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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Intuitionism has for many years been a poor relation among the various metaethical theories, commonly thought both parochial and irrational. Most recent writers who attempt a survey of ethical theory mention it briefly in an embarrassed sort of way, and then dismiss it in a paragraph or two. John Rawls, however, does not share this common attitude. In his recent book he represents his own theory as being an alternative both to intuitionism and to utilitarianism, and it is apparent from his discussion that he takes both of these latter theories seriously, as having substantial attraction to reasonable men. Those sympathetic to intuitionism have no doubt been cheered by Rawls’ respectful treatment; but they are likely also to have been dismayed by the fact that, because he focuses upon a somewhat unusual understanding of it, he does not make clear how his theory stands in relation to intuitionism in its most general form, nor whether there are varieties of intuitionism consistent with the whole of his theory or at least with important parts of it. I shall try to answer these questions here.
1 A Theory of justice, (Cambridge, 1971). Numbers in parentheses distributed throughout the text refer to pages in Rawls’ book.
2 Moral Obligation, (Oxford, 1948). p. 17. A similar intuitionistic view is discussed, although not attributed to anyone, in Sidgwick, H., Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., (London, 1907), p. 99f.Google Scholar See also: Brandt, R. B., Ethical Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, 1959), p. 188.Google Scholar
3 Moore's view of rightness is a bit more complicated than the above sentence suggests. He held that “right” means “productive of the greatest intrinsic good;” but he also held that it is always right to follow the numerous rules of common sense morality, on the ground that we are never justified in believing that breach of such a rule will be optimific. Principia Ethica, (Cambridge, 1903), p. 162f. Still, on his view, the act utilitarian principle is the one by means of which we discover what is right for us to do: this is because we can know that we should think it right always to follow the rules of common sense morality only by calculating the probable consequences of their breach and by then applying the act utilitarian principle. As for his view of intrinsic goodness, his principle of organic unities (viz., that the intrinsic value of a whole is not in general a function of the intrinsic values of its parts, so that things intrinsically bad can combine to make something intrinsically good) prevents Moore from holding that goodness can in general be determined by subsuming things under general rules. (Cf., p. 27f.)
4 Distributive Justice, (Indianapolis, 1966).
5 “Intuitionism” is of course a technical term, and even among philosophers it probably has no uniform use. It therefore cannot be supposed that any proposed definition of it captures precisely its correct usage. Still, there are limits to how it should be used. Certain theories are counted intuitionistic by all philosophers, e.g., those of Prichard, Moore, Ross, Ewing, Carritt, together with that of such an earlier figure as Richard Price. Theories which deny truth value to moral judgments or which deny that there can be moral knowledge ditter so radically from these paradigmatic intuitionistic ones that a definition which allowed them to count as intuitionistic could only breed confusion.
6 So far as I am aware, the point was first recognized by Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1006a, 8-12. It may be supposed that holding that there are moral judgments that can be known to be true without proof is equivalent to holding that some moral judgments are self-evident, but this would be a mistake. I take it that it is not selfevident that there is an external world, but surely we know that there is. However, since skepticism has yet to be given a conclusive refutation, we as yet have nothing like a proof of the external world.
7 “The Independence of Moral Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XLVIII (1974-75), p. 9.
8 To forestall a likely objection, in saying that intuitionists have held that appeal to the judgment of reflective and conscientious men is the most important test of a moral judgment's truth I do not mean to deny that many intuitionists have thought it the sole test. It is, however, important to recognize that an intuitionist need not be committed to this test alone, and that in cases in which disagreement persists, perhaps because factual error and bias are hard to eradicate, he may appeal to some ancillary test. At least one intuitionist, Ewing, A. C., recommends that a coherence test be used in such cases, vide, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, (New York, 1959), esp. p. 72f.Google Scholar
9 I borrow the notion of a considered judgment from Rawls, who characterizes it as applying to judgments made in such circumstances that “the more common excuses and explanations for making a mistake do not obtain,” i.e., when we are confident in our opinion, when we are not emotionally upset, when our interests are not directly affected, and when we have a desire to reach a correct determination. (47f)
10 See, e.g., Carritt, E. F., Ethical and Political Thinking,(Oxford, 1947), p. 5f;Google ScholarRoss, W. D., The Foundations of Ethics, (Oxford, 1939), p. 312;Google Scholar A. C. Ewing, op. cit., p. 123.
11 “The Independence of Moral Theory,” op. cit., p. 9.
12 He suggests even that our present concept of something's being right be replaced by “the concept of being in accordance with the principles that in the original position would be acknowledged to apply to things of its kind.” (111) Such energetic advocacy of the parties’ moral conception seems hard to square with his subsequent advice that we suspend search for the correct theory of right or wrong. But perhaps he now intends that the book's moral conception be regarded only as one among many plausible conceptions to be examined, not as being uniquely correct.
13 I owe the germ of the argument to Nagel, Thomas, “Rawls on justice,“ Philosophical Review, LXXXII (1973), p. 226f.Google Scholar See also Barry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of justice, (Oxford, 1973), p. 15.Google Scholar
14 A “well-ordered society” is one in which everyone accepts the principles of right adopted in the original position, knows that everyone does so, and knows that society is ordered according to the principles of justice. (4f, 453f) Rawls stipulates that the parties choose principles for the well-ordered society. (145, 245)
15 For a plausible argument to the conclusion that the parties need not settle upon some determinate principles of distributive justice, and so a fortiori not Rawls' own, see Gardner, Michael R., “Rawls on the Maximin Rule and Distributive Justice,” Philosophical Studies, XXVII (1975), pp. 255-269.Google Scholar
16 For a discussion of the obligation of fair play from an intuitionistic point of view, see my “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?,” Yale Law journal, LXXXII (1972-1973), esp. pp. 954-960. I there argue that the obligation is rather more complex than Rawls allows.
17 Nagel, op. cit., p. 228; Barry, op. cit., esp. Chapter 2.
18 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York, 1974), pp. 198-204.Google Scholar
19 Rawls takes brief notice of this consequence of his theory on pp. 504-512. See also Tribe, Laurence H., “Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law,” Yale Law journal, LXXXIII (1973-1974), p. 1335.Google Scholar
20 I must thank Gerald Barnes, Hugo A. Bedau, Robert A. Simon, and Stephen R. Munzer for acute criticism of an earlier draft.
