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To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living

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Abstract

David Benatar argues that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living (LWL), then you have not all things considered wronged her. Lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding (LWA) constitute a net harm. Lives worth avoiding are net high in objective bads and low in objective goods. It is the prospect of a LWA that gives us good reason to not bring someone into existence. Happily, many lives are not worth avoiding. Contra Benatar, many are indeed worth living. Even if we grant Benatar his controversial asymmetry thesis, we have no reason to think that coming into existence is always a net harm.

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Notes

  1. Benatar (2006).

  2. Benatar (2006, ch.2).

  3. In fact, Benatar provides three arguments. The third is not well developed. Benatar (2006, p.92) argues that given the risk of significant suffering, we should not gamble with the lives of our offspring. DeGrazia (2010, p.329) raises objections. Benatar (2012, pp.141–148) replies.

  4. Not to be confused with Lucretius’ symmetry argument against the badness of non-existence. Lucretius (2007, p.101; III, ln.965–976)

  5. Metz (2011, p.239) calls it “the argument from the point of view of the universe.”

  6. There might be an exception: If we could have brought the same person into existence in such a way that they would have lived a better life, but instead bring them into existence into a less good life, then we can plausibly be said to wrong that person.

  7. Yeates (2012, p.1) introduces the helpful label “a life worth avoiding.”

  8. Benatar (2006, p.48) acknowledges this implication.

  9. I think the implausibility of the conclusion is likely a reductio, despite Benatar’s (2006, pp.202–7) protest to the contrary. Nevertheless, I agree with Smilansky (2008, p.571) that “this is a daring and highly original philosophical book.”

  10. One might cast a related claim in terms of negative and positive duties. The distinction also tracks the difference between malfeasance and beneficence.

  11. Benatar (2006, p.32). Benatar (2012, p.127) is skeptical.

  12. Benatar (2006, p.31).

  13. As is common in the axiological literature, I use the terms “well-being”, “welfare”, and “prudential value” interchangeably.

  14. Benatar (2006, p.14). Here it isn’t clear if he means morally bad or prudentially bad for the deprived. Harman (2009, p.785, n.3) says that Benatar told her that he is talking about prudential value. Benatar (2012, p.125) makes this explicit.

  15. Benatar seems to accept the standard deprivation account of the badness of death. For a coma case, see Luper (2009, p.104).

  16. Benatar (2006, p.41) says that the state of the absence of pleasure is not like a neutral state for a person, since no one exists. He treats the absense of pain differently. Brown (2011, p.51) argues that the putative incommensurability should also apply to the bads. If non-existence is the issue, this would seem to apply to the absence of pain as well. Benatar (2013, pp.138–140) replies to Brown. Harman (2009) and Bradley (2009) argue that any alternate version of the argument assuming the remarks on page 41 is unmotivated if not incoherent: it “wreaks havoc with the logic of” betterness. Benatar (2013, pp.135–138) replies to Bradley.

  17. Put this boldly, Harman (2009, p.782) argues that the asymmetry is unmotivated. Bradley (2010, p.4) makes a stronger complaint. They are both attuned to the problems of page 41.

  18. I will ignore the strangeness in talking about things being good or bad for those who would have existed. DeGrazia (2010, p.321–2) finds it odd to speak of the interest of the non-existent. Bradley (2010, p.1) develops a version of the argument that avoids this awkwardness. He (2010, p.1, n.1) frames the argument in terms of value simpliciter rather than in terms of welfare.

  19. Benatar (2006, p.1). I assume that Benatar is working with a notion of harm much like that defended by Feinberg—a culpable setback of interests.

  20. Benatar (2006, p.38) presents this chart.

  21. Troublesome remarks suggest that we should compare 1 to 3, but not 2 to 4. I find this apiece with the problematic remarks on page 41.

  22. I think this presentation of the argument is more straightforward and closer to the text than that offered by Harman (2009, pp.778–80), who skillfully teases out some possible ambiguities.

  23. Metz (2011, pp.240–5) develops several objections to Benatar’s argument for the asymmetry claim. DeGrazia (2010, pp. 322–4) raises objections to all four sources of support for the asymmetry. Benatar (2012, pp.128–141) replies to several other criticisms of the asymmetry claim.

  24. This is a theoretical device, not a claim about our ability to produce such numbers for any actual lives. This kind of talk has precedent. See: Feldman (2006), Bradley (2009), and McMahan (2002).

  25. Nozick (1989) defends the relevance of the narrative to the value of a life for the one who lives it. As does Velleman (1993).

  26. Benatar (2006, pp.44–8).

  27. Benatar (2006, pp.45–6).

  28. If the first two replies fail, as I think they do, the asymmetry based argument stands or falls on Benatar’s second argument—the argument from pessimism.

