Husserlian Essentialism Revisited

A Study of Essence, Necessity and Predication

by

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Contents

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List of Abbreviations

CM: *Cartesian Meditations*
EJ: *Experience and Judgement*
EP2: *Erste Philosophie, vol. 2*
EW: *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*
Ideas 1: *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. 1*
ILTK: *Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07*
Logik 1896: *Logik. Vorlesung 1896*
Logik 1902/03: *Logik. Vorlesung 1902/03*
Logik 1917/18: *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1917/18*
LU + arabic numeral: *Logical Investigations*
PHAN: *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*
Prolegomena: *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*
PRS: *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*
WES: *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation*

Abstract

Husserlian Essentialism is the view, maintained by Edmund Husserl throughout his career, that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths obtain. In this thesis I have two goals. First, to reconstruct and flesh out Husserlian Essentialism and its connections with surrounding areas of Husserl's philosophy in full detail – something which has not been done yet. Second, to assess the theoretical solidity of the view.

As regards the second point, after having presented Husserlian Essentialism in the first two chapters, I raise a serious problem for it in Chapter 3. In the remainder of the thesis I endeavour to solve the problem. In order to do so, I propose to amend both Husserl's theory of essence and his theory of predication.

The bulk of the emendation consists in working out an account of essence and an account of predication that do not presuppose, or in any way imply, the claims that: 1) for a universal to be in the essence of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal; 2) for a universal to be truly predicated of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal. These claims, notice, apart from being what gets Husserl in trouble, are well entrenched not only in Husserl's, but in most theories of essence and predication (at least in those that feature universals). It is thus interesting to see what an alternative option may be – even regardless of the Husserlian setting in which I work it out.

Introduction

There is a view encapsulated in exchanges such as the following:

> - Why must all squares have four sides?
>
> - Because having four sides is part of what being a square is.
>
> - Why is it necessarily the case that all humans are animals?
>
> - Because to be an animal is part of what it is to be human.

At its crudest, the view is that necessary truths about objects of a given type obtain in virtue of what it is to be an object of that type. If what it is to be an object of a given type is the essence of the type, then the view is that necessity is explained by essence. This is the core idea of Edmund Husserl's theory – of Husserlian Essentialism, as I call it.

I find the view irresistible in its simplicity: I cannot help but think that it, or something very much like it, must be true. Yet, as soon as I look at Husserl's texts, I find the view so couched in complex language and torn between different strands of thought that it becomes difficult to assess whether my initial enthusiasm can be vindicated. Unfortunately, in this case Husserlian scholarship is of little help: the study of the connections between essence and necessity is one of its most underdeveloped branches

(unlike the study of essence *per se*, or of the connections between essence and apriority). Indeed, as far as I am aware, Kevin Mulligan's *Essence and Modality: The Quintessence of Husserl's Theory* (2004) is the only essay in English entirely devoted to the issue. And as helpful as that essay has been for me (indeed, as I point out in Chapter 2, I agree with almost everything Mulligan says there – with regard to substance if not to spin), I definitely feel more needs to be said. One of my two aims here, then, is historical: to fill this gap in Husserlian scholarship.

Not only that, however. As I said, I am interested in Husserlian Essentialism not for its own sake, but because I believe Husserl is actually on to something. Reassuringly, I am not alone. In his article *Essence and Modality* (1994), Kit Fine defends a view that is close to Husserl's (in fact, he credits Husserl with the original idea). Incidentally, I will expand on Fine's position in Chapter 4. But even if Husserl (and Fine) were on to nothing, the question that Husserlian Essentialism is meant to answer is urgent and profound. Philosophers in general, and phenomenologists in particular (at least those of the Husserlian stripe), like to believe that their propositions, if true, are necessarily true. The claim is strong, and people have a right to be sceptical. Whoever advances that pretence, therefore, had better be able to justify it. There is plenty of literature on how necessary truths can be known or discovered. Assuming that there are necessary truths, however, the deeper issue is *why* that is so. To account for necessity is first of all to answer *this* question. And of all the accounts I have come across, Husserl's is the one that seems to me to be the most promising. My second aim is to give a theoretical assessment of it.

There are several ways to pursue a historical and a theoretical goal in the same work. I have chosen to do so by expounding the Husserlian theory as faithfully as I could, and assessing it with a focus on its *internal* problems. No doubt objections can be brought against it from outside; but, since I simply lacked the space to deal satisfactorily with them as well, I decided to ignore them (for the most part, at least).

So much for motivation and general presentation. I will now give a quick overview of the thesis, in order to give the reader a feel of, and prepare them for, what is to come.

The thesis has two parts. The first part, Chapters 1-3, is mainly devoted to presenting Husserlian Essentialism. In Chapter 3, however, I raise a serious problem for the latter. I then spend the whole of the second part, Chapters 4-6, trying to solve the problem.

Husserlian Essentialism, recall, is the view that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths obtain. Three notions thus figure in it: essentialist truth, necessary truth, and 'because'. Chapter 1 is entirely devoted to fleshing out the first notion, while Chapter 2 is about the second and third. Chapter 3 raises the problem I mentioned.

An essentialist truth is just a true proposition that spells out the essence of an object. In order to illuminate the notion, in **Chapter 1**, after presenting the view in its broad lines (Section 1), I illustrate Husserl's construal of essence (Section 2) and his theory of predication (Section 3) in considerable detail. Finally, in Section 4 I address some issues arising from the whole discussion (including Husserl's idealism). Importantly, since for Husserl

essences are complexes of universals, Section 2 is, in effect, an overview Husserl's theory of universals.

Chapter 2 is mostly devoted to necessity and 'because'. In Section 1 I present Husserl's construal of the former notion. Importantly, the idea that necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence is *included* in Husserl's characterisation of necessity; as a consequence, while giving the characterisation, I will also be presenting the account, i.e., Husserlian Essentialism itself. Necessity is also the subject of Section 3, where, among other things, I discuss the characterisation in more detail and compare it with the standard possible-worlds definition. Section 2 is about Husserl's view that 'because'-propositions express a non-epistemological and non-causal explanatory relation between propositions called 'grounding'. I present the conceptual and the structural features of the relation (also with reference to Bernard Bolzano, from whom Husserl borrowed the notion) and discuss some issues related to how grounding figures in the Husserlian account of necessity. Finally, in Section 4 I compare my reading of Husserl's account of necessity with Mulligan's interpretation, and argue that, save for a certain caveat, the two are in substantial agreement.

One of the findings of Chapter 2 is that for Husserl there are several species of essentialist propositions. Those that figure in the account of necessity are what he calls 'eidetic laws' and 'laws about eide'. The former are true universal propositions that spell out the essence of the actual and possible instances of universals; the latter, by contrast, are true propositions that spell out the essence of universals. Importantly, for Husserl laws about eide ground eidetic laws. As a consequence, they are the fundamental

element of the Husserlian-Essentialist account. In **Chapter 3**, however, I argue that laws about eide are incompatible with Husserl's theories of essence and predication. This is a major issue: if I am right, Husserlian Essentialism as it stands is bereft of what is supposed to do the main grounding work in it.

The second part of the thesis is about rescuing Husserlian Essentialism by solving the problem I raise for it in Chapter 3. This mainly happens in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 4 provides some background knowledge needed to come to grips with Chapter 5, and also includes some discussion of a minor but not unimportant issue left open from Chapter 2.

As I said earlier, Fine's essentialist account of necessity is similar to Husserl's in many respects. In **Chapter 4**, Sections 1 and 2, I present and discuss it. In the discussion I am especially interested in establishing whether Finean Essentialism is a reductive account of necessity, and, if it is not, how else it can be thought of. My view is that it is best not to construe it as reductive, but rather, as I will say, as 'global universal'. I argue that the same is true of Husserlian Essentialism. Section 3 is about the logical representation of essentialist truths. Fine's sentential approach is discussed and found ill-suited for my purposes. I rather propose a predicational approach based on George Bealer's intensional language $\mathcal{L}_\omega$.

In **Chapter 5** I argue that not one, but two notions of essence are available to Husserl: 'objectual' essence and 'infinitive' essence. Part of the trouble with Husserlian Essentialism – i.e., with Husserl's original version of it – is that it only includes objectual essence. I thus defend infinitive essence and argue that, if we allow Husserlian Essentialism to include it, too, we

are launched towards a solution of the problem. The notion of infinitive essence is based on Fabrice Correia's notion of 'generic' essence. The two, however, are not identical. In the chapter I show why and how they differ.

In **Chapter 6** I complete the rescuing of Husserlian Essentialism by expanding Husserl's theory of predication. I make a distinction between the principles and the paradigms of Husserl's official theory, and argue that it is only the paradigms (which are perceptual in character) that are incompatible with laws about eide. My view is that the principles, once slightly amended, are instead able to accommodate laws about eide. In Section 1 I present the principles in isolation from the perceptual paradigms, while in Section 3 I carry out the emendation and discuss the resulting picture. Section 2 is an interlude: a discussion of the so-called problem of the unity of the proposition, and in particular of David Wiggins' and Richard Gaskin's views, with the main purpose of familiarising the reader with the Husserlian theory by showing how the latter may be placed in recent debates.

Each chapter ends with a short summary of core findings. Diagrams are used here and there; hopefully they will be helpful to the reader.

Part I

Husserlian Essentialism

Chapter 1

Essence, Universals, and Predication

Roughly put, the core idea of Husserl's account of necessity is that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths (i.e., truths that spell out the essence of some object) obtain; or, as he also expresses himself, that essence 'grounds' necessity. The first part of this thesis is devoted to making that claim intelligible in its Husserlian framework (Chapters 1 and 2, as well as part of Chapter 3), and to showing that the overall view, which I call Husserlian Essentialism, has a problem and needs revisiting (the remainder of Chapter 3).

In order to make the view intelligible, I will present and discuss it with respect to the following questions. What is essence, and what is an essentialist truth? What is necessity? What is grounding? How does the obtaining of essentialist truths ground the obtaining of necessary truths?

This chapter is entirely devoted to the first issue, namely, essence and

essentialist truths. In Section 1 I give the barebones of Husserl's view; in Section 2 I expound Husserl's theory of universals; in Section 3 I present his theory of predication (because essentialist truths are, in effect, true essentialist predications). In Section 4 I discuss some additional issues.

A word of warning. There is a question as to whether Husserl's conception of essence is modal or non-modal, i.e., whether for Husserl essence can be fully accounted for in modal terms. Ultimately I will argue that, despite Husserl's often misleading wording, in Husserlian Essentialism essence must be construed as non-modal. Some of the premises of that argument, however, follow from Husserl's view of necessity, and can only be extracted from it through substantial exegetical work. I will thus be ready to put forward the argument only in Chapter 2, after I have brought in necessity and Husserl's view of it. In the present chapter I will instead take Husserl's modal wording at face value.

1.1 The View

The essence of an object 'of a certain kind', says Husserl in *EJ*, is 'that without which an object of [that] kind cannot be thought' (*EJ*, §87a: 341). To think of an object 'without something' or 'with something' means, in this connection, to think of the object as determined in a certain way, as having a certain feature. The essence of an object of a given kind is thus constituted by the features which the object, insofar as it belongs to that kind, cannot be thought without.

Husserl's mention of kinds while defining essence should not be over-

looked. Traditionally, the intuition which the notion of essence is intended to capture is that some of the features that a thing has determine what the thing is in a metaphysically fundamental sense. In Locke's words, essence is 'the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is' (*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, III, iii, §15). One way to understand this is to think of the essence of an object *a* as the collection of the features that make *a* the individual object that it is, i.e., the collection of the features that distinguish it from everything else. Essence in this sense is usually called 'individual' essence. Another way to think of essence is as the collection of the features that make an object not the individual object that it is, but the kind of object that it is. Essence in this sense is usually called 'general' essence.

For a series of reasons, general essence is commonly regarded as a less controversial notion than individual essence. Be that as it may, it is clear from Husserl's definition that whatever he may have in mind when he talks about essence, it is not individual essence. Nor, however, is it general essence as just characterised. The reason is that attributions of essentiality specifying general essences are logically simple: 'Socrates is essentially human', for example – '*a* is essentially *F*'. Attributions of essentiality specifying Husserlian essences, on the other hand, are logically complex: *F* is in the Husserlian essence of *a if a* belongs to a pre-given kind. In other words, that *a* belong to some given kind is *a condition* for it to have a Husserlian essence. At one point in *EJ* Husserl is very explicit about this: the essence of an object, he says, is a 'necessary structure' that determines 'what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an object of this kind' (*EJ*, §: 352). Thus, what has general essences is objects; what has Husserlian

essences, on the other hand, is not objects but, so to say, objects-cum-kinds.

An example may help. Take a feature such as animality. For it to be in Socrates' general essence, it is enough that it be a fundamental feature of Socrates, i.e., one that determines what Socrates is. And plausibly animality is in the general essence of Socrates. (Incidentally, it cannot be in Socrates's individual essence: because Plato is an animal, too, and so is – say – my cat Maria Pocchiola. Animality does not individuate Socrates.) For animality to be in Socrates' *Husserlian* essence, however, it must determine not what Socrates is *per se*, but what Socrates is *qua human*, say.

Interestingly, Locke seems to have held a similar view – at least on Jonathan Bennett's reading. In Chapter 26 of *Learning from Six Philosophers*, vol. 2, Bennett argues that according to Locke 'no property of an individual thing is essential to it *per se*', and that 'essentialness is [for Locke] not a dyad relating a property to a substance, but rather a triad relating a property, a substance, and a kind: my rationality is not essential to me simpliciter, though it may be essential to me *qua* human' (Bennett 2001: 92). One piece of evidence supporting Bennett's interpretation is, for instance, Locke's dictum that 'essence . . . is considered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into sorts' (*Essay*, III, vi, 4). Although I am not interested in endorsing Bennett's reading of Locke, I do want to stress that Husserl's approach to essence is not as outlandish or isolated as one might perhaps be inclined to think.

A word on notation. Given Husserl's conception of essence, I will often need to write things like 'Feature *F* belongs to the essence of object *a* if *a* is of kind κ'. Unless the conditional form is crucial for the point being made,

I will abbreviate it by indexing the object (*a*) with the kind (κ). Thus, '*a* is essentially *F* if it is of kind κ' becomes 'a_κ is essentially *F*'; and '*F* is in the essence of *a* if *a* is of kind κ' becomes '*F* is in the essence of a_κ'.

So essences are constituted by features. It is important to appreciate that Husserl means that quite literally: essences, he says, are collections, 'stocks' (*Bestände*), of features – or, better, stocks of predicables (*Prädika-bilien*). See *Ideas 1*, §2: 7. In this sense, predicables are for Husserl literally parts of essences; and essences are complex objects whose constituents are predicables. Thus:

(1) A truth about the essence of an object a_κ, typically of form 'a_κ is essentially *F*', obtains if and only if *F* is a predicable that is part of the essence of a_κ.[1]

Predicables, in turn, are for Husserl *universals*, or, as he calls them, general objects (*generelle Gegenstände*). These are understood as non-spatiotemporal and multiply instantiable objects (though not necessarily multiply instanti-ated, or even just instantiated, in the actual world).[2] To that extent they may be thought of as platonic universals. This, in fact, is just an approximation; but it will do for now. Essences are thus collections of universals.

I spoke of instantiation. To say that an object instantiates a universal is, for Husserl, to say that the object is a particular case (*Einzelfall*), or a particularisation (*Vereinzelung*) of the universal. Husserl has yet other ways of expressing facts about instantiation – all bluntly Platonic: a particular

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[1]Here parthood is improper parthood. This is required not to rule out by sheer definition that some objects may have simple essences.

[2]More about Husserl's definition of universality in Section 2.3.

'participates in' a universal (*Methexis* or *Teilhabe*), and a universal 'dwells in' (*wohnt bei*) a particular (*koinōnia*). See *EJ*, §81c: 326-327. The notion itself, however, is never accounted for by Husserl; in fact, at one point he deems it primitive (*LU2*, §1). This, I have to say, is hardly uncommon among philosophers who countenance instantiation. Be that as it may, the notion serves Husserl to define what it is for an object to have a feature if that feature is a universal (a predicable): it is for the object to instantiate it.

The relationship between instantiation and predication will play an important role throughout this thesis. Husserl's position with respect to it will turn out to be very problematic, and there will be an issue as to whether an alternative position is possible. Here, however, we are concerned with the barebones of Husserl's overall view. Suffice it then to say that, for Husserl,

(2) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if *a* instantiates the predicable, i.e., the universal, *F*.

A particular case of (2) is that in which the relevant universal is part of the essence of *a*-cum-kind:

(3) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-kind a_κ if and only if:

   (a) *a* instantiates *F*, and

   (b) a_κ cannot be thought as not instantiating *F*.

To finesse this point just a little. Kinds, for Husserl, are universals. Thus, for an object to belong to a kind is for it to instantiate a universal,

and, correlatively (given (2)), for the relevant universal to be liable of being truly predicated of the object. We may then reformulate as follows:

(4) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G if and only if:

  (a) *a* instantiates *F*, and

  (b) a_G cannot be thought as not instantiating *F*.

Husserl calls 'essences' not just collections of universals, but also the constituents of those collections, i.e., universals themselves. In fact, he goes so far as to use the terms 'essence' and 'universal' (or 'general object') interchangeably. Surely this calls for justification: one thing is a collection of universals instantiated by an object on condition that it instantiates another, and a very different thing is a universal simpliciter. To my knowledge, Husserl never justifies this particular choice of nomenclature. But I believe he thinks that since, in principle, all universals are liable to belong to the essence of some object, to that extent, they may be called 'essences'. It goes without saying, this may engender confusion. Usually context is enough to disambiguate. Otherwise, I will refer to the essence of objects as *genitive essence*. As for universals, I will simply call them their name.

Finally, for Husserl both universals and (genitive) essences come in two varieties: empirical and pure. The distinctions are somewhat difficult to make out, as Husserl's texts only help so much (see for example *EJ*, §86). A logical and ontological criterion has been proposed by Rochus Sowa (Sowa 2007: 93) and has later been connected with Husserl's phenomenological account of the distinction, to be found in *EJ*, *WES* and *PHAN*, by Daniele

De Santis (De Santis 2012: 35-36). We need not go into that, here. I submit, without arguing for it, that however the distinction is to be cashed out, it entails the following equivalences:

(5.1) A universal is pure if and only if it exists necessarily

(5.2) A truth about the genitive essence of an object is pure if and only if it is necessarily true

From (5.1) and the fact that, for Husserl, not all universals are pure, it follows that for him some universals exist contingently. An odd view: the vast majority of the philosophers who countenance universals also believe that universals exist necessarily. Odd or not, the view comes directly from Husserl's phenomenological account of universals, so, as far as Husserl is concerned, it cannot be overlooked.

On the other hand, for reasons I shall give in due course (Chapter 2, Section 1), Husserl is committed to the claim that if essence is to account for necessity, then essentialist truths cannot be contingent. However, as we have seen, essences are complexes of universals, and therefore essentialist truths ultimately express facts about universals. But then universals, insofar as they are to constitute essences, cannot exist contingently: for if they did, facts about them would also be contingent, and so would propositions expressing those facts – including essentialist propositions. Therefore, the universals that constitute the essence of objects, and thus figure in Husserl's account of necessity, must exist necessarily. There are, for Husserl, contingent universals (he calls them 'empirical types' or 'empirical generalities', §§82-83); but do not ground necesssity, nor are they part of the essence of

objects.

That, I should add, is why I think it is fine to force Husserl a little and understand, at least in this connection, the pure/empirical distinction simply in terms of (5.1) and (5.2): they are entailed by Husserl's own account, whatever the details of it may be, and they are something Husserl is committed to anyway.

Since I am interested in Husserlian essences only insofar as they figure in Husserl's account of necessity, throughout this thesis I will be concerned with pure universals and pure essences alone. Incidentally, another Husserlian term for those is the Greek *eidē*, sing.: *eidos*. (Given the extensive use I will be doing of these terms, I will not italicize them except for emphasis. I will also drop the long vowel mark in the plural form, and simply write 'eide'.) These terms, too, are used by Husserl sometimes to denote universals, and sometimes to denote essences of objects. The latter is the case, for example, in the passage from *EJ* from which I extracted the initial quote; indeed, the very next sentence reads: 'This general essence is the eidos, the idea in the Platonic sense'.

Now for the details of the view, the defence of my interpretation of it and some discussion. The most important aspects of the view are Husserl's theory of universals, and the relations between instantiation on the one hand, and predication and essential predication on the other – i.e., propositions (2) and (4). I shall discuss them first. I will also say something about the form of essentialist truths, which will come in handy in later chapters. All this happens in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4 I will address some additional issues.

1.2 Universals and Particulars

That essences are complexes of universals is a distinctive trait of Husserl's conception. The notion of universal, of course, goes hand in hand with that of particular; so that in order to understand Husserl's theory of essence, considerable attention should be paid to his view of the distinction, and the relations, between universals and particulars. In order to come to grips with that view, however, it is best to start with another distinction: the one Husserl makes between real and ideal objects.

First, however, let me lay out a plan for the section. I shall first introduce the notions of particularity and universality, and propose a definition for the former (Section 2.1). Three sections (2.2-2.4) will then be devoted to expanding on those notions, especially with respect to the following questions: What types of universals are there? What types of particulars? What are the relations between them? What is universality? Finally, I will wrap up things with respect to essence and essentialist truths (Section 2.5). Among other things, I will discuss the logical form of those truths. This is meant to deal with doubts that, at that point, may have arisen, and to anticipate some of the themes of later chapters.

1.2.1 Introducing the Notions

Real objects (*reale Gegenstände*) are objects that exist in time. See *EJ*, §65: 265-266. Some real objects, such as myself or the Eiffel Tower (substances), exist in space as well as in time. So do some events and processes, which, for Husserl, are too particular objects; for example, a boxing match (event)

or a person's swimming (process). (Sadly, he seldom speaks of heaps and masses; so I will leave them aside, too.) Other events and processes, however, do not exist in space: for example, my going over the proof of Cantor's theorem, or my having a mental life.[3] But they exist in time. Thus, for Husserl, they count as real.

It is worth pointing out that this notion of reality is not to be contrasted with appearance – whereby, for example, I see a fat man in the doorway but 'in reality' there is nothing there. Husserl's German word for reality in this latter sense is *Wirklichkeit* (which can also be translated as 'actuality'), not *Realität*. I will say something about *Wirklichkeit* later (very briefly in Section 3 and more extensively in Section 4.3).

Objects that are not real are, for Husserl, ideal. Ideal objects (*ideale Gegenstände*), then, are objects that do not exist in time. Examples of ideal objects are, for Husserl, universals, propositions, sets, numbers, and so on. This, of course, is a negative characterisation of ideality; later on, in Section 3.1, I will give Husserl's positive one. It is worth pointing out, however, that working with only a negative characterisation of ideal objects, or, as they tend to be called in contemporary debates, abstract objects, is quite common. So that even if Husserl had in fact no positive account of ideal objects, that would not be specifically *his* shortcoming.[4]

For Husserl reality and particularity are coextensive: all particular ob-

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[3]If one thinks that a subject's mental life is just a subject's neural life, then one will think that my having a mental life and my going over the proof of Cantor's theorem too exist in space. That outlook, however, is completely foreign to Husserl.

[4]In *EJ* Husserl came to replace the notion of ideality with that of *irreality* (*Irrealität*). Since, as far as I can see, the distinction has no bearing on the main argument of this thesis, I will not elaborate on it. For an excellent discussion, see Van Atten 2007, §§4.1, 5.4.

jects are real, and all real objects, particular. I am not sure whether he has a definition of particularity in its own right, and that is why I introduced reality first and pointed out coextensivity. At one point (*Ideas 1*, §2) Husserl seems to define particulars in terms of contingency: they are the sort of objects that are what they happen to be, but might as well not have been as they are, or not have been at all. However, since he countenances empirical universals, which are just as contingent (at least according to my criterion (5.1)), that cannot be a good definition; indeed, Husserl seems to have abandoned it later in his career. At best, contingency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for particularity. Universals, on the other hand, are defined since very early on – *LU* (1900-1901) and *ILTK* (1906-1907) – in terms of instantiation and shareability. We shall see what that means. However, since Husserl takes at least instantiation to be primitive, the following definition of particularity is available to him: an object is particular if and only if it is not instantiable by other objects. This option is not entirely without difficulties; however, it will do for my purposes. It is worth noticing that, for Husserl, even though reality and particularity are coextensive, ideality and universality are not, because there are some ideal objects that are not instantiable: for example, at least for the Husserl of *EJ*, propositions and, in fact, meanings in general.[5]

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[5]In the *Investigations* Husserl thought that meanings were universals ('species') instantiated by 'meaning intentions', i.e., by mental acts in which something is meant. See Simons 1995: 106-118. Gradually, however, Husserl came to repudiate this view. His clearest statement in this sense is perhaps in *EJ*, §64d: 262.

1.2.2   Types of Universals, Types of Particulars

There are, for Husserl, two types of universals and two types of particulars. Some universals are *substantival*, some are *adjectival*; on the other hand, some particulars are *concrete* (he calls them 'individua'), and some are *abstract* (he calls them 'moments'). The first distinction is to be understood in terms of the second: a universal is substantival (*substantivisch*) if the members of its extension (*Umfang*), i.e., of the collection of its possible instances (*EJ*, §89), are all concrete particulars; it is adjectival (*adjektivisch*) if the members of its extension are all abstract particulars. See *EJ*, §84a: 335. See also *Ideas 1*, §15.

Let me point out immediately that 'abstract' and 'concrete' here do not mean 'ideal' and 'real' – as they do in contemporary philosophical debates. For an object to be abstract is for it to depend ontologically on some other object; for it to be concrete is for it to be ontologically independent. I will elaborate on this presently. I also wish to stress that being an abstract object is not the same as being an abstract particular, nor is being a concrete object the same as being a concrete particular. Indeed, some ideal objects depend ontologically on others, or so Husserl thinks; and some do not. Individua are concrete *particular* objects; moments are abstract *particular* objects.

The distinction between individua and moments has its roots in Husserl's theory of wholes and parts (to be found in the third *Logical Investigation*). Here I will give a short account of it, and say only as much as I need for my purposes. I will add something later on, in Section 4.1. According to Husserl, objects have parts in two senses. One – the more familiar – is the sense in which what we are left with if we section an object, for example

a tomato, in any way, is a part of it. In the second and more technical sense, however, the particular features of the tomato – its colour, its shape, its solidity, and so on – are also its parts, for, as Husserl puts it, they may all be discerned 'in' the object. There is a radical difference between these two types of parts, however. Parts in the former sense do not depend ontologically on the original object: they are *Selbständig*, independent – just as the tomato is. Parts in the second sense, however, are *Unselbständig*, non-independent: because they exist only if the object of which they are parts exists. In other words, sections or 'pieces' (*Stücke*) of the tomato do not need, in order to exist, that the tomato exist.[6] Things are quite different for the colour or the shape of the tomato: if the latter goes, they go, too.

It is not just colours and shapes of individua that ontologically depend on other objects. A fist ontologically depends on a hand, and a smile on a mouth. Boundaries too are non-independent objects – and, arguably, so are actions, events, processes and states, which all presumably require the existence of agents or participants or the like. See Mulligan et al. 1984: 290-292. As far as I can see, however, when Husserl speaks of moments he mainly (or perhaps even exclusively) has in mind colours, shapes, extensions, etc., i.e., particular qualities or features of individua. Indeed, it is only these that can be said to be parts (though not pieces) of the objects on which they depend. A fist, for example, is not part of the hand it depends on – nor is an event, such as a duel, part of the duellers (as pointed out in Mulligan et al. 1984: 295). In what follows, I will restrict my use of 'moment' accordingly.

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[6]Of course, describing – say – a half of the tomato as 'a half of that certain tomato' involves reference to the original, whole object. That, however, is not to say that the partial object itself (the half) cannot exist unless the whole object (the tomato) does.

In recent times, objects of this sort – i.e., particular qualities or features of objects – have been mostly called 'tropes' (see Williams 1953 and Campbell 1981 among others) or, sometimes, 'modes' (Lowe 2005). It would be misleading, however, to identify Husserlian moments with tropes. For one thing, there is not one notion of trope, but several – so that it is not clear exactly with what moments would be identified. Second, tropes are mostly appealed to for reductionist purposes: either to reduce substances to their particular features (in so-called Bundle-Theories), or to reduce universals to their instances (Lowe is a notable exception). Needless to say (given Section 1), Husserl is not interested in the latter kind of reduction; nor is he interested in the former. Third, the notion of trope is widely taken to be primitive. The notion of moment, on the other hand, is analysed by Husserl in terms of ontological dependence and parthood.

1.2.3 Defining Universality

Some universals, then, are instantiated by moments. These, as we have seen, Husserl calls adjectival. Some others, the substantival, are instantiated by individua. So, for example, there is an adjectival universal Red instantiated by the red-moments of all the possible red individua; and there is a substantival universal Tomato instantiated by all the possible tomatoes. More details, and discussion, later. But what are universals to begin with?

As we know, Husserl has a primitive notion of instantiation, whereby some objects are particular cases of others. The red-moment of our tomato, for example, is a case of red, and the tomato is a particular tomato. However,

nothing can be a case of the red-moment of the tomato, nor can anything be a case of the tomato. The moment and the tomato, then, are not instantiable; indeed, they are particulars (recall my earlier definition of particularity). What is instantiable is only universals; and if something is a universal, then it is instantiable.[7] Universality may then be defined in terms of instantiability: an object is universal if and only if it is instantiable. This option, which is, for example, the one Lowe goes for in Lowe 2005: 89, is open to Husserl, and I daresay He at the very least had it in the back of his mind. It is not, however, his favourite approach.

His favourite approach is rather to define universality in terms of shareability. Suppose we have here two red tomatoes. They are two distinct, non-overlapping individua. Each has its own red-moment, which, in turn, does not overlap the red-moment of the other. They are two utterly distinct objects, and so are their moments. Now, on the other hand, we are more than disposed to say that the two tomatoes are *both* red, that they *share* a feature (red), and even that red is a feature shared by them. Unless these are all false propositions (and they are not), and unless they can all be explained otherwise (and, for reasons I will not go into, Husserl thinks they cannot), it is safe to say that the tomatoes share a numerically identical feature, and, therefore, that *there is something*, i.e., a feature, which the two tomatoes share. Is this feature particular or universal? It cannot be particular, for, as Husserl points out, two particulars can share a particular part, be it a moment or a section, only if they overlap. But, *ex hypothesi*, our tomatoes

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[7]R. Sowa has proposed counterexamples to the claim that if something is a universal then it is instantiable. See Sowa 2010.

do not overlap. Therefore, if they share a feature, and they do, the latter cannot be particular. It will then be universal. This is the sort of argument Husserl runs, for example, in *ILTK*, §47a: 292. In *EJ*, too, universals are characterised as *hen epi pollōn* (one over many): see §81b: 325.

Let me mention an issue related to Husserl's shareability approach. It is not clear to me that one can get every universal this way. Take substantival universals, for example. Does the argument apply to them? It is tempting to say: of course it does; it is just that substantival universals are not features but kinds of objects – so that what is shared by the tomatoes is not just the feature Red, but also the kind Tomato. Unfortunately, that does not work: because to be a substantival universal is not the same as to be a kind. Indeed, what is it to be a kind, as opposed to being a feature? Intuitively, features are 'how' objects are (qualities), whereas kinds are 'what' objects are. But then Colour will count as a kind: the kind to which red, yellow, green, etc., all belong – for it is what they all are. Now, if substantival universals were just kinds, and kinds substantival universals, Colour would be a substantival universal. But Colour is not a substantival universal, because its instances are moments. By the same token, adjectival universals cannot simply be identified with features: because Colour is not (or at least not necessarily) a feature, but a kind, because it is 'what', not 'how' specific colours are. So all substantival universals are kind-like; some adjectival universals, however, are also kind-like (e.g., Colour), while others are not (e.g., Red).

