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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2023
Convincing narratives are not confabulations. Presumably they “feel right” to decision-making agents because the probabilities they assign intuitively (i.e., implicitly) to potential outcomes are plausible. Can we render explicit the calculations that would be performed by a decision-making agent to evaluate the plausibility of competing narratives? And if we can, what, exactly, makes a narrative “feel right” to an agent?
Target article
Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
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Author response
Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought