Discussion
The unnatural racial naturalism

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Highlights

  • I show that ‘racial naturalism’ need not mean ‘humans are divided into subspecies’.

  • I define three different non-subspecies definitions of ‘racial naturalism’.

  • I show that new racial naturalism need not be hasty.

Abstract

In the recent article, “Against the New Racial Naturalism”, Adam Hochman (2013, p. 332) argues that new racial naturalists have been too hasty in their racial interpretation of genetic clustering results of human populations. While Hochman makes a number of good points, the purpose of this paper is to show that Hochman’s attack on new racial naturalists is misguided due to his definition of ‘racial naturalism’. Thus, I will show that Hochman’s critique is merely a consequence of an unnatural interpretation of racial naturalism.

Introduction

Adam Hochman has put forth a challenge to “racial naturalists” by arguing that the “new racial naturalism” inspired by recent population genetics is “too hasty” (Hochman, 2013, pp. 331–332). Hochman goes on to argue that, in fact, recent genetic clustering results are “entirely consistent with social constructionism” (Hochman, 2013, p. 351). While I agree with Hochman’s second claim, I disagree with his first.

I agree that racial constructionism is compatible with races having “biological correlates” (Hochman, 2013, p. 334). In fact, if racial constructionism is just the view that race is a social construct, and if it is possible for biologically real entities to be socially constructed (e.g. ant colonies, human populations, etc.), then not only is racial constructionism compatible with races having biological correlates, but it is compatible with race being a biologically real entity.1 With that said, I disagree that racial naturalism based on recent genetic clustering results is too hasty. I disagree because racial naturalists are under no obligation to show that human races are subspecies just in order to show that race is biologically real.

I will argue for my position by disambiguating the three race debates that Hochman’s interlocutors are engaging in, and then by showing that in none of these race debates must a racial naturalist argue that “humans can be nonarbitrarily divided into subspecies” as Hochman (2013, p. 351) claims. Thus, the result will be that Hochman’s attack on racial naturalism is more borne out of an unnatural interpretation of racial naturalism than anything else. I will begin by summarizing Hochman’s argument. Then I will defend my claim that racial naturalists need not show that humans have subspecies. After this I will respond to one major objection. Last, I will provide conclusive remarks.

Section snippets

Hochman’s argument against the new racial naturalism

Hochman (2013, p. 332) begins his critique by stipulating that “Racial naturalism is the view that humans can be divided into subspecies.” Hochman (2013, pp. 331–332) says that this view is something that “Scientists have presumed,” in addition to some philosophers. Next, Hochman (2013, pp. 332–333) distinguishes between “genetic naturalism about race” and other forms of “racial naturalism”. The former is unique insofar as it attempts to defend racial naturalism using results from population

Why all the talk about subspecies?

Crucial to Hochman’s argument is his definition of ‘racial naturalism’ as ‘the view that humans can be divided into subspecies’. Hochman claims that this is just how racial naturalists characterize their view in the literature.10 But this is not true. While some racial

Is Hochman’s critique still relevant?

Even though Hochman’s critique of new racial naturalism is misguided, one might wonder whether his basic concerns are still legitimate concerns for new racial naturalists. After all, if the biological theories of race that new racial naturalists are generating do not satisfy (a)–(d), this still seems to be a problem. For one, Hochman (2013, p. 347) technically says that (a)–(d) should hold for “clusters” of human populations if they are to be “meaningful biological units”, not just subspecies.

Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to show that Hochman’s attack on new racial naturalism was misguided due to his definition of ‘racial naturalism’. In order to accomplish this goal, I summarized Hochman’s argument and his defense for each of his premises. Next, I showed that Hochman’s definition of ‘racial naturalism’ misrepresented his opponents’ ontological position. Then, I identified three distinct race debates that Hochman’s interlocutors are engaging in and clarified what ‘racial naturalism’

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Adam Hochman, Jonathan Kaplan, Matthew Kopec, and Rasmus Winther for helpful discussions about the content of this paper. This research was funded by a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship and a fellowship matching stipend from the University of San Francisco.

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