Heidegger and Derrida on Structure and Form.

As a subject constructs and organizes an object via a valuative account, the object is conditioned by this subjective activity. But if that were the end of it, we would not move past Kant's conditions of possibility. The subject must in turn be reciprocally conditioned by the object. The object grounded by the subject and the subject grounded by the object is a non-grounded grounding, or more precisely, an activity of reciprocal transformation. Philosophers in the post Hegel era, from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, have recognized that Being, if it is to overcome metaphysics, must take into account, imply, differentiate from, structural beings while not being a structure itself. Heidegger was committed to forging a path of thinking integrating, without succumbing to, the dominant philosophical traditions of the 20th century(dialectical and Neo-Kantian subjectivism and positivist empiricism). Heidegger laid the groundwork for this path in Being and Time.

Being distinguishes itself as the unity of the mutual carrying out and trans-formative nature of beings-being. BT's challenge was to formulate the Ontological-Ontic Difference in such a way as to avoid rendering Being as grounding condition of possibility for beings, as unconditioned master concept, a first principle. Via the ontological difference, "Being grounds beings, and beings, as what IS most of all, account for Being. One comes over the other, one arrives in the other. Overwhelming and arrival appear in each other" (Heidegger, Identity and Difference). With the era initiated by the Kehre, Heidegger further developed a way to think the overcoming of the self-contradiction of a grounding concept that seeks to overcome objectification. Ereignis performs the unity of the difference between Being and Beings as differentiating event.

If Heideggerian Being takes into account, implies, differentiates from, structural beings while not being a structure itself, what does it mean for beings to 'have a structure'? Words like rote and mechanical depict the effects of structure as generator of process of repetition of a dominating theme. And this is what many scholars target in Heidegger's critique of technology and Gestell. But what is a structure in and of itself, prior to and outside of its production-reproduction? What is the meaning of structure as momentary state, before it is thought as programmatic process, as conversion, formulaic self-unfolding?

Writers endorsing a general account of meaning as non-recuperable or non-coincidental from one instantiation to the next may nonetheless treat the heterogeneous contacts between instants of experience as transformations of fleeting forms, states, logics, structures, outlines, surfaces, presences, organizations, patterns, procedures, frames, standpoints. When thought as pattern, the structural-transcendental moment of eventness upholds a certain logic of internal relation; the elements of the configuration mutually signify each other and the structure presents itself as a fleeting identity, a gathered field. The particularity of eventness is not allowed to split the presumed (temporary) identity of the internal configuration that defines the structure as structure. History would be the endless reframing of a frame, the infinite shifting from paradigm to paradigm.

It is this presumed schematic internality of eventness, the power of abstractive multiplicity given to the sign, which causes experience to be treated as resistant to its dislocation, as a lingering or resistant form, pattern, configuration, infrastructure. Of the numerous philosophers since Hegel who have attempted to resuce the subject-object scheme-content relation from metaphysical domination(Kierkegaard, Gadmaer, Levinas, Nietzsche), Heidegger and Derrida are the first to question and dismantle the very possibility of structure-pattern-scheme as subject or object. How so?

Let us examine the phenomenon of structure more closely. How is structure composed? What is the structurality of structure? Contemporary philosophical thinking outside of Heidegger and Derrida tends to think the spatial frame of structure as enclosure of co-present elements. It is an internality, full presence, a resting in itself and an auto-affection. Structure would be a pattern framing a finite array of elements . It would be a system of classification, a vector or center of organization. We can think pattern in abstract(the structure of democracy) or concrete(the structure of a house) terms. A structure has properties in the minimal sense that it is defined by its center, that which organizes and, determines it thematically as that which is the bearer of its attributes, that according to which its elements are aligned. Structure is plurality of the identical.

If a structure is an organization of elements, those elements themselves are structures. The object is structure in that it is self-presence, its turning back to itself in order to be itself as presence, subsistence, auto-affection, the 'this as itself'. Therefore structure would be irreducible. It would be the primordial basis of beings as objects (point of presence, fixed origin) as internality, space as frame, subsistence, pure auto-affection, representation , category, law, self-presence itself. Also value, will, norm. So much rides on where we begin from in thinking about beginnings.

In various writings Derrida deconstructs the notion of structure. He argues that structure implies center, and at the center, transformation of elements is forbidden. But he says in fact there is no center, just the desire for center. If there is no center, there is no such singular thing as structure, only the decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. "Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences."(Sign, Structure and Play, Writing and Difference p352)

"The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling

presence; it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence..(Limited Inc p53)."

