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Guidance and constraint: the action-guiding capacity of Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Nils Jareborg and Aleksander Peczenik, as well as the participants in the higher seminar in jurisprudence at the Department of Law, Uppsala University (Sweden) for helpful comments on parts of this article, which were presented to them in a different form. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for Law and Philosophy for equally helpful comments on the article. Finally, I would like to thank Robert Carroll for checking my English. The usual caveat applies, however: The author alone is responsible for any remaining mistakes and imperfections.

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  1. Department of Law, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 512, 751 20, Uppsala, Sweden

    Torben Spaak

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  1. Torben Spaak
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Correspondence to Torben Spaak.

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Spaak, T. Guidance and constraint: the action-guiding capacity of Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning. Law Philos 26, 343–376 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-006-9002-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-006-9002-2

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