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Collective Decisions About Medical Futility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Bethany Spielman
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Extract

The debate about medical futility is no longer in its infancy. Scholarly literature on this seemingly intractable problem is voluminous. The list of widely publicized cases in which physicians have wanted to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment that families demand has grown to include not just Helga Wanglie, but also Baby Rena, Baby L, Jane Doe, Joseph Finelli, Baby K, and Teresa Hamilton. A futility case has now been decided at the appellate court level.

Commentators have generated three kinds of proposals for resolving these conflicts. One group contends that the problem can be solved within the physician-patient-family relationship. While some in this group view professional authority broadly enough to warrant unilateral judgments by physicians that interventions desired by the patient or family should not be provided, others contend that physician authority does not extend that far, and that any resolution must be constrained by informed consent requirements.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , Summer 1994 , pp. 152 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1994

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