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Explaining the Disquotational Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jeff Speaks
Jeff Speaks*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN46556, USA
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Extract

Questions about the relative priorities of mind and language suffer from a double obscurity. First, it is often not clear which mental and linguistic facts are in question: we can ask about the relationship between any of the semantic or syntactic properties of public languages and the judgments, intentions, beliefs, or other propositional attitudes of speakers of those languages. Second, there is an obscurity about what ‘priority’ comes to here.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 211 - 238
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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