Abstract
There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two common presuppositions about the notion of relevance. The account holds that worlds, rather than alternatives, are relevant, and that distant worlds can be relevant. Relevant worlds turn out to be those worlds at which an alternative to one’s belief obtains, and is such that one’s epistemic position (with respect to what one believes at the actual world) is worse than it is at the actual world.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Boer, S. E. (1979). Meaning and contrastive stress. The Philosophical Review, 88, 263–98.
Cohen, S. (1988). How to be a fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 91–123.
Cohen, S. (1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 289–306.
DeRose, K. (1998). Relevant alternatives and the content of knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56, 193–97.
DeRose, K. (1988). Solving the skeptical problem. In K. DeRose & T. Warfield (Eds.), Skepticism: A contemporary reader (pp. 183–219). New York: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. (1970). Epistemic operators. The Journal of Philosophy, 67, 1007–1023.
Dretske, F. (1972). Contrastive statements. Philosophical Review, 81, 411–437.
Dretske, F. (1981a). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1981b). The pragmatic dimension of knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 40, 363–378.
Feldman, R. & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 15–34.
Firth, R. (1978). Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts? In A. Goldman & J. Kim (Eds.), Values and Morals (pp. 215–229). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Goldman, A. (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 771–791.
Greco, J. (2000). Putting skeptics in their place: The nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Heller, M. (1999). Relevant alternatives and closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 196–208.
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549–567.
Sanford, D. (1981). Knowledge and relevant alternatives: Comments on dretske. Philosophical Studies, 40, 379–388.
Schaffer, J. (2003). Perceptual knowledge derailed. Philosophical Studies, 112, 31–45.
Sosa, E. (1986). On knowledge and context. The Journal of Philosophy, 83, 584–585.
Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Vogel, J. (1999). The new relevant alternatives theory. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 155–180.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Smith, J.A. Relevant possibilities. Philos Stud 138, 55–71 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0009-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0009-1