1.2.4 Relations between Universals and Particulars

For Husserl instantiation is the main, fundamental relation between universals and particulars: so much we know. We also know that substantival universals may only be instantiated by individua, and adjectival universals by moments. Something more needs to be said, however: because what about propositions such as 'This tomato is red'? By (2), a predicable *F* may be truly predicated of an object *a* if and only if *a* instantiates *F*. The tomato, however, does not instantiate the universal Red: its red-moment does. As Husserl says in *EJ*, it is only in a 'metaphorical' and 'improper' sense that the particulars which have a red-moment can be said to be particularisations of the universal Red (*EJ*, §81c: 327). But then, if (2) is true, Red cannot be truly predicated of the tomato. Surely, however, we must be in a position to account for the facts that the tomato *is* red and that it *is* true that it is.

Indeed, (2) is not an accurate statement of Husserl's position. For him, not one but two relations obtain between universals and particulars. One is instantiation. The other, to be defined, as we shall see, in terms of instantiation, is the relation of *bearing*. I borrow the name from *Logik 1896*, where Husserl points out that a red-moment is not red, but, rather, a case of red; and that what can properly be said to be red (a *Rotseiendes*) is a bearer (*Träger*) of the attribute Red. See §7: 61, 61n. Mulligan notes this in Mulligan 2004, but calls the relation 'exemplification' (390). However one calls the relation, it obtains between an individuum and an adjectival universal if and only if the former has a moment that instantiates the latter.

We may then summarize the relations between universals and particu-

lars in the Husserlian picture as follows. Individua (concrete or indepen-
dent particulars) instantiate substantival universals; moments (abstract or
non-independent particulars) instantiate adjectival universals; individua
bear adjectival universals. Here is a diagram representing these relations:

If one of the above conditions is met, then the universal can be truly
predicated of its instance or its bearer. We may then reformulate (2) as
follows:

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

  (a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival univer-
       sal or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal; or

  (b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an
       individuum and *F* an adjectival universal.

1.2.5   Essence Again

Let me wrap up things with respect to essence – which, after all, is my main concern here. Genitive essences are collections of universals that meet the conditions laid down in

(4) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G if and only if:

   (a) *a* instantiates *F*, and

   (b) a_G cannot be thought as not instantiating *F*.

Now that we have some more detailed knowledge of Husserl's theory of universals, we need to slightly reformulate those conditions, by inserting some 'bearing' clauses as follows:

(4*) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G if only if

   (a) *a* instantiates *or bears F*, and

   (b) a_G cannot be thought as not instantiating *or bearing F*.

As far as Husserl's theory of essence is concerned, apart from extensive remarks on predication and essentialist predication, to be given in the next section by way of justification of (2*) (and (4*)), this will be enough. However, I wish to say something more about the form of truths about essence. This will help dealing with some ambiguities one might be struggling with at this point. It will also come in handy in later chapters (especially in Chapter 2).

I have taken Husserl's *EJ* definition:

> essence proves to be that without which an object of a particular
> kind cannot be thought

to be a definition of the essence of a particular object-cum-universal, of form

(6) a_G is essentially F

where *a* is the name of an object.

However, one may read it as being a definition of the essence of an *arbitrary* object instantiating a given universal. Essentialist truths of this sort would be of the form:

(7) An arbitrary a_G is essentially F

Notice that there is no principled reason why we should choose between the two readings. On the other hand, there are reasons why they should not be conflated. On the first reading, what is essentially F is a particular object on the condition that it instantiates or bears a given universal G. On the second reading, what is essentially F is an arbitrary object that instantiates or bears a given universal G. If talk of arbitrary objects as opposed to particular ones makes sense at all, the two forms are clearly distinct.

But one might argue that talk of arbitrary objects does not make sense: it is just a bad way of expressing universally quantified propositions. Thus, the second reading of Husserl's definition should rather be the following:

(8) For all x, if x is G then x is essentially F

or, in my index-notation,

(9) For all x_G, x_G is essentially *F*

From a Husserlian standpoint, there is indeed a tight relationship be-
tween arbitrariness and universal quantification. The two, however, should
not be conflated. In fact, Husserl believes that universality, as a quantity of
proposition, should be accounted for in terms of arbitrariness – so that (8)
and (9), far from being the real logical form of (7), are really derived from
it. He says, for example:

> All bodies are heavy, meaning, a body in general and univer-
> sally is heavy. . . . Universality presupposes indefiniteness. An
> indefinite presentation in general necessarily has the form of in-
> definite individual presentations and that of presentations uni-
> versally embracing all particulars in indefinite ways. (*ILTK*,
> §48a: 302)

The same point is made in *EJ*, §97a: 372-373.

What should we make of this view? Admittedly, it is unusual – and
possibly odd: is it not much easier to account for arbitrariness in terms
of universality and universal quantification? That may be so. Compare,
however, this quote from Fine:

> There is the following view. In addition to individual objects,
> there are arbitrary objects; in addition to individual numbers,
> arbitrary numbers; in addition to individual men, arbitrary men.
> With each arbitrary object is associated an appropriate range of
> individual objects, its values . . . An arbitrary object has those
> properties common to the individual objects in its range. . . .

Such a view used to be quite common, but has now fallen into complete disrepute. As with so many things, Frege led the way. Given his own theory of quantification, it was unnecessary to interpret the variables of mathematics as designating variable numbers; and given the absurdity of the notion of a variable number, it was also unwise. ... In the face of such opposition, it might appear rash to defend any form of the theory of arbitrary objects. But that is precisely what I intend to do. (Fine 1983: 1-2)

In that paper Fine goes on to make out a philosophical case for the view. In a subsequent book, he also shows that one can reason systematically with arbitrary objects: he gives syntax, proof theory (or rather proof theories) and semantics for logics of arbitrary objects, and proves soundness and completeness (see Fine 1985).

So Husserl's view may be not so extravagant after all.[8] At any rate, the fact that one can, if one wishes to, reason in terms of arbitrary objects just as well as in terms of universal quantification – and perhaps even hold that one can reason in the latter terms *because* one can reason in the former – that fact is enough to block any easy dismissal of Husserl's position. That being the case, I suggest we should indeed take (7) to be a genuine form of essentialist truth, distinct from, and perhaps prior to, (8) and (9). Although this is not particularly important for the overall argument of this thesis, it is a distinctive and original trait of Husserl's position. As such, I believe, it is worth highlighting. I will mention it again in the following chapters.

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[8]Also compare Russell's remarks in *The Principles of Mathematics*, §60: 58-59, §75, §87: 90-91.

1.3   Husserl's Theory of Predication

As we have seen, the following principle:

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

> (a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival universal, or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal; or
>
> (b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* an adjectival universal

governs, in Husserl's view as presented in Section 1, the relations between instantiation and predication. Husserl, however, has also a full-blown theory of predication, set forth, in its mature shape, in *FTL* and especially *EJ*. Now, what (2*) does is to give predication – a linguistic and logical phenomenon – a metaphyisical significance, by connecting it with the notions of instantiation and bearing (i.e., with the relations between particulars and universals). The official theory, on the other hand, is eminently *phenomenological*: it accounts for predication in terms of underlying mental performances. So that even though, as I shall argue in the second part of this section, the theory entails (2*), (2*) does not exactly reflect the content of the theory. In order to raise my main objection to Husserl in Chapter 3 (and thus to run the main argument of this thesis), it would perhaps be enough to postulate that Husserl's official, phenomenological theory of predication entails (2*): because in Chapter 3 I will show that there are cases of predication that, on the one hand, are paramount to Husserlian essentialism, but, on the other, falsify (2*). That would save time, both to me and

to the reader. Unfortunately, the only way I can see to satisfactorily deal with the objection, and which I will propose in Chapter 6, trades heavily on the phenomenological theory. So, one way or another, the latter must be expounded. That is the task of the first part of the present section. In the second part, as I said earlier, I will show that the account entails (2*).

1.3.1   The Theory

As I mentioned, Husserl's official theory of predication sees the latter as a linguistic and logical phenomenon, and seeks to explain it in terms of underlying mental performances. To that extent, it differs substantially from most of its modern (20th- and 21st-century) competitors, which typically account for predication in terms of syntax and/or semantics, and thus, in general, in terms of the logical features of language and/or of the relations between linguistic items and their referents in the world. To present Husserl's theory of predication, then, is to expound Husserl's view on how mental processes bring about the linguistic and logical phenomenon whereby, to put it crudely, something is affirmed of something. In order to do so, I will first put forward what I will call a Husserlian definition of predication. It is not *Husserl's* definition; but it is *Husserlian* in that it is the best way I was able to concoct to express the core idea of Husserl's theory. It does so by bringing together all the main elements of the latter. The plan of this half-section, then, is first to state the definition and then to illuminate it by working my way through its components, thereby touching upon all the main points of Husserl's theory.

The definition is the following:

(10) A predication is a linguistic and logical objectivity expressing the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive syntheses

I will divide it into two parts, and deal with them in order. The first part is: *A predication is a linguistic and logical objectivity*; the second, *expressing the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive syntheses*.

Language, Logic, and Objectivities

Let us begin with the claim that 'a predication is a linguistic and logical objectivity'. If we disregard for a moment the notion of 'objectivity', part of the claim is that predication is a linguistic and logical phenomenon. This should not require particular comments: if predication is anything at all, it is that linguistic phenomenon in which something is said, or affirmed, of something. Someone who did not think of predication – at least partially – in this way, would not be thinking of predication at all. Paradoxically, however, due to the central role of consciousness in the Husserlian theory, the importance of the linguistic dimension of predication – which, I think, is partly constitutive to it – risks downplaying. That would be a mistake. Indeed, according to Husserl it is from language that the study of the underlying mental processes (which, it is true, makes up the bulk of the theory) should start. As he writes in *LU*1,

> All theoretical research, though by no means solely conducted
> in acts of verbal expression or complete statement, none the less
> terminates in such statement. Only in this form can truth, and

> in particular the truth of theory, become an abiding possession
> of science, a documented, ever available treasure for knowledge
> and advancing research. Whatever the connection of thought
> with speech may be . . . , it is at least plain that judgements
> stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular the
> regions of science, could barely arise without verbal expression.
> (LU1, §2: 166)

A similar point is made almost thirty years later in *FTL*, §1: 19. It is only fair, then, to take Husserl to regard predication as a constitutively linguistic phenomenon – even though he accounts for it in non-linguistic, but rather phenomenological, terms. Notice, moreover, that language is not exceptional in this respect: because for Husserl *everything* should be accounted for in ultimately phenomenological terms. Phenomenology, as he liked to put it, is 'first philosophy'.

A linguistic *and logical* phenomenon: that is what the definition says. Logic comes into it in two ways. One is the following. Logic, for Husserl, divides into three branches: pure grammar, the logic of truth, and the logic of consequence.[9] The second branch obviously presupposes predication, for it is only in predication that truth is summoned. The third branch presupposes, for Husserl, the second (he thinks of logical consequence in what today we would call semantic terms), and therefore also predication. The first branch studies the possible ways in which meaning may combine in order to yield constructions that make sense (i.e., that are not *unsinnig*,

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[9]I am leaving the theory of manifolds to one side.

nonsensical).[10] Since the other two branches are based on predication, the most important combinations of meanings studied by the first are those that yield predications. Predication, in this sense, is for Husserl a central logical phenomenon.

The second way in which predication is a logical phenomenon is this. Logic at its fullest is for Husserl not just the theoretical study of meaning-forms, truth, and inference, but also a normative theory of scientific reasoning ('science' should be understood here as 'rational pursuit of knowledge' rather than as 'natural or experimental science'). Scientific reasoning, however, is essentially predicative (*FTL*, §5: 27), in that it aims at 'cognizing the particular province determiningly' (*FTL*, §45: 126), i.e., at discovering and ascertaining what and how things belonging to a certain field of enquiry are and behave. The main logical phenomenon must therefore be the determination of things as being thus-and-so, or, to put it differently, the affirmation that things are thus-and-so determined. But that is just predication. Indeed, predicative propositions are for Husserl 'self-contained unities of determination' (*FTL*, §45: 126). Thus, again, for Husserl 'the concept of predicative judgement, of apophansis, stands at the center of formal logic as it has developed historically' (*EJ*, §1: 11).

So predication is both a linguistic and a logical phenomenon. (10), however, speaks not of *predication*, but of *a predication* (i.e., of predication*s* in general); and says that a predication is a logical *objectivity*. In this context,

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[10]*Unsinn*, nonsense, is different from *Widersinn*, absurdity. An absurd meaning, such as 'round square', is one that does make sense, although it is 'apodictically evident' that no object can correspond to it. A nonsensical meaning is no meaning (or no 'unified' meaning) at all. For example: 'a round or'. The distinction is drawn and defended by Husserl in *LU*4, §12.

'objectivity' just means 'object'. So the definition could have read: 'A predication is a linguistic and logical *object* expressing the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive consciousness '. However, apart from being less elegant than (10), this formulation is confusing, because, as we shall see, the two occurrences of 'object' have a very different significance. I have thus preferred 'objectivity', which in Husserl's usage denotes a particular type of object – the type, in fact, to which predications belong: ideal objects, i.e., recall from Section 2.1, objects that do not exist in time. So the claim that predications are linguistic and logical objectivities is, in effect, identical with the claim that predications are linguistic and logical ideal objects. Which I will now try to clarify.

Predication, as a linguistic and logical phenomenon, manifests itself in a certain kind of sentence, the assertoric. A way of putting this – Husserl's way – is by saying that assertoric sentences express predications, or that predications are the meanings of assertoric sentences. The claim that predications are ideal objects is now a consequence of the claim that meanings in general are ideal objects. The latter claim is one that I have already mentioned (see Section 2.1); I will now expand on it.

It is a fact that different speakers at different (and possibly very far off) points in time and space can, and often do, say the same thing. Here, for example, I am taking myself to be expounding *the same theory* as Husserl came to conceive at some point in the 1920s, and developed throughout the rest of his philosophical career. I also take it that, at the end of this section, my readers will or will not have gained an understanding of *that same theory* (depending, among other things, on the quality of my exposition). Here

is another example. Whenever I go over the proof of Cantor's theorem – the one given in Cantor 1891 – I take myself to be going over *the same proof* that Cantor devised for his theorem and published in 1891. Examples are legion. Now this fact, for Husserl, is best explained by the view that Husserl's theory of predication and Cantor's proof – which, at bottom, are arrays, or systems, of propositions – are meanings that, although they can be expressed linguistically by different speakers at different spatio-temporal locations, and are thus liable to make their 'spatio-temporal appearance' (*EJ*, §64c: 260) at each and every such location, are not *themselves* spatio-temporally located, and thus do not themselves exist in space-time. As Husserl puts it, 'the word, the sentence itself is an ideal unity, which is not multiplied by its thousandfold reproductions' (*FTL*, §2: 20) – where, notice, there can be 'reproductions' of words or propositions only if the latter are distinct from their spatio-temporal utterances.[11] All meanings are thus, for him, ideal objects; and, in particular, propositions, i.e., predications conceived as what assertoric sentences express or mean.

Summing up: the first part of (10), which states that predications are linguistic and logical objectivities, means in effect that predications are ideal

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[11]I will say more about ideal objects later on in this section and, in particular, in Section 4, while presenting and substantiating Husserl's view of the ontological status of universals. Notice, however, that the idea that propositions or complexes thereof are ideal, self-identical and multiply reproducible items is part and parcel of our ordinary attitude towards such issues as, for example, intellectual property. The debate on patents – whether a person should be granted legal rights on his or her ideas and realisations thereof – only makes sense if we think that a certain idea (the formula of a certain drug, say) is distinct from its realisations. Also the debate on copyrights – whether a person should be granted legal rights of stories, poems, essays, etc., and their reproductions – only make sense if we think that the content of a publication is distinct from the publication itself. Ordinary discourse, says Husserl at one point, always objectifies the ideal (*EW*: 201). It is only in misguided philosophical discourse that we seek not to explain, but to explain away ideal objects.

objects – meanings – liable to be expressed in language and studied by logic.

Cognitive Synthesis and Enrichment of Sense

According to the second part of the definition, predications, as linguistic and logical objectivities, 'express the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive syntheses'. Several sub-claims are included in that statement. First, that objects have senses. Second, that the senses of objects may undergo a type of change referred to as 'enrichment'. Third, that such enrichment happens in the context of some mental operations referred to as 'cognitive syntheses'. As before, I will go through all these claims and explain them, both singularly and collectively.

Before we can tackle the claim that objects have senses, we must discuss the notion of *object* that is operative in it: because 'object', in Husserl, is a technical term, and is synonymous with 'intentional object'. Many books have been written about intentional objects (most recently Crane 2013), intentionality and Husserl's specific view of them. Husserl's theory is particularly complex. Fortunately, I need not present it in detail. In fact, I will merely sketch a view of intentionality that I will call *intentionalism*, and that closely resembles Husserl's position but disregards questions of detail and historical development.

For Husserl, as well as for other philosophers, a wide class of mental acts are 'intentional': they are, by their own nature, *directed to something*. To think, for example, is to think of something; to love is to love something; to fear is to fear something; to hallucinate is to hallucinate something; and so on. And it seems that this directedness is part of what those acts are. One

way of putting this is in the following terms: intentional acts link, by their own nature, a subject to an object. Intentionality is thus a relation, whose first-place relatum is the subject, and whose second-place relatum is the intentional object. As Smith and McIntyre 1982 and Drummond 1990 point out, however, the intentionality relation has the following peculiarity: that its second-place relatum, the intentional object, is 'existence-independent' and 'conception-dependent'. I will now try to illuminate the notion of intentional object by explaining these two features.

Let us start with existence-independence. Intentionalists (as I will construe their view) deny that the objects of intentional acts are entities – where an entity is something that exists in reality.[12] To be sure, for there to be an intentional act there must be a subject that performs it (Husserl would say: that 'lives' it). However, the object of the act need not exist. Why think so? Because it is a phenomenological fact about consciousness that we can be aware of non-existents: we can think of the round square cupola on Berkeley college, for example, or fall in love with a character in a book, or fear the ghost of Abraham Lincoln (which apparently haunts the White House), or hallucinate a fat man in our (empty) doorway. As A.D. Smith puts it,

> Central to intentionalism is the denial that the expression 'is aware of' must express a relation between two entities. On this view, to speak of an object of awareness is not necessarily to

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[12]'Reality' here is not *Realität* – which is reality in the sense of real objects, i.e., existence in time – but *Wirklichkeit*, which is reality as opposed to appearance and non-existence. Notice that something can be real in the first sense and yet not in the second. Hallucinated objects, such as, for example, the fat man in the doorway, do exist in time (the man is here *now* but will be gone *soon* – he is waving at me, and was not doing so *before* – and so on), and to that extent they are *real*; however, they are not *wirklich*.

> speak of an *entity* that is an object of awareness: for some objects
> [of awareness] do not exist. [Smith 2002: 224]

In other words, intentionalists insist that even when we entertain thoughts about round square cupolas, fall in love with fictional characters, fear ghosts, or hallucinate fat men in doorways, we are aware of something, or are mentally directed to something, or have something over and against our consciousness, just as well as in cases in which what we are aware of exists in reality. As Smith writes, intentionalism 'suggests that nonentities too must be discussed as being in some sense "over and against" consciousness; or . . . that there is a phenomenological "overagainstness" to cognition even in cases where no real object is cognized' (Smith 2002: 236).

That being their position, intentionalists need a way to construe the notion of 'object' that does not include the claim that an object, as such, exists. What we may call the Husserlian way is as follows. Talk of an experience's having an intentional object is, from an ontological standpoint, *just* talk of *the experience*, just the description of a particular way in which the subject is minded. So that, for example, the proposition 'I am thinking of Cantor's theorem' does not *by itself* carry a commitment to the existence of a certain object, Cantor's theorem; it only carries a commitment to the existence of a certain experience, my thinking of Cantor's theorem, whose descriptive character (or, as Husserl puts it, descriptive essence) is best captured in terms of directedness to an object. It is in this sense that the notion of intentional object has absolutely no ontological import (apart from implying that there exists a subject who is minded in a particular way), and

is, rather, merely phenomenological: it only serves to adequately describe a certain class of experiences (namely, the intentional ones). And it is in this sense that existence and non-existence do not accrue to intentional objects *qua* intentional objects. In Husserl's words:

> ... only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention [i.e., the specific directedness] in question. ... If this experience is present, then, *eo ipso* and through its own essence , the intentional 'relation' to an object is achieved and an object is 'intentionally present'; these two phrases mean precisely the same. And of course such an experience may be present in consciousness ... although its object does not exist at all .... The object is 'meant', i.e., to 'mean' it is an experience, but it is then merely entertained in thought, and is nothing in reality. ... If, however, the intended object exists, nothing becomes phenomenologically different. ... I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck, of the tower of Babel as I think of Cologne Cathedral, of a regular thousand-sided polygon as of a regular thousand-faced solid. (*LU*5, §11: 98-99)

Smith shares the specifically Husserlian outlook. As he writes in *The Problem of Perception*, 'to speak of [an] experience's intentional object is simply to talk about the "descriptive nature" of that experience, to advert to its specific intentional character. The intentional object is not any sort of being "over and above" the experience itself' (Smith 2002: 243). While trying to illuminate the view, he helpfully puts the matter in terms of ontological

versus psychological reduction. Husserlian intentionalism is an *ontologically* reductive view of intentional objects, because it holds that intentional objects are nothing over and above the experiences of which they are the objects. It is not, however, a *psychologically* (or, better, phenomenologically) reductive view: because for Husserl (as well as for Smith) the only adequate way of describing the experiences in question is as being directed to objects. That is what Husserl means when he says that directedness belongs to the 'essential descriptive character' of intentional experiences. Again Smith: 'Talk of awareness *of an object* [my emphasis] is inescapable if we are adequately to characterize certain psychological states as they are lived. Reference to intentional objects is not just "a way" of talking about experience, but the phenomenologically necessary, only adequate way. It is necessary in order to do *descriptive justice* to the phenomenological fact of someone's being "minded" in a determinate fashion' (Smith 2002: 244).

Let us now turn to the second peculiarity of intentionality, namely, that intentional objects are conception-dependent. This is closely connected with the first claim included in the second part of (10), viz., the claim that objects have senses. For Husserl, objects are always intended in determinate ways.[13] This means that, whenever we describe an intentional experience, and thus invoke its intentional object, we should always heed the fact that the object is intended not as an indeterminate something, but as something with this or that property, or as something standing in this or that relation with something else – in general, as being thus-and-so determined. The

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[13]To be 'intended', to be 'presented', and to be 'represented' in or by consciousness are all locutions that, although they have different meanings in Husserl, I will be using as synonyms.

hallucinated fat man in the doorway, for example, is intended as being fat, a man, and in the doorway. My cat, which is what is really in the doorway asking for nourishment, I am seeing as black, as having a certain shape, as moving in a certain way, and so on. Thus, what I have been referring to above as 'the intentional object of an experience' is in fact, for Husserl, a structure, called (at least from 1913 on) *noema*, comprising not only the object, but the object together with the way in which it is intended, i.e., its *noematic sense* (or 'sense' for short).[14] To say, with Drummond, McIntyre and D.W. Smith, that intentional objects are conception-dependent is just to say that there is no such thing as a "bare" intentional object, so to speak.

The claim that objects have senses, then, is the claim that intentional objects are present to consciousness along with a collection of determinations. It is this collection that, according to (10), undergoes an 'enrichment' due to certain mental operations referred to as 'cognitive syntheses'. We will soon learn what that means. Before we do so, however, I need to introduce two additional notions: that of constitution and that of intentional system. They do not appear in the definition of predication, but will be useful in its explanation.

As we have seen, intentional objects are nothing over and above intentional acts. In this sense, as Smith puts it, 'Husserl is of the opinion that certain conscious processes *suffice* for objects to be present to us. If certain subjective processes occur in you, then – *ipso facto* – an object of a certain sort is present to your consciousness. Objects supervene on such subjective processes' (Smith 2003: 34-35). Another way of expressing this

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[14]For a full account of the noema, see Drummond 1990.

is, in Husserl, by saying that intentional acts *constitute* intentional objects. 'Constitution' is here a technical term, meant to express precisely the circumstance that the obtaining of certain acts is a sufficient condition for the obtaining of intentional objects. In fact, the former is a *necessary and sufficient* condition for the latter: because talk of intentional objects only makes sense relative to a description of intentional acts. Moreover, Husserl thinks that to types of intentional acts correspond types of intentional objects: to thought, thought-objects, to love, loved-objects, and so on. The primary aim of phenomenology (at least, of what Husserl calls 'static' phenomenology; more about this in Chapter 6, Section 3) is thus to investigate which types of intentional acts constitute which types of intentional objects, i.e., which types of mental operations are presupposed by the givenness of certain types of intentional objects. How must thought be understood if it is to be able to constitute what we take to be the objects of thought? How must love be understood, if it is to be able to constitute what we take to be the objects of love? Again Smith:

> The detailed tasks of phenomenology as 'constitutional research'
> are concerned with specifying what sorts of mental accomplish-
> ments are required to constitute various types of object: i.e.,
> what sorts of processes are *necessary and sufficient* for various
> types of object to be given to consciousness. (Smith 2003: 35)

This is why Husserl's account of predication is in terms of consciousness: because it aims at discovering the mental processes that underpin the fact that there are such intentional objectivities as predications. Those processes

are what in (10) is referred to as 'cognitive syntheses'.

As a synonym for 'cognitive', I should warn the reader, Husserl often uses 'predicative'. So that (10) could have read:

 (11) A predication is a linguistic and logical objectivity expressing the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in *predicative* syntheses

Thus framed, the definition may appear to be circular, as the word 'predication', or its close cognate 'predicative', appears both in the definiendum and in the definiens. In the definiens, however, it merely qualifies a type of mental performance, and, as I have said, actually means 'cognitive'. What the latter means, I will say in due course. But the point is that 'predicative', unlike 'predication', has its own, further definition; thus, (11) is not circular. However, it is confusing; therefore I will stick to (10).

The notion of *intentional system*, on the other hand, is meant to capture the fact that it is not always a question of one single act constituting an intentional object. Sometimes, and predicative synthesis, as we shall see, is a case in point, it is a question of several acts, linked together in an organic, systematic way, constituting an object – or, indeed, enriching the sense of an object. A related notion is that of *theme* or *thematic object*. A system is not simply an array of unrelated items; it is rather a coherent and organic unity (a functional unity, perhaps). What gives unity and coherence to an intentional system is the object that it collectively constitutes, and that is what Husserl calls the theme, or the thematic object, of the system. (The objects of single intentional acts are also called their themes by Husserl.)

I should warn the reader that 'intentional system' is not Husserl's term.

Rather, he refers to intentional systems either simply as 'synthetic consciousness' (*synthetischen Bewusstsein*) or as 'many-membered' (*gegliederten*) or 'polythetical' (*polythetische*) syntheses (*Ideas 1*, §118). These expressions, however, do not strike me as particularly helpful; that is why I have used my own, and will continue to do so.

So far we have learnt what objects are for Husserl, and that objects have senses. We have also learnt that objects are constituted by intentional acts – or, indeed, by intentional systems. What is it, however, for the sense of an object to be enriched? In fact, as (10) has it, to be 'enriched in cognitive syntheses' – or, as I will also say, to be 'cognitively enriched'?

Cognitive (or predicative) syntheses are intentional systems, i.e., systems of intentional acts working together towards a certain specific achievement. The achievement, in this case, is the enrichment of the noematic sense of the thematic object of the system. Cognitive syntheses are, for Husserl, ultimately responsible for the constitution of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities. I say 'ultimately' because, as we shall see, other intentional systems are required for that constitution. Predicative syntheses, however, are uniquely important, because, again, it is in them that cognitive enrichment of sense takes place. I will now explain what this means. I should point out, however, that for Husserl there are enrichments of sense, and corresponding synthetic processes, that are non-cognitive. As we shall see later in this subsection, these also concur to the constitution of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities. Cognitive and non-cognitive syntheses and enrichments of sense, however, have a common structure – so that it is possible to characterise both at once, albeit at a certain level of

abstraction. This is what I will try to do here. I will also give Husserl's criterion for distinguishing between the cognitive and the non-cognitive case. Later I will furnish the details of non-cognitive and cognitive syntheses, as well as of their relations.

As we have seen, every intentional system has a thematic object x. This, as we have also seen, and like all intentional objects, is presented to consciousness in a determinate way, i.e., with a noematic sense. Let us represent this sense, for the sake of exposition, as a set of determinations $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n\}$. (Later on I will say what it is that can take up the role of a determination.) The claim that the sense of an object can be enriched as a result of synthetic mental processes is now the claim that some intentional systems are such that their thematic object x is presented in them *first* with the sense $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n\}$, and *then*, as a result of a synthetic process taking place in the system (more about this in a minute), with the sense $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n, \mathbf{d_{n+1}}\}$. It is in this sense that the noematic sense of an object undergoes an 'enrichment'(e.g., *EJ*, §50a: 209), or an 'accretion' (206): it gains more determinations. As for the synthetic processes themselves, they are systems consisting of at least three intentional acts. One is directed to the thematic object x of the system, and intends it with what we may call the initial sense $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n\}$. Another act is directed to a determination d that is not included in the initial sense s_x. A third act connects the new determination, d, with the initial sense s_x, in such a way that d comes to be included in s_x. As a result, s_x changes, and becomes one determination richer: $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n, \mathbf{d_{n+1}}\}$. This, notice, is why the process is 'synthetic': it brings together two previously separated items.

The process may then go on to include other syntheses of the new s_x with yet further determinations, and the sense of x may thus become richer and richer. The one I have described, however, is the *basic synthetic unity* to be found in processes of enrichment of sense. Here is a graphic representation of it (where each circle represents an act of the system):

Incidentally, the fact that synthetic processes are made up ultimately of systems in which a noematic sense is enriched by *one* determination is the phenomenological ground of Husserl's claim that predication has always two members (*EJ*, §2: 14; §50c: 215). Again, the description I just gave is an abstract, schematic one. Later I will show what the process looks like *in concreto*, both in cognitive and in non-cognitive intentional systems.

Notice that I have left the question open as to what counts as a deter-

mination. The reason is that that is what the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive enrichment of sense turns on: in the non-cognitive case, determinations are moments; in the cognitive case, determinations are universals. This is the official criterion I will go on to propose in a minute. I have to say, however, that reference to universals or lack thereof is not *Husserl's* official criterion. The official account of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive is rather in terms of the different 'attitude' (*Einstellung*) that the subject has in each case when engaged in the synthetic process: *passive* in the non-cognitive, *active* in the cognitive. Husserl writes: 'In the explication [which, as we shall see, is a non-cognitive synthetic process of enrichment of sense] of a substrate *S* . . . the substrate has obtained in this synthesis of transition from *S* to *p* [i.e., from *S* to a determination *p*] an accretion of sense. . . . [However, the synthesis] arose *passively* between the substrate *S* . . . and its determination *p*, and the thematic object-substrate found its enrichment of sense in this passive modification' (*EJ*, §50a: 206). In the cognitive case, however, 'the transition [i.e., the synthesis] is guided by the cognitive *will* to retain *S* in its determination. An *active* intention aims at . . . producing in an original activity what accrues to *S*' (*EJ*, §50a: 207). And again on the same page: 'What is peculiar to the predicative synthesis consists in the *active* accomplishment of the synthetic transition from *S* to *p*'.

