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Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference it Should Make

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Abstract

P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, 70 Laurier East Street, P.O. Box 450, Stn. A, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1N 6N5

    Andrew Sneddon

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  1. Andrew Sneddon
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Correspondence to Andrew Sneddon.

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Thanks to an audience at Carleton University for helpful discussion.

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Sneddon, A. Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference it Should Make. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 8, 239–264 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-2484-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-2484-4

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