In their essence, Beings don't HAVE structure or constitution. There is no such THING as a form, a structure, a state. There is no trans-formation but rather a trans-differentiation, (transformation without form, articulation as dislocation) What is being transcended is not form but difference. Each of the elements in the array that define a structure are differences .They do not belong to a structure . They are their own differentiation. There is no gathering, cobbling , synthesis, relating together, only a repetition of differentiation such that what would have been called a form or structure is a being the same differently from one to the next. Not a simultaneity but a sequence. So one could not say that form of nature is the way in which nature transitions through and places itself into the forms and states that, from a schematic perspective, constitute the path of its movement, and nature turns into natural things, and vice versa. Nature would not transition through forms and states, Nature, as difference itself, transitions though differential transitions. Differences are not forms. Forms are enclosures of elements organized according to a rule. Forms give direction. Difference does not give direction, it only changes direction. What are commonly called forms are a temporally unfolding system of differences with no organizing rule, no temporary 'it'. The transformation is from one differential to the next before one ever gets to a form.

Schemes, conceptual, forms, intentions, willings have no actual status other than as empty ontic abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms, immediately and unknowingly transform the senses operating within (and defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways concealed by but overrunning what ontically understood symbols, bits, assemblies, bodies, frames and other states are supposed to be , even if (and especially when) Ereignis as transformative event names the overturning of being as Ge-stell. The briefest identification of a so-called state is an unknowing experiencing of temporally unfolding multiplicity of differences. This is the ontological being of the ontic notion of structure, in the service of which Heidegger puts the old word to work as its deconstruction. In Heidegger's fundamental ontological 'forms' one finds nothing like a structure in any commonly understood sense, only what would be difference as the hermeneutical 'as', heedful association, 'being underway', producing, project, existing, care, the 'is', temporality, disclosiveness.

In BT, 'What is a Thing' and other writings, Heidegger describes a structure-thing as the bearer of properties and underlies qualities. A thing is a nucleus around which many changing qualities are grouped, or a bearer upon which the qualities rest, something that possesses something in itself. It has an internal organization. But Heidegger doesn't settle for this present to hand account. In a gesture allied with Derrida, he thinks the structurality of structure as the Being of beings. But he doesn't do this by conceiving Being via the transitioning through and placing itself into, the turning toward and away from, structures, forms, schemes. This would be to pre-suppose the metaphysical concept of structure as present to hand state, and thus leave it unquestioned. It would not only leave it unquestioned , but confuse ontological-ontic difference with ontic-ontic difference. What I see Heidegger doing is locating transformation within structure, as Derrida does in his own

way. Heidegger's discussion of propositional statements in BT sec 33 is key here. In this section he derives the apophantic 'as' structure of propositional logic from the hermeneutical 'as'.

As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of propositional statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external 'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it is taken together with it, but not in the manner of a synthesizing relating. Heidegger instead describes the 'as' as a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the same time takes apart what has been put together." Transcendence locates itself in this way within the very heart of the theoretical concept. Simply determining something AS something is a transforming-performing. It "understands, interprets, and articulates", and thereby "takes apart" and changes what it affirms by merely pointing at it, by merely having it happen to 'BE' itself. Heidegger's hermeneutical 'as' functions as Derrida's differential system of signs. Something is something only as differential . Articulation of the 'is' transforms in order to articulate. That is, articulation, hinge, IS the 'in order to'. Thus, the problem of the primordial grounding of the 'is', and the analysis of the logos are the same problem.

Heidegger writes:

"...if the formal characteristics of "relation" and "binding" cannot contribute anything phenomenally to the factual structural analysis of the logos, the phenomenon intended with the term copula finally has nothing to do with bond and binding."(BT,p160)
"The "is" here speaks transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in the manner of a transition to beings. But Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings were first without Being and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being transits (that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over." "That differentiation alone grants and holds apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each other."(Identity and Difference.p.64)

This is the method of Heidegger's decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. The thinking of structure as a singularity implies a multiplicity of supposed 'parts' captured in an instant of time. But the assumption that we think this parallel existence of differences at the 'same time', as the 'same space', organized and centered as a 'THIS', must unravel with the knowledge that each differential singular is born of and belongs irreducibly to, even as it is a transformation of, an immediately prior element . Two different elements cannot be presumed to exist at the same time because each single element is its own time(the hinged time of the pairing of a passed event with the presencing of a new event) as a change of place. Thus, whenever we think that we are theorizing two events at the same time, we are unknowingly engaging in a process of temporal enchainment and spatial recontextualization.