  29. Benatar (2006, p.47).

  30. Benatar (2013, p.125).

  31. Metz (2011, p.248) notes that the capacity would simply not be good for the person who never gets sick.

  32. Benatar (2006, p.43).

  33. Benatar (2006, p.40).

  34. Brill (2012). Benatar (2012, p.142).

  35. Benatar (2012, p.142, n.46). Why value neutrality is not best represented as a 0 is unclear. Although this is the central problem for the asymmetry argument, Benatar has never offered a clear statement of his reply. Too much of it is buried in dense notes, such as the one cited here. Benatar (2006, p.41–49, 2012, p.142–144, and 2013, p.137) all grapple with the issue, but it is difficult to see the solution. In what follows, I do my best.

  36. Benatar (2006, p.14). The “real” adjective is far more prominent in the early article length version of the argument. It has been removed from key passages that are otherwise verbatim.

  37. Benatar (2012, p.144) holds that the absence of pleasure has neutral intrinsic value in quadrant 4, “but it is also not worse than the pleasure in (2).” It might appear worse, but worse than is a relative assessment. Relatively, given that there is no one deprived, it is not worse. Hence, the good in quadrant 2 is not better than the neutral value in quadrant 4. Putting aside Bradley’s (2010) troubling concerns about the odd logic of betterness on display here, I don’t see any argument for Benatar’s claim here other than that stemming from the notion of real advantages. Otherwise, his claim is unsupported. As I argue, it is not an implication of the asymmetry thesis alone. The fact that quadrant 4 is not bad, does not mean that quadrant 2 is not better.

  38. Draper (1999) uses a similar set of examples in developing a theory of misfortunes.

  39. Benatar (2006, p.41).

  40. Benatar (2006, p.40) notes that it is most accurate to say that the absence of pleasure is “not bad” for the non-existent.

  41. Benatar (2012, p.144).

  42. Draper (1999) and Smuts (2012) argue against comparative notions of bad. Benatar (2013, p.128) quickly claims that it is “axiologically” good to avoid pain. By this he means that it is prudentially better. That the avoidance of pain is good for me. It makes my life better. Here, he adopts a comparative notion of good. His theory of what constitutes an advantage is a symmetrical view about the bad: the absence of a good is bad. I think both claims are wrong, but I am only taking issue with the claim about the bad. I deny that less good is (axiologically) bad; it’s just less good.

  43. Clearly Benatar thinks that we can compare existence and non-existence, he does so. As mentioned earlier, he says so explicitly in Benatar (2013, pp.125 and 126).

  44. Benatar (2013, p.126).

  45. Adams (2003) makes a similar point regarding horrendous evils.

  46. Metz (2011, p.238) also argues that the asymmetry argument is dependent on the argument from pessimism.

  47. If my distinction ultimately turns out to be untenable, the rest of my argument survives: Simply read my account of what makes a life worth lives as an objective list theory of welfare. Since Benatar intends for his arguments to apply to objective list theories of welfare, my objections hit the mark. We are not talking past each other.

  48. For a current survey of the literature, see Metz (2007).

  49. Only a few have drawn a distinction between what makes a life worth living and what makes a life meaningful. As far as I can tell, Baier (1988) provides the only sustained discussion of the distinction. Baier (1997, pp.67–69) also makes a few passing remarks on worth. Apart from this, only Trisel (2007) argues for the distinction, though he offers what appears to be a welfarist notion of worth. Metz (2007, p.213) makes a clear statement of the difference, but provides little defense. Metz (2002, p.788, n.10) also briefly notes the distinction. Blumenfeld (2009, p.8, n.2) seconds Metz’s proposal. Haack (2002) proposes that we ditch the concept of meaning for worth. She does not explain the conceptual difference. Wollheim (1984, pp.444–8) proposes a distinction between a life worth living and a worthwhile life. I decline adopting this terminology, since there is better, more familiar conceptual machinery: his distinction closely tracks that between welfare and meaning. Other commentators, such as Wolf (2010), understandably interchange concepts such as “the good life,” (pp.12, 52, and 118) a life that would seem a benefit (pp.21, 23, and 27), the “fully successful life” (p.32), the “fully flourishing life” (p.12), and the life good for the one who lives it (p.32). Since, she thinks that the notion is different from self-interest (pp.56, 63, and 116) and happiness (p.109), it appears that we might have in mind a similar notion. By “the good life” Hurka (2011) seems to have in mind a life worth living. He too defends an objective list account. Haybron (2010, p.38) refers to “the good life” as “a choiceworthy life on the whole.” This closely tracks the notion I defend. Here I will avoid the vexed term “the good life,” since some, such as Feldman (2006), use it to refer to a life high in individual welfare, though this usage is somewhat aberrant. Baier (1997, pp.67–9) makes a few passing remarks on worth. McDermott (1991) and Harries (1991) putatively discuss worth, and both are cited as making a contribution to the literature, but neither directly addresses the topic.

  50. The limited appeals to the notion in the animal rights and population ethics literature seem to use the notion as indicating a minimum threshold of positive welfare.

  51. Kagan (1992 and 1994) makes an important distinction between me and my life. He defends a narrow theory of wellbeing, of what is good for me. As for what improves the value of my life, he says very little. I think that the welfare / worth distinction captures what is important in Kagan’s proposal.

  52. In her critical study, Harman (2009, pp.777 and 783) phrases the issue in terms of what makes a life worth living. But she does not offer a theory. Nor does she make a distinction between worth and welfare.

