: ‘together’, Lasersohn (1998: 278) distinguishes “collectivizing”, “spatial”, “temporal”, “coordinated action”, “social accompaniment” and “assembly” readings, whilst Moltmann (2004: 289–90, 308, 313) distinguishes “cumulative numerical measurement”, “collective-action”, “coordinated-action”, “spatiotemporal-proximity”, “temporal-proximity”, “mixture” and “configuration” readings. Moltmann thinks (290) that “[w]ith an appropriate generalization of the notion of measurement”, her readings are subsumable under a “cumulative measurement” reading.
Pace what is suggested by Frege (1979: 227–8): “[Regarding the sentence ‘Siemens and Halske have built the first major telegraph network’] ‘Siemens and Halske’ designates a compound object about which a statement is being made” and Armstrong (1978: Vol. 1, 32): “On the natural interpretation of ‘Tom, Dick and Harry lifted a girder’ the phrase ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ refers to a single entity: the team which Tom, Dick and Harry made up for the purpose of lifting the girder.”
It should be noted that Davidson would make the point using the notion of a description, not that of a type—also that he does not (as far as I can determine) discuss any multiply-agented actions.
I was pressed to say more by two anonymous referees.
Bratman argues that intentions that meet a similar interdependence condition are a necessary part of a sufficient condition for ‘shared intention’. See his condition (v) in (Bratman 2009b: 159).
For discussion, see Peacocke (1979).
Worries raised by Lewis (1979) about such ‘backtracking’ conditionals must here be bracketed.
I here gloss over a number of important differences between these authors’ views.
Whilst Gilbert here speaks of agreement, the point holds if we substitute talk of joint decision.
An additional problem for (IMMODEST DECISION) is presented by the fact that deciding is, plausibly, an intentional activity. If it is so, then (IMMODEST DECISION) faces a regress worry.
Two anonymous referees objected in this way to an earlier, less precise, formulation of (RIDI).
An (S)-type determination of (IMMODEST INTENTION), or something close to it, is defended by Pettit and Schweikard (2006: 23):
…a plurality perform a joint action in enacting a certain performance together only if… they each intend that they enact the performance;
Roth (2004: 361) defends a similar view:
…each participant in some shared or joint activity, such as walking together, is committed to that activity.
where (361):
…each participant is committed in that at least for now, the participant can answer the question of what he is doing or will be doing by saying for example “We are walking together” or “We will/intend to walk together”.
and where (352):
…the intention and commitment being expressed, for example, by “We will walk together” is not, or not merely, the intention of a group comprising everyone encompassed by the ‘we’. Rather, the intention must be distributive, so that it will attach to each of the individuals referred to by the ‘we’. Only then would “We will walk together” as thought or uttered by me express a participatory commitment I have to the activity.
A (J)-type determination of (IMMODEST INTENTION), or something close to it, looks to be defended by Gilbert (2006a: 12):
Persons A and B are collectively doing A if and only if they collectively intend to do A… and each is effectively acting… so as to bring about fulfillment of this intention.
Bratman (2009a: 42) defends a similar view:
Our painting together is a shared intentional activity, roughly, when we paint together because we share an intention so to act.
An anonymous referee assures me that a (V)-type determination of (IMMODEST INTENTION), or something close to it, is defended by Tuomela (2007: ch. 5). I have not been able to verify this.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for forcing me to clarify this.
I omit ‘jointly’ from the description of Ollie’s belief, as I would wish to use a sentential ‘jointly’, and there is no natural way to add one. (My best attempt: Ollie believes that, all things considered, Stan and he ought not to be such that—or ought not to see to it that—jointly, they carry the piano).
I omit ‘jointly’ so as to ensure an isomorphism with the belief in (ii). See the previous note.
A similar argument—albeit one that does not explicitly invoke akrasia or normative belief—is sketched by Kutz (2000: 26): “…many cases of collective action involve contexts where agents are alienated from the end to which they contribute, whether because of coercion, willful ignorance, or moral qualms. A pacifist takes a job at the nuclear weapons plant, because it is the only job available; an accountant processes the astonishingly large receipts of a pizza parlor, not inquiring too carefully into their explanation. These are cases in which the collective activity is jointly intentional and the product of individual intentional participation, for they involve individuals who see themselves as acting in concert, contributing to a collective end though they disavow that end. Participating individuals necessarily orient their conduct around a collective end, and so participatory intentions must have collective content. But participants need not intend to achieve that collective end”. As we shall see, my solution to the puzzle will also draw on Kutz’s paper.
Suggested by an anonymous referee.