The assumption of a spatial frame depends on the ability to return to a previous element without the contaminating effect of time. How can we know that elements of meaning are of the same spatial frame unless each is assumed to refer back to the same 'pre-existing' structure? The same goes for the fixing of a point of presence as a singular object. This pointing to, and fixing of, an itself as itself is a thematic centering that brings with it all the metaphysical implications of the thinking of a structural center. Heidegger's 'as'(which is not a structure in itself but a differential) explains, derives and deconstructs form, structure, thing before it can ever establish itself as a 'this'.

The issue here centers on the understanding of Heideggerian temporality.
Is there a notion of transformation, transcendence, differentiation, event , performance that doesn't 'take time' but also avoids being a state, concept, intention, presence, structure? Is it possible to think of such a notion without inadvertently lapsing into metaphysical totalization? To fail to deconstruct the concept of structure is to conceive the 'both-together' of past-present-future as a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which supplements that past. It is not that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each must are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities in order to arrive at a notion of stricture-pattern-scheme as an identity. The association between past and present would be a fracturing, the fracture between Self and Other, between immanence and transcendence, rather than Heidegger's ecstatic unity. Ontological-Ontic difference is misread as difference between presences. As the overcoming-arriving difference of Heideggerian temporality, it is difference WITHIN presence.

Temporality as a 'split' within will, intention, presence is misread if it is thought as smaller bits of presence. Penetrating the veil of the formal permeating our language of the things within us and around us is not a matter of discovering smaller, faster, dumber, more interactive 'bits' within the unities of current approaches, for that would simply displace the issues we've discussed onto a miniaturized scale. It is a matter of revealing perhaps an entirely different notion of the basis of entities than that of the freeze-frame state. Being is not an interiority or enclosure(or in between enclosure and overcoming as the event of their differentiation). On the contrary, it exposes and subverts the presumed interiority of conceptuality, representation, will from within its own resources, in the same moment. To read Being and Time starting from the 'is', not as conceptual binding but as the transit of 'overwhelming and arrival', de-thrones logos, structure, concept and representation, relegating them to where and how we actually find them in BT, as special derived modifications of the hermeneutical 'as'.

How are we to do we understand Heidegger's admonitions concerning the dangers of Gestell? What does one make of those who have not read Heidegger, who have not grasped what he was aiming at, who battle against what they see as the dangerous 'antiscience' relativisms of postmodern thinking, who contribute to the universal objectification of being? As Heidegger points out in Identity and Difference, "the manner in which the matter of thinking-Being-comports itself, remains a unique state of affairs. The inauthentic

modes of the ready-to-hand, the present-to-hand, average everydayness, authentic Being, Ereignis all mark different factical experiences. Yet what is common to all possible modes of Being is a certain radical mobility. This means that there is, every moment , within the thinking of each individual who participates in the most apparently rigidly schematic orientations, a radical mobility WITHIN the will to conceptual schematism* that is easy to miss (and in fact has been missed for most of Western history , according to Heidegger). Even if the effect of this mobility is subtle enough that it appears for all intents and purposes as though the reign of the dominating objectivizing scheme were absolute, it is crucial to recognize that even in such situations that seem to exemplify the a priori neutralization of otherness, a more originary but radically self-dissimulating a priori, that of Being, is in play, always right now, this instant.

Within and beyond states, forms and structures, lies a universe of barely self-exceeding accents, modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but modulations of modulations. The worlds generated from (but never overtaking) this intricate process may be clumsily described via the terminology of patterned interactions between states, but at the cost of missing the profound ongoing internal relatedness and immediacy of this underlying, overflowing movement. Heidegger reveals Being as an interface both more intrinsically self-transformative and implicatively self-consistent than current views allow for. The belief in temporary discrete states stifles the intimately interactive potential of their approaches by making the whole works dependent on irreducible units of formal resistance and polarization.

Rather than originating in an invasive, displacing outside. of interactions between partially independent regions, the 'isness' of Being is already articulated as intersections of intersections, metaphors of metaphors(as metaphoricity itself), guaranteeing that the person as a whole always functions as an implicatory unity at the very edge of experience. Before there is self or world , there would be this single-split gesture, co-implicating continuity and qualitative transformation in such a way that existing maintains a unity which recognizes itself, at every moment, the 'same differently'. Aspects hidden within so-called present forms and structures, unique to the implicative thrust of my own existing, belong to me in a fashion that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity. On the contrary, the radically inseparable interaffecting between my history and new experience exposes me to the world in an immediate, constant and thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of my sense of myself and others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via a narrative conception of socialization.