  53. Please put aside worries about foreknowledge and free will. Such concerns can be avoided, or obscured, by re-phrasing the test into an end of life counter-factual evaluation of this general form: Would a benevolent caretaker with knowledge of your life as you lived it have allowed you to have been born, if it had been up to her?

  54. Williams (1995, p.228). This is illuminating, but the condition is not necessary, since someone such as Hitler, who lived a worthless life, might not resent his existence.

  55. Smuts (forthcoming) critically evaluates four other tests to the same end.

  56. Blumenfeld (2009, p.386, n.36). The recurrence test is not a good test for whether a life is worth living. Blumenfeld (2009, p.378) concurs.

  57. Feldman (2006. pp.9–10) and Bradley (2009, pp.2–3) discuss the test. Adams (1999, p.97) proposes a similar test. Feldman (2011, pp.164–170) backs off the crib test in favor of triangulation.

  58. Darwall (2002, pp.4–8) offers a related suggestion: What is in someone’s welfare is what someone who cares about her would want for her. It’s what we want for her sake. Bradley (2009, pp.3) finds the notion of a “sake” unilluminating, as does Heathwood (2008, pp.53 and 54 n.11).

  59. Bradley (2009, pp.3)

  60. I assume that morality and self-interest can conflict. This is the default view. The burden is on anyone who suggests otherwise. I will return to this later in the paper.

  61. It is fairly common to motivate the concern this way. See: Frankl (1959, p.117), Metz (2001, p.147), Wolf (2010, p.8), and Weilenberg (2005). In contrast, Sumner (1999, pp.22 and 24) uses a deathbed test to raise thoughts about welfare.

  62. Smilansky (1997, p.241). Yeates (2012, p.2) presents a subjective theory as well: these are lives that “from the animal’s point of view [are] ‘worth having’ or ‘worth avoiding’”. He thinks it is a matter of “overall welfare” (forthcoming, p.3).

  63. Blumenfeld (2009, p.383) suggests that idea of a caretaker for determining whether it would be good to live again.

  64. Smilansky (1997).

  65. Here I echo a point Adams (2003) makes about meaning.

  66. Benatar thinks that the two require very different standards. I disagree. DeGrazia (2010, p.320) also questions the need for different standards.

  67. Kavka (1981, p.105) calls lives deficient in such goods “restricted lives.” These, he argues, are less worth living.

  68. Wolf (1997 and 2010).

  69. Kamm (2003).

  70. Yeates (2012).

  71. The calculation will have to account for the intensity as well as overall quantity. An extremely painful episode might make the entire life worth avoiding. Also, an extremely long life that is barely positive in goods might not just be a LWN, it might be a LWA. It is out of scope to sort out these kinds of details. See: Parfit (1984).

  72. Metz (2011, p.249) argues that more than welfare is relevant to whether a life is worth living. I agree.

  73. Some of the more influential defenses of the OLT of well-being (not worth) include: Brink (1989, pp.221–36), Hooker (1996), Nozick (1989), and Scanlon (1993).

  74. If harm is purely a matter of welfare, and worth is not, you could sometimes harm someone by bringing them into a life worth living. For instance, the welfare level could be negative but the meaning level high. Sure. But that does not mean that you have done something wrong, not unless welfarism about morality is true. I do not accept welfarism, but a defense of anti-welfarism is out of scope. See Keller (2008) and Sumner (1999) for overviews of the issue. Note that Benatar’s argument is not confined to these odd edge cases. He claims that it is always a net harm to be brought into existence.

  75. Bradley (2010, p.5) argues that if the good outweighs the bad, then a life is worth starting. Metz (2011, p.241) and DeGrazia (2010, p.323–4) arrive at a similar conclusion. Due to limitations of scope, I must put aside concerns arising from the non-identity problem. For a foundational exchange on the issue see: Kavka (1981) and Parfit (1981).

  76. Edwards (1979, p.94) argues that desiring is often pleasant: “This is the whole point of standing on the corner and watching all the girls go by.”

  77. Smuts (2008) defends this view. Soll (1998) develops this argument.

  78. Benatar (2006, p.81–2).

  79. Benatar (2006, p.86).

  80. Benatar (2006, p.82).

  81. Benatar (2006, p.83). Taylor (2008) beautifully expresses a similar view.

  82. Russell (2008, p.56)

  83. Weilenberg (2005, p.16).

  84. Edwards (2008, p.121). Weilenberg (2005, p.29) and Wolf (2010) make this point. Nagel (2004) seems to raise a similar objection.

  85. Draper (1999).

  86. Benatar (2006, p.84). Benatar (2012, p.151) raises similar considerations.

  87. DeGrazia (2010, p.328) disagrees.

  88. But not in every way. I cannot explore the issue here, but it is worth noting a heresy ala Pico della Mirandola: humans can realize values not available to god-like creatures or angels. Unlike angels, we have to get our knowledge the old fashion way: we earn it.

  89. I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for providing detailed, thoughtful feedback.

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    Aaron Smuts

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Smuts, A. To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 711–729 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9461-0

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