The distinction between non-cognitive and cognitive syntheses is then, for Husserl, that between passive and active syntheses; and the distinction between the latter is that between syntheses that are performed without the subject's will on the one hand, and syntheses that are performed will-

fully by the subject on the other. In *EJ*, §47, Husserl goes so far as to say that in the cognitive case the enriching of the sense of the thematic object is itself an 'object of the will' of the subject, and that 'every step of cognition is guided by an active impulse of the will to hold on to the known as the same and as the substrate of its determining characteristics in the later course of life' (198). In fact, the family of concepts to which will belongs – will, drive, striving, and even instinct – has a paramount role in Husserl's overall philosophy. There is evidence to suggest that for him intentionality as a whole should be accounted for in terms of what he called 'transcendental instincts', and that the basic form of intentionality, or 'proto-intentionality', is for him 'drive-intentionality' (*Triebintentionalität*), or 'instinct-intentionality' (*Instinktintentionalität*). This, in turn, is connected with Husserl's metaphysics of 'monads'. See Smith 2003: 149-156, 200-210, and the relevant excerpts from the original manuscripts (258-261). See also Mensch 1998.

I am not sure what to make of this particular view of Husserl's. In any case, it involves such tangled issues as the nature and the phenomenology of the will, of agency, of active or passive engagement in mental processes, and, if we follow Husserl to the end, the phenomenology of drives and instincts. To engage with all this would clearly take me too far afield. That is why I propose to cash out the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive mental processes in different terms, at least for present purposes. This is not to excessively stretch Husserl, because the criterion I am about to put forward – involvement of reference to universals, or lack thereof – is, in *EJ*, at least equivalent to cognition.

As we shall see in detail later in the section, in *non-cognitive* syntheses and enrichments of sense what counts as determinations within, or to be synthesised with, the noemantic sense of a thematic object *x*, is either *x*'s independent and non-independent parts, or the objects (and their parts) in the environment of *x*; and thus, in general, particular objects. *Cognitive* or predicative syntheses and enrichments of sense, however, always involve reference to universals; and it is indeed universals that function as determinations in the cognitive case. This is explicitly claimed by Husserl in *EJ*:

> There is no act of predicative judgement [i.e., synthesis or enrichment of sense], no constitution of predicative forms, which does not already include in itself at the same time a formation of generalities. ... In every predicative formation there already takes place a determination "as" this or that ... on the basis of general significations . . . .
>
> If, for example, in a judgement of perception of the simplest form, *S* is *p*, we determine this particular object of perception as red, in this "being-determined-as-red", there is already contained implicitly, *in virtue of* the generality of the signification "red", the relation to the general essence "redness", although this relation need not become thematic . . . .[15] (*EJ*, §49: 204)

This supports the claim that involvement of reference to universals is a necessary condition for cognition. The condition, however, is plausibly

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[15]As pointed out in square brackets within the quotation, 'judgement' here means an act of predicative or cognitive enrichment of sense in general.

also sufficient: for if it were not sufficient, then there could be cases of syntheses involving reference to universals that were not cognitive, but, for example, merely perceptual. Surely, however, if a mental operation involves reference to universals then it is cognitive. If this is correct, then the condition is necessary and sufficient for cognition – although, again, is not Husserl's official account of the latter.

Notice, moreover, that the fact that in the passage reference to universals is deemed 'implicit' with respect to at least some predicative syntheses should not be overplayed: because a little afterwards Husserl says that, although predications in which reference to universals is only implicit are not cases of 'conceptualising thought in the proper sense', in saying so he is 'intentionally neglecting the problems which result from the fact that to *every* predication are linked . . . a general signification and, in this sense, an act of conceptualisation' (205).

It thus seems both fair (to Husserl) and helpful (to us) to take the distinction between cognitive or predicative syntheses and enrichments of sense, and their non-cognitive, non-predicative counterparts, to hinge on the fact that in the first case what acts as determination, and thus both makes up and enriches the sense of thematic objects, is universals, while in the second case is particulars.

We will come to appreciate all the details in the next part of the section. What I have been presenting up to now, however, should be enough to illuminate the second part of (10). The mental processes that are ultimately responsible for the constitution of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities are cognitive syntheses, for it is in them that the relevant type

of enrichment of the sense of intentional objects (the one expressed by predications) takes place. What is distinctive about cognitive, as opposed to non-cognitive, enrichment of sense is that both the determinations in the sense of a given object and the determinations that go on to enrich that sense are universals.

As I said, however, predicative syntheses are not the only processes involved in bringing about the constitution of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities. The overall process is indeed a three-stage one. I will now review it in its entirety. This is detailed, very fine-grained Husserlian doctrine, but is far from superfluous: because it is on its basis that I will argue for the claim that Husserl's official theory of predication entails (2*).

A Three-Stage Process

As I mentioned, cognitive synthesis is not the only intentional system responsible for the constitution of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities. Comprehensively considered, the latter is rather a three-stage process:

> *Stage 0:* non-cognitive synthesis between the sense of a thematic object *x* and a determination *d*;

> *Stage 1:* cognitive synthesis between the sense of *x* and *d*;

> *Stage 2:* constitution, thanks to a higher-order act, of a proposition (a predication) expressing the achievement of the stage-1 synthesis.

Here I will mainly discuss the relations between stage-0 and stage-1 processes, and treat the stage-2 achievement as comparatively unproblematic.

In Chapter 6 I will expand on the relations between predicative syntheses (stage 1) and their linguistic, stage-2 expressions.

As we have seen, the main difference between stage-0 and stage-1 syntheses is that in the first case the determinations that make up the sense of *x*, as well as the determination which, due to the synthesis, comes to be included in that sense at the end of the synthetic process, are particulars (e.g., *x*'s pieces and moments), while in the cognitive case they are universals. Ultimately I will argue that the universals involved in stage-1 syntheses are those that the particulars involved in stage-0 syntheses instatiate or bear: this is how Husserl's theory entails (2*). But I am getting ahead of myself. Stage-1 – cognitive, universals-involving – syntheses, on the other hand, are, for Husserl, based on stage-0, non-cognitive syntheses; that is to say, the latter are a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the former. As he writes, 'All enrichment of logical [i.e., predicative] sense presupposes an enrichment in receptivity' (*EJ*, §56: 233) – where 'receptivity' (*Rezeptivität*) is just another, somewhat Kantian term for passivity, to be contrasted with 'spontaneity' (*Spontaneität*, i.e., activity).[16] The paradigm, as well as the most fundamental type, of non-cognitive – or, as he also calls them, *prepredicative* (*vorprädikative*) – syntheses are for Husserl *perceptual* syntheses. (Less fundamental non-cognitive syntheses are syntheses in memory and in imagination, which according to Husserl are 'quasi-perceptual' types of consciousness). I will say more about the primacy of perception in Husserl's

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[16]In support, if need be, of my equating 'logical' and 'predicative': '. . . a sense which does not come from receptive apprehension, but accrues to it in predicative spontaneity, logical spontaneity . . . , and which we accordingly call logical sense. . . . It is only in the predicative judgement that an object, hitherto logically undetermined, can be invested with logical sense' (*EJ*, §56: 232-234).

philosophy, and especially in his theory of predication, in Chapter 6. The point here is just that the non-cognitive intentional performances that, in Husserl's theory, make cognitive enrichment of sense possible are perceptual performances.

Husserl refers to non-cognitive, perceptual, syntheses as 'explications' or 'explicative syntheses' (*Explikation*, *explikative Synthesis*). Different types of explication at stage 0 give rise to (better: allow the arising of) different types of cognitive syntheses at stage 1, and these, in turn, give rise to (allow the arising of) different forms of predication at stage 2 (i.e., at the level of language and logic). For Husserl, the main distinction in this connection is, at stage 2, between 'determinative' and 'internal-relational' (the latter is my expression, not Husserl's) propositions on the one hand, and 'relational' propositions on the other. For example, and respectively, '*a* is red', '*a* has *b* as an independent part', and '*a* is bigger than *b*'. Their basis, in terms of underlying mental processes, is cognitive syntheses (stage 1) underpinned, at stage 0, by two different types of explication: *internal explication* in the first two cases (determinative and internal-relational) and *external* explication in the third (relational).

Internal explications are perceptual intentional systems in which a synthesis occurs between a thematic object *x* (an individuum – i.e., an ontologically independent object) and either one of *x*'s independent parts (one of its pieces) or one of its non-independent parts (one of its moments). In order that this part may enter the explicative synthesis – this is important, I will return to it – it must *not* be *already included* in the noematic sense of *x*. As in the cognitive case, the synthesis results in the piece or the moment

of x becoming included in the noematic sense of x, which therefore, as a result of process, ends up enriched. Depending on whether the enriching determination is an independent or a non-independent part of the thematic object, the resulting predication at stage 2 will be internal-relational or determinative.

External explications, on the other hand, are intentional systems in which a synthesis occurs between a thematic object x (again an individuum) and either another object (another individuum) in the perceptual environment of x, or one of that individuum's sections or moments. Again, if the object or its parts are to be able to enter the external explication of x, they must *not* be *already included* in x's noematic sense. As before, the synthesis results in the individuum, or its section or moment, becoming included in the noematic sense of the thematic object, which is therefore enriched in the process. The corresponding stage-2 predications are the relational.

The different kinds of explication are described in detail by Husserl in the first part of *EJ* (esp. §§22-32). Here I will present them only to the extent that I need in order to clarify their relations with the stage-1, predicative syntheses that are based on them – and, in turn, give rise to the relevant types of predication at stage 2. In doing so, I will also clarify how it is that pieces and moments of a given object of perception x may not be in x's noematic sense from the beginning – i.e., how it can be that, when x is presented in consciousness, it is not presented already as fully determined at least with respect to its own sections and moments. In the previous paragraphs I repeatedly stressed that this is important. The reason why it is, is that if all the pieces and moments of x were in x's noematic sense

from the beginning, then, according to Husserl's theory, no explication would take place, no cognitive synthesis would occur, and therefore no proposition about *x* could ever be constituted. The key concept in this connection is that of *horizon* (*Horizont*).

The reason why the noematic sense of the objects of perception is in a position to be enriched in the first place is, for Husserl, that an element of incompleteness is included in every perception; for if every perception is incomplete, then the noematic sense of any object of perception (i.e., the way in which the object is presented in the perception) will also be incomplete, and thus be amenable to enrichment. Why, however, think that an element of incompleteness is included in every perception?

Consider, for example, the perception of this tomato. Although what is perceived is the tomato, what is actually present to consciousness (what is actually seen, for example) is not the whole tomato, but only its front side, along with its colour, shape, etc. The rear side of the tomato, its own colour, shape, etc., are absent from the perception. For this reason, they are not in the noematic sense of the tomato: because the latter is not presented as having this thus-and-so determined rear side, with this specific colour and this exact shape – and so on. This, for Husserl, is true of every perception, and it is why perceptions are incomplete.

In a sense, however, when I perceive the tomato, even though I am not presented with its rear side or the latter's parts, I must still be aware of them somehow: because after all the perception in question is the perception *of a tomato*, not of the front side of a tomato. As Heidegger would put it, absence is a mode of presence. The absent aspects of perceptions, which make the

latter incomplete, are present in the sense that they are at least implied or anticipated. And if absence is what allows noematic senses to be enrichable (in that they lack some determinations to begin with), anticipation is what makes it possible for them to be actually enriched: because it opens the phenomenological space for explication. The explication of a given object x is just the conscious exploration, on the part of the subject, of the absent-but-anticipated aspects of the perception of x. These aspects are what Husserl refers to as x's 'horizon'.

Horizons, however, come in two species: inner and outer. The *inner horizon* of the object x of a given perceptual act is the collection of the independent and non-independent parts of x that are not presented, but only implied, or anticipated, in the perception. This collection, although it is only implied in the perception, can be progressively brought to consciousness. Suppose for example that after having become aware of the tomato (and thus having seen its front side, its colour, its shape, etc.) I wished to take a closer look at it, perhaps in order to make sure it has not gone bad. I will then pick it up, turn it around and come to see its previously only anticipated parts (and thereby lose sight of what I was earlier in a position to see). When I do so, I explicate the inner horizon of the tomato ('internal explication of x' is actually short for 'explication of x's inner horizon'): because every time a previously out-of-sight section or moment of the tomato becomes visible it is synthesised with the sections and moments that are already in the noematic sense of the tomato; and the latter is thereby enriched. This explication is, for Husserl, the most basic form of a subject's conscious life.

The *outer horizon* of the object x of a given perceptual act, on the other hand, is the collection of the objects in the perceptual environment of x, as well as of their sections and moments. For example, the table the tomato is on, the knife I will use in a minute to slice it, the brown-moment of the table, and so on. These however, one might say, unlike the rear side of the tomato are seen from the very beginning. How could I see the tomato without also seeing the table, if the tomato is on the table? If they are seen from the very beginning, however, why are they in the tomato's horizon, and not already in its noematic sense? Because for Husserl, even though they are presented to consciousness along with the tomato from the very beginning, the subject is typically not attentive to them: they are at the margins, so to say, or in the background, of the perception. Indeed, when I perceive the tomato, the latter is not necessarily presented as being red, round, ripe, etc., *and* on the table, beside a knife, etc. In case it is not – and for Husserl that is the typical case – the table and the knife (or their moments) are not part of the way in which the tomato is present to consciousness, and thus are not part of its noematic sense. However, as was the case for the tomato's inner horizon, they are anticipated in the perception: for the tomato, like all objects of perception, is always present to consciousness as having some spatial location (even an unspecified one), as being in the vicinity of some other objects (even unspecified ones), and so on. By exploring the perceptual environment of the tomato, which simply means becoming attentive to its make-up, we explicate its outer horizon (i.e., we 'externally explicate the object'). When we do so, the objects in that environment, as well as their parts, become included in the noematic sense

of the tomato, and thus enrich it.

Non-cognitive enrichments of sense thus consist in the explication of the inner or the outer horizon of some thematic object. Specifically, as a result of the explication of a given object x's inner or outer horizon the noematic sense of x comes to include some determinations that it previously did not include – where, and *this* is what is specific to the non-cognitive case, the relevant determinations are *particulars*: individua and their independent and non-independent parts. In the *cognitive* case, on the other hand, the relevant determinations are *universals*: the ones, as I mentioned earlier, that stand in the right relations – instantiation and bearing – with the individua, the pieces and the moments involved in the non-cognitive process. In Chapter 6 I will investigate the most salient aspects of cognitive syntheses and their linguisic expressions (i.e., of stage-1 and stage-2 achievements). Here, instead, I will focus on the relations between stage-0 and stage-1 syntheses. My view, to state it again, is that the universals involved in a cognitive, stage-1 synthesis are those which are instantiated or borne by the particulars involved in the corresponding non-cognitive, stage-0 synthesis. If this is correct, notice, then, as I also mentioned earlier, Husserl's phenomenological theory of predication does indeed entail (2*): because what the latter states is precisely that a predicate 'F' is true of an object a if and only if a either instantiates or bears the universal F. In the next part of the section I will try to build a case both for this view of the relations between stage-0 and stage-1 syntheses and for the claim, implied by the view, that Husserl's theory of predication entails (2*).

1.3.2 Entailment of (2*)

In Section 1 we have seen that for Husserl predication is governed by the following principle:

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

   (a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival univer-
   sal, or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal; or

   (b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an
   individuum and *F* an adjectival universal

Essentialist predication is a special case, in which *F* is also such that *a* – in fact, *a qua* instance or bearer of some other universal – cannot be thought as not instantiating or bearing *F*. This is stated in

(4*) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G if and
   only if

   (a) *a* instantiates *or bears F*, and

   (b) a_G cannot be thought as not instantiating *or bearing F*.

In the present section, on the other hand, we have seen that for a predicate '*F*' to be true of an object *a* some mental processes must occur, stage 0 through stage 2, that collectively constitute the predication (the predicative proposition) that *a* is *F*. So, in a sense, we have two Husserlian accounts of predication: one in terms of a governing ontological principle, (2*) the other a full-blown phenomenological theory. I will now show that the latter

entails the former. For the reasons given above, in so doing I will also be clarifying the relations between stage-0 and stage-1 syntheses.

Before I begin to argue for the entailment, however, let me point out the following. (2*) is a biconditional: it states that there is a true predication *if and only if* certain conditions relative to instantiation or bearing are met. But one may argue: it is clear from Husserl's account that *a* instantiating or bearing *F* may be a necessary condition for there being a true predication '*a* is *F*', but certainly it is not a sufficient condition. Because even if *a* does instantiate or bear *F*, it seems that something more is needed to get the predication, namely, a subject that constitutes it (stage 0 through stage 2). So that, at best, Husserl's account can only entail the left-to-right direction of (2*): there is a true predication *only if* the instantiation/bearing conditions are met.

In effect, in order to run the overall argument of this thesis the left-to-right direction of (2*) is enough: in Chapter 3 I am going to argue that since a paramount class of predications falsify (2*), since (2*) is entailed by Husserl's theory of predication, the theory must succumb to *modus tollens* or be amended so as to avoid the entailment. So I could simply modify the claim as follows:

(2*→) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a only if*:

> (a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival universal or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal; or
>
> (b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* an adjectival universal.

However, it is possible to make a case to the effect that Husserl's account also entails the original, biconditional version of (2*). That is because, for Husserl, ideal objects, such as predications, exist if and only if they are *possibly*, as opposed to actually, constituted (this is implied by Husserl's idealism, which I will discuss in Section 4.3). Thus, in order to get the right-to-left direction of (2*), we need the instantiation/bearing conditions plus the possible (not the actual) constitution of the predication on the part of a subject. The latter implies, among other things, the possible existence of a subject, the possibility of the latter's constituting the relevant predication (stage 0 through stage 2), as well as the possible existence of *a* and *F* as intentional objects (*not* necessarily as entities). But if the instantiation/bearing conditions are met – i.e., if *a* either instantiates or bears *F* – then both *do* exist as intentional objects. As for the possible existence of a constituting subject, since Husserl, as I will explain in Section 4.3, is an idealist, if that condition is not met there is just nothing: no necessities, no essences, no objects. But since, *ex hypothesi*, the instantiation/bearing conditions are met (i.e., since *a* does either instantiate or bear *F*), and thus *a* and *F* do exist as intentional objects, then a subject exists, too. Finally, if there is a subject and there are *a* and *F* (as intentional objects), then surely it is possible that the former should constitute '*a* is *F*' on the basis of the latter. Thus, in effect, the right-hand side of (2*), together with assumptions that can safely be extracted from Husserl, entails the further conditions it needs in order to entail the left-hand side. This validates the biconditional. (Let me point out again, however, that even if I am wrong about this, what I really need for my purposes is (2*→), i.e., the left-to-right direction of (2*).)

Now: does Husserl's theory of predication entail (2*)? Let us start with clause (b). Given the account, '*a* is *F*', for *a* an individuum and *F* an adjectival universal, is true if and only if the explication of the inner horizon of *a* yields the result that *a* has an *F*-moment. But *a* has an *F*-moment if and only if *a* bears *F*. Thus, '*a* is *F*' is true if and only if *a* bears *F*. Husserl's theory, then, entails clause (b) of (2*).

There are two problems at this point. First, to show that the Husserlian account entails the instantiation clause (a) is less straightforward than to show that it entails clause (b). Second, the account includes relational predication and relational universals, which, on the face of it, (2*) does not even mention. I will deal with these problems in order.

The instantiation clause of (2*) is that '*a* is *F*' is true if and only if *a* instantiates *F* for either *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival universal, or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal. The problem is that, as far as I am aware, Husserl never gives full-blown (in fact, not even half-baked) analyses of these cases – so that it is not even clear what he himself made of the constitution of '*a* is *F*' read as we are now reading it. I will try to show that, nevertheless, if the overall account is to make sense, then it has to entail clause (b).

Consider the first case: *a* is an individuum, *F* a substantival universal. E.g., '*a* is a tomato'. It is not as if *a* had a tomato-moment of which we could become aware by explicating its inner horizon. If that were so, then Tomato would have (tomato-)moments as its instances, and would thus be an adjectival universal – which, for Husserl, it is not. How is the relevant reading of '*a* is *F*' constituted, then?

Husserl sometimes seems to think that substantival universals are, or can be, associated with sets of adjectival universals that are collectively equivalent to them (i.e., such that $\forall x(Fx \equiv (G_1 x \wedge \ldots \wedge G_n x)))$. There is a question as to whether this should be taken to be a reductive claim; I will simply answer 'no' here, and postpone discussion until Section 4.2. If, however, Husserl does think that an object instantiates a substantival universal F if and only if it bears certain adjectival universals $G_1, \ldots, G_n$, then plausibly that is what his account of the constitution of 'a is F', current reading, is going to turn on. And the account will be something like this: 'a is F' is constituted on the basis of the internal explication of a and is true if and only if the latter yields the result that a has G_1-, $\ldots$, G_n-moments.

This takes us back to the bearing clause of (2*): for 'a is F' will then be true if and only if a bears $G_1, \ldots, G_n$. If, however, as I think and will argue in Section 4.2, Husserl takes substantival universals to be associable with, but *not* reducible to adjectival universals, then there is a genuine sense in which 'a is F' is true if and only if a instantiates F – a sense, that is, which, at least from a logical and ontological standpoint, is not to be understood in terms of bearing.

Consider now the second case: a is a moment, F an adjectival universal. Does the explanation above work in this case? I am not sure. For one thing, it is not clear to me whether Husserl thinks that moments have inner horizons. In *LU*3 he allows moments to have moments of their own (see *LU*3, §14, Proposition 4 and its gloss); to that extent, one may conjecture, Husserl also allows moments to have inner horizons. But, to the best of my knowledge, there is no explicit mention of those in *EJ* (or anywhere else, for

that matter), and thus no account of the relevant reading of '*a* is *F*' in terms of the internal explication of moments.

Be that as it may, since, as we know, Husserl clearly says that moments instantiate adjectival universals just as individua instantiate substantival ones, and since we have already established that the individuum-substantival case is indeed entailed by Husserl's account, considerations of uniformity, as well as the absence of an argument to the contrary, compel us to admit that the account also entails the moment-adjectival case.

Therefore, although (2*) is not all there is to Husserl's comprehensive view of predication, which also includes a phenomenological theory, the phenomenological theory entails (2*). Importantly, due to the entailment, whatever falsifies (2*) or is incompatible with it, also falsifies, or is incompatible with, the phenomenological theory.

There is, however, a second worry I mentioned at the beginning: that, since in the phenomenological theory figure relational predications and universals, which, on the other hand, are not even mentioned in (2*), the latter may actually not be enough to express Husserl's view of predication even if it is entailed by his phenomenological theory. Again, to the best of my knowledge, there is no full-blown Husserlian account of relational universals – so that in the overall picture some questions remain unanswered. For example: Are relational universals substantival? Are they adjectival? Are they *sui generis*? What are their instances? Are they borne by anything?

Let me first say something about the instantiation of relational universals; then I will discuss whether (2*), as it is, is enough or not to express Husserl's view, and, if not, what should be done about it.

What instantiates relational universals? The simplest answer is: their relata. So, for example, if a and b stand in a relation ϕ, then ϕ is instantiated by a and b collectively. Husserl has a notion in terms of which 'collectively' should be spelled out in this case: that of *situation* (*Sachlage*). I will not go into that, here, and only refer the reader to *EJ*, §59, and to Rosado Haddock 2000. If we buy this view, and I see no reason why we should not, then (2*) can be expanded to accommodate relational universals as follows:

(2*$_{REL}$) A predicate 'X^n' is true of objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ if and only if:

(a) a instantiates X^1, for a an individuum and X^1 a substantival universal or a a moment and X^1 an adjectival universal;

(b) a bears X^1, i.e., a has a moment which instantiates X^1, for a an individuum and X^1 an adjectival universal;

(c) $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ instantiate X^n, for $a_1, \ldots, a_n$.

where 'X^n' is an n-place predicate ($n > 1$) and X^n the corresponding relational universal, and $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ is not merely a series of relata, but a situation in Husserl's sense (whatever that is). If clause (c) is vaguer than the others, that is due to the unclarity of Husserl's position with respect to relational universals and instantiation.

Although (2*) can be so expanded, however, for the sake of simplicity I shall mostly disregard relational universals. That will have no significant effect on my overall argument. On the other hand, I think it is clear that if Husserl's original account of predication entails (2*), the account plus my conjecture about relational universals and instantiation entail (2*$_{REL}$).

A final remark. (2*) is important in itself because it is the general principle governing the relations between predication on the one hand, and instantiation and bearing on the other. But it is especially important in the narrative of this thesis, because, as I said at the beginning of this subsection, (4*) – the principle governing essentialist predication and essentialist truth – is a special case of (2*): the case in which *F* is part of the essence of *a*-cum-universal (i.e., the case in which *a*-cum-universal cannot be thought of as not instantiating or bearing *F*). Securing (2*) and its entailment from Husserl's phenomenological theory of predication, then, is a way of securing (4*) and *its* entailment from the same theory.

1.4 Issues

In this section I address a number of questions that arise from Husserl's view of essence and universals as I have presented it. Not *all* the questions that arise, of course, but some that, I think, particularly call for discussion and need to be addressed before we proceed to the following chapters. These questions are: hierarchies of, and ontological dependencies between, universals (4.1); the relationship between adjectival and substantival universals, and in particular whether for Husserl the latter reduce to clusters of the former (4.2); and the ontological status of universals and ideal objects in general (4.3).

1.4.1 Hierarchies and Dependencies

Here I wish to discuss two ideas of Husserl's: that universals come in hierarchies, and that they stand in relations of ontological dependence between them (I have hinted at this earlier, when I said, in Section 2.2, that for Husserl it is not just particulars that stand in those relations).[17]

That universals come in hierarchies means for Husserl that they are arranged according to a species-genus structure: from lowest (*infimae*) species to highest genera. Universal *F* is a species of universal *G*, and *G* is the genus of *F*, if and only if, necessarily, something instantiates *G* if it instantiates *F*. Human, for example, is a species of Animal: because nothing can be human without being an animal. Quite traditionally, transitions within hierarchies are made by giving or taking specific differences in terms of adjectival universals; see e.g. *Ideas 1*, §§12-14, and *EJ*, §84. Thus, for example, the transition from Animal (genus) to Human (species) is made by means of the adjectival universal Rational (at least on some accounts). This, notice, is why for Husserl there can be no simple essences: if an object instantiates or bears a universal, it will also instantiate or bear all the genera of the universal and at least one of its species (unless the universal is a lowest species).

There is a sense, however, in which Husserl's view is less traditional than it may appear from this sketch. He distinguishes between *material* and *formal* universals. Material universals are universals whose instances can be

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[17]Plausibly, among ideal objects it is not only universals that stand in relations of ontological dependence. This is so both in general and for Husserl, as we shall see in Chapter 6.

grasped by the senses—Red, Colour, Sound being a few examples. Formal universals or *categories*, on the other hand, are universals whose instances are not graspable by the senses. Examples of these are Universal, Substantival Universal, Relation, Instantiation, State of Affairs. Alternatively, the distinction can be made out in terms of possession or lack of content: material universals have a determinate content, whereas formal universals do not – in the sense in which formal logic is often said not to have a content. See *LUIII*, §11; *Ideas 1*, §13; *EJ*, §85.

There is a minor difficulty in this connection. Necessarily, nothing can instantiate Human without also instantiating Object. Thus, Human should be a species of Object. Which, in turn, implies that Object, a formal universal, is a genus and has species. At some points, Husserl declared view accords with this. In *FTL*, for example, he speaks of 'the genus apophansis' ('aphopansis' meaning the same as 'predication', and thus Apophansis being a formal universal if anything is), and writes that 'each judgement-form is a *generic universality*, not only with regard to ... determinate judgements but also with regard to pure forms subordinate to it' (*FTL*, §13b: 50-51). Other times, however, Husserl denies that formal universals are genera and have species: because, he argues, generalisation, which is the process through which we ascend from lowest species to highest genera, is distinct from formalisation, which is the process through which we ascend from particulars to formal universals. He writes:

> One must sharply distinguish the relationships belonging to generalisation and specialisation from the essentially heteroge-

neous relationships belonging, on the one hand, to the *universal-isation of something materially filled into the formal in the sense of pure logic* and, on the other hand, to the converse: the *materialisation* of something logically formal. In other words: generalisation is something totally different from that *formalisation* which plays such a large role in, e.g., mathematical analysis; and speciali-sation is something totally different from *de-formalisation*, from "filling out" an empty logico-mathematical form or formal truth.

(*Ideas 1*, §13: 26)

Thus, for Husserl, or at least for the Husserl that makes this sort of claims, it is *only* material universals that stand in relations of genus and species: because it is only they, and not formal universals, that are steps in processes of generalisation or specialisation.

I am not sure whether these two outlooks can be reconciled, nor am I sure which of them is Husserl's official view. If it is the second, however, then the characterisation of the genus/species relation given above turns out to be too permissive and should be restricted to material universals alone. Here is a way of doing so. Universal *F* is a species of universal *G* if and only if: 1) for any particular *x*, *x* instantiates *F* only if *x* instantiates *G*, and 2) *F* and *G* are both material universals. *F* is a species of *G* if and only if *G* is a genus of *F*. The restriction, as far as I can see, is sufficient to define the genus/species relation in the desired way. That is good, because the only alternative seems to be to tamper with instantiation – which, given how basic a notion it is, would be rather inconvenient.

The second issue I mentioned at the beginning is that, for Husserl, it is not only particulars that stand in relations of ontological dependence: universals do as well. Even if he is right, the case is less straightforward than it might appear, and deserves discussion.

For Husserl, propositions expressing ontological dependencies among particulars are modal truths; and that is because, for him, ontological dependence is a modal notion. Peter Simons has shown this quite convincingly: see Simons 1987: 315-318.[18] The best way of cashing out ontological dependence in modal terms is, I think, the one Simons proposes (see Simons 1987: 295): *a* ontologically depends on *b*, where *a* and *b* are two objects, if and only if: 1) *a* and *b* are distinct, 2) necessarily, *a* exists only if *b* does, 3) *b* does not exist necessarily. In symbols

(12) $a \neq b \land \Box(E!a \rightarrow E!b) \land \neg\Box E!b$

where '*E!*' is the existential predicate, to be defined as usual: $\forall x(E!x \equiv \exists y(x = y))$. If *a* and *b* were identical, it would not make much sense to say that *a* depends on *b*. That justifies the first conjunct. The second conjunct is what does the main definitory work: it captures the idea of *a* being ontologically dependent on *b* by stating that, necessarily, *a* exists only if *b* does. Finally, the third conjunct states that *b* should not exist necessarily: because if it did, then the second conjunct, a conditional, would be true for any *a*, so that everything would depend on *b* – a bad result.

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[18]Non-modal reconstructions of Husserl's theory are available: Null 1983, Fine 1995a, Casari 2000. These, as Simons rightly argues, may well represent Husserl's own theory (beside being theories of their own, each with its own merits); but so long as they do not involve modality, they do not capture it, for Husserl just did think of ontological dependence as a modal notion.