I am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply person-specific rather than located intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before there is a pre-reflective personal 'I' or interpersonal 'we', there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings (recent examples of such intersubjective 'cobbling' include enactive, embodied, embedded accounts put forth by writers like Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson, which posit distributed cognition and affect, inter-corporeal

co-creation of meaning, participatory sense-making). Events understood as interaffectings of interaffectings, working within and beyond relations among presumed temporary essences (conceptual, affective-bodily, interpersonal), do not achieve their gentle integrative continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, they simply lack the formidability of static identity necessary to impose the arbitrariness of conditioning, mapping, mirroring, grafting and cobbling, on the movement of experiential process.

Most readings of Heidegger (Gadamer, Levinas, Evan Thompson) view the mutual carrying out and trans-formative nature of beings-being as implying, including, and carrying along with it rather than erasing the internal composition of a structure of a being-to-be-modified. Being for them is substance and movement . Being is nature itself as the transformative substance and movement that goes across and beyond formation. Being is the 'in between' the subjective conditioning of the object and the objective conditioning of the subject. So the array of elements that are organized and thought together, at once, thematically as this structure-form are carried into their trans-formation(we could also say trans-structuration). But I have argued here that the purpose of Heidegger's investigation of propositionality is not to identify theoretical objects as ontological givens for Being, but to establish propositional object, concept, representation, Gestell, as ontic existents in order to reveal them more rigorously as grounded ontologically (in the sense of fundamental ontology) in primordial unconcealment. Most readings of Heidegger do the reverse, attempting to ground fundamental ontology, and all of the modal analyses which spring from it, in what for Heidegger is the ontic plane of propositional representation. In other words, they reduce the ontological difference to a difference between two ontic determinations. Being conceived as the performative difference between schematism and existence is a difference between two ontic determinations and therefore is itself on the ontic plane of propositionality. It is a present to hand thinking masquerading as post-metaphysical.

When one begins from the subjectivism of representationality, the way of out of Kantian a priorism must stand as the absolute other to representation; that is to say, it must arrive in the guise of the performance of the differentiation between Subjective structuring and Objective determination. Only in this way can the empirically conditioned and contingent beginning of thought avoid being mistaken for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Even the radicality of Deleuzian difference begins from a thinking of structure-state as irreducible. Heidegger and Derrida give us a way to avoid grounding fundamental ontology in the performative difference between schematism and existence as its condition of possibility.

Gendlin and Heidegger on Logic, Proposition, Concept, Pattern:

 The greatest challenge to philosophical thinking today is to become aware of how deeply entrenched traditional notions of logic remain, in the extent to which they still govern approaches from Nietzsche and Gadamer to Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty.
In recognition of the daunting task of dismantling the metaphysics of propositional thinking, Heidegger spoke of the necessity, in a confrontation with the tradition, to "revolutionarily shake

up the notion of logic" from the ground up (Logic as the Question concerning the Essence of Language).

As an illustration of the difficulty of achieving a revolution in our thinking of logic, I want to bring the work of Eugene Gendlin into the discussion. Drawing from diverse influences spanning hermeneutics, existentialism, pragmatism and phenomenology, Gendlin has submitted the problematic of structure-state-pattern to a fundamental questioning that nearly approaches the radicality of Heidegger and Derrida in its situating the genesis of meaning-making in an always-already self-temporalizing interaffecting whose unfolding precedes and overflows any notion of state or form.

Reminiscent of Heidegger's analysis of propositional statements, Gendlin writes concerning structurality "The notion of an imposed order splits everything into two sides: The order is considered as if it were independent. On the other side there is something passive and unordered, upon which order is imposed, something that does not feed back, because it has no order of its own." The essence of a pattern for Gendlin is the self-identicality of representation.

"An imposed order is the sort of order that can be the same, here or there, so that it does not depend on what it is imposed upon. The very notion of "order" has come to mean the sort that can be imposed, that is to say it is assumed to function like a pattern. An order that can be imposed is inherently abstract, since it is the same in many places. So it is independent of the places and can omit everything that does not fit it. Therefore it can be put on something that did not have it from itself. Such an order seems to work alone." (Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Language, and Situations).

