Kant and the Faculty of FeelingKelly Sorensen, Diane Williamson Kant stated that there are three mental faculties: cognition, feeling, and desire. The faculty of feeling has received the least scholarly attention, despite its importance in Kant's broader thought, and this volume of new essays is the first to present multiple perspectives on a number of important questions about it. Why does Kant come to believe that feeling must be described as a separate faculty? What is the relationship between feeling and cognition, on the one hand, and desire, on the other? What is the nature of feeling? What do the most discussed Kantian feelings, such as respect and sublimity, tell us about the nature of feeling for Kant? And what about other important feelings that have been overlooked or mischaracterized by commentators, such as enthusiasm and hope? This collaborative and authoritative volume will appeal to Kant scholars, historians of philosophy, and those working on topics in ethics, aesthetics, and emotions. |
Contents
The Sublime and Its Architectonic | 9 |
Two Different Kinds of Value? Kant on Feeling | 25 |
Rationalizing the Animal Within | 67 |
Feeling and Desire in the Human Animal | 88 |
Psychological Taxonomies | 107 |
Pleasure as Transition | 130 |
What Is It Like to Experience the Beautiful and Sublime? | 147 |
The Feeling of Enthusiasm | 184 |
Sympathy Love and the Faculty of Feeling | 208 |
Respect in Every Respect | 224 |
Is Kantian Hope a Feeling? | 242 |
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Common terms and phrases
action activity affect Anthropology apperception argues beautiful Cambridge University Press causality Clewis concept Critique of Judgment discussion distinction duty emotions empirical psychology enthusiasm Ethics faculty of cognition faculty of desire faculty of feeling feeling and desire feeling of pleasure feeling of reason’s feeling of respect freedom Frierson hope human ideas of reason Immanuel Kant inclination inner sense insofar intuition involves judge judgment of taste Kant’s account Kant’s Theory Kant’s view Kantian lectures merely Metaphysics of Morals mind moral cognition moral feeling moral law motivation noumenal one’s oneself ourselves particular Paul Guyer phenomenological pleasure and displeasure pleasure and pain pleasure or displeasure possible power of judgment practical cognition practical reason priori principles rational feelings rational psychology reason’s need reflecting judgment relation representation role schema second Critique sensation sensible sensus communis spheres sublime suggests supersensible sympathy systematic teleology things third Critique transcendental imagination understanding unity virtue