As far as particulars are concerned, (12) is fine. However, if dependence is construed as per (12), Husserl's claim that ontological dependencies among particulars 'obviously carry over' to universals (*LU*3, §7a: 13) must be false. The reason is that universals (at least pure universals) just *do* exist necessarily. But then every particular depends on every universal, and every universal depends on every other. That cannot be right: I do not ontologically depend on the universal Tomato, nor, it seems, does the universal Tree, for example. Thus, either ontological dependence is not a modal notion, in which case its applicability to universals will depend on exactly how it is alternatively construed; or it is a modal notion and it does not apply to universals. *Or*, of course, there is not one but at least two modal notions of ontological dependence, and the notion which is not the one expressed by (12) fares better than (12) when applied to universals.

Fine 1995b argues that ontological dependence is not a modal notion. Correia 2005, after discussing Husserl's account of it, suggests that it should be recast in terms of grounding – again a non-modal notion (I shall expand on it in Chapter 2). Simons, on the other hand, takes up the third option. The dependence of a given object on another given object, expressed by (12), is called by Simons 'rigid'. What he calls 'generic dependence', on the other hand, is defined by him not for objects, but for classes of objects; more specifically, for extensions of universals. For the *F*s to generically depend on the *G*s is for every *F* to depend on some *G*; in symbols:

(13) $\forall x \Box((Fx \rightarrow \Box(E!x \rightarrow \exists y(Gy \land y \neq x))) \land \Diamond \exists xFx \land \neg\Box \exists xGx)$

See Simons 1987: 297. The clause '$\Diamond \exists xFx$' rules out trivial cases by prevent-

ing the antencedent of the main conditional, i.e., *Fx*, from being necessarily false. This may well be what Husserl himself had in mind when he claimed that some universals depend on others. While clarifying the claim that ontological dependencies carry over from particulars to universals, he says for example that if a universal is such that it cannot be instantiated unless some other universal is instantiated, then the former depends on the latter (*LU*3, §7a: 13). Thus, if the instances of *F* generically depend on the instances of *G*, *F* depends on *G*.

Prima facie, (13) does not suffer from the same problem as (12). It also accords with Husserl's *LU*3 statements. So we may accept it, at least provisionally. If we do accept the generic approach, however, we also have to be careful not to think, as most commentators seem to do, that for Husserl dependencies between universals ground dependencies between particulars. To be sure, Husserl does believe that dependencies between particulars obtain because of the essence of the particulars involved – that is, ultimately, because of facts about the universals instantiated by said particulars; which of course is a particular case of essence grounding necessity. He says, for example, that instances of certain universals, e.g., of Colour, are 'predestined by their essence' to being non-independent (*LU*3, §7: 12), i.e., to depend on instances of other universals. Indeed, he thinks that every colour-moment depends on an extension-moment. However, he never says that the relevant facts about universals are dependencies between them. All he requires is that there should be a 'law of essence' to the effect that instances of certain universals depend on instances of other universals. This is as it should be: because if dependencies between universals are *defined*

in terms of generic dependencies between their instances, then surely the former cannot ground the latter! How could a definiendum ground, or explain, its definiens?

1.4.2 Substantival and Adjectival Universals: a Reduction?

As we have seen, there are, for Husserl, two types of universals: substantival and adjectival. For example, Tomato and Red. Now, it seems fairly uncontroversial to say, as Husserl does (as we have seen in Section 3.2), that to every substantival universal a series of adjectival universals may be associated that are collectively equivalent to it. The question, however, is: do substantival universals thereby *reduce* to the relevant adjectival ones?

In *ILTK* (1906/07), and in particular in Appendix XV, Husserl says that substantival universals may indeed be thought of as complexes of 'universal moments', i.e., adjectival universals, 'specifiable each in its own right'. It is not clear to me whether that is his mature outlook as well. In *EJ*, for example, he says that to substantival universals, such as the empirical type Dog, belong 'a stock of attributes' determining them (*EJ*, §83a: 332) – which might be taken to speak in favour of constancy. On the other hand, in *EJ*, and not in *ILTK*, Husserl clearly makes a distinction, and a definitory one (in terms, as we saw, of extension) between the two types of universals. Also, the empirical type is said to have an 'open horizon ... of further [possible associated] attributes': since it *has*, as opposed to *is*, such attributes, and since the latter are only anticipated in the horizon, and are thus potentially but not actually associated to the type, it seems fair to say that what Husserl

has in mind in *EJ* is not a reduction of substantival to adjectival universals.

Be that as it may, the early view, regardless of whether it was later abandoned or not, does not seem straightforwardly reductive itself. Because the fact that we can think of substantival universals in terms of sets of characterising adjectival universals does not, by itself, entail that the former should be analysed in terms of, and thus reduce to, the latter. Thus, since in *EJ* substantival universals appear to be treated as a *bona fide* type of universals, I propose to take Husserl to be a non-reductionist with respect to them.

Incidentally, this suggests that a further relation may be introduced in the Section-2.4 diagram between adjectival and substantival universals, which we may call *association*:

1.4.3 Idealism and the Ontological Status of Ideal Objects

We have already seen what it is for an object to be ideal (as opposed to real): it is for it to be atemporal. In Section 1 I presented this characterisation in terms of existence, by saying that for Husserl ideal objects do not exist in time. Are we entitled, however, to put things this way in the Husserlian framework? A reason to think we are not is the following. As we saw in Section 1, Husserl refers to universals as 'general objects' (*generelle Gegenstände*). In Section 3.1 we also saw that Husserl's use of the term 'object' is technical. The corresponding notion – viz., that of intentional object – is a phenomenological one, and, importantly, has no ontological import: the fact that a certain mental act of a certain subject is directed to a certain object has no bearing at all on the question as to whether the object exists. It would thus seem that the issue of the ontological status of all intentional objects, ideal and real alike, cannot even be brought up in the Husserlian framework.

Not so, however. Husserl does have an account – a phenomenological account – of what it is for an intentional object to exist, i.e., according to the terminology of Section 3.1, for it to be not only an intentional object, but also an entity. In this sense, in Husserl's philosophy the issue of the ontological status of ideal objects (notably universals and propositions) does arise and, as we shall see, gets answered.

I said that the account in question is phenomenological. In fact, it is *idealistic*: according to Husserl, for an intentional object to exist is for it to satisfy a certain necessary and sufficient condition to be spelled out *itself*

in terms of consciousness and intentionality. Before I go on to give the condition, however, I should mention that not all commentators agree that Husserl was an idealist. I am not talking about what we may call the 'early' Husserl (1886-1907), who was definitely not an idealist, but about the mature Husserl (from 1913 onwards). Defending the idealistic interpretation, on the other hand, would take me too far afield; therefore I will simply refer the reader to the case A.D. Smith makes for that interpretation in Smith 2003: 179-182, which I endorse.

My view is that for Husserl the conditions that intentional objects must meet if they are to be entities (i.e., to really exist) are, at some level, the *same* for real (i.e., temporal) and ideal (i.e., non-temporal) objects. There is evidence for that. For example, the following passage:

> The *transcendence of the world* [i.e., for my purposes, the reality of the world] . . . is of the same species as the *transcendence of numbers* and other [ideal] objects. (*EP*2: 180)

Now, the conditions for real (i.e., temporal) objects, and in particular for objects of perception, to be entities have been investigated more – both by Husserl and by commentators and fellow phenomenologists – than those for ideal objects to be entities. I will therefore work out the latter by first briefly explaining what the former are for Husserl, and then proposing an analogous explanation for ideal objects. I will then take this analogous explanation to be the Husserlian condition that ideal objects have to meet if they are to be not mere intentional objects, but rather entities in the fullest sense.

In order to spell out the existence-condition (first for objects of perception and the for ideal objects as well), I will introduce the notion of 'total harmonization of intersubjective experience' – my attempt to bundle together all the Husserlian insights that are relevant to the issue. I will first define the notion, and then explain it. Here is the definition:

> the *total harmonization of intersubjective experience* is the comprehensive system of all the actual and possible intentional experiences (perceptions, hallucinations, thoughts, imaginations, fears, and so on) of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations.

Appeal to 'all the actual and possible subjects' and 'all their actual and possible intentional experiences' should not be particularly problematic. I will now try to explain the last part of the definition, 'in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations' (*their* refers to *experiences*, of course).

Suppose I have a sensory experience of a tomato. As we have seen in Section 3, for Husserl a sensory experience is never static, so to speak: it rather consists in actual presentations of the relevant intentional object (the tomato) along with the awareness of its inner and outer horizons, and it develops through time in the progressive exploration of those horizons. Now Husserl distinguishes two cases, one good and one bad. In the good case, the overall sensory experience may develop in such a way that all the horizonal anticipations are fulfilled (satisfied): the tomato turns out to have indeed a rear side as I expected it to have, with its colour and shape

and so on; and it turns out to be solid as I expected, so that I can actually grab it and pick it up – and perhaps smell it (and it does have a smell, as I anticipated) – and, in sum, I can do with it everything I anticipate being able to do with it, and find in it everything I anticipate finding. I also close my eyes, open them again, and the tomato is still there, unchanged. I even go out of the room, go back in, and still the tomato is there, and still it is unchanged. Husserl calls this type of overall experience *harmonious*: everything goes well, every partial experience accords with every other and subsequent partial experiences *confirm* previous ones.

If, on the other hand, at some point something goes wrong and my horizonal anticipations are fustrated in some important way – e.g., it turns out that I cannot pick up the tomato, because my hand grabs through it, or I close my eyes and then reopen them and the tomato is changed or gone – then, Husserl says, the experience is not harmonious: it 'explodes' (Husserl's term).

Now, if my experience of the tomato is harmonious, then surely I will take the tomato to be not merely an intentional object (merely something I see, grab, etc.), but a real object, an entity – I will take it to really exist. Subsequent experiences, however, may *correct* previous ones. E.g., I remember picking up the tomato a minute ago, but I do not seem to be able to do that now – my hand actually grabs through it. *Then* the overall experience, i.e., the system of the two, explodes: although the first experience was harmonious, the overall experience (i.e., the system) is not, and therefore the tomato turns out not to be real after all. I was probably hallucinating it. Or perhaps the second experience does not correct the first one at all, but

confirms it: I am still able to grab the tomato and do all sorts of things with it, and I still take it to be real.

This is for Husserl (a very simplified description of) how a subject's conscious life unfolds, and how the subject's experiences relate to each other: in terms of confirmations and corrections. At least at a first approximation, for Husserl an object is an entity (it really exists) *only if* it is the correlate of a harmonious experience or system of experiences; or, as Husserl also puts it, only if a subject's experiences of the object, after all corrections and confirmations, are such that the object's positing holds good. 'At a first approximation', because for Husserl an object's really existing – its existing in the real world, so to speak – must be the correlate not of the experiences, no matter how harmonious, of *one* subject, but of a *community* of subjects. In Smith's helpful words: 'By a "real world" we mean something that is intersubjectively accessible and determinable. Such a world is "public", as Russell put it' (Smith 2003: 177). Husserl's view, however, is that the experiences of the subjects of a community are related to each other in the same way as the experiences of one subject are related to each other: in terms, that is, of confirmations and corrections.

Suppose that, after a series of disharmonious experiences, I cannot make up my mind as to whether there really is a tomato in front of me. Plausibly, I will then ask someone else: 'Can *you* see a tomato there? Can *you* pick it up?'. Whatever the answer, my own experiences will be either confirmed or corrected, and the tomato will gain the status of a really existing, intersubjectively accessible object, or else of a merely hallucinated object. Of course, two people form a very small community. A better approximation

to what Husserl conceives of as the relevant community of subject is humanity. A second version of the Husserlian condition for the existence of objects of perception, then, is the following: an object really exists *only if* it is the correlate of all the experiences of all humans in all their corrections and confirmations.

But we are still not quite there – because humanity is not enough. In fact, no *actual* community of subjects is enough. Indeed, suppose no sentient being had ever made its appearance on Earth or on any planet of the universe. Would, say, Mount Blanc still have existed? Of course it would have existed. The question is: how can Husserl be entitled to say so? The answer is: by modalising the condition above. Even if no sentient being had ever made its appearance on any planet of the universe, some sentient being, or beings, *could* have. Mount Blanc really exists only if those possible sentient beings, in the right spot and conditions, would have experienced it harmoniously.

The notion of total harmonization of intersubjective experience – i.e., the notion of all the actual and possible intentional experiences of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations – simply generalises and expands this idea. Thus, for Husserl, an object really exists *only if* it is a correlate of all the actual *and possible* intentional experiences of all the actual *and possible* subjects in all their actual *and possible* mutual corrections and confirmations.

That, however, is still only an approximation. Notice that the last formulation, like the previous ones, is a *conditional*: *if* an object really exists, *then* it is the correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience.

What this means is: being the correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience is a *necessary* condition for being an entity (i.e., for really existing). Now, one need not be an idealist to endorse this. Indeed, if one accepts the notion of total harmonization of intersubjective experience (if one thinks that such a notion makes sense), then one, I believe, will easily agree that if an object really exists, then it is an object that would be harmoniously experienced by any possible community of subjects.

What makes Husserl an idealist is that he takes the condition to be *necessary and sufficient*. In particular, he thinks that being the correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience *suffices* for the real existence of an object. The official Husserlian condition for an intentional object to be an entity is thus the following:

> An intentional object is an entity *if and only if* it is a correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience, i.e., of all the actual and possible experiences of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations.

This is the Husserlian, idealistic condition for the existence of objects of perception. As I mentioned earlier on, my view is that according to Husserl something like this is true for ideal objects, too. We need not change the formulation of the condition, because, notice, the total harmonization of intersubjective experience includes not only perceptions, but intentional acts of *every* kind, including those directed to ideal objects. The problem is rather that it is not clear what the relevant corrections and confirmations

may look like with respect to experiences of ideal objects.

Here is my suggestion. Consider the (putative) property of being a non-self-exemplifying property (incidentally, we shall see more of this property in Chapter 5). There is, I believe, no doubt that we can think of that property; to such an extent, it is an intentional object. But does it really exist? What would be a disconfirmation, and thus a correction of the initial, naïve assumption of its existence? For instance, to come to realise that it entails a version of Russell's antinomy. If the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property exists, then either it is self-exemplifying or it is not self-exemplifying. If it is self-exemplifying, then it is a non-self-exemplifying property, and thus it is not self-exemplifying: contradiction. On the other hand, if it is not self-exemplifying, then it is a non-self-exemplifying property, and it is thus self-exemplifying: contradiction. Since the assumption that the property exists leads to an unsustainable logical situation, the property does not exist. Our initial experience of it – i.e., the intentional act of which it was the intentional object – has been corrected by a further experience, and the property has gained the status of a non-entity (which, however, does not preclude its being an intentional object). If, on the contrary, the experience of an ideal object undergoes no such correction and is thus included in the total harmonization of intersubjective experience, then the object is a *bona fide* entity.

Thus, when we say that for Husserl real objects exist in time while ideal objects do not, this is the meaning we should attach to the word 'exist'. On the other hand, having or not having a temporal location is for Husserl also part of the noematic sense of both real and ideal intentional objects

– regardless, that is, of their ontological status. A hallucinated object, for example, is intended as having a temporal location even though, in reality, it has none. Non-existent ideal objects, such as the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property, are different in this respect: they lack a temporal location *in principle*, and thus have none even in their noematic sense.

1.5 Summary

The task of this chapter was to clarify Husserl's view about essence, thereby illuminating part of his essentialist account of necessity.

The most important concepts are those of (genitive) essence, (pure) universal and truth about essence.

The essence of an object is the collection of the universals which the object has to instantiate or bear if it is to instantiate, or bear, a further, pre-given universal. Universals, in turn, are instantiable ideal objects.

An essentialist truth about an object-cum-universal a_G states that, if a instantiates or bears G, then it must also instantiate or bear other universals, the collection of which is its essence. This is expressed by (4*), which, in turn, is a particular case of (2*), i.e., of the general principle governing the relations between predication on the one hand, and instantiation and bearing on the other.

The first two notions, presented in Sections 1 and 2, are strictly Husserlian. The third was formulated, also in Sections 1 and 2, on the basis of (2*), which, although it is not strictly Husserlian, in Section 3 was shown to be

entailed by Husserl's original account of predication.

All this raises a number of issues. Some of these were discussed in Section 4. In Section 4 I also presented Husserl's view about the ontological status of universals and ideal objects in general, as well as his particular brand of idealism.

Chapter 2

The Account of Necessity

In this chapter I give the details of Husserl's essentialist account of necessity.
As far as essence is concerned, I will mostly rely on the findings of Chapter
1. A notable exception is the issue, also mentioned at the beginning of that
chapter, as to whether essence is for Husserl a modal or a non-modal notion.
As we have seen, when Husserl defines essence in *EJ* – 'the essence of an
object of a certain kind is that without which an object of that kind cannot
be thought' – his wording is modal. Our official principle governing the
relations between essentialist truths, instantiation/bearing, and universals,
namely,

(4*) A predicate '*F*' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G if and
only if

   (a) *a* instantiates *or bears F*, and

   (b) a_G **cannot** be thought as not instantiating *or bearing F*

is extracted from the *EJ* definition, and, as the boldfaced bit shows, preserves

its *prima facie* modal character. In the present chapter, however, I will show that if essence is to ground necessity, then necessity has to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for essentiality. To that extent, I will argue, essence must be for Husserl a *non*-modal notion (contrary to the *EJ* statement), in the sense that it cannot be fully accounted for in modal terms. I will also maintain that in the Husserlian framework essence should be treated as a primitive notion, linked to necessity in two ways: first, as its explanans; second, by the fact that every essentialist truth is also a necessary truth (because, as I said, necessity is for Husserl a necessary condition for essentiality). Whether the view that essence is non-modal and in fact accounts for essence, and the view that essentialist truths are necessary, are compatible, I will explore in Chapter 4, Section 2.

Essence, however, is only one out of three components of the Husserlian account. The others are necessity and grounding. These too need spelling out. I thus first present the account in its broad lines (Section 1), and then discuss grounding and necessity in detail (Sections 2 and 3). Finally, in Section 4 I compare my own interpretation of the Husserlian account with Mulligan's (in Mulligan 2004) and argue that, despite some differences in presentation and nomenclature, and barring a certain caveat, the two are in substantial agreement.

2.1 The Account

Here is a claim that Husserl repeatedly makes:

 (14) for a proposition to be necessarily true is for it to be true on the ground

of a law (*Gesetz*).

See for example *Prolegomena*, §63: 146; *Logik 1902/03*: 195; *Logik 1917/18*, §43b: 220. This is as close as one gets to a Husserlian general characterisation of necessity. Notice that it is stated in terms of what grounds, or explains, or accounts for, a necessary truth as such. In other words, Husserl characterises the notion of necessity by pointing out the source, or the ground, of necessary truths. For this reason I take the characterisation to be, in effect, also a concise statement of the Husserlian *account* of necessity. What I will try to do in this section is to extract and flesh out the whole account on the basis of the characterisation.

Before I do so, however, let me say something to make the term 'ground' intelligible. There are several competing accounts available of what it is for something to be grounded on something. One of their points of agreement is that claims about grounding can be (and, in ordinary contexts, typically are) expressed in English by means of 'because'-propositions. In this section, then, I will put things in terms of 'so-and-so because such-and-such' rather than in terms of 'so-and-so is grounded on such-and-such'. This allows me to present the Husserlian account of necessity while remaining neutral, at least for the time being, with respect to the question as to how grounding should exactly be construed. In Section 2 I will present and discuss Husserl's own view of the concept in detail.

That said, here is how I will be reading the Husserlian characterisation above:

(15) For every necessary truth $\Box A$, there is a law α such that $\Box A$ because α.

This is the first step of the extraction of the account from the characterisation. The former, as I shall understand it, aims at illuminating the concept of necessity by claiming that every necessary truth is grounded on a truth of a special kind: a *law*. This is what I take Husserl's project to be. Fleshing out the notion of law, however, will take considerable effort; in fact, that is what much of the extraction will amount to.

Let me briefly mention why I call (14) Husserl's 'characterisation', as opposed to 'definition', of necessity. The reason is that calling it a definition would arguably imply construing Husserl's account of necessity as reductive. There is some evidence that Husserl did indeed regard the account as reductive; however, as I will argue in Chapter 4, Section 2.3, the evidence is not conclusive. Besides, there are convincing reasons to think that the account, whatever it is that Husserl actually made of it, should *not* be construed as reductive. I will discuss them in Chapter 4, Section 2. This is why here I take the more cautious stance of regarding (14) as a mere *characterisation* of the concept of necessity – one that, I repeat, I regard as, in effect, a concise statement (of the core idea) of the full-blown Husserlian account.

The next step of the extraction is to understand what a law is. A law, one might suggest, is just a necessary truth. The suggestion is worth considering for at least two reasons. First, it strikes me as very natural. Second, although it will be refuted, the refutation will prove useful in that it will point us to a very important piece of information. Suppose, then, that the suggestion is correct. It follows that necessity is a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood. We can thus reformulate (14) and (15) as follows:

(14*) For a proposition to be necessarily true is for it to be true on the ground of a necessarily true proposition.

(15*) For every necessary truth $\Box A$, there is a law $\alpha = \Box B$ such that $\Box A$ because $\Box B$.

Both (14) and (14*) are characterisations of necessity. But whereas (14) is non-circular, (14*) is evidently circular.[19] The only difference between the two, however, is that the concept of law has been substituted, in (14*), with that of a necessarily true proposition. If the substitution leads to circularity, then it must be a wrong move. But if necessity is a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood, then the move is warranted. Therefore, necessity is not a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood – as indeed Husserl explicitly maintains in *Prolegomena* (§63: 146), *LU3* (§7: 12), and *Logik 1917/18* (§43b: 220).

This refutes the suggestion that laws are just necessary truth – i.e., that necessity is a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood. But there is more to say. Specifically, although necessity cannot be a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood, in the Husserlian environment it must, nonetheless, be a necessary one. To see this, notice that Husserl requires necessity to satisfy the principle that if it is possible that A, then it is necessarily possible that A:

(S5) $\Diamond A \rightarrow \Box \Diamond A$

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[19]It is important to keep in mind that I am reading (14), and the whole of Husserl's project, as meant to illuminate the notion of necessity itself. There is nothing wrong in saying that a *given* necessity $\Box A$ is grounded on another necessity $\Box B$. But if we expand this to every necessity, and read it as an account of the notion itself, then (and only then) it will be circular.

In *Ideas 1*, for example, he characterises possibility as 'absolutely necessary possibility' (*Ideas 1*, §135: 323). Now (S5), among other things, entails the principle that if it is necessary that *A*, then it is necessarily necessary that *A*:

(S4) $\Box A \rightarrow \Box\Box A$

Since (S5) entails (S4), if Husserl endorses the former then he is committed to the latter. In a paper, Ross Cameron has put forward a compelling argument to the effect that if (S4) is true, then the truths that ground necessity (as he puts it, the 'source' of necessity) cannot be contingent. See Chapter 4, Section 2. If the argument is sound (as I believe it is), then laws, being what, for Husserl, grounds necessities, cannot be contingent.

Now, a proposition *A* is contingent if and only if it is possible that it should be true and it is possible that it should be false:

$$\Diamond A \wedge \Diamond\neg A.$$

Laws, then, insofar as they are to ground necessity, should be such that, for every law α, it is not the case that it is possible that α and it is possible that not-α:

$$\neg(\Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\neg\alpha)$$

By De Morgan:

$$\neg\Diamond\alpha \vee \neg\Diamond\neg\alpha$$

Assuming, as is customary and as Husserl himself does (see *LU3*, §6: 12), that possibility and necessity are dual concepts (i.e., that it is necessary that *A* if and only if it is not possible that not-*A*: $\Box A \equiv \neg\Diamond\neg A$):

$$\Box\neg\alpha \lor \Box\alpha$$

Every law must verify the last disjunction: otherwise it would be contingent and could not ground necessity. The first disjunct, however, must be false if α is a law: because laws are *true* propositions (not impossible, and thus false, ones). Therefore, if α is a law then it is necessarily true.

We thus know that Husserl is committed to the claim that all laws are necessary, i.e., that necessity is a necessary condition for lawhood. We also know that necessity is not a sufficient condition for lawhood, and that, as a consequence, there must be something that distinguishes laws from mere necessities. The question, at this point, is what that may be.

In order to answer this question, I suggest we begin by focusing on the role that laws are supposed to play in the account: to provide a ground for every necessary truth. While doing so, let us stipulate to think of laws as propositions that are necessary, that are liable to ground other necessities, and that meet some further, still unspecified condition. Our task is then to specify the latter. Let us ask: what is it for a necessity to be grounded on a law?

Husserl distinguishes two cases. Every necessity $\Box A$ is grounded on some law α. Sometimes the necessity is itself a law; that must be so, because, as we have just seen, for Husserl every law is a necessity. In that case, for Husserl, the necessity which is a law (i.e., $\Box A$) and the law on which it is grounded (i.e., α) *coincide*: $\Box A = \alpha$. Incidentally, this seems to imply that, for Husserl, it is possible for a truth to ground itself – which flies in the face of most (if not all) theories of grounding, according to which grounding is

irreflexive: it is never the case that *A* because *A*. See for example Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* (§204), Rosen 2010 and Correia 2010. If those theories are correct, and grounding really is irreflexive, then Husserl has a problem. I will discuss the matter in Section 2.3.

Now, all this happens in case the necessary truth □*A* which is said to be grounded in some law is itself a law. Sometimes, however, □*A* is not itself a law. As we shall see, Husserl's full construal of laws entails as much. According to Husserl, if □*A* is not a law then for it to be grounded on a law is for it to *instantiate* the law. In Husserl's own words:

> '*S* is necessary' means: 'It is so [i.e., it is the case that *S*], according to a law (*es ist gesetzlich so*)'. One must thus distinguish the statements:
>
> 1. a proposition *S* is a necessity, namely, the proposition is itself a law (*sei selbst ein Gesetz*), and
>
> 2. a proposition is a necessarily valid [i.e., true] one (*sei ein notwendig geltender*), it is valid because it is lawlike (*er gelte nämlich gesetzlich*), it is valid as an instance of a law (*als Besonderheit eines Gesetzes*).
>
> (*Logik 1902/03*: 195)

(As to 2, see also *Logik 19717/18*, §43b: 219, §44: 223.)

Notice that 'instantiation' here is not a relation between certain types of universals and certain types of particulars. It is rather the form of inference in virtue of which we derive particular propositions from general or universal ones. For example, the proposition that a given triangle ABC

has interior angles summing to 180° is an instance, in the relevant sense, of the universal proposition that all triangles have interior angles summing to 180°. Clearly, instantiation in the first sense and instantiation in the second sense are not the same thing: a given tomato is not an instance of the universal Tomato in the same sense in which the proposition that a given triangle has interior angles summing to 180° is an instance of the proposition that all triangles have interior angles summing to 180°.

Earlier I suggested that a more detailed understanding of how laws are meant by Husserl to ground necessities would help get to grips with the question of the sufficiency clause for lawhood (i.e., the question as to what laws are). The reason is that if for a necessity (one that is not a law) to be grounded on a law is for the former to instantiate the latter, then laws must be, in the first place, propositions liable to be instantiated. And indeed for Husserl a proposition is a law *if and only if* it is *either* a true 'pure general proposition', i.e., a true proposition about some pure universal, *or* a true proposition about all the possible instances or bearers of some pure universal.[20] In *Ideas 1* laws of the former kind are called *laws about eide*; laws of the latter kind, *eidetic laws*. Before proceeding to elaborate on pure general and pure universal propositions and their instantiability, let me say something about their relationship.

Even though for Husserl laws divide into 'eidetic' and 'about eide', he thinks that the former are laws only in a derived sense. For one thing, when

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[20]Earlier on I said that the Husserlian construal of laws entails that not every necessity is a law. We are now in a position to appreciate why this is so: it is so because there certainly are necessarily true propositions that are neither about pure universals nor about all the possible instances (or bearers) of some pure universal. For example, 'Socrates is an animal if he is human'.

Husserl defines lawhood, in the vast majority of cases he does so in terms not of universal but of general propositions (i.e., propositions about pure universals). In *Logik 1902/03*, for example, he writes that 'a law is a general proposition which is grounded only in "pure concepts [for our purposes, pure concepts are just pure universals]"' (119). In *Logik 1917/18* he makes the same point: 'It is clear that a law is a [pure] general proposition' (§44: 221). In *Prolegomena*, laws are identified with pure general truths, while universal truths (eidetic laws) are not even mentioned (§63: 146). Second, Husserl seems to think that eidetic laws *derive* from laws about eide, and that the latter can be 'turned' (*gewendet*) into the former (see *Logik 1917/18, §45: 225*). Third, Husserl explicitly says that general propositions *ground* the corresponding universal ones, and thus, when it comes to laws, that laws about eide ground eidetic laws: for every eidetic law α there is a law about eide β such that α because β. For example:

> Judging specifically [i.e., about species, about universals], we can say: Red is a color, judging universally, though: Everything red is colored. And ... both are closely connected through essential laws, as follows from what we shall say here: *Because* red is a color (the essence of the red implies color as a genus), then any particular that is red must also be colored. (*ILTK*, §48a: 302)

Notice that, as appears from Husserl's texts (see the foregoing quotations), this disjunctive clause (either pure generality or pure universality) is for Husserl definitory of, and thus a necessary and sufficient condition

for, lawhood. Thus, even though we were after a mere sufficiency clause, we ended up with a necessary and sufficient one. However, the conditions we already had – i.e., necessity and ability to ground necessities – are still necessary: if a law does not comply to them, then it cannot perform the role Husserl wants it to perform (namely, grounding necessities).

Back to the claim that both pure general and pure universal truths are instantiable. The usual formulations of Universal Instantiation (or ∀-Elimination) as a rule of inference are defined for universal propositions, and thus apply to pure universal propositions as well. As for pure general truths, plausibly they too are instantiable. At least, in *Prolegomena* Husserl thinks they are: for there, too, for a necessary truth that is not a law to be grounded on a law is for it to instantiate the latter – except that in *Prolegomena*, as I have already mentioned, laws are only construed as general, not as universal truths. But even if truths about universals were not the kind of truth that can be instantiated, they would still connected with instances of corresponding eidetic laws: because, by grounding the latter, they ground them too – albeit in an indirect or mediate sense (more about mediate grounding later in the chapter, in Section 2). This is why it was important to make the relations between the two types of law explicit before discussing instantiability. But also notice that in Chapter 1, Section 2.5, we have seen that for Husserl universal propositions about the possible instances or bearers of universals derive from propositions about arbitrary possible instances or bearers of those universals. This is true, in particular, of eidetic laws: to say that all the possible instances or bearers of *G* are *F* is, in the first place, to say that an arbitrary possible instance or bearer of *G* is

F.[21] Propositions about arbitrary objects are also liable to be instantiated –
as Fine shows in Fine 1983 and Fine 1985.

Here is a summary of what we have learnt so far about laws:

(16.1) α is a law, respectively 'about eide' or 'eidetic', if and only if it is either

> (a) a true proposition about some pure universal, or
>
> (b) a true universal proposition about all the possible instances or
>   bearers of some pure universal

(16.2) For every eidetic law α there is a law about eide β such that α because
β.

(16.1) is our *provisional* sufficiency clause for lawhood, whereas (16.2) spells
out the relations between the two sub-clauses of (16.1).