So far Gendlin's idea of form, pattern and rule as cutting itself off from its meaning-giving context of relevance jibes with Heidegger's notion of statement as a limiting derivative modification of primordial ontological interpretation. But Gendlin stops short of deriving logical form from his generative implicit order.
Whereas for both Heidegger and Gendlin logical forms derive their originating meaning from a framing context (circumspection, attunement and the ready to hand for Heidegger, the bodily implicit order for Gendlin), the former's forms and patterns are irreducibly primordial in their internal structure, prior to their enbeddedness in a larger implicit order. Gendlin's wider implict order doesn't reveal the perceived self-identicality of his distinctions, forms, grids, patterns, schemes, categories to be a distortion or covering over of a more fundamental meaning-making, but instead reifies them by having them function alongside and feeding back into that wider, more intricate order. Gendlin says

 "Rules and forms are always at work; they are implicit in all our situations and our bodily experience — how we interact, eat, sleep, feel, and perceive. If there is a bodily order, we will see it functioning with, not without them.""Much of our living needs to be done within steady existing forms. But it is important to know that this intricacy is always there. At certain junctures it is vital to let it function."""[Implicit intricacy] is more demanding than logic. The working, changing, and coming of words is a function not just of extant forms but also of the implicit intricacy"(Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Language, and Situations).

"We need to go back and forth between logic and bodily-felt understanding. They build upon each other. It would be wrong to make an ideology of lauding one and pretending to do without the other."...patterns work-in another, more intricate order which talks back..."(The Time of the Explicating Process: A Comment on Thomas Fuchs' "Body Memory").

"To study the role played by implicit understanding in the coming of new concepts will not undermine the concepts we already have. Those concepts work explicitly, with logical implications. Logic is their own power for precise consequences. To use their power we must let them work as if they were alone, without us. Logical inference requires that we don't let anything upset the concepts. For example, while calculating our bank account we don't double one deposit because it came from a special source. All our technology depends on logical inference. Seven billion of us couldn't all live on the planet without it. To undermine logic and explicit concepts is not sensible. Of course we know that we operate the concepts. How they work 'alone' is something we let them do. This isn't very puzzling.

Whatever else concepts are, they are tools.
For example, a screwdriver must be allowed to keep its own narrow head, and to engage the screw with it. We are holding it, of course, but the screwdriver's own pattern turns the screw. Obviously, more complex machines produce their own results. Concepts similarly have their own logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts. We keep the system of existing concepts inviolate and separate. Then we can also have a second system in which we study how something implicit works in the coming of new concepts. We will be concerned throughout with the necessary separation, contrast, and relationship between the system of explicitly formed concepts and our second system about how something functions implicitly. Far from being in conflict, this article will show that if the two systems stay separate, they expand each other reciprocally."(What First and Third Person Processes Really Are).

Would Heidegger agree that concepts are tools that consist in their 'own' patterns and logical inferences, 'quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts'(Gendlin 2009)? The point for Heidegger would be that this apparent apartness of explicit logic from implicit experience is a kind of distortion of primordial Dasein's interpretive signification. Contrary to the 'precise consequences' Gendlin lauds in logical calculation, Heidegger says "the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more exact than historiographical, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it."

"The first, constant, and last task [of primordial understanding] is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to guarantee the scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves." Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's concept of logos would seem to apply to Gendlin's distinctions and patterns. "Aristotle had a more radical view [than Plato]; every logos is synthesis and diairesis at the same time, not either the one-say, as a "positive judgment"-or the other-as a "negative judgment." Rather, every statement, whether affirmative or negative, whether false or

true, is equiprimordially synthesis and diairesis. Pointing out is putting together and taking apart. However, Aristotle did not pursue this analytical question further to a problem: what phenomenon is it then within the structure of the logos that allows and requires us to characterize every statement as synthesis and diairesis? What is to be got at phenomenally with the formal structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the two, is the phenomenon of "something as something."

In accordance with this structure, something is
understood with regard to something else, it is taken together with it, so that this confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, at the same time takes apart what has been put together. If the phenomenon of the "as" is covered over and above all veiled in its existential origin from the hermeneutical "as," Aristotle's phenomenological point of departure disintegrates to the analysis of logos in an external "theory of judgment," according to which judgment is a binding or separating of representations and concepts. Thus binding and separating can be further formalized to mean a "relating." Logistically, the judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations," it becomes the object of "calculation," but not a theme of ontological interpretation." "If the kind of being of the terms of the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things."(BT 206)

"In the first and authentic instance, this "as" is not the "as" of predication qua predication but is prior to it in such a way that it makes possible the very structure of predication at all. Predication has the as-structure, but in a derived way, and it has it only because the as-structure is predication within a [wider] experience. But why is it that this as-structure is already present in a direct act of dealing with something? The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act. The non-explicitness of this "as" is precisely what constitutes the act's so-called directness. Yes, the thing that is understood can be apprehended directly as it is in itself. But this directness regarding the thing apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure. Moreover, what is structural and necessary in the act of [direct] understanding need not be found, or co-apprehended, or expressly named in the thing understood.

I repeat: The [primary] as-structure does not belong to something thematically understood. It certainly can be understood, but not directly in the process of focally understanding a table, a chair, or the like. Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it "as something," are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the "as" requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. Understanding something without the "as"—in a pure sensation, for example—can be carried out only "reductively," by "pulling back" from an as-structured experience. And we must say: far from being primordial, we have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most important, such an experience is per se possible only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only within an as-structured experience and by prescinding from the "as"— which is the same as admitting that as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from." (Logic,

The Question of Truth,p.122).

The minute one considers something like a form or distinction as a capacity to impose 'itself' on something or someone else, one is assuming calculability, representationalism and self-identical repetition. If, instead, a distinction always already distinguishes itself from what it relates itself to as a new 'this way' of relevant relating, then it would never have the chance to simply impose itself; it would always be itself as a new relevant distinction.

In Gendlin's example of the screwdriver's 'own logical pattern' turning the screw, the shape of a screwdriver's head may be understood in any variety of ways, but each possible account is understood primordially for Heidegger as a unique and particular relevant sense in relation to one's current involvements, via the hermeneutical 'as' structure. This is also true of the screw and its relationship with the screwdriver head, in terms of the precision of fit between the two or any other respect that is encountered in relation to our concernful dealings with screwdriver and screw as tools .

Most of the examples of logical patterns that Gendlin mentions in his writings involve public language rather than calculative machines, and as we saw with the use of screwdriver and screw, Gendlin posits an independence of logical relationships from his underlying implicit generating process. The former feed back into, but are not derived from the latter. Language concepts have "their own logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts", Heidegger refers to such public language in terms of the average everydayness of idle talk. He says "We encounter the vagueness and vacuity of meanings, which are not in fact grasped as meanings, in the way everyday talk pursues its themes. This impoverished ontological structure of the said and the talk that is governed by it must not prompt us to view language as a matter of tone or sound in the first instance. The vagueness of meaning is a specific quality, namely the routinized intelligibility of well-worn everyday talk....it may also pervade and govern the treatment of problems within scientific disciplines."(The Concept of Time 1924)." For Heidegger everyday communication can only be taken as an impoverished leveling down of primordial understanding precisely because the very basis of language is the primordiality of the hermeneutical 'as' structure. Thus, contrary to Gendlin, there is nothing about the logical functioning of language , or of tool use in general , that is independent of this generating impetus. We don't go back and forth between logic and bodily-felt understanding as independent systems of meaning. Rather, logic, as the derived modality of the present-to-hand, never departs from the fundamental dynamics of Being as attuned, discursive temporality.

In conclusion, Gendlin's struggle to jettison the remnants of the metaphysical foundations of logic led him to a compromise between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. He had taken a step beyond discourses of intersubjective cobbling, such as that of enactive, embodied extended cognitive theorists and Deleuzian bio-politics, by rethinking their arbitrary inter-relational schematics more fundamentally as the implicit intricacy of bodily intraffecting. Yet, rather than grounding logical forms, structures and states in this interaffecting, he left the basis of logic undeconstructed, thereby forcing his generating process to accommodate itself to and operate alongside rules and forms.

*The will never has a grasp of itself that is not a being beyond itself. When we think of intention as grasping toward objects, we don't see the underlying alterity that always makes desire want otherwise than what it wants in the very instant of desiring. Desire is only a willing of what it wills if thought of as a being-for-itself, auto-affection, the contingent self-identicality of the moment of a program. Intention-will-desire must be thought this way as long as it thinks itself grounded via structure, form, and state. Only when thought in this way does the problem arise of extricating ourselves from the temporary solipsism of the event (We MUST keep reason in play). Heidegger's critique of Will to Power, as I see it, faults Nietzsche for not departing radically enough from a Levinasian thinking of intentionality as the 'grasp of the Will'.