Since this is ruled out, must I withdraw the hypothesis (entertained earlier in the text) that any agents’ joint decision that they do a thing just is a plurality of (as it may be) interdependent and/or interconditional decisions, directed towards their doing that thing? No. What is ruled out is that any agents’ joint decision that, jointly, they φ is a plurality of singly made decisions that, jointly, they φ. What is not ruled out (for reasons that shall become clear) is that any agents’ joint decision that, jointly, they φ is a plurality of singly made decisions that one φ, jointly, with the others.
It may be thought that an unrescinded decision to do something pointless or wicked does not even commit its parties, and that, we should, accordingly, expand the list of caveats (coercion etc.) in the truism from which we inferred (1). I think this is mistaken. It is precisely because a decision to do something pointless or wicked does commit one that other “things” ought to be “considered”.
‘Pro tanto’ because of the concerns regarding pointlessness and wickedness already mentioned.
Here I closely follow Broome (2001: 112)—although his focus is intention, not decision.
I follow Gilbert (2003: 50) in thinking that a joint decision—or, as she prefers to say, joint “commitment”—“is not rescindable by [any] party unilaterally, but only by the parties together”.
The point generalises. It may appear that if I murder, I ought to do so gently, that if I will not submit the paper on time, I ought to decline the invitation, that if I smoke, I ought to smoke low tar cigarettes etc. But if I have the power to render false the antecedents of these conditionals, then that is what I ought to do, not what the consequents prescribe, even if the antecedents are true. If, however, the antecedents’ truth is given to me, then I ought to do what the consequents prescribe. See Humberstone (1991).
van Inwagen recapitulates the point at 118, where he adds that he uses ‘think’ in a “very liberal sense” in which it applies to, among other things, “feeling pain” and “planning for tomorrow”.
For references, see my ftn. 20.
I have elided a paragraph break.
In (Bratman 1999b: 121, 131) a description of such “attitudes… and their interrelations” is put forward as a condition necessary and sufficient for shared intention. In more recent work (Bratman 2007: 291, 2009a; 2009b), Bratman withdraws the claim of necessity. The details of his description have developed over the years, but a constant feature of it is that the parties severally intend the act-type that they “share” an intention to do. So whilst Bratman may seem to offer a (J)-type explanans of intentional joint activity, the explanans offered has an essential (S)-type element.
As we have noted in ftn. 20, Pettit and Schweikard also hold (23) that those who intentionally jointly act “each intend that they [the plurality of agents] enact the performance”.
I here take no stand on Kutz’s claim (2000: 26) that even when dissent is absent, attributions of partaking intentions may be warranted “in… circumstances of routinized cooperation, hierarchical authority, and compartmentalized information”. In his (23) view: “It would ring false to attribute to an individual cellist in an orchestra the intention that “we play the Eroica,” or to a single running back the intention that ‘we win the football game.’ (A cellist or running back who said this might be thought to take too grandiose a view of his or her role.) Rather, it is far more natural to attribute to the cellist an intention to perform his or her part in the symphony, and likewise to the running back.” As I see it, it is at least not obvious that these are cases of intentional joint activity.
See Tuomela (1995: 128–9), which cross-refers to a number of other passages in the same text, and Kutz (2000: 10, 25–6). Insofar as I understand these passages, I suspect that neither Tuomela’s nor Kutz’s conception of an intention to partake is mine. Tuomela’s conception appears to be of an intention to do something of which it is believed true that it is a doing of one’s part. Kutz’s is—his interchangeable uses of ‘participate’ and ‘contribute’ notwithstanding—of an intention to contribute.
Compare: in one “contributory” sense, a suitably fashioned piece of wood is a part of a chair, even if no chair exists that (at any time) has it as a part. In another “participatory” sense, the same piece of wood is not a part of a chair unless there exists a chair of which it is (at some time) a part.
I take it that the content of such an intention is not: if, and only if, others do likewise, then I will do something sufficient for the activity. Rather it is: I will do something that is such that if, and only if, others do likewise, then it is sufficient for the activity. One key difference is that agents could execute intentions of the former type—but not ones of the latter type—by doing nothing.
Oliver and Smiley also distinguish, as I here do not, between argument places and “positions” within them.
For relevant discussion, that may throw doubt on the identity claim, see (Fine 2000).
I here adapt a claim of Anselm’s. See (O’Neill 1994) for discussion.
Thanks to audiences in Helsinki, York, Konstanz, London, Cambridge, Southampton, and Manchester, where some of this material was presented. Many others, too numerous to thank, have helped along the way. Special thanks to the editors and to my Ph.D. thesis supervisor Mike Martin.
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Smith, T.H. Playing One’s Part. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 213–244 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0059-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0059-y