I emphasised that (16.1) is a provisional sufficiency clause for lawhood
because, at a closer look, it needs refinement. For neither is *any* true propo-
sition about some pure universal a law about the universal, nor is *any* true
proposition about all the possible instances or bearers of some pure univer-
sal a law about those instances or bearers. For one thing, as we know, laws
must be necessary propositions: so that 'Eidos *G* is currently the object of
my thought', for example, although it satisfies clause (a) of (16.1), is no law
about *G*. But there is more. Consider the proposition that, possibly, *G* is
the object of someone's thought. Since, as we know, Husserl is an idealist,
that proposition is for him not only true, but necessarily true. So it satisfies

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[21]Whenever Husserl is concerned with free imaginative variation – i.e., the procedure
through which, for him, eide are constituted and genitive essences discovered and assessed
– it is with the arbitrary rather than the universal construal of eidetic laws that he typically
works with.

clause (a) (16.1) plus the necessity condition. Clearly, however, it is no law about G.

Laws, I submit, are for Husserl *essentialist* truths: pure general or pure universal propositions that spell out the essence of the objects they are about. Specifically, a proposition is a law about eide if and only if it states the genitive essence of some pure universal, and it is an eidetic law if and only if it states the essence of all the possible instances or bearers of some pure universal (or – which for Husserl amounts to the same – the essence of an arbitrary possible instance or bearer of some pure universal). We should therefore amend (16.1) as follows:

(16.1*) α is a law, respectively 'about eide' or 'eidetic', if and only if it is either

> (a) a true essentialist proposition about some pure universal, i.e., a pure general essentialist truth, or

> b) a true essentialist proposition about all the possible instances or bearers of some pure universal, i.e., a pure universal essentialist truth.

We now know what laws are: a proposition is a law if and only if it is a pure general or pure universal essentialist proposition. This is why the Husserlian account of necessity is *essentialist* in character. But this has also important implications with respect to how essence should be construed in the Husserlian framework. For if necessity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for lawhood, and lawhood and essentiality are equivalent, it follows that necessity is also a necessary *but not sufficient* condition *for essentiality*. Husserl's modal wording in *EJ*, then, is both

misleading and misguided – at least as far as the essence of pure universals, or of the collections of their possible instances or bearers, are concerned. For if their essence were what they cannot be thought without, then the relevant essentialist propositions would be, *as such*, necessary propositions. But since necessity is not a sufficient condition for essentiality, they cannot be. This is why Husserlian essence is, after all, non-modal. It is important, however, to qualify this claim: that essence is non-modal simply means that it cannot be accounted for solely in terms of modality (necessity). Necessity, however, is a necessary condition for essentiality. In this sense, the claim that Husserl's notion of essence is non-modal is wholly compatible with (16.1*), according to which essentialist propositions are laws, and thus necessary truths.

Clearly, if essence is non-modal in the above sense then (4*) needs amending. Before I go on to propose one, however, I need to say something more on essentialist truths about *particular* objects-cum-universals – which, after all, in Chapter 1 were our paradigm. That is because the argument I have just given for necessity not being a sufficient condition for essentiality turns on two facts: first, that laws are, as such, pure general or pure universal essentialist truths; second, that necessity is not a sufficient condition for lawhood. Essentialist truths about particular objects-cum-universals, however, are neither pure general nor pure universal propositions. Thus, they are not laws; therefore, the argument does not apply to them. True, there are some essentialist truths that, for Husserl, even though they are neither general nor universal, and are thus no laws, nonetheless have 'the value of a law', or are equivalent to a law (*Logik 1917/18*, §44: 223, 224). These

are 'singular mathematical judgements'– something like 'The cardinality of $P(\mathbb{N})$ is $2^{\aleph_0}$', I take it. These cases, however, are not in point: because since for Husserl mathematical objects are ideal, while particulars are real (recall that particularity and reality are for Husserl coextensive), essentialist truths about particulars are anything but mathematical propositions.

So the argument I gave for necessity being a necessary but not sufficient condition for essentiality, although it goes through when laws are concerned, fails when it comes to essentialist truths about particulars (i.e., about particular objects-cum-universals). Should we then take the latter to be simply necessary truths? I know of no Husserlian argument against that. In Chapter 4 we shall look at some non-Husserlian ones (mostly due to Fine). But even without such arguments, there is at least one reason not to think of essentialist truths about particular objects-cum-universals in the Husserlian picture simply as necessary truths. The reason is that if we did, then we would end up with two notions of (genitive) essence: one modal, for particulars-cum-universals, and one non-modal, for pure universals and totalities of their possible instances or bearers (or for their arbitrary possible instances or bearers). Husserl, however, never even suggests that he intends to be working with two notions of (genitive) essence in this sense. True, he is typically more interested in laws than in the essence of particulars: that, one might argue, may explain why he never expatiates (in fact, even mentions) the issue – which, so the argument would go, nonetheless is there. This is an interesting hypothesis, but it boils down to the problem of finding independent reasons for holding that there really are two notions of essence in Husserl. To that question I answer first that I

see no such independent reasons, and second that, as a consequence, due to simple considerations of uniformity we should take essentialist truths about particular objects-cum-universals to be non-modal in the same sense as laws are: they cannot be accounted for solely in terms of necessity.

We are now ready to amend (4*) according to our new findings:

(4**) A predicate '*F*'is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G, be it a particular, a pure universal or an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal, if and only if

(a) *a* either instantiates or bears *F*, and

(b) *F* is in the essence of a_G.

How is this different from (4*)? Whereas in clause (b) of (4*) the notion that *F* is in the essence of a_G is analysed in terms of the impossibility that a_G should be thought as not instantiating (or bearing) *F*, in clause (b) of (4**) that analysis is abandoned (because modality does not account for essence) and essence is left unanalysed. I suggest we should indeed treat it as a primitive notion: once modality has fallen, I fail to see any plausible candidates.

Importantly, for (4**) to be true *a* must instantiate or bear *F*; and it must instantiate or bear it on condition that it instantiates or bears *G*. Indeed, for *F* to be in the essence of *a* is, among other things, for *a* to instantiate or bear it. That is: being instantiated or borne by *a* is a necessary condition for *F* to be in the genitive essence of *a*. This I shall call Husserl's *instantiation-based account of essence*.[22] It is important to keep this in mind, because in Chapter

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[22]Instantiation-based, as opposed to instantiation-and-bearing-based, because bearing

3 I will argue that laws about eide – which, as we have seen, do the main grounding work in Husserl's account of necessity – are in fact incompatible with (4**).

The overall Husserlian account of necessity in terms of essence, then, looks as follows:

(17) For every necessary truth $\Box A$, there is a law α such that:

    (a) $\Box A$ because α, and either $\Box A = \alpha$ or $\Box A$ instantiates α; and

    (b) α is either a law about eide, i.e., an essentialist truth about a universal, or an eidetic law, i.e., an essentialist truth about all the possible instances or bearers of a pure universal (or about an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal); and

    (c) for every α which is an eidetic law, there is a law about eide β such that α because β.

In Section 2.3 this statement of the account will have to be modified (slightly). But it will do for the time being.

2.2 Grounding

The notion of grounding is part of Husserl's account of necessity. In Section 1 I treated grounding claims simply as 'because'-claims, and was thus able to remain neutral with respect to the several, competing theories of grounding available on the market. Here I will present and discuss Husserl's view of the notion in some detail. We shall look at the basic conceptual features he

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is itself defined in terms of instantiation.

attributes to it (Section 2.1) as well as some of its structural features (Section 2.2). To my knowledge, Husserl never concernes himself with the latter; nevertheless, if his talk of grounding is to make sense, he is committed to them. Among the structural features of grounding, as we shall see, is irreflexivity: it is never the case that *A* because *A*. This is part of the standard understanding of grounding – which, at least to this extent, I endorse.[23] As I have mentioned in Section 1, however, the fact that grounding is irreflexive seems to be at odds with Husserl's account of necessity: in particular, with clause (a) of (17), according to which necessities that are laws are grounded on themselves. I will try to solve this problem in Section 2.3, by slightly amending Husserl's position but not, I hope, betraying its spirit. The solution will lead to a reformulation of (17).

In Section 2.1, among other things, I will argue that for Husserl grounding and logical consequence are distinct relations: for a truth to follow from a set of premises is not, in and of itself, for the former to be grounded on the latter. The Husserlian account, however, includes the idea that the necessities that are not laws are grounded on laws in the sense that they instantiate the latter. But then, since Universal Instantiation is a form of inference, Husserl must explain why, of all forms of inference, at least Universal Instantiation is also a grounding relation. Although he never actually does so, in Section 2.4 I propose a way he might have.

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[23]There are a few philosophers who deny that grounding is irreflexive: for example, Jenkins 2011 and Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015.

2.2.1 Conceptual features of grounding

Grounding, as Husserl understands it, is an explanatory relation (*erklärende Zusammenhang*) between true propositions (*Prolegomena*, §63: 147). That is indeed why grounding claims are expressed through 'because'-propositions. Thus:

(18.1) Proposition *A* is grounded on proposition *B* if and only if *A* because *B*;

(18.2) If *A* because *B*, i.e., if *A* is grounded on *B*, then *A* is true and *B* is true.

See *Logik 1896*, §58: 232-233; and Mulligan 2004: 390-392. The problem here is that 'because' has more than one reading, depending on the sense in which something is being said to explain something else. Fixing the notion of grounding, then, requires fixing the right notion of explanation. That is no easy task. In fact, it is so difficult that it is tempting to try and reduce grounding to other, more familiar explanatory relations. In this subsection I will show how, for Husserl, all those reductions fail, and grounding should be taken as a primitive concept. While doing so, I will deploy some non-Husserlian arguments, borrowed from Bernard Bolzano.

The most immediate reductionist strategy is perhaps to identify the notion of grounding with that of logical consequence. For *A* to be a logical consequence of *B* (or of a set of propositions *B, C, . . .*) is for *A* and *B* to be such that there is no situation in which *B* is true and *A* false.[24] One could

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[24]Modal extensions of the definition are possible ('no possible situation' and the like). Alternatively, one could think of situations as models: mathematical structures in which every non-logical expression of the language in which premises and conclusion are formulated is interpreted.

perhaps observe that although I chose the semantic conception of logical consequence, there is also a syntactic (or proof-theoretic) conception: *A* follows from *B*, *C*, . . . if there is a proof from *B*, *C*, . . . to *A* (where a proof is a finite series of formulas such that the first formula is *B*, the last is *A*, and all the intermediate (if any) result from manipulating previous formulas in legitimate, specified ways). Can we not understand grounding in terms of it, rather than the other? My view is that we cannot, because if, on the one hand, the idea that in a case of grounding the relata should be true to its being a case of grounding, on the other hand truth plays no role in the syntactic (or proof-theoretic) conception of logical consequence. Therefore, if grounding must be reduced to anything like logical consequence, it will have to be the semantic concept.

Husserl agrees that 'alle Gründe sind Prämissen', all grounds are premises (*Prolegomena*, §63: 147): if *B* grounds *A*, there is an inference (*Schluß* in Husserl's German) from *B* to *A*. Semantically that makes sense: because, by (18.2), if *B* grounds *A* then it cannot be the case that *B* is true and *A* false (for both must be true). However, logical consequence and grounding are not the same thing: as Husserl puts it, even though all grounds are premises, 'not all premises are grounds'. I should say that although that is Husserl's declared position, I do not know of any Husserlian argument for it. There are, however, convincing arguments that Husserl was certainly aware of: Bolzano's – to which I now turn.[25]

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[25]If Franz Brentano was the main influence on Husserl's theory of intentionality, Bolzano (along with Hermann Lotze) was the main influence on Husserl's views on logic and ontology. In *Prolegomena* we find Husserl saying that Bolzano's main work, the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), is 'a work which . . . far surpasses everything that world-literature has to offer in the way of a systematic sketch of logic'; in fact, Husserl goes so far as to deem Bolzano 'einen

One sense in which grounding and logical consequence are distinct concepts is, says Bolzano, that the former, unlike the latter, only applies to true propositions (Bolzano 1972, §200: 274). It is debatable whether the drawing of a false conclusion from a (set of) true premise(s), or of a false conclusion from a (set of) false premise(s), can be said to be inferences properly so called. At least on the standard account of logical consequence, however, the drawing of a true conclusion from a (set of) false premise(s) is a *bone fide* inference. However, it is not a case of grounding: because, by (18.2), it is only true propositions that can stand in the latter relation.

But the main reason why for Bolzano grounding is distinct from logical consequence is that the latter is not an explanatory relation: for there are cases of sound inferences – in which both premise(s) and conclusion are true and which therefore verify (18.2) – in which the premises fail to explain, and therefore to be a ground for, the conclusion. I will not rehearse Bolzano's original version of the argument here, not least because doing so would require presenting his own notion of 'deducibility' (*Ableitbarkeit*) – which is far beyond my purposes.[26] Here is, however, the gist.

Consider the valid inferences:

$$p \models p$$

$$p \wedge q \models q$$

and suppose that p, q are both true. The inferences are thus not only vaild, but also sound, and therefore satisfy (18.2). Still, it is hard to see how a

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der größten Logiker allen Zeiten', one of the greatest logicians of all time (*Prolegomena*, Appendix to §61: 142).

[26]See Bolzano 1972, §155.2: 209. See also Tatzel 2002.

proposition, even if it can be inferred from itself, could also ground itself: it is raining, therefore it is raining – but is it raining *because* it is raining?[27] It is even harder to see how a conjunction could ground one of its conjuncts: it is raining and the wind is blowing, therefore the wind is blowing – but is the wind blowing *because* it is raining and the wind is blowing? To derive a conclusion from a (set of) premise(s), even when both are true, is not, in and of itself, to explain the former in terms of the latter. Thus, logical consequence is not an explanatory relation, and cannot be identified with grounding. These, notice, are also counterexamples to grounding being reflexive. Indeed, the present objection to the reduction of grounding to logical consequence is, at an abstract level, that logical consequence is reflexive, while grounding is not. As I have already said, I will discuss irreflexivity in detail later in the section.

Notice, however, that even though logical consequence and grounding are not the same thing, there may still be specific forms of inference that not only warrant the drawing of a conclusion from a certain set of premises, but also explain (ground) the truth of the conclusion in terms of the truth of the premises. Indeed, if Husserl's account is to make sense, Universal Instantiation must be one (for, recall from Section 2, particular necessities are grounded in eidetic laws in the sense that they instantiate them). I will say something more about this later on, in Section 2.4.

So grounding is not logical consequence. It is not, because, as we have seen, unlike logical consequence grounding is an explanatory relation. But

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[27]One might argue that axioms ground themselves. Bolzano has arguments against that view: see Bolzano 1972, §204.

one might urge: is not explanation an epistemological concept? Is not grounding, then, an epistemological relation? For Husserl, as well as for Bolzano, it is not. Let me say why.

There are two ways in which we could think of something like an epistemological ground for a truth. One is the following. In at least some cases, it is plausible to say that the recognition of the truth of a certain proposition is caused by the recognition of the truth of some other proposition(s). Here is Bolzano's example. Consider:

- If the thermometer registers higher, then it is warmer;

- In summer, the thermometer tends to register higher than in winter;

- In summer it tends to be warmer than in winter.

Surely there is a sense in which the recognition of the truth of the third proposition is caused by the recognition of the truth of the first and the second. Let us call the mental act in which a subject recognises the truth of some proposition, and that brings about another mental act in which the subject recognises the truth of another proposition, the *psychological ground* of the second mental act. The question, then, is: does grounding reduce to psychological grounding? Clearly, as Bolzano points out, it does not: even though the recognition of the truth of the first and second propositions above causes (and thus psychologically grounds) the recognition of the truth of the third proposition, 'we do not want to say that the first [and the second] truths are *themselves* the ground of the third; on the contrary, we want to assert that the exact opposite relation holds in this case' (Bolzano

1972, §198: 271, my emphasis). In other words, one thing is the recognition, on a subject's part, of the truth of some proposition, and quite another thing is the truth that is thereby being recognised. Psychological grounds are grounds for the former, not the latter.

The second way to construe epistemological grounds is not as mental acts, but as propositions, or collection of propositions, to which a cognizing subject appeals to in making sense of some truth A.[28] Epistemological grounds for A, in this sense, are *reasons* for taking A to be true. Notice that a psychological ground for the recognition of the truth of A need not be a reason for taking A to be true. For example, I can be brainwashed, through some kind of psychological technique, into believing that – say – the rational numbers are countable in such a way that, though due to the brainwashing that is my belief, I am not in a position to answer any question as to why I take the rationals to be countable. In that case, the brainwashing would bring about my recognising the truth of the relevant proposition, but it would give me no reason for taking the latter to be true. Such a reason would be, for example, Cantor's "zig-zag" proof.

Clearly, however, epistemological grounding is not the sense of grounding in which Husserl and Bolzano are interested. For one thing, the epistemological grounds of true propositions may very well be false propositions – although, presumably, the subject needs to take them to be true if they are

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[28]I am not attaching any particular importance to 'making sense' as opposed to other epistemological projects such as acquiring knowledge, establishing truths, or what have you. Also, here I am focusing of propositions, as opposed e.g. to facts (which are surely important in epistemological enterprises), because grounding is a relation between truths – and it is not obvious that what applies to truths also applies to facts. Although, as we shall see in Section 2.2, for Husserl it does.

to count for him as reasons at all. Suppose, for example, that I worked out a crazy proof of the countability of the rationals, and that an ill-trained mathematician bought it and took it for a reason for believing that the rationals are countable. It would be a reason for him even if none of the propositions in the proof were true.[29] However, as we know, Husserl and Bolzano require that only true propositions should be able to enter grounding relations.

Second, presumably there is a great many true propositions that no one has thought about; and most of them (all of them, if you buy into some version of the principle of sufficient reason) have a ground in Husserl and Bolzano's sense. Presumably there is also a great many true propositions that no one has thought about which, nonetheless, ground other propositions. However, they clearly have, or are, no epistemological grounds (yet): for even if epistemological grounds, unlike psychological grounds, are propositions and not mental acts, insofar as they are reasons to believe that certain propositions are true, they are propositions that some subject takes to stand in a certain epistemological relationship, whatever that might be, with further propositions. In other words, reasons, at least according to the definition I have given above, are always reasons *for a subject*, not propositions in themselves. Grounds, however, are not grounds for a subject: whether two propositions stand in the grounding relation is a matter of them and them alone.

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[29]It could be argued that the crazy proof would not *be* a reason for the ill-trained mathematician to believe that the rationals are countable: it would only *seem* a reason to him. But it seems to me that the epistemological sense of 'reason' does not support this kind of distinction. If a reason is epistemological, then it is what a subject takes, for better or for worse, to be a reason. If a reason is what it is independently of the subject's regarding it as such, then, it seems to me, it is not a reason in the epistemological sense, but a reason in a metaphyisical sense, and thus a ground in Bolzano's and Husserl's sense.

So grounding is distinct from logical consequence, because, unlike logical consequence, it is an explanatory relation. On the other hand, the relevant sense of explanation is neither psychological nor epistemological. Is it causal? For Husserl, it cannot be: because, as we know, propositions are for him ideal objects, which are causally inert. A view that, notice, Bolzano shares.[30] If grounding were causation, then no proposition could ground or be grounded on any proposition.

There are yet other reductionist strategies one could appeal to in this connection. For example, one might think that for a proposition A to be grounded on a proposition B just is for A to be necessitated by B, i.e., for the conditional 'Necessarily, if B then A' to be true. But it does not take much to see that necessitation does not do the trick: for if A is a necessary truth, then it will be necessitated by any B whatsoever, regardless of the latter having any explanatory relevance to A. Assuming for instance that the propositions of number theory are necessary, the conditional: 'Necessarily, if this tomato is red then the rationals are countable' is true – and yet the proposition that this tomato is red clearly does not ground the proposition that the rationals are countable.

In general, all the grounding theorists of our day think that no reductionist strategy works for grounding, and that, as a consequence, we ought to take the latter to be a primitive concept. See for example Rosen 2010 and Audi 2012. It is safe to assume that Husserl shared this view. Indeed, as far as I am aware, he never even tries to account for grounding. And

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[30]In fact, Husserl inherits the view from Bolzano – albeit *via* Lotze: see Husserl 1994: 201-202.

why should he? Since he believes that propositions are objects in their own right, the view that, if they – by which I mean *they themselves* – stand in some explanatory relation, this relation should be non-psychological, non-epistemological and non-causal is default. Of course, default views can be attacked; and that is where the arguments I proposed against putative reductions kick in. But as far as Husserl goes the role of those arguments is (or would be) not to establish the view – which, again, for him is default – but only to defend it. As to the arguments for ruling out reduction to logical consequence and necessitation, they would presumably be accepted by Husserl – regardless of his view of propositions: because they turn solely on logic.

There is room for scepticism about grounding, of course. The best example I know of is Daly 2012, who believes that grounding is an uninteligible notion. (Interestingly, Daly seems to agree that if grounding were intelligible, it would have to be primitive.) Here, however, I do not wish to argue against the sceptic: it is enough to know that Husserl relied on grounding while laying out his account of necessity, and how, by and large, he understood the concept: as a primitive, non-psychological, non-epistemological and non-causal explanatory relation holding between true propositions.

2.2.2 Structural Features of Grounding

The structural features of grounding are the algebraic properties that grounding has as a relation.[31] Before we begin to talk about those properties, how-

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[31]Some grounding theorists deny that grounding is a relation; see for example Fine 2001: 16. Husserl however, as we have seen, is not one of them.

ever, it will be convenient to have a symbolism to work with. In order to preserve the similarity with 'because'-propositions, I shall keep speaking of truths being grounded on, rather than grounding, other truths, and symbolize the two-place predicate 'is grounded on' as '◁'. There is a question as to what '◁' should be flanked by. In '*A* because *B*', '*A*' and '*B*' denote propositions, such as 'The rationals are countable'. If we want to express the same thought in terms of grounding, however, in English we have to resort to such phrases as 'The proposition that the rationals are countable'. We may call such phrases *propositional abstracts* and assume their logical behaviour to be that of individual terms (which is plausible, since they are noun phrases). I propose to symbolise them as '⟨*A*⟩'. The claim: 'The proposition that *A* is grounded on the proposition that *B*' will thus look as follows:

$$\langle A \rangle \lhd \langle B \rangle$$

Among the grounding theorists that, like Husserl, take grounding to be a relation, some think that what grounding relates is not (true) propositions, but *facts*. These, in turn, are variously understood. But however facts happen to be understood in the current debate on grounding, in the Husserlian environment the propositional and the factual approaches really amount to the same, because, I submit, for Husserl: 1) the state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) that *A* obtains if and only if the proposition that *A* is true (See *EJ*, §§58, 60); 2) there is the fact that *A* (or it is a fact that *A*) if and only if the state of affairs that *A* obtains.[32] As a consequence, there is the fact that *A* (or it is a

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[32]In Husserl's usage, 'fact' (*Tatsache*, *Faktum* and cognates), especially in such phrases as

fact that A) if and only if the proposition that A is true. In this sense, there is no harm in freely switching, as Husserl often does, between grounding claims about true propositions and grounding claims between facts. It will be good, however, to denote facts and propositional abstracts in different ways. Thus, 'The fact that A' I shall write as '$[A]$'; and I shall take '$[A]$', just like '$\langle A \rangle$', to behave as a singular term (again, this is plausible, since 'the fact that A' is a noun phrase). Accordingly, 'The fact that A is grounded on the fact that B' will look as follows:

$$[A] \lhd [B]$$

Notice that:

(19) A because $B \equiv \langle A \rangle \lhd \langle B \rangle \equiv [A] \lhd [B]$

The most important structural features of grounding – most important, that is, for my purposes – are asymmetry, irreflexivity and transitivity.

First, grounding is an *asymmetric* relation: if the proposition that A is grounded on the proposition that B, then the proposition that B is not grounded on the proposition that A. In symbols:

(20) $\langle A \rangle \lhd \langle B \rangle \rightarrow \neg \langle B \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$

Here is a brief justification of (20). If grounding is an explanatory relation, then the idea that a proposition B grounds a proposition A involves the idea that B should be prior, in some sense, to A. Some even characterise grounding as 'a particular sort of non-causal priority' (Correia and Schnieder 2012:

'matters of fact' and the like, means something like a contingent situation or circumstance. In this sense, Husserl never uses 'fact' as synonymous with 'obtaining state of affairs'. What the second equivalence means is, rather, that what English-speaking philosophers have called 'facts' are what Husserl calls 'obtaining states of affairs'.

1). But it seems that if *B*, so long as it grounds *A*, is prior to *A*, then *A* cannot be prior to *B*. But even if one does not appeal to priority, the room for denying that grounding is asymmetric is very little – if there is any room at all. If *B* explains *A*, and so *A* is true in virtue of *B* being true, then it seems that it just cannot be the case that *B* is true in virtue of *A* being true. In this sense, asymmetry just seems to be written into the notion. If one rejects the idea that the grounding relation is asymmetric, in other words, one rejects grounding tout court.

Second, irreflexivity. It can be proved by *reductio* from (20).[33] But there is, I think, also a compelling intuitive case for it. If the ground of the proposition that *A* is what explains *A* (in the relevant sense of 'explains'), and if what explains the proposition that *A* must be prior to *A*, then surely *A* cannot perform that role: for there is no sense in which *A* can be prior to *A*. Thus, it just makes no sense to say that a certain proposition, or a certain fact, grounds itself. Alternatively: if *A* is grounded on *B*, then *A* is true in virtue of *B* being true. But if *B* = *A*, then *A* is true in virtue of *A* being true. And it seems to me that the only way to make sense of this is to read it as a statement to the effect that *A* has no ground (or perhaps is not apt for being grounded). Thus, grounding is *irreflexive*:

(21) $\neg \langle A \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$

Third, transitivity. It is important because it provides us with the notion of mediate grounding we need in order to make sense of the explanatory

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[33]By (20), $\langle A \rangle \lhd \langle B \rangle \rightarrow \neg \langle B \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$. Assume for reduction that $\langle A \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$. It follows from (20), by substitution and modus ponens, that $\neg \langle A \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$. Contradiction. Therefore, $\neg \langle A \rangle \lhd \langle A \rangle$.

relation that laws about eide have with the instances of eidetic laws. For
Husserl, laws about eide ground the instances of eidetic laws because:
1) they ground eidetic laws, and 2) eidetic laws ground their instances.
But it can be so only if grounding is *transitive*, i.e., only if, in general, if the
proposition that A is grounded on the proposition that B and the proposition
that B is grounded on the proposition that C, then the proposition that A is
grounded on the proposition that C. In symbols:

(22) $(\langle A \rangle \triangleleft \langle B \rangle \wedge \langle B \rangle \triangleleft \langle C \rangle) \rightarrow \langle A \rangle \triangleleft \langle C \rangle$

Most grounding theorists agree that grounding is transitive (some less en-
thusiastically than others; see Rosen 2010: 116). An exception is Schaffer
2012. As I said, transitivity is needed in the Husserlian account. Notice,
however, that it need not be transitivity of grounding *as such*; it is enough
that the *particular* grounding relations Husserl appeals to be transitive. Still,
if I took up that option, however, I would need to make a case for the tran-
sitivity of those relations; which would lead me too far astray. Thus, I
will simply assume, with the vast majority of grounding theorists, that
grounding is transitive.

Finally, some brief remarks on other structural features of grounding,
which are less relevant to the Husserlian picture but are interesting in their
own right. First, grounding is *not connected*: as Rosen puts it, 'barring some
enormous surprise in metaphysics' not every proposition or fact grounds
or is grounded on every other proposition or fact. The proposition that the
rationals are countable, for example, is not grounded on the proposition that
this tomato is red. Second, grounding (unlike logical consequence, at least

on its standard account) is *non-monotonic*. Suppose that $\langle A \rangle$ is grounded on the set $\{\langle A \rangle, \langle B \rangle, \langle C \rangle\}$. There is no reason to think that $\langle A \rangle$ should then be grounded on every set containing the set $\{\langle A \rangle, \langle B \rangle, \langle C \rangle\}$. For instance, the proposition that there are at least two infinite cardinalities is grounded on the proposition that there is no bijection between the naturals and the reals. The former proposition, however, is not grounded on the set of the propositions that there is no bijection between the naturals and the reals, that this tomato is red, and, say, that the moon is not made of cheese: for the latter two have no explanatory relevance with respect to there being two infinite cardinalities.

Last, grounding is widely taken to be a *hyperintensional* relation. That is to say, if the proposition that A is grounded on the proposition that B, and there is a proposition C which is strictly (i.e., necessarily) equivalent to B, it does not follow that A should also be grounded on C. Again, the proposition that there are at least two infinite cardinalities is grounded on the proposition that there is no bijection between the naturals and the reals. The latter, however, is a necessary proposition, and is thus strictly equivalent to any necessary proposition; for example, to the proposition that if this tomato is red, then this tomato is red. But surely this last proposition does not ground the proposition that there are at least two infinite cardinalities.

2.2.3 Irreflexivity of Grounding and the Husserlian Account

We have seen that grounding is irreflexive. This is a problem for Husserl's account of necessity, which includes the idea that if, on the one hand, all necessities are grounded on laws, on the other hand: 1) all laws are necessities, 2) for any necessity $\Box A$ which is also a law, the law on which it is grounded is $\Box A$ itself. If that is Husserl's view, then grounding for him cannot be irreflexive. But grounding just *is* irreflexive: even if one does not have a compelling intuition to that effect (which, I venture, is unlikely), irreflexivity, as I showed in Section 2.2, still follows from grounding being asymmetrical. And surely grounding is asymmetrical – or it is not grounding at all. So Husserl's account as stated in (17) would seem to be incoherent: because it appeals to grounding and yet contradicts one of the principles governing the notion.

My position is that this is a genuine problem for Husserl, but that the account can be so amended as to preserve its original spirit and yet escape the difficulty. Let me say how.

First, notice that if we take Husserl to his word, then in effect $\Box A$ cannot be grounded simply on $\Box A$. Indeed, if the reason why Husserl suggests that $\Box A$ should ground itself is that $\Box A$ *is a law*, then $\Box A$'s being a law should figure in the explanation of why $\Box A$ is true. Otherwise, what grounds $\Box A$ would simply be a necessarily true proposition (as it happens, $\Box A$ itself). But then why appeal to laws in the first place? In other words, Husserl must concede that it is only because $\Box A$ is a law that it is alleged by him to be liable to ground itself: otherwise, the sense in which it is only those

necessities which are laws, and not necessities in general, that are in a
position to ground themselves is lost; and if necessities in general are in
a position to ground themselves, then there is no need to appeal to laws
to begin with, and Husserl's particular account of necessity loses its raison
d'être. But shouldn't we say, then, that what grounds $\Box A$ is not $\Box A$, but the
proposition, or the fact, *that A is a law*? In symbols:

$\langle \Box A \rangle \lhd \langle \text{It is a law that } A \rangle$

Admittedly, this is not what Husserl says; but it may be what he means.
And if it is not, then, I submit, it is what he should have said and meant.
For one thing, this way of putting things, unlike the original Husserlian
one, is compatible with the irreflexivity of grounding: because $\langle \Box A \rangle \neq$
$\langle \text{It is a law that } A \rangle$. Second, the proposal is intuitively appealing: for it
makes good sense, at least in the Husserlian environment, to say that, e.g.,
necessarily all humans are animals because it is an (eidetic) law that all
possible humans are animals – i.e., because it is in the essence of every
possible instance of Human that it is an animal. I see no reason why one
that accepts Husserl's basic idea should turn down this particular way of
cashing it out. Indeed, the fact that the latter, and not Husserl's way, is
compatible with the irreflexivity of grounding is a strong reason to accept
the proposal.

If we do accept the proposal, however, and decide to modify the account
accordingly, then we ought to extend the amendment to other parts of the
account. If $\Box A$ is not a law, for Husserl it is grounded on a law α such that
$\alpha \neq \Box A$ and A instantiates α. However, if my proposal is sound, what puts

α in a position to ground $\square A$ is not merely its content (i.e., the proposition that α, whatever it may be), but α's being a law. Thus, instead of saying, with Husserl, that $\langle \square A \rangle$ is grounded on $\langle \alpha \rangle$, we should say that

$\langle \square A \rangle \lhd \langle$ It is a law that $\alpha \rangle$

The same applies to eidetic laws and laws about eide. If α is an eidetic law and β a law about the relevant eide, instead of saying, with Husserl, that $\langle \alpha \rangle$ is grounded on $\langle \beta \rangle$, we should say that

$\langle$ It is a law that $\alpha \rangle \lhd \langle$ It is a law that $\beta \rangle$

This leads to the following reformulation of (17) (in which the new symbolism for propositional abstracts is incorporated):

(17*) For every necessary truth $\square A$ there is a law α such that:

(a) $\langle \square A \rangle \lhd \langle$ It is a law that $\alpha \rangle$, and either $A = \alpha$ or A instantiates α;

(b) α is either a law about eide, i.e., an essentialist truth about a universal, or an eidetic law, i.e., an essentialist truth about all the possible instances or bearers of a pure universal (or about an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal); and

(c) for every α which is an eidetic law, there is a law about eide β such that $\langle$ It is a law that $\alpha \rangle \lhd \langle$ It is a law that $\beta \rangle$.

2.2.4 Universal Instantiation as a Grounding Relation

As I pointed out in Section 2.1, we need to explain why, even though for a proposition A to be grounded on a proposition B is not for A to be a logical

consequence of *B*, if *B* is an eidetic law and *A* its instance then *A* is not only a logical consequence of *B*, but also grounded on it. The key here is, I think, the fact that *B* is not simply a universal proposition, but an eidetic law.

Suppose that *A* is the proposition that Socrates-cum-Human is essentially an animal, and *B* the eidetic law that every possible human – i.e., every possible instance of the universal Human – is essentially an animal. As we know from Section 1, *B* states the essence of every possible object-cum-Human. But then to say that the proposition that Socrates-cum-Human is essentially an animal is grounded on the proposition that every possible human is an animal is just to say that Socrates-cum-Human is essentially an animal because every possible human is, as a matter of essence, an animal. In other words, it is as if we asked: 'Why is Socrates is essentially an animal if he is human?'. It makes good sense, at least in the Husserlian environment, to answer: 'Because all humans are animals: it is part of their essence'.

It is in this sense that the particular proposition – which, by the way, is also a necessary and in fact an essentialist proposition about Socrates-cum-Human – is not merely deducible from the eidetic law that every possible object-cum-Human is an animal, but is also explained by (grounded on) it. Then, of course, the eidetic law is in turn grounded, for Husserl, on some law about the eidos Human; but that is another story, and I will have much to say about it in Chapter 3.

2.3 Necessity

In Section 1 I stated that the following claim:

 (14) for a proposition to be necessarily true is for it to be true on the ground
     of a law (*Gesetz*)

is as close as one gets to a general Husserlian characterisation of the concept
of necessity. Here I produce some textual evidence to support this (Section
3.1) and compare the Husserlian characterisation with that which has come
to be the standard definition of necessity, namely, the one in terms of possi-
ble worlds (Section 3.2). I also elaborate on Husserl's position on the issue
as to how to formulate necessary (in fact, generally modal) propositions
(Section 3.4).

2.3.1 The Husserlian Characterisation

Textual evidence to the effect that (14) does indeed express Husserl's con-
ception of necessity abounds. In *Prolegomena* Husserl writes:

> Necessity as an objective predicate of a truth (which is then called
> a necessary truth) is tantamount to the law-governed validity of
> the state of affairs in question. (*Prolegomena*, §63: 146)

'Validity' translates 'Gültigkeit'. In the case of states of affairs, their being
'valid' is just their obtaining (their being 'facts', according to the terminol-
ogy of Section 2.2). As I said earlier, for Husserl the state of affairs that *A*
obtains – or, equivalently, there is the fact that *A* or it is a fact that *A* – if
and only if the proposition that *A* is true: that is why he feels free to switch

from talk of 'valid' states of affairs to talk of truths, and vice versa, at any time. So free feels he, in fact, that other statements of the characterisation – of the very same characterisation, I should stress – do not mention states of affairs at all. For example:

> '*S* is necessary' means: 'It is so [i.e., that *S*] according to a law
> (*Es ist gesetzlich so*). (*Logik 1902/03*: 195)

In yet other passages, Husserl mentions *both* propositions and states of affairs, and says, as we may expect, that to every necessary state of affairs corresponds a necessary proposition. See for example the following quote from *Ideas 1*:

> Any eidetic particularisation and singularisation of an eideti-
> cally universal state of affairs [the latter corresponding to an
> eidetic law], *in so far as it is that*, is called an *eidetic necessity*. ...
> The corresponding judgements are also called necessary. (*Ideas
> 1*, §6: 14)

Consider now the following passages from *Logik 1917/18*:

> Every necessity points at (*weist hin auf*) a law; necessity and
> legality (*Gesetzlichkeit*) are correlate, and that gives a concept
> of necessity in a strict (*festen*) sense. The 'It must be so' ex-
> presses (*drückt aus*), the predication obtains (*gelte*) as a conse-
> quence (*Folge*), as an instance (*Einzelfall*) of, a law. (*Logik 1917/18*,
> §43b: 219)

> To every such pure law corresponds as an individual case (*im*
>
> *individuellen Fall*) an (absolute) pure apodictic necessity. (§44:
>
> 223)

In the last three quotes (i.e., in the two immediately above and in that
from *Ideas 1*) there is no mention of laws being themselves necessary. What
is said to be necessary is rather only the instances of laws. In yet other
passages Husserl calls the view that laws are necessary an 'equivocation'
(*Prolegomena*, §63: 146) and urges us to 'heed the distinctions and above
all not to designate eidetic universality as necessity (as people usually do)'
(*Ideas 1*, §6: 14). So one might think that the 1902/03 view that laws are
themselves necessary propositions which, what is more, are grounded on
themselves – a view which I have quoted and taken seriously in Section
1, and discussed and amended in Section 2 – was in fact at some point
abandoned by Husserl.

There are problems, however, with this line of interpretation. First,
Husserl keeps lawhood and necessity distinct already in *Prolegomena* (1900),
and thus before 1902/03:

> A natural equivocation leads us to call every general truth that
>
> itself utters a law, a necessary truth. Corresponding to our first
>
> defined sense [already quoted above], it would have been better
>
> to call it the explanatory ground of a law, from which a class of
>
> necessary truths follows. (*Prolegomena*, §63: 146)

So, if the interpretation is correct, Husserl must have changed his mind
immediately after 1900 and then changed it again at some point before

1913. This seems to me to be a bit of a long jump: if any other interpretation is available, it should be preferred.

Naturally, I do believe there is another interpretation available. Before I get to that, however, let me point out a second problem for the interpretation under discussion. For the reasons given in Section 1, Husserl is committed by his requirements on modality to the claim that laws are necessary. So that if his considered view were that laws are not necessary, then the view would be incompatible with the rest of his account.

But the main reason why this line of interpretation fails is that it is pointless. Of course Husserl warns us not to conflate lawhood and necessity: since the former is part of the latter's definiens, to conflate them would make the whole account circular. We have already seen as much in Section 1. But it does not follow, from the fact that for a proposition to be a law is not simply for it to be necessary – i.e., from the fact that necessity is not a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood – that necessity cannot be at least a necessary condition for lawhood. The latter claim is compatible with the former. In fact, given his requirements on modality, Husserl is committed to both. It is thus unlikely that he should try to warn us off the second claim – i.e., to warn us off the claim that necessity is a necessary condition for lawhood. The 'equivocation' is for him the view that to be a law is *just* to be a necessary proposition (i.e., that necessity is a necessary and sufficient condition for lawhood), not that laws are necessary. So, I submit, all things considered, the fact that the latter claim is mentioned in *Logik 1902/03* but not in *Ideas 1* or in *Logik 1917/18* need not disturb us at all.

One last remark on the Husserlian characterisation, before I proceed to

compare it with the standard possible-worlds one. The mention of apod-
icticity in the second *Logik 1917/18* passage quoted above, as well as in the
following:

> . . . a pregnant concept of necessity, that of apodicticity, which is
> a real modal concept, but equivalent with the concept of validity
> on the ground of a law. . . (*Logik 1917/18, §43b: 220*)

might suggest an epistemological reading of Husserl's characterisation.
Specifically, one might take Husserl to understand necessity as his teacher
Brentano did. For Brentano, both truth and its modalities should be un-
derstood in terms of knowledge. This is the core both of his theory of
judgement and of his alternative to the correspondence theory of truth. In
particular, according to Brentano for a judgement to be true is for the pre-
sentation which it is about to be known with evidence, and for a judgement
to be necessarily true is for the presentation to be known with apodictic
evidence, i.e., for it to be evident on the basis of the concepts involved in
the judgement.

Now, in *Prolegomena* Husserl agrees that '*A* is true' and 'It is possible
that someone should judge with evidence that *A*' are equivalent (§50: 117).
However, he denies that they mean the same thing: because for him, and
this is a crucial disagreement between Husserl and Brentano, truth and
evidential knowledge are distinct.[34] Indeed, as Husserl points out, the first
judgement does not say anything about anyone's judging or knowing any-
thing: it is rather about a proposition and its truth *in themselves*. These

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[34]See for example Brentano 1966, Appendix 1: a letter Brentano wrote to Husserl in 1905
precisely about this issue.

may be 'contents' of some subject's knowledge, and thus be considered in relation to such knowledge; however, in and of themselves, they are independent of it: they are 'ideal' and 'purely logical' (*Prolegomena*, §66a: 149-150). Incidentally, this is crucial to Husserl's case against psychologism (the main theme in *Prolegomena*) and to his construal of what he calls pure logic. But not only are for Husserl propositions and truth ideal and knowledge-independent; the modalities of truth are too. Indeed, at one point (shortly after the *Investigations*) we find him complaining that

> unfortunately, traditional logic conflates these subjective psychological concepts of possibility and necessity with certain purely logical ones, which do not contain anything about us and our knowing (*Wissen*), intending (*Meinen*), supposing (*Vermuten*). (*Logik 1902/03*: 194)

This, I take it, is also what Husserl means when he says, in the last *Logik 1917/18* passage quoted above, that necessity is a 'real' modal notion: necessity concerns, in other words, not knowledge but truth and its modality.

2.3.2 Husserlian Necessity and Possible-Worlds Necessity

In this subsection I draw a comparison between two characterisations of necessity: the Husserlian and the standard one in terms of possible worlds. I shall be assuming some familiarity, on the part of the reader, with the latter. I will argue first that the two are conceptually distinct, and second that at least up to a point, as well as *only* up to a point, Husserlian modal discourse can be represented in terms of possible-worlds semantics.

Now, when I say that the following possible-worlds characterisation of necessity (on which I shall expatiate in a short while):

(23) $\Box A$ at world w if and only if A at every world accessible from w

is 'standard' I mean, of course, that it is standard *nowadays*. It was not standard when Husserl wrote. By the time he died, in 1938, some important results in modal logic had of course been reached: most notably, Hugh MacColl's algebraic work (1880-1905), C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford's **S1-S5** formal axiom systems (1918-1932), and Kurt Gödel's contributions on the relations between classical and intuitionistic logic, which traded on a reading of the necessity operator in terms of provability (1933). Husserl was perhaps aware of some of that – though by the 1930s his working-mathematician and working-logician days were long gone. Be that as it may, the possible-worlds characterisation of necessity, along with the more general semantic approach to modality to which it belongs, Relational Semantics, only became mainstream in the second half of the 20th century.

Even if it had been standard in Husserl's days, however, I doubt Husserl would have helped himself to it. The reason is that, although I call it the possible-worlds 'characterisation' of necessity, in and of itself (23) is not a characterisation of the notion of necessity, but rather a semantic condition on the truth of sentences, or propositions, of a certain form ('$\Box A$'). True, at least in the analytic tradition, there are few philosophers these days who, if asked what they mean when they say that they regard a certain proposition as necessary (in the actual world, say), would answer something other than 'I mean that I regard it to be true in every possible world (accessible from

the actual)'. In this sense, (23) is more often than not also taken to be a philosophical analysis, and thus not only a characterisation but a *definition* proper, of necessity. This is one reason why the debate on possible worlds – what is their nature? What their ontological status? – is alive and thriving: modal actualists, such as Fine (Fine 2005a, Fine 2005b), tend to downplay their definitory (though not their semantic) potential, while modal realists, such as D.K. Lewis, take them very seriously (Lewis 1973, Lewis 1986).

Still, it seems to me, the philosophical fortune of the possible-worlds definition of necessity is largely due to its semantic fortune: in the 1950s, Relational Semantics made it possible to endow modal logic, which is an intensional logic, with an extensional (set-theoretic) semantics. This crucially contributed to the rescue of modal logic from Quine's and others' attacks, which traded on the former's being intensional and thus allegedly obscure and, ultimately, useless if not pernicious. Husserl, however, was very keen on keeping technical developments of mathematics and logic, which nonetheless he prized highly, from philosophy. So I doubt he would have bought into the possible-worlds definition of necessity on the sole ground that it makes the notion more workable from a semantic point of view. Moreover, if the main reason for the technical and subsequently philosophical success of Relational Semantics is that it allowed intensional logic to be treated extensionally, on the other hand Husserl was a convinced intensionalist – in fact, in today's terminology, a convinced *hyperintensionalist*: see for example his 1891 review of Schröder's *Vorlesungen* and *The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents* (Husserl's own attempt at outlining an intensional logic) in Husserl 1994. Also, in a 1903 review of Menyhért

Palágy's book *Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik* (1902), between a charge of misinterpretation and an accusation of intellectual dishonesty we find Husserl reminding Palágy, who apparently read him as attempting, in *Prolegomena*, to 'reduce [logic] to a "class logic" in the style of the Boolean school', that he had already 'laid bare the follies of extensional logic over twelve years ago in a very detailed critique [i.e., his review of Schröder]'(Husserl 1994: 199). It is thus likely that Relational Semantics would not have elicited Husserl's philosophical enthusiasm, had he lived to see it.

All this, however, is mere (though not unmotivated) conjecture. What is not conjecture is that the Husserlian and the possible-worlds characterisations of necessity are, at least from a conceptual standpoint, utterly distinct. We already know enough about the former. Let me highlight the main points with respect to the latter, and then proceed to comparing the two and substantiating that claim.

(23) analyses necessity in terms of possible worlds and the accessibility relation between worlds. As I have already mentioned, possible worlds are variously understood. Minimally, a 'world' is a situation, or a set of situations, against which the truth of a given proposition is assessed. So if I claim: 'It is (actually) raining', in order to assess the claim I have to look at what is actually the case, i.e., at what we may call the actual world. If, however, I claim: 'It might have rained', in order to assess the claim I have to look at what might have been the case, i.e., at some possible world. To thicken this very thin conception is to take a stance in the debate on the nature and ontological status of possible worlds, and thus to side

with the actualist or the realist, or the conceptualist, or what have you (the 'Possible Worlds' entry of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* lists three main camps: concretism, abstractionism and combinatorialism). Since that debate is irrelevant to my purposes, I shall only discuss the thin notion.[35]

Accessibility is a relation in which possible worlds are supposed to stand. Some think that not every possible world is accessible from every other world, while some think the exact opposite is true. There are middle-ground positions, too. What the accessibility relation allows one to do, however, is to define increasingly strong sorts of necessity – strong, that is, from a proof-theoretical standpoint – as one strengthens the structural properties of the relation. If accessibility is only allowed to be reflexive, for example, the resulting concept of necessity will be that of the weakest (normal) modal logic, **K**. If, on the other hand, accessibility is allowed to be an equivalence relation, i.e., reflexive, symmetrical and transitive, the resulting concept of necessity will be that of the strongest modal logic, **S5**, whose basic axiom is the very same (S5) of Section 1.

The Husserlian and the possible-worlds characterisations are thus clearly distinct: the former mentions neither possible worlds nor accessibility, while the latter mentions neither grounding nor laws. They are not, however, incommensurable. My view, as I already stated, is indeed that the Husserlian modal discourse can be *represented*, though not fully captured, in terms of Relational Semantics.

The argument is very simple. The first premise is that Relational Se-

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[35]Wallner 2014 argues that Husserl is in fact an actualist of sorts – albeit perhaps implicitly. He calls the Husserlian brand of actualism 'phenomenological actualism'.

mantics is a good semantics for modal logic. It is not the only semantics available: George Bealer's algebraic semantics, for example, developed at length in Bealer 1982, is a competitor and, at least in principle, is just as good (if not, as Bealer claims, better). The point, however, is just that Relational Semantics simply works for modal logic: if the latter is first-order, it is provably sound and complete with respect to the former.

In Section 1 I have already implicitly assumed that Husserlian modal discourse can be represented, syntactically and proof-theoretically, in terms of at least the **S5** formal axiom system. The second premise of the present argument is a generalised version of that assumption: Husserlian modal discourse can be represented in some (normal) modal logic. I should add: in some of those very same (first-order) modal logics which are provably sound and complete with respect to Relational Semantics.

If Husserlian modal discourse can be represented, syntactically and proof-theoretically, in terms of some normal modal logic; and if the latter are sound and complete with respect to Relational Semantics; it would be very surprising if Relational semantics turned out to be somehow incompatible with Husserlian modal discourse. So surprising, in fact, that it seems safe to conclude that Husserlian modal discourse *can* be semantically represented in terms of Relational Semantics. In particular, in a structure in which accessibility is an equivalence relation – as required by (S5), to which Husserl, as we know, is committed.

Now all this is not to say that we can bypass the Husserlian characterisation of necessity and simply work with the possible-worlds one: because something which Relational Semantics, and thus the possible-worlds char-

acterisation of necessity, cannot capture is the idea that for a proposition to be necessary is for it to be grounded on a law – which is the Husserlian characterisation itself! I have already argued (Section 2.1) that talk of grounding cannot be reduced to modal talk. The same is true of talk of laws. True, Husserl's case for the claim that necessity is not a sufficient condition for lawhood trades on his characterisation of necessity in terms of lawhood. So the latter cannot be used as a premise in arguing that laws cannot, in general, be accounted for in modal terms. Laws, however, are essentialist propositions; and in Chapter 4 we shall appreciate convincing non-Husserlian arguments, and thus arguments independent of Husserl's particular view of necessity, to the effect that necessity is not a sufficient condition for essentiality. But if neither grounding nor lawhood can be reduced to modality, then there is no hope that the possible-worlds definition should be able to capture the Husserlian one. The latter, then, cannot possibly be bypassed in favour of the former.

Incidentally, since, as I have already argued, Husserl was a convinced intensionalist, Relational Semantics would probably not have been his first choice even from a sheer technical standpoint. Bealer's algebraic semantics, for example, along with his intensional logic (as outlined in Bealer 1982), makes a much more plausible candidate.

2.3.3 Expressing Necessity: Predicational or Sentential?

There is a general question as to how modal propositions should be formulated, and a specific question as to how Husserl formulated them. This has

no great relevance to the Husserlian account of necessity, but it is interesting in that it makes non-trivial aspects of Husserl's conception of necessity precise.

The standard approach to expressing modality is to formulate modal propositions by means of the operators 'Necessarily, . . . ' ('□ . . .') and 'Possibly, . . . ' ('◇ . . .'). These are sentential operators: they take in a sentence and put out a sentence. For example, 'The rationals are countable' becomes, in output, 'Necessarily, the rationals are countable'. The sentential approach, however, is not the only one available. In particular, some have argued for what we may call the predicational approach to expressing modality. On George Bealer's version of the predicational approach, for example, modal sentences are instances of the intensional sentence-form:

It is *T* that *A*

where *T* is a predicate, *A* is a sentence, and 'that *A*' is a term (Bealer calls it an 'intensional abstract': see Bealer and Mönnich 2003: 156-164, 220; and Bealer 1982, Ch. 2, for a full outline of Bealer's logic of intensional abstraction). In our case:

It is necessary that *A*

It is possible that *A*

For an argument for the predicational approach, see for example Bealer and Mönnich 2003: 149-154.

My view is that Husserl adopted both approaches, but regarded the predicational as more fundamental.

Husserl *expresses* modality adverbially (an approach which may be associated with the sentential) *and* predicatively interchangeably. That happens between different texts, within the same text and even within the same sentence. In *Logik 1917/18*, for example, while presenting the forms of modal propositions, he gives '*S* ist in Gewißheit *p*' and 'Es ist wirklich so daß *S p* ist' for assertoricity (or actuality), which are predicative; and '*S* ist möglicherweise *p*', '*S* ist notwendigerweise *p*', which are adverbial, for problematicity (possibility) and apodicticity (necessity) respectively.[36]

However, when he *explains* modality, Husserl is all for the predicational approach – and for theoretical reasons: for him, modalities are predications of predications. He writes:

> To this consciousness of necessity corresponds in meaning a peculiar coloration of the 'is' (*eine eigentümlichen Tinktion des Ist*), which, brought to predicative expression, gives the ... judgement: 'That *M* is, that is a necessity', 'That *S* is *p* – this state-of-affairs-being (*dieses Sachverhaltsein*) – is a necessary being. (*Logik 1917/18*, §43b: 220)

In the passage from *Prolegomena* quoted at the outset of Section 1, too, Husserl calls necessity an 'objective predicate of a truth' (*Prolegomena*, §63: 146).

It is thus fair, I think, to hold Husserl to be a predicationalist more than a sententialist. On the other hand, since for him, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Section 3, predication is a matter of consciousness before than a matter

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[36]In line with the Kantian tradition, Husserl treats actuality as a modality.

of logic or language, the issue as to how predications should be expressed in language and represented logically is less important to him than it is to working logicians. That, I take it, is why he feels free to switch between the two approaches whenever he sees fit.

2.4 Comparison between my Interpretation and Mulligan's

In this final section I draw a comparison between two interpretations of the Husserlian essentialist account of necessity: my own and Kevin Mulligan's. My view is that, except for a caveat I will point out in due course, the two differ in spin but not in substance. I shall first present Mulligan's interpretation and then discuss it vis-à-vis mine. All quotes are from Mulligan 2004: 398-399.

For Husserl, says Mulligan, 'necessities are particularisations of laws which are grounded in essence', where 'neither laws nor essentialist propositions are modal propositions'. Consider, he goes on, an essentialist proposition such as

(24) Self-evident judging is valuable

Since it is an essentialist proposition, for Husserl (as we too have seen) it has 'the value of a law'. Thus, Mulligan points out, it implies

(25) $\forall x$(Self-evident judging$(x) \rightarrow$ Valuable(x))

(24), however, 'also refers to self-evident judging, and tells us that (25) is grounded [i.e., that it has a ground] ... Self-evident judging is a species

or essence [i.e., a universal]. It is an object we will refer to as "SEJ". (24) therefore says'

(26) $\forall x((\text{Self-evident judging}(x) \rightarrow \text{Valuable}(x)) \text{ because Instantiates}(x,\text{SEJ})$

Consider now a 'particularization' of (26). 'By a particularization of a positive universal proposition', Mulligan explains, 'Husserl refers to the particular or singular proposition the falsity of which would directly falsify the universal proposition (*LU*3, §12)'. Suppose then

(27) $\exists x(\text{Self-evident judging}(x))$

i.e., suppose there is something that is a case of self-evident judging. Then, according to Mulligan, for Husserl it follows from (26) and (27) that

(28) $\exists x(x \text{ is necessarily valuable})$

which, if we substitute existential quantification with a proper name, is roughly what I have been calling a necessary truth about a particular-cum-universal. 'It seems likely', Mulligan goes on, that for Husserl from (26) and (27) it also follows that

(29) $\exists x(\text{Good}(x) \text{ because Self-evident Judging}(x))$

i.e., that there is something which is good because it is a case of self-evident judging.

Let me now compare the two interpretations. Substantially, they seem to me to agree: both regard necessities as instances of laws, laws as essentialist truths (or, in Mulligan, as implied by the latter), and both laws

and essentialist truths as non-modal. There are some differences, however: either in minor points or in the way the substantial claims are presented.

First, Mulligan never mentions laws about eide. He rather only takes laws to be universal propositions – i.e., eidetic laws – such as (25). However, though uncredited, laws about eide do feature in Mulligan's interpretation: (24) is an essentialist proposition that has the value of a law, that grounds an eidetic law (i.e., (25)) and that is about a 'species or essence'. So at bottom Mulligan agrees that, for Husserl, eidetic laws such as (25) are grounded on essentialist propositions about the relevant universals – even though he does not call the latter 'laws'.

Mulligan also agrees that necessities are both instances of eidetic laws and grounded on propositions such as (24), i.e., on laws about eide. His (26) is something of a mix between my own (4**) and (17*): while I keep the grounding relations between propositions and the instantiation relations between universals and objects separated (the former are spelled out in (17*), the latter in (4**)), he bundles them up in (26). But it seems to me that the resulting pictures, in their basic traits, are in accord.

In order to show that for Husserl laws and essentialist propositions are non-modal, I developed an argument based on elements of Husserl's own view. Mulligan makes the same claim, but justifies it with more general considerations about the relations between essence and necessity. I believe that the two approaches complement each other – so much so that in Chapter 4 I will discuss some of Mulligan's general considerations.

Mulligan calls 'because' in (29), *essential because*, and 'because' in (26), *because of essence*. The difference is that the latter mentions an essence, i.e.,

a universal, while the former does not. I do not make the distinction in my reconstruction of Husserl – not least because I am not sure it is genuinely Husserlian (nor am I sure whether Mulligan thinks it is). However, it seems to me that the work that is done by it in Mulligan's picture is done in mine by the notion that laws about eide, which mention universals, immediately ground eidetic laws and only mediately ground the latter's instances. Mulligan's 'essential because' would thus be the immediate grounding relation between eidetic laws and their instances, while his 'because of essence' would be the mediate grounding relation between instances of eidetic laws and laws about eide.

Finally, being less detailed (it is only a part of an article), Mulligan's interpretation is less committed than mine with respect to a number of exegetic issues I have dealt with throughout this chapter and the first. Insofar as my overall reading of Husserl is coherent, however, I see no compatibility issues with my and Mulligan's reading of Husserl's account of necessity. I should mention, however, that laws about eide have, in my view, a different logical form that (24). I will argue as much in Chapter 3. At this stage, this is a trifle. It will, however, become momentous as we progress, starting from Chapter 3 itself.

2.5 Summary

This chapter was devoted to reconstructing Husserl's account of necessity in terms of essence. The reconstruction was ultimately given in the following terms:

(17*) For every necessary truth $\Box A$ there is a law α such that:

(a) $\langle \Box A \rangle \lhd \langle$It is a law that $\alpha \rangle$, and either $A = \alpha$ or A instantiates α;

(b) α is either a law about eide, i.e., an essentialist truth about a universal, or an eidetic law, i.e., an essentialist truth about all the possible instances or bearers of a pure universal (or about an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal); and

(c) for every α which is an eidetic law, there is a law about eide β such that $\langle$It is a law that $\alpha \rangle \lhd \langle$It is a law that $\beta \rangle$.

It is important to appreciate that the basic grounding work is done in the picture by laws about eide.

I argued that, despite Husserl's wording in *EJ*, the Husserlian concept of essence is non-modal, i.e., that it cannot be fully accounted for in modal terms. This prompted the following amendment of (4*), a principle proposed in Chapter 1:

(4**) A predicate 'F' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G, be it a particular, a pure universal or an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal, if and only if

(a) a either instantiates or bears F, and

(b) F is in the essence of a_G.

I called (4**) Husserl's *instantiation-based* view of essence and predication. In the next chapter I shall argue that laws about eide, with all their fundamentality, are incompatible with (4**). This raises a serious problem

for Husserl. The remainder of this thesis (Chapters 4 through 6) will be devoted to solving it.

I presented and discussed Husserl's views on grounding and necessity in some detail.

Finally, I compared my reconstruction of the Husserlian account of necessity with Mulligan's, and found the two to be in substantial agreement – with one important caveat relative to the logical form of laws about eide.

Chapter 3

A Problem for Husserl

This chapter has two tasks. First, to give a characterisation of laws about eide with respect to their logical form. Second, to show that if laws about eide – which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, do the basic grounding work in the Husserlian picture – have the logical form I attribute to them, then they are incompatible with (4**), the principle that in the Husserlian picture governs the relations between essence, instantiation (and bearing), and predication. This is a serious problem for Husserl. I believe, however, that his overall doctrine of essence, universals and predication can be so modified as to avoid the difficulty. This is indeed the task of the remainder of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). To so modify the overall doctrine is not the only way one can attempt to solve the problem. It is however, as I shall argue, the only effective way.

The chapter has three sections. In Sections 1 and 2 I explore the issue of the logical form of laws about eide. In Section 1 I argue that Husserl's approach, which I call the 'generic account', is flawed. Specifically, I first

lay out three conditions on the logical form of laws about eide, and then show that the generic account, in any of its variations (I discuss three), does not meet them. In Section 2 I put forward my own proposal, the 'infinitive account'.

In Section 3 I argue that laws about eide, construed according to the infinitive account, do not obey the (4**) principle. I discuss and reject a number of possible solutions to this problem. Ultimately I argue that the only effective solution is to expand the Husserlian picture so as to include a *non-instantiation-based* view of essence and predication. This should not substitute, but rather complement Husserl's instantiation-based view. In the following chapters (5 and 6) I show what such an expansion may look like.

3.1   The Form of Laws about Eide

In this section I explore the issue of the logical form of laws about eide. The section has three parts. In the first I give three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which a proposition has to meet if it is to be a law about eide. In the second and third I present, discuss, and ultimately reject three versions of the generic account of laws about eide – which Husserl endorses – on the ground that they do not meet the conditions.

3.1.1   Three Conditions

In Chapter 2 we learnt a fair amount about the logical form of eidetic laws. They may be viewed either as *universal* essentialist propositions (i.e., as

essentialist propositions about all the possible instances or bearers of some pure universal) or as essentialist propositions about an arbitrary instance or bearer of some pure universal. As I argued in Chapter 1, Section 2.5, although both options are endorsed by Husserl, he regards the second as more fundamental: for he thinks that universal propositions as such derive from propositions about arbitrary objects. Despite that, however, since the logic of universal propositions is more widely known than the logic of propositions about arbitrary objects, it will be convenient to think of eidetic laws in terms of the former rather than the latter. But although we have some grasp on the form of *eidetic* laws, we still know little about that of laws *about eide*.

What we do know is that the latter are, for Husserl, essentialist propositions about some pure universal, and that their functional role in the Husserlian account of necessity is to ground eidetic laws (immediately) and the latter's instances (mediately). This gives us three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that a proposition has to meet if it is to be a law about eide:

(30) A proposition α is a law about eide if and only if:

    (I) it is about some eidos F;

    (II) it states the essence of F;

    (III) it is able to ground some eidetic law about the possible instances or bearers of F.

Condition I is straightforward. Condition II is justified in Chapter 2, Section 1, on the basis that it is needed in order to rule out unwanted cases (i.e.,

contingent or even necessary propositions about *F* which, however, are clearly not laws). Condition III states the role that laws about eide have in the Husserlian account of necessity.

But just what do laws about eide look like? In fact, what do they have to look like, if they are to meet the conditions? Husserl's view seems to be that laws about eide are *generic* essentialist propositions, such as (I will maintain):

(31) A human is an animal.

I say 'seems to be' because, to my knowledge, Husserl never explicitly addresses the issue: he merely says that laws about eide are 'general' propositions – which, as I will argue later on, is not very illuminating as regards their logical form. From piecemeal remarks and his overall usage, however, the generic account, or at least a generic approach, may safely be inferred. I will mention one piece of evidence in particular, a passage from *The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents* (Husserl's attempt at outlining an intensional logic). The piece is from 1891, and thus belongs to an early stage of Husserl's philosophical career; as far as I am aware, however, there is no reason to think he changed his mind on this particular issue in later years.

At one point in the article, Husserl wants to give intensional interpretations of the formula 'All *S* are *P*' .[37] He distinguishes between an interpretation without quantification over contents and an interpretation with such quantification. I am interested in the second, which is:

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[37]Husserl's wording for what I call intensional interpretations is 'interpretations purely in terms of contents', which he contrasts with 'interpretations purely in terms of extensions'.

'The ideal content of *S* includes the ideal content of *P*'. That
is, **the totality of properties belonging to an *S* as such** (*einem S
als solchen*) **includes the totality of properties belonging to a *P*
as such** (*einem P als solchen*). This is the fundamental form for
the calculus of 'ideal' contents. (*EW*: 98)

The notion that 'All *S* are *P*' should be interpreted as 'The ideal content
of *S* includes the ideal content of *P*' is, in and of itself, neutral with respect to
whether Husserl endorsed the generic account of laws about eide (indeed,
my own account, to be offered in Section 3, is compatible with it). What
is not neutral is the fact that Husserl chooses to express that very same
interpretation ('that is', *d.h.*) – which, unlike the original proposition, 'All *S*
are *P*', is something like a law about eide, in that it is about properties rather
than their bearers – by means of a generic (see boldfaced text): 'The totality
of properties belonging to *an S as such* includes the totality of properties
belonging *to a P as such*'.

It is important, in this connection, not to confuse genericity and gener-
ality. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Section 1, for Husserl a proposition is
general if and only if it is about universals (or, as he sometimes puts it, about
concepts). Generality, then, is a question of what a proposition is about,
and is neutral with respect to logical form: a general proposition may be
singular, plural, existential, universal, or what have you. Genericity, on the
other hand, is *not* neutral with respect to logical form: if a proposition is
generic, then it is neither singular nor universal (I suspend judgement on
whether it might be plural or existential – though I would say 'no'). We

shall see as much presently. If this is true, however, then even though we know that laws about eide are general (which is what condition I states), at this point it is a substantive and yet undecided claim that they are also generic. Of course, if the generic account is correct, they are. But is the generic account correct? In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that it is not.

3.1.2 Against the Generic Account

Generics are propositions such as 'The potato is highly digestible', 'The English drink beer', 'A fir is a conifer', 'Lions are ferocious beasts', 'The dodo is extinct', 'The rat reached Australia in 1770'. As linguists (and philosophers who have a hand in the debate) usually put it, generics express claims about kinds or categories rather than individuals.[38] See for example Krifka and Gerstner-Link 1993, Krifka et al. 1995, Pelletier 2009, Prasada et al. 2013. Generics are usually divided into two categories, dubbed *I-generics* and *D-generics*. I-generics express generalisations about the members of a given kind: 'The potato is highly digestible', 'The English drink beer', 'A fir is a conifer', 'Lions are ferocious beasts' are all of this type. D-generics, by contrast, appear to express claims about the kinds themselves: for example, 'The dodo is extinct', 'The rat reached Australia in 1770'. I have three arguments against the notion that laws about eide are generic propositions. I shall now rehearse them.

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[38]Some linguists regard propositions such as 'John smokes a cigar after dinner' as generics (they call them 'characterising sentences about individuals'). Here, however, I will disregard those, as they clearly cannot express laws about eide (no eidos is an individual).

The first argument targets the truth-conditions of I-generics. Consider condition II on laws about eide: a proposition α is a law about eide only if it states the essence of some eidos. Among other things, the condition entails that a law about eide is necessary: because laws about eide are essentialist truths, and, recall from Chapter 2, essentialist truths are necessary. This, in turn, entails that a law about eide should admit of no exceptions; in fact, of no possible exceptions. The vast majority of I-generics, however, do not satisfy this requirement. 'Swans are white', 'The English drink beer', 'Ducks lay eggs' are all generics whose truth is compatible with the existence of – respectively – black swans, English subjects that do not drink beer, and ducks that do not lay eggs (the young females, for example, or some dysfunctional individual).[39] Therefore, if eidetic laws are I-generics they have to belong to the minority – i.e., to the restricted group of I-generics that do not admit of exceptions: for example, 'Whales are mammals' and 'A fir is a conifer'. The last proposition, in particular, is what linguists call an 'IS-generic' (IS = Indefinite Singular), and is the form which Husserl often uses to express essentialist truths about eide. It is also the form of his intensional interpretation of 'All S are P', as we have seen. I will deal with IS-generics (and, in general, with I-generics that do not admit of exceptions) later, with my third argument.

The second argument has to do with the subject matter of (both I- and D-) generics. If we follow the linguists, then generics may, as such, be only about kinds – for that is just how they are defined: as propositions about

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[39]Unless, of course, one reads the propositions as universal ones; but in that case they cease to be generics and become universal propositions. Generics as such involve no quantification.

kinds of things. However, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Section 2.3, not every Husserlian universal – not every eidos – is a kind. Among the universals that are kind-like are all the substantival and some of the adjectival: for example, Potato and Colour (which is a kind of visual quality). But most adjectival universals are not kind-like. Qualities (such as Red, Loud, Beautiful, etc.), relations (Parenthood, Friendship, etc.), type-events (Boxing Match), type-processes (Swimming), and so on, are non-kind-like eide. But then if generics are, by definition, about kinds, the generic account of laws about eide cannot accommodate reference to non-kind-like adjectival eide. This is a major shortcoming.

Perhaps, however, linguists are wrong, and there are in fact generics that are about qualities, relations, etc. For example, 'In Western cultures, black is associated with mourning' (which, on the face of it, is about black, a quality); or 'Parenthood is valuable' (which, on the face of it, is about a relation). If these examples are valid (or if other, valid examples can be concocted), then generics may accommodate non-kind-like as well as kind-like universals.[40] My view, however, is that even if we grant that there are genuine generics able to accommodate reference to non-kind-like universals, two further issues arise: 1) Are any such generics really essentialist truths about non-kind-like universals? If not, condition II is not met. 2) More importantly, generics about non-kind-like universals imply a semantic loss that is fatal when it comes to expressing laws about eide, because it prevents the alleged laws to meet condition III. Let me explain.

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[40]As a consequence, the mainstream definition of generics would have to be amended; but that is beyond my interest here.

As for the first issue, it seems to me that while some generics about non-kind-like universals do not express the essence of the relevant eide, others do. Our first example, 'In Western cultures, black is associated with mourning', is clearly among those that do not; our second example, however, 'Parenthood is valuable', is probably among those that do. Thus I do not take the first issue to be fatal to the generic account (always granting, against the linguists, that there are genuine generics that are about qualities, etc., as opposed to kinds). Things are different, however, with the second issue.

If laws about eide are to be able to ground eidetic laws (which is what condition III requires), there are restrictions as to what essential traits they should state about the relevant eide. In particular, and this is a concept I will develop at length in Section 3 (and later on in Chapter 6), a law about an eidos F should be about F in its determining capacity: otherwise, whatever an alleged law about F states, it will not be in a position to ground any eidetic law. Take an uncontroversial example: 'Parenthood is a relation'. It is a proposition about an eidos (condition I) and it states the essence of that eidos (condition II). But is it able to ground any eidetic law, i.e., any truth about all the possible instances of the eidos (about all possible parents)? It seems to me that it is not. Once we know that parenthood is essentially a relation, we do not know the first thing about all possible parents (except perhaps that they are related to something; but if you think that this is a genuine eidetic law, then you can read both my argument and, in fact, condition III as being about non-trivial eidetic laws). Similarly: what do we know about all possible parents once we know that Parenthood is

essentially an eidos? At most, that they are all instances of an eidos. Again, if this is an eidetic law it is a very trivial one.

No: if a law about eide is to be able to ground some eidetic law, it has to capture the essence of how the relevant eidos determines its instances or bearers (as I will call it in Chapter 6, the eidos' 'way of determining'). Generics such as 'Parenthood is a relation' (again, if they are indeed genuine generics) are unable to do so. This is due to the semantic loss I referred to above. Specifically, the problem with generics about qualities, relations, and so on, is that they refer to the latter by means of generic noun phrases that, so to speak, completely nominalise them. In other words, one thing is to consider Parenthood simply as an object, and another, completely different thing is to consider it in its determining capacity. Terms like 'Parenthood', however, only accomplish the former, not the latter. Thus, generics about non-kind-like eide, insofar as their subject noun phrases are terms such as 'Parenthood', do not meet condition III.

The third argument targets both I- and D-generics. The I-generics in which I will be interested in this connection are those that do not admit of exceptions (i.e., the minority that survived the first argument I offered against the generic account); but I will turn to them later. As for D-generics, I have in mind propositions such as 'The dodo is extinct' and 'The rat reached Australia in 1770'. Let us start with these. What is the semantic value of their subject noun phrases? On their most immediate reading, it is the kinds Dodo and Rat. In principle, these may be construed either as real or as ideal objects. In effect, however, at least *prima facie* they cannot be construed as ideal objects: for no ideal object is extinct or has reached

Australia in 1770. So the relevant kinds must be real objects. But then the generics will not be about eide, and condition I will not be met.

Is this a knock-down argument? One might think that it is not: all we need is a semantic device allowing the predicates 'is extinct' and 'reached Australia in 1770' to be predicated not of the kinds Dodo and Rat themselves, but of their members. So one might hold, for example, that 'The dodo is extinct' really means something like 'The last member of the kind Dodo has died'. On this reading, the kind may well be construed as ideal. But then there is another problem: that, strictly speaking, the proposition will not be about the kind, but about its members. It will the fail to meet condition I, and therefore will not express a law about eide.

Let us turn to I-generics. I will focus on IS-generics in particular, i.e., on propositions such as 'A fir is a conifer', 'A human is an animal', and the like. This is because, as we have seen earlier on, IS-generics do not admit of exceptions. To be sure, it is not *only* IS-generics that do not admit of exceptions; for example, 'Firs are conifers' does not, and it is no IS-generic (because its subject noun phrase is not determined by the indefinite article). It is a common view among linguists, however, that IS-generics *as such* do not admit of exceptions; as for non-IS I-generics which do not admit of exceptions, they can always be paraphrased as felicitous IS-generics – while non-IS I-generics that do admit of exceptions cannot. For example, it is fine to paraphrase 'Firs are conifers' as 'A fir is a conifer', but it is not fine to paraphrase 'Swans are white' as 'A swan is white'– at least so long as we know that there actually are black swans. In other words, while 'A fir is a conifer' is just a true IS-generic, 'A swan is white' is either a false or

an infelicitous (ungrammatical) IS-generic.[41] In this sense, by focusing on IS-generic alone one is able to track the behaviour of all the other I-generics that do not admit of exceptions: because the latter – and only the latter – are liable to be paraphrased in terms of the former.

Consider, then, 'A fir is a conifer'. Is it about the kind Fir, or is it about firs (a fir in general, or something like that)? If it is about the kind Fir, how is the kind construed? If it is construed as an eidos, then the proposition is false: the eidos Fir is not a conifer. If it is construed as a real object, then the proposition is true – but is no law about eide, for eide are ideal objects. If, on the other hand, the proposition is not about the kind Fir, but about firs, we have the same result: it is true but not a law about eide (it is rather a law about the members of a kind).

If the three arguments I have just offered are good, the generic account of laws about eide is flawed. As a consequence, laws about eide are not generic propositions. The question, then, is what their logical form may be.

3.2   The Infinitive Account

In this section I put forward my own proposal, the infinitive account. The main idea is that laws about eide are propositions expressed by sentences of forms

(36.1) To be an *F* is to be a *G*

(36.2) To be *F* is to be *G*

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[41]See for example Lawler 1973, Burton-Roberts 1976, Burton-Roberts 1977, Krifka 2012, Krifka et al. 1995, Pelletier 2009, Leslie 2011.

(36.3) To *F* is to *G*

and combinations (e.g., 'To *F* is to be a *G*', etc.). Semantically, the instances of these forms should be taken at face value; that is to say, they should be taken to be sentences about whatever it is that their subjects denote. Their subjects – 'to be an *F*', 'to be *F*', and 'to *F*'– are infinitive verbal phrases (corresponding to finite-tensed nominal or verbal predicates such as 'is an *F*', 'was *F*', 'will *F*'). The proposal is as follows. First, that infinitive verbal phrases denote eide, and that, as a consequence, the propositions in which they function as subject are propositions about eide (condition I). Second, that such propositions state the essence of eide (condition II). Third, that the propositions in question are in a position to ground eidetic laws (condition III).

Let us begin with two overlapping (though not identical) distinctions, both exclusive and exhaustive, between predicates. Some predicates, such as *is an animal*, have a subject, be it specified or not; while others, such as *to be an animal*, have none. The former, and this is the second distinction, are finite-tensed verbal phrases; the latter are non-finite verbal phrases. I shall assume, as one should in the Husserlian framework, that all predicates refer to universals (in the sense of Chapter 1, Section 3.1). Predicates with and without subjects, however, have distinct functions. The former are attributive: they characterise what their subjects denote by expressing the fact that it either instantiates or bears the universal to which the predicate refers. Subjectless predicates, on the other hand, have no subject to which they could attribute the universal they refer to. Their function is indeed not

attributive, but denotative. That is why, unlike their counterparts, they can, and more often than not do, occur in subject position. (True, in sentences of form (36.1)-(36.3) they also occur in predicate position. More about this, however, in Section 3.)

If we accept this picture (much of it I owe to Burton-Roberts 1976), then we have an account of laws about eide which escapes all the difficulties faced by the generic account. These, recall, are the following. First, most I-generics admit of exceptions. Second, it is open to doubt whether there are genuine generics about non-kind-like universals; but even if there are, because of the semantic loss problem they do not meet condition III. Third, some D-generics, as well as – notably – the I-generics that do not admit of exceptions (and thus do not face the first difficulty), are false if the semantic value of thir subject noun phrase is construed as an eidos.

Sentences of form (36.1)-(36-3) clearly meet condition I: for subjectless predicates denote universals, and therefore all the sentences in which they occur in subject position are about universals. Notice that subjectless predicates, unlike generic noun phrases, may denote *all* types of universals, not just kinds. *To be F* – in (36.2) – can denote qualities, relations, places, states, events, and yet other types of universals, while *to F* – (36.3) – accommodates actions.

Conditions II and III are best dealt with together. *Assume*, for one moment, that condition II – according to which a law about eide should express the essence of eide – is met; i.e., assume that a proposition such as 'To be human is to be an animal' states the essence of the eidos Human. Then condition III – according to which a law about eide should be able

to ground some eidetic law about the possible instances or bearers of the relevant eidos – is clearly met. Because it makes good sense to say, e.g., that it is an (eidetic) law that every possible human is an animal *because* it is a law (about eide) that to be human is to be an animal. This is because infinitive verbal phrases ('to be human'), unlike names ('Human', 'the eidos Human'), capture eide in their determining capacity. I will fully develop this concept in Chapter 6.[42]

Of course, the claim that the infinitive approach meets condition II cannot remain an assumption: sooner or later it must be discharged. Here are a couple of reasons why, I think, we can do so. First, the idea that propositions of form (36.1)-(36.3) state the essence of an eidos is not at all outlandish: surely there is a sense of essence in which to be human is essentially to be an animal. Indeed, in the generic literature the claim is often made that IS-generics, by expressing conditions for belonging to kinds, express the essence of kinds. But if the proposition that a human is an animal can be sensibly said to state the essence of the kind Human, then, short of an argument to the contrary (and none comes to mind), so can the proposition that to be a human is to be an animal. (This connects with crucial issues to be discussed in Section 3.)

Second, if the idea that propositions expressed by (36.1)-(36.3) state the essence of eide is rejected, and the infinitive approach discarded, then what will the account be of laws about eide? As we saw, the generic account will

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[42]Gerunds such as 'being human', 'being an animal' and 'running' do the same job as infinitives. The reason why I prefer the latter is that in German – which after all is the language in which Husserl wrote – gerunds do *not* do the same job as infinitives: both 'being an animal' and 'to be an animal' translate as *ein Tier zu sein*, which is an infinitive.

not do, and yet other candidates will be discarded in Section 3. So that if the infinitive account fails, the whole Husserlian account of necessity must be abandoned. I thus propose to accept the infinitive approach as the right one, at least provisionally (until, that is, I show in Section 3 that all the other candidates are indeed hopeless).

I shall now turn to what I take to be the main problem for Husserlian Essentialism: the fact that laws about eide, construed according to the infinitive account, are incompatible with principle (4**).

3.3   A Problem for Husserl

According to the infinitive account, laws about eide are propositions of form (36.1)-(36.3). For example:

(37) To be human is to be an animal

Recall that laws about eide, among other things, state the essence of the eidos, or the eide, which they are about; (37), for example, states the essence of the eidos Human. Now recall the following principle from Chapter 2:

(4**) A predicate 'F' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G, be it a particular, a pure universal or an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal, if and only if

  (a) a either instantiates or bears F, and

  (b) F is in the essence of a_G.

The problem for the Husserlian account is that if laws about eide are propositions of form (36.1)-(36.3), then they falsify (4**).

Take clause (a) first. A necessary condition for there to be a true essentialist predication '*a* is essentially *F*' is that *a* either instantiate or bear *F*. But consider (37): eidos Human neither instantiates nor bears eidos Animal. In fact, if the proposition is to be true, Human *must not* instantiate (or bear) Animal: if Human were an animal, it would not be an eidos (in fact, not even an empirical universal), but a particular (for animals are particulars); thus, it would be neither instantiable nor bearable; and a question such as 'What is it to be Human?' would simply make no sense. Clearly this is true of any proposition of form (36.1)-(36.3).

Incidentally, (4**), and in particular clause (a), is in effect a special case of:

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

(a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival universal or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal, or

(b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* an adjectival universal.

I pointed this out at the end of Chapter 1, Section 3.2, with respect to (4*), the old version of (4**). (2*) is the principle, entailed (as I also showed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2) by Husserl's theory of predication, according to which predication is instantiation-based, i.e., it always involves instantiation as a necessary condition. Thus, by falsifying (4**), clause (a), laws about eide also falsify (2*).

Consider now clause (b). It is falsified in two ways. First because, recall from Chapter 1, Section 1 and Chapter 2, Section 1, for a universal to be in the essence of an object the latter must either instantiate or bear the former. As we have just seen, however, that is not the case in propositions such as (37) – or, in general, in propositions of forms (36.1)-(36.3). Second, notice that essentialist propositions such as (37) do not state the essence of objects-cum-universals – as (4**) instead requires – but of objects simpliciter. That is to say, while Husserl defines essence for instances or bearers of universals (i.e., for objects on condition that they instantiate or bear some given universal), laws about eide, if they look like (37) (i.e., if they are of forms (36.1)-(36.3)), state the essence of objects *regardless* of the universals they instantiate or bear. The claim that to be human is to be an animal, for example, does not contain any mention of the universals that Human instantiates or bears.

We have two options at this point. We can either retain the infinitive account of laws about eide and look for a solution to the problem by tampering with the Husserlian doctrine (i.e., by either rejecting (4**) or complementing it with some other principle); or we can discard the infinitive account, and thus – hopefully – get rid of the problem. Of course, if we take up the second option we will need to give an alternative account of laws about eide – one that is satisfactory both on its own terms and with respect to the problem we are now trying to solve (i.e., an account that does a decent job explaining laws about eide and, on the other hand, does not conflict with (4**)). My view is that no alternative account satisfies these desiderata, and that, as a consequence, we should take up the first option.

Let us see how the second option may be implemented, and why, as I

maintain, all implementations fail. One obvious move is to turn to the generic account. What prompted us to endorse the infinitive account in the first place, however, is that the generic account is flawed regardless of questions of compatibility with (4**). One may then try to reduce non-instantiation-based laws about eide (which conflict with (4**)) to instantiation-based ones (which comply with it). For example, one may try to reduce the law that to be human is to be an animal to a law of form

Human is *G*

where *G* is a further eidos, predicated of Human in the sense prescribed by (4**), and thus, in particular, instantiated or borne by Human. But what are the eide that Human instantiates or bears? Universal, Ideal Object, Substantival Universal, and a few others. These, however, are the wrong kind of universals to figure in a law about Human. For suppose we substitute them for *G* in the above proposition. Would the resulting, alleged laws about Human – 'Eidos Human is a universal', 'Eidos Human is an ideal object', etc. – be able to ground any eidetic law at all about the instances or bearers of Human? Clearly not. So this option leads nowhere.

Except, one might point out, that there is a class of properties that can be predicated of Human in the sense of (4**) – i.e., which Human instantiates or bears – and which could actually do the trick. These are the properties expressed by such predicates as 'is a species of *F*', 'is a genus of *G*', and so forth. The resulting laws, for example 'Eidos Human is a species of eidos Animal' seem, unlike those above, to be able to ground eidetic laws. In fact, however, they only seem to. Recall from Chapter 1, Section 4.1, that for

Husserl genus-species relations between universals are to be cashed out in terms of truths about the instances (or bearers) of the relevant universals. So that, in effect, the proposition that Human is a species of Animal is a proposition about *the instances or bearers* of Human, not about Human itself. It is thus no law about eide, nor, as a consequence, can it ground any eidetic law. The same, of course, is true of any reinterpretation of non-instantiation-based laws in terms of instantiation-based propositions about instances or bearers of eide.

Finally, one might read 'To be an F is to be a G' as a statement of partial identity between two eide: 'Eidos G is a proper part of eidos F'. The copula, then, would express the proper-parthood relation. There are reasons, however, not to take up this option. One is the following. Suppose we did take up the option. Then eidos Animal would be a proper part (literally) of eidos Human. But this has counterintuitive consequences. First, since – say – to be a whale is to be an animal, it follows that eidos Animal is also part of eidos Whale – and of eidos Ant, Dinosaur, or what have you. But then eidos Human would be partially identical with eide Whale, Ant, Dinosaur (because they would all share a part). It is much more plausible, however, simply to say that the same thing can be said of Human, Whale, Ant, Dinosaur – namely, that to be human, to be a whale, etc., is to be an animal – rather than saying that all those eide are partially identical.

Second, consider the proposition that to be human is to be an animal and such that there are infinitely many primes. Either it is true or it is false. Suppose it is true. Then there is an eidos Animal-and-such-that-there-are-

infinitely-many-primes – which, on the partial-identity reading, will also be partially identical with eidos Human. But this is odd: it is much more natural to think that it can be said of Human that to be human is to be an animal and such that there are infinitely many primes. But suppose now that the proposition is false (as I think and, as we shall see in Chapter 4, is implied by Finean essentialism4). Then it cannot be said of Human that to be human is to be an animal and such that there are infinitely many primes. But then eidos Human and eidos Animal-and-such-that-there-are-infinitely-many-primes will not be partially identical. And yet how can that be? If they exist (and notice that it is not required for their existence that the proposition in question be true), then on the partial-identity view they must share a part: Animal. Otherwise it is not clear what the view is all about.

Third, propositions of form 'To be (an) *F* is to be (a) *G*' have (perhaps uncommon but perfectly legitimate) non-essentialist readings. Consider the following passage from *The Economist*: 'To be English is to have influence, to dominate a larger political body and yet have a separate cultural identity' (June 20th 2015: 34). It refers to the actual political situation in the United Kingdom, and the gist of it is: English representatives at Westminster have a great influence on, and in effect politically dominate, the United Kingdom; however, the English have a cultural identity which, to a great extent, is distinct from that of the Welsh, the Scots and the Northern Irish. Surely, to have influence and to dominate a larger political body (intuitions are slightly less clear on having a separate cultural identity) are not essential to being English. How will the partial-identity view account for this? If

the universals denoted by those verbal phrases are parts of the universal English, then plausibly they will be essential to it. But this flies in the face of intuition. If they are not parts of the universal English, however, the proposition will count as false. But there seem to be no independent reasons (independent, that is, of the partial-identity view) to think that the proposition is false. True, subscribers to the view might hold the latter to account for the essentialist readings but *not* for the non-essentialist readings. But this would only speak for the superiority of the predicational view, which accommodates equally well, and equally naturally, both readings: in one case the predication is essentialist (i.e., something is said of something in order to state the latter's essence), in the other case it is not (i.e., something is said of something full stop).

Finally, apart from yielding counterintuitive results and being unsatisfactory in the above sense, the partial-identity view, for all its *prima facie* plausibility and simplicity, makes heavy theoretical demands. Indeed, it deploys notions, such as identity and parthood, of which we have a good understanding *only so long as they apply to particulars.* I am thinking not only of classical mereology, but also of non-classical systems (mereologies for masses, and temporal and modal mereologies) such as those presented in Simons 1987. These are all theories about particular objects and their parts. We simply lack a clear understanding of the mereology of universals. Incidentally, this is one of the lessons to be drawn from D.K. Lewis' arguments against the 'pictorial conception' of structural universals in Lewis 1986.

There may be ways of responding to these arguments. My point, however, is that the partial-identity view of propositions of form (36.1)-(36.3) is

much less intuitive, and carries heavier theoretical commitments, than the predicational view – according to which the proposition that to be human is to be an animal, far from stating a partial identity, simply determines (recall Husserl's view of predication from Chapter 1, Section 3) eidos Human in terms of eidos Animal. True, this raises the question as to how there can be predication without instantiation; but it seems better to me to do more theoretical work to preserve intuitions than keeping the theory simple (if the partial-identity view *were* simple – which, as I have argued, it is not) and forsaking intuitions. This, at least, is a guiding principle of all of Husserl's philosophising. I do not see why we should abandon it while trying to fix his own theory. Besides, as I will show in Chapter 6, Husserl's *EJ* theory of predication has pretty much all the ingredients needed to construct a more liberal version of it – so that no theoretical burden (or a very light one) will be placed on the already-existing picture.

At this point, it seems to me, the only feasible option is to retain the infinitive account of laws about eide and try to solve the compatibility problem (compatibility with (4**)) by modifying the Husserlian doctrine. In particular, we should supply the latter with a non-instantiation-based account of both essence and predication. This should not simply replace Husserl's own instantiation-based account, which after all makes perfect sense for most types of propositions (not least eidetic laws), but rather complement it. In other words, we should not try to reject (4**), but work out a sense in which a universal can be predicated of another universal, and be in its essence, without the second universal having to instantiate or bear the first, and without its being considered as an instance or bearer of some

other, pre-given universal. Such is the task of the second part of this thesis.

3.4   Summary

In this chapter I investigated the logical form of laws about eide. I laid out three conditions which a proposition must meet if it is to be a law about eide. A number of accounts were scrutinised and ultimately rejected; in particular, the generic account – which is probably the one Husserl subscribed to. I have rather endorsed the infinitive account, according to which laws about eide have the forms 'To be an *F* is to be a *G*', 'To be *F* is to be *G*', 'To *F* is to *G*', and combinations thereof (e.g., 'To be *F* is to *G*', etc.).

I also argued that if the infinitive account is correct, then laws about eide violate both clause (a) and clause (b) of (4**), the principle which in the Husserlian picture governs the relations between essence, predication, and instantiation (and bearing), and which in Chapter 2 I have called Husserl's instantiation-based account of essence and predication. If laws about eide are not captured by it, then, I argued, the Husserlian doctrine of essence must be supplemented by a *non-instantiation-based* account of essence and predication. Otherwise, Husserl's essentialist account of necessity is bereft of its most basic element.

This concludes the first part of this thesis. In the second part I will show what the supplementation may look like, by sketching a Husserl-friendly non-instantiation-based account of essence and predication. In particular, in Chapter 5 I will give a non-instantiation-based notion of essence (Chapter 4 provides the needed background knowledge); and in Chapter 6 I will

sketch a Husserlian non-instantiation-based theory of predication.

Part II

Husserlian Essentialism Revisited

Chapter 4

Finean Essentialism

This chapter is about Kit Fine's view of essence (which I call 'Finean Essentialism'). I have two reasons for being interested in it. The first reason has to do with how I intend to revisit Husserlian Essentialism and solve the problem I raised for it in Chapter 3: that predication and essence, at least as far as laws about eide are concerned, do not abide by (4**), and thus do not involve, or presuppose, instantiation. Indeed, recall what I set out to do at the end of Chapter 3: to work out a non-instantiation-based notion of essence and a non-instantiation-based notion of predication. Chapter 5 is devoted to the former task. There I shall be building up on results of Fabrice Correia's. In order to come to grips with those, however, some knowledge of the basics of Finean Essentialism is needed. I furnish it here.

The second reason is the following. Recall that, for Husserl, essence is non-modal: necessity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for essentiality. The argument for this, which I put forward in Chapter 2, is the following (all assumptions are justified in Chapter 2, Section 1):

1. For a proposition to be necessary is for it to be true on the ground of a law. [ass.]

2. Due to Husserl's commitments on modal logic, necessity is a necessary condition for lawhood. [ass.]

3. If necessity were also a sufficient condition for lawhood, then 1 would be circular.

4. By 3, necessity is a necessary *but not sufficient* condition for lawhood.

5. A proposition is a law if and only if it is an essentialist truth (either pure general or pure universal). [ass.]

6. If necessity were a necessary and sufficient condition for essentiality, then, since (by 4) necessity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for lawhood, lawhood and essentiality would not be equivalent – against 5.

7. Therefore, necessity is a necessary *but not sufficient* condition for essentiality.

Admittedly, the picture is complicated by the fact that the pure general and the pure universal are not the only types of essentialist truths. The argument above does not apply to essentialist truths that are neither pure general nor pure universal, because they are not laws; and therefore it does not warrant extending the claim that essence is non-modal to *all* essentialist truths. I have argued, however, that due to considerations of uniformity the claim should nevertheless be extended. See Chapter 2, Section 1.

Even apart from this complication (to which, however, I will return in a few moments), notice that the whole argument depends on Husserl's characterisation of necessity as truth on the ground of a law (step 1). Now,

suppose one did not buy the characterisation: the whole argument would be blocked. What, then, of the claim that essence is non-modal?

If there were further, independent arguments for that claim (independent, that is, of the Husserlian characterisation and account of necessity), they would strengthen the Husserlian picture – especially if they applied to *all* essentialist truths, not only to the pure general or the pure universal. Since the core of Finean Essentialism is just an array of such arguments, it is certainly worth our while to become acquainted with it.

This, I take it, is enough to justify my interest in Finean Essentialism. The latter, however, also includes the claim that essence, besides being non-modal, accounts for necessity. Three questions arise in this connection. Is Fine's essentialist account of necessity a reductive one? If not, what kind of account is it? And how close is it to Husserl's own position? Drawing on a paper by Bob Hale, and on already-mentioned work by Rosen, I distinguish three types the account may belong to – local, global, reductive – and argue that the safest option is to regard the account as global (and thus, in particular and against some readers of Fine, as non-reductive). This takes care of the first two questions. I argue, moreover, that Husserl's account is also best construed as global – thus answering the third question and fulfilling the promise, made in Chapter 2, Section 1, to expand on the aim and the form of the Husserlian account.

Finally, I discuss the problem of how to logically represent essentialist propositions. Fine's sentential approach is explored and found unsatisfactory for my purposes. A predicational approach based on Bealer's intensional language $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ is adopted instead.

The chapter has three sections. In Section 1 I present Finean essentialism, and in particular Fine's arguments against the modal account of necessity. In Section 2 I argue that both Fine's and Husserl's accounts of necessity are best construed not as reductive but as global. In Section 3 I discuss the logical representation of essentialist propositions.

4.1   Finean Essentialism: Against the Modal Account

My main reference in this section will be Fine's *Essence and Modality* (Fine 1994a). I will go through the paper and reconstruct (and discuss) Fine's case against the modal account of essence.

Talk of 'what things are' is, according to Fine, one of the main concerns of metaphysicians. A notion of essence is operative in such talk, whose role is to distinguish the properties relevant to specifying what a given object is from all the other properties had by the object: 'For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers'. It has been attempted to cash out this notion of essence in modal terms (a tendency which is prominent in contemporary analytic philosophy, but which, says Fine, goes 'at least as far back as Aristotle'); in particular, in terms of *de re* necessity: an object x has a property F essentially if, necessarily, if x exists it has F.

The first main tenet of Finean Essentialism is that the modal account of essence is flawed. Specifically, Fine thinks that, although necessity is a

necessary condition for essentiality, it is not a sufficient one:

> My objection to the modal account will be to the sufficiency of
> the proposed criterion, not to its necessity. I accept that if an
> object essentially has a certain property then it is necessary that
> it has the property (or has the property if it exists); but I reject
> the converse. (Fine 1994a: 4)

It is important to keep this in mind in order to understand the arguments.
It is also something that Fine and Husserl have in common; that is to say,
they both think that essentialist truths are necessary. I will say more about
this in Section 2.2.

Let me review Fine's case. Consider Socrates and the set whose sole
member is Socrates (i.e., singleton Socrates). Necessarily, Socrates belongs
to singleton Socrates if he exists: for if Socrates exists then the singleton
does, and if both exist then the former belongs to the latter. Thus, according
to the modal account, Socrates essentially belongs to singleton Socrates. The
notion of essence the account should capture, however, is 'what a thing is';
and, intuitively, belonging to singleton Socrates is not part of what Socrates
is. As Fine puts it,

> Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it has never
> been suggested that in order to understand the nature of a person
> one must know to which sets he belongs. There is nothing in the
> nature of a person ... which demands that he belongs to this
> or that set or which demands, given that the person exists, that
> there even be any sets. (Fine 1994a: 5)

This particular way of constructing the argument appeals to ideal objects such as sets. But the argument itself need not. Consider Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. Necessarily, Socrates and the Eiffel Tower are distinct (if they exist); but being distinct from the Eiffel Tower is not essential to Socrates – it is not part of what Socrates is. See Fine 1994a: 5.

Fine is quite aware that the point he is trying to make is a subtle one. In particular, he is aware that his opponent might simply deny that they understand the phrase 'what a thing is' other than in modal terms, and also argue that, if the modal account is flawed, then so much the worse for essence: we can afford to be sceptical about it. Although, as Fine puts it, 'one cannot argue a conceptually blind person into recognizing a conceptual distinction, any more than one can argue a colour blind person into recognizing a colour distinction' (Fine 1994a: 5), something can still be done to bring the difference between essence and modality to the fore.

There seems to be a difference between saying that belonging to single-ton Socrates is part of what *Socrates* is, and saying that having Socrates as a member is part of what *singleton Socrates* is. The difference is that while the second essentialist claim is probably uncontroversial, the first is at least debatable. However, no corresponding modal asymmetry can be made out: for it is just as necessary that Socrates should belong to singleton Socrates (if he exists) as it is necessary that singleton Socrates should have Socrates as its sole member (see Fine 1994a: 5). Thus, for an object to have a property essentially is not simply for it to have it necessarily: because if it were, then there would be a modal asymmetry corresponding to the essentialist one. (Providing, of course, that there is an essentialist asymmetry. Fine thinks

there is, and I believe he is right.)

The modal account has yet other problems, which have to do with the logical form of *de re* essentialist attributions. I will mention three. First, take any necessary truth – a mathematical truth, for example, or the proposition that if the moon is made of cheese then the moon is made of cheese. A conditional whose consequent is a necessary truth is itself necessary. Thus, necessarily, if Socrates exists he is such that, say, there is a bijection between the primes and the naturals, or such that if the moon is made of cheese then the moon is made of cheese. But surely these properties are not part of what Socrates is (see Fine 1994a: 5). Furthermore, if the modal account is correct (in fact, even if Finean essentialism is correct), essentialist truths are among the necessary ones. Now, accept for example that the Eiffel Tower is essentially a material object (which is an essentialist truth). Then the Eiffel Tower will also be a material object necessarily. As a consequence, however, on the modal account the following truth: 'Necessarily, if Socrates exist then he is such that the Eiffel Tower is essentially a material object' will state the essence of Socrates – and so will any conditional whose antecedent is 'Socrates exists' and whose consequent is 'Socrates is such that ϕ', where ϕ is an essentialist truth about anything whatsoever. 'O happy metaphysician!', Fine comments, 'for in discovering the nature of one thing, he thereby discovers the nature of all things' (Fine 1994a: 6).

Finally, every proposition necessarily implies itself. Thus, necessarily, if Socrates exists then Socrates exists. Thus, on the modal account it is part of the essence of Socrates (in fact, of every thing) that he (it) should exist. There are two problems with this, one more obvious than the other. The

obvious problem is that very few people would be happy to accept that everything essentially exists. Not simply because very few people would be happy to accept that everything *necessarily* exists, but also because it is unclear that existence should be part of what a thing is: intuitively, once I know that the ten-pound note I have in my pocket exists, I know nothing more about its nature. This, notice, is not necessarily to say, with Kant, that existence is not a real predicate; rather, even if existence, *pace* Kant, is a real predicate, it is not part of what things are, of their essence (unless perhaps the thing is God defined as per Anselm). The not-so-obvious problem is that even if we accepted that it is part of the essence of every thing that it should exist, in this connection that would not be true in virtue of what each and every thing is, or even in virtue of what it is to be a thing, but in virtue of what *essence* is according to the modal account. Substantive questions of essence, that is, would be settled by definition – not, notice, the definition of the things involved, but the definition *of the concept of essence*. Which looks like an undesirable outcome.

Is there any way to make the modal account good, despite all these problems? According to Fine, there is none. To see this, recall the point previously made about there being an asymmetry between essentialist claims and modal claims about Socrates and singleton Socrates. It can be generalised: it seems always possible to agree on all the modal claims and yet disagree on the essentialist claims. Here is Fine's example (it is a long quote, but very effective and therefore, I think, worth reporting):

> Consider the mind-body problem. What is the relationship be-

> tween a person, his body and his mind? We can imagine two philosophers agreeing on the modal facts; they accept that a person, his body and his mind are all distinct, that it is necessary that a person have just one body and one mind and that a mind or body necessarily belong to just one person ... and so on. But all the same, they may disagree on the essential properties of persons, bodies and minds. For the one philosopher may think of the body and the mind as some kind of abstraction from a person. For him therefore it is of the essence of a body or a mind to belong to the person they belong to, though not of the essence of a person to have the body or mind that he has. The other philosopher, though, may think of a person and his mind as some kind of abstraction from the body. For him therefore it will be of the essence of a person and mind to belong to the body that they belong to, though not of the essence of a body to belong to the person or the mind. (Fine 1994a: 8)

However, if any version of the modal account were correct, it would not be possible to agree on the modal facts and yet disagree on the essentialist facts. Hence, the modal account is misguided in principle.

I should mention that Fine is not the only one to have argued against the modal account of essence. For example, Lowe – who, incidentally, endorses the Finean arguments (see Lowe 2008: 45, footnote 36; Lowe 2012: 934) – offers convincing epistemological arguments in Lowe 2008. Hale 1996 is basically an argument to the effect that if people who believe

in metaphysical necessity are to escape a certain dilemma, they have to appeal to the idea that essence accounts for necessity – and, therefore, think that essence is not reducible to necessity. Hale does not officially endorse Fine's own view; in fact, at one point he criticises it. However, as we shall see, in Hale 2002 he puts forward an account of necessity which looks very much like Fine's. Finally, Mulligan has an argument from syntax: since the alethic modal concepts can have three syntactic roles, while the concept of essentiality can only have one, at least the default view should be that essence is not a modal concept. See Mulligan 2004: 392-393. In and of itself this does not seem to be enough to warrant the claim that essence does not reduce to necessity – because after all it can be construed as a mere fact about (the English) language – but it does support it (which, incidentally, is all Mulligan demands of the argument – or so I read him).

How are we to account for essence, then? According to Fine, we should not: essence is a primitive notion. This is not explicitly stated in "Essence and Modality"; however, in another paper from 1994, "Senses of Essence", Fine says he doubts 'whether there exists an explanation of the notion in fundamentally different terms' (Fine 1994b: 53). This is also what most readers of Fine (for example, Correia; see Correia 2012: 641 and Correia 2006: 753) take his view to be – and rightly so.

In Section 2 I will review Fine's positive view that essence, far from being accountable for in terms of necessity, rather accounts for it; and I will explore the question as to whether the account is reductive.

4.2 Finean Essentialism: A Global Universal Account of Necessity

Besides the arguments I presented in Section 1, Finean essentialism includes the claim that (not only is essence irreducible to necessity, but) essence accounts for, or is the 'source' of, necessity (Fine 1994a: 8). Is Fine's position, however, that necessity *reduces* to essence?

4.2.1 Reductive, Local, and Global

There can be little doubt that Fine, at least in his philosophical papers on essence (i.e., Fine 1994a, 1994b, 1995b), does indeed take the account to be reductive. He writes, for example, that 'we should view metaphysical necessity as *a special case* of essence', and that 'the metaphyisically necessary truths can be *identified* with the propositions that are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever' (Fine 1994a: 9, my emphases). Readers of Fine have also taken the account to be reductive: see for example Correia 2006, Correia 2012 (the latter has the tell-tale title of "On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence") and Cameron 2010b. Rosen 2010, too, reads Fine as a reductionist about necessity, and states Finean Essentialism as follows: 'For it to be necessary that *p just is* for there to be some things, *X*, such that *p* holds in virtue of the natures of the *X*s' (Rosen 2010: 121, my emphasis). *Should* the account, however, be thought of as reductive?

In a more recent paper, Fine offers two reasons why Finean Essentialism should *not* be conceived as reductive. The first reason is the following.

Suppose that Finean Essentialism is true. Then the following equivalence is also true:

(A) A proposition is (metaphysically) necessary if and only if it is true in virtue of the essence of some object(s).

If the account is reductive, however, (A) will also be a correct definition of necessity. That it is, however, is doubtful: because, on the face of it, (A) is an account of the source of the proposition's truth, not of its modal status (Fine 2002: 246). This, I think, can best be seen by putting things in terms of questions and answers. (A) answers the question as to *why* necessary truths are necessary; a correct definition of necessity, however, should spell out *what* it is for a truth to be necessary – or, since necessity is a modality of truth, and thus a way truths may be, it should say *how* a truth should be if it is to be necessary. Since it is not clear that the first question (the why-question) is identical with the others (the what- and the how-question) – indeed, intuitively they are different – it is not clear that (A) is not only an account of the source of necessity (which it is), but also a correct definition of the latter.

The same, as Fine points out, is true of views that seek to reduce (logical) necessity to logical truth. On those views, the following equivalence obtains:

(B) A sentence is (logically) necessary if and only if its truth is preserved under any substitution for its non-logical constituents.

And yet it is doubtful that (logical) necessity *just is* (consists in) invariance. Necessity is a modality of truth, while invariance is a property of series of

operations performed on linguistic items (sentences). Thus, the logical account, just like the essentialist, fails to capture what necessary propositions are *as such*, because it fails to capture modal force. The latter consists in neither truth in virtue of essence nor invariance with respect to substitution.

Not only this, however. In Fine 2002 the foregoing considerations are embedded in a discussion of the following issue: are all the necessary truths and connections reducible to one single kind of necessity? If not, what are the distinct kinds of necessity? Fine's answer to the first question is 'no'. His answer to the second question is that there are at least three fundamentally distinct kinds of necessity: metaphysical (to which logical necessity should be reduced), normative, and natural. However, although these are irreducible to one another, they are still all kinds of necessity: they have something in common, namely, a distinctive modal force. This need not mean that they are all species of a common genus – call it Necessary Truth. More modestly, and borrowing from Aristotle, it may mean that necessity belongs to them analogically. But if metaphysical, normative and natural necessity all have the modal force that is distinctive of necessary propositions (this is what their being necessary consists in), then, and this is the second problem for the reductive reading of Finean Essentialism, even if metaphysical necessity were reducible to truth in virtue of essence, since truth about essence is unable to capture modal force, metaphysical necessity would turn out to have nothing whatever in common with the other types of necessity. And this is an unwelcome result. Rosen, for one, is aware of this (Rosen 2010: 121).

For these reasons, it seems best *not* to conceive of Finean Essentialism as

a reductive account of necessity. This is true even if one does not find Fine's arguments decisive: for one will have to concede, at the very least, that they present the reductive construal with serious difficulties. As a corollary, if a satisfactory non-reductionist reading of the account were available, Fineans should opt for it instead. In the remainder of this section I will show what the alternative reading may look like.

Let us begin by clearing the field of unhelpful options. One way to account for necessity seems to be to explain, for every necessity, why it obtains. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only three necessary truths: $\Box A$, $\Box B$, $\Box C$. Then an account of necessity may look as follows: '$\Box A$ because D, $\Box B$ because E, $\Box C$ because F', where D, E, F are propositions. As far as it goes, there is nothing inherently wrong with this. Notice, however, that according to the definition, the account need not be unitary. By this I mean that the account may very well be a sum of self-standing, unrelated and possibly disparate explanations of given necessities — a sum, in other words, that in principle could be a motley crew lacking any overarching criterion. Let us call accounts of necessity of this kind *local*.

It is easy to see that local accounts of necessity are in fact too minimal for present purposes. Indeed, it seems to me that a local account of necessity is not an account *of necessity* at all: because an account of necessity should say something *general* about necessity — somehow illuminate *the notion* -– not simply provide a self-standing explanation for every necessary truth. Fine, however, clearly wants to say something about necessity as such, or in general: at least prior to 2002, he even takes himself to be reducing necessity to essence! Hence, Finean Essentialism, whatever it may be, is not a local

account of necessity.

To think of the Finean account as local, then, is not a good alternative to thinking of it as reductive. There is, however, a third option: what I will call a *global* account of necessity. This is an explanation of necessity *in general* that, however, is *non-reductive*. In other words, a global account of necessity aims at illuminating the notion of necessity *without* thereby trying to reduce it to anything else. What does such an account look like?

Global accounts of necessity come in two varieties. One seeks to account for necessity in general by explaining why there are necessities at all, i.e., by explaining why there is at least a proposition A such that $\Box A$. To achieve that, we explain one given necessity and then generalise existentially on its basis. This is Bob Hale's proposal (see Hale 2002: 309). Call it a *global existential* account of necessity.

Another way of globally explaining necessity is to give a *unitary* account of every necessary truth, i.e., a unitary explanation of why every necessary truth is in fact necessary. Call this a *global universal* account. It resembles a local account in that it consists in a collection of explanations, one for every necessity. It differs from a local account, however, because it is unitary: it is not a motley crew of explanations, but a collection of explanations *all belonging to one same kind or family* (which provides the needed overarching criterion).[43] In Fine's case, the explanations are all framed in terms of essence. This, notice, is indeed how Fine does present his account: in terms, that is, of every necessity being explained by (obtaining in virtue of) an essentialist truth. It is also how Rosen recommends Fineans should

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[43]If I may put it this way: Globality = Locality + Unifying Criterion

construe their position, given that construing it as reductive is problematic:

(C) If $\Box p$ is true, then the fact that $\Box p$ is true is grounded on the fact that there are some objects X such that it is true in virtue of the X that p.

See Rosen 2010: 121. The universalist nature of the account can be made explicit as follows:

(D) For every necessary proposition $\Box p$, there is an essentialist truth α such that $\Box p$ because α.

Thus, the option is open for Fineans to think of their account of necessity as a global universal account of necessity – specifically, as one in terms of essence. This preserves the nature of the project, which is ostensibly of illuminating the notion of necessity (of saying something general and explanatory about it), but does so without being reductive. I submit that, all things considered, this is the Finean's safest option.[44]

4.2.2   Non-Transmissive Explanations of Necessity

Perhaps, however, we haven't yet considered *all* things. Here is a problem. According to the global universal reading of Finean Essentialism, the class of the necessities is explained in terms of the class of the essentialities. Fine, however, takes necessity to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for essentiality. Thus, in Finean Essentialism if A is an essentialist truth then it is also a necessary truth. Hence, the essentialities are a subclass of the necessities. But then Finean Essentialism, globally-universally construed,

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[44]In a recent book, Hale too seems to take up this option. See Hale 2013, Chapters 5,6.

would in fact explain the class of the necessities in terms of a particular sub-class of necessities. But then necessity appears to be both the explanandum and part of the explanans. Doesn't this make the account unfeasible?

Notice that Hale, with his global existential account of necessity, is in the same predicament: because for him the explanans of that one necessity he needs for the existential generalisation, and thus for globally-existentially explaining necessity, is itself a necessity. Hale, however, is aware of the difficulty, and has a convincing way out — one that I endorse and which, as I will argue, helps square Finean Essentialism as well.

But one might say: why not simply drop the claim that essentialist truths are necessary – that the essentialities are a subclass of the necessities? That would solve the problem without further ado. Things, however, are not so simple. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 1, developing work of Hale's Ross Cameron has offered a compelling argument to the effect that whatever it is that one takes to explain necessity, if one endorses or is committed to the principle that if a proposition is necessary then it is necessarily necessary:

(S4) $\Box A \rightarrow \Box\Box A$

then one is also committed to the claim that the explanans of necessity is itself necessary. This is an important result, so let me at least give an informal overview of Cameron's argument (the original version is in Cameron 2010a: 139-140).

First, developing Hale 2002, Cameron establishes that if the explanans q of an arbitrary necessity $\Box p$ is contingent, then it is possible that the

explanandum not be necessary (i.e., it is possible that $\neg\Box p$). This is done by means of two parallel arguments, differing only in that one employs a *would*-counterfactual as a premise, while the other employs a *might*-counterfactual. Here they are:

First Argument

1.	$\Box p$ because q	[Ass.]
2.	If A because B, then if it were not the case that B it would not be the case that A	[Ass.]
3.	If it were not the case that q, it would not be the case that $\Box p$	[1,2, →Elim]
4.	Possibly, it is not the case that q	[Ass.]
5.	Possibily, it is not the case that $\Box p$	[3,4]

Second Argument

1.	$\Box p$ because q	[Ass.]
2*.	If A because B, then if it were not the case that B it might not be the case that A	[Ass.]
3*.	If it were not the case that q, it might not be the case that $\Box p$	[1,2, →Elim]
4.	Possibly, it is not the case that q	[Ass.]
5.	Possibly, it is not the case that $\Box p$	[3,4]

Counterfactuals in the arguments (2,2*) are treated by Cameron in terms of D.K. Lewis' semantics (Lewis 1972); in particular, the inference from 3/3*,4 to 5 is justified with respect to that semantics. But even apart from that justification, the inference seems intuitively compelling to me. Now the point is that the conjunction of the claims that $\Box p$ because q, that possibly $\neg q$, and that possibly $\neg\Box p$ will be problematic if you are committed to the (S4). The reason is that since (S4) contraposes as

$$\neg\Box\Box p \rightarrow \neg\Box p$$

it will follow, from $\Diamond\neg\Box p$ and its consequence $\neg\Box\Box p$, that $\neg\Box p$. Thus, the conjunction of the claims above plus (S4) entails $\neg\Box p$.

As a result, if you endorse or are committed to (S4), then, you cannot allow for two of the three conjuncts. One is the conclusion of the argument, viz., the claim that possibly $\neg\Box p$. The other is one of the assumptions from which the conclusion follows, viz., the claim that possibly $\neg q$ (i.e., that $\neg\Box q$). And this is the lesson to be learnt: if q explains $\Box p$ and (S4) is true, then it must be the case that $\Box q$. Therefore, if Finean Essentialists drop the claim that essentialists truths are necessary, they will also have to drop the claim that essence explains necessity – unless they are prepared to drop (S4) as well. For most philosophers, the latter is too strong a price to pay. All the more so, because Fine's logic of essence (Fine 1995b, 2000) satisfies the S5 principle that $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box\Diamond p$, which entails (S4). Thus, if possible, Finean Essentialists should try to hang on to the claim that essentialist truths are necessary, and, as a consequence, to the claim that the essentialities are a subclass of the necessities. As for Husserl, as we saw in Chapter 2, Section 1, he endorses the S5 principle and is therefore committed to (S4). So we are back to square one: doesn't this make the Finean account unfeasible, since it seemingly entails that the explanans is part of the explanandum? As I said, however, Hale has a convincing solution – to which I now turn.

One thing, says Hale, is to explain a given necessity, $\Box A$, in terms of the fact that a further truth B necessarily obtains. Quite another thing is to explain $\Box A$ in terms of the fact that a further truth B obtains -– *regardless*

of *B*'s modal status. In the first case, *B*'s being necessary is relevant to the explanation; in the second case, it is not. In other words, the proposition that it is necessary that *A* is explained in one case by the proposition that it is necessary that *B*, while in the other case by the proposition that *B*. Hale calls accounts of the first type, in which the fact that the explanans is a necessary truth has an explanatory role, *transmissive* explanations of necessity (see Hale 2002: 309). On the other hand, an account of necessity such that the fact that the explanans is necessary is irrelevant to the explanation Hale calls a *non-transmissive* account of necessity. If a global account of necessity could be framed in terms of non-transmissive explanation, then it would turn out to be compatible with the explanans being necessary: because the explanans' being necessary will then be irrelevant for the purpose of the account.

Can a global (existential or universal) account of necessity be framed in non-transmissive terms? Let us consider Hale's global existential case first. The central idea of Hale's account is the same as that of Fine's: necessities are to be explained in terms of essentialist truths. Since Hale is interested in a global existential account, he only needs to explain one single necessity in terms of essence -– '$\Box A$ because *B*', where *B* is a given essentialist truth — and then generalise: $\exists A \Box A$ because *B*, or, perhaps more aptly, $\exists A \Box A$ because $\exists B$ such that *B* is an essentialist truth. What is important is that the first step be secured non-transmissively. The way Hale achieves the latter is the following:

> $\Box$(vixens are female foxes) *because* being a vixen just *is*, or consists

> in, being a female fox. (Hale 2002: 312)

The kinship with the Husserlian account if striking. Regardless of that, however, intuitively it makes perfect sense to say that it is necessary that vixens are female foxes because of what it (essentially) is to be a vixen. But the point of the account being non-transmissive is that, although it is necessarily true that to be a vixen is to be a female fox, this is not what explains the necessity of the proposition that all vixens are female foxes. What explains the necessity of the proposition that all vixens are female foxes is that to be a female fox is just what being a vixen is.

In this sense, the explanation does not presuppose what it seeks to explain – necessity. The same, notice, is true of the global universal construal of Finean Essentialism. According to Fine, every necessity is to be explained in terms of an essentialist truth. The latter is also necessary; but its being necessary is not what puts it in a position to ground a first necessary truth. What does put it in such a position is rather the fact that it is an essentialist truth, i.e., the fact that it spells out the essence (or, as Fine sometimes puts it, the 'identity') of the relevant object or objects. It is worth quoting Hale at length here:

> Necessities are explained by appeal to facts about the nature or identity of the things they concern. It is plausible that these facts are themselves necessary, but — or so I am claiming — the explanation does not exploit or rely on their necessity.
>
> ... Even if an explanation '□p because q' of the kind suggested [i.e., what I have been calling a global explanation, be it

existential or universal] cannot be correct unless *q* is itself necessary – so that the necessity of the explanans is in some sense presupposed –– it does not follow that it is presupposed in a relevant way, i.e., in a way that compromises the explanation. It would do so if the explanation worked by transmitting the necessity of the explanans to the explanandum, but that it does not do. (Hale 2002: 313-314)

It is an interesting question whether non-transmissiveness works in cases of reduction. Hale thinks it does not:

> The concession that an explanation of the suggested kind cannot be correct unless the explanans is itself necessary would by itself be fatal . . . if the aim were to furnish a *reductive* explanation, i.e., a general account of the source of necessity, or of how there can be such thing as necessity at all, which draws only upon premises which are not themselves true as a matter of necessity. But that was not the aim, and it is not clear how the demand for a reductive explanation could be justified. (Hale 2002: 314)

The same point is made in Hale 2013. I myself am not sure about this: after all, why should a reductive account of necessity be based on premises that are not necessary in any sense? Is it not enough to require that they should not be necessary in any *relevant* sense? Presumably, that also depends on how the very notion of reduction is cashed out – itself a hard nut to crack. Be that as it may, since I have already established on independent grounds that Finean Essentialism is best not thought of as reductive, I will leave

the question open as to whether appealing to non-transmissive explanation works in reductive cases.

I conclude that Finean Essentialism is best conceived as neither reductive nor local, but rather as a global account of necessity – in particular, as a global universal account in terms of essence containing only non-transmissive explanations of given necessities.

Let me now address some doubts one might have regarding Hale's claim, which I have endorsed, that non-transmissive explanations of necessity are compatible with their explanans being necessary. Here is an objection. Here is, however, an objection. It is against the notion of non-transmissive explanation, and therefore against both Hale's and Fine's accounts. Accept that *B* explains □*A*; i.e., accept that *B* explains the fact that *A* is necessary. Also assume that explanation is transitive (if explanation is not transitive, the objection collapses). It follows that whatever explains *B* also explains, at least partially, □*A*. Notice, moreover, that □*B* –– the fact that *B* is necessary –– explains at least partially the fact that *B* is in a position to explain □*A*. One reason is that *B* is in a position to explain □*A* because it is an essentialist truth, and – at least in Finean Essentialism – necessity is a necessary condition for essentiality – so that if *B* were contingent it would not be essentialist. Another reason is Hale's and Cameron's line of reasoning: if we endorse (S4), then the explanans of any necessity must itself be necessary. It seems to follow, against non-transmissiveness, that the fact that *B* is necessary does contribute, after all, to explaining the fact that *A* is necessary. In other words: □*B* appears to be as relevant as *B* with respect to explaining □*A*: because it is what (partially) explains the fact

that B is in a position to explain $\Box A$. If this is correct, then Hale's alleged non-transmissive explanation is, in effect, transmissive.

It seems to me, however, that even though $\Box B$ (partially) explains the fact that B is in a position to explain $\Box A$, in fact it does not contribute to explaining $\Box A$ at all. In particular, the transitivity of explanation does not warrant the claim that $\Box B$ explains, however partially, $\Box A$. Indeed, what $\Box B$ (partially) explains is not B, but the fact that B explains $\Box A$. For the transitivity of explanation, it will then also (partially) explain whatever is explained by that fact. But whatever that may be, it is not $\Box A$: for surely $\Box A$ is not explained, however, partially, by the fact that B can explain it. The objection, then, is unsound.[45]

4.2.3 Husserl's Account as Global Universal

I shall now turn to Husserl. His account of necessity, just like the Finean, and for the same reason, is best construed as non-reductive. Now, in Chapter 2 I presented the Husserlian account as, in effect, a global universal account. To see this, take (17) – or the refined

(17*) For every necessary truth $\Box A$ there is a law α such that:

(a) $\langle \Box A \rangle \lhd \langle \text{It is a law that } \alpha \rangle$, and either $A = \alpha$ or A instantiates α;

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[45]Here is a semi-formal version of the argument (I avoid talk of partial explanation, for the sake of simplicity; this, however, should be of no consequence): Let us stipulate to symbolise 'The fact that A' as $[A]$, and 'The fact that A is explained by the fact that B' as $[A] \lhd [B]$. Now suppose that $[A] \lhd [B]$ and $[B] \lhd [C]$; by the transitivity of explanation, $[A] \lhd [C]$. Now suppose that $[[A] \lhd [B]] \lhd [D]$; then, again by the transitivity of explanation, for any $[E]$ such that $[E] \lhd [[A] \lhd [B]]$ it is the case that $[E] \lhd [D]$. However, $[E] \neq [A]$: for if $[E]$ and $[A]$ were identical, then it would be the case that $[A] \lhd [[A] \lhd [B]]$ – i.e., $[A]$ would be explained by the fact that $[A]$ is explained by $[B]$. But this is absurd. Therefore, $[E] \neq [A]$. Therefore $[D]$ does not, from the sheer fact that it explains $[[A] \lhd [B]]$, also explain $[A]$.

(b) α is either a law about eide, i.e., an essentialist truth about a universal, or an eidetic law, i.e., an essentialist truth about all the possible instances or bearers of a pure universal (or about an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal); and

(c) for every α which is an eidetic law, there is a law about eide β such that $\langle$It is a law that $\alpha\rangle \lhd \langle$It is a law that $\beta\rangle$.

The account explains necessity by tracing every necessary truth back to a unitary source – in this case, to the class of the laws (eidetic or, at bottom, about eide), i.e., ultimately, to the class of the essentialist truths. But this is simply what a global universal account, at least an essentialist one, does. It is therefore possible to read the Husserlian account of necessity as a global universal one.

The notion that the Husserlian account may be local does not, in my view, deserve much attention: for, as we have seen, a local account of necessity does not illuminate the notion – it does not say anything general about it. But clearly Husserl does want to say something general about necessity.

In Chapter 2, however, I also mentioned that there may be some evidence that Husserl's intentions were, in fact, reductive. There are indeed passages that can be construed as such evidence. Sometimes Husserl seems to be stating that '*A* is necessary' and '*A* is grounded on a law' mean the same (*Prolegomena*, §63: 146; *Logik 1902/03*: 195). Other times he talks of necessity and truth on the ground of a law being 'equivalent' (*Logik 1917/18*, §43b: 220). These turns of phrase are compatible with Husserl having a

reductionist aim. I will not try to counter this interpretation. My position is simply that *if* Husserl did have a reduction in mind (which may well be the case), then he was misguided – for the same reasons as Fine was (prior to 2002). I maintain that the best, or at least the safest, way of making sense of (both Fine's and) Husserl's account is to take it (them) to be not reductive but global universal.

4.3 The Logical Representation of Essentialist Propositions

How should we represent essentialist propositions? Fineans prefer the *sentential* approach. Consider:

(38.1.1) Socrates is essentially human

(38.2.1) Socrates$_{Human}$ is essentially an animal

Fine's view is that, instead of naturally treating the adverb 'essentially' as a predicate modifier, we should reinterpret the propositions as follows:

(38.1.2) It is true in virtue of the essence of Socrates that Socrates is human

(38.2.2) It is true in virtue of the essence of Socrates$_{Human}$ that Socrates$_{Human}$ is an animal

The operator 'It is true in virtue of the essence of *a* that. . . ' is a sentential operator: it takes a sentence (e.g., 'Socrates is human') to form a sentence ('It is true in virtue of the essence of Socrates that Socrates is human').

The object *a* must be mentioned in the sentence which is plugged into the operator. Incidentally, pluralities of objects are admissible (for discussion, see Correia 2012). Fine represents the essentialist operator as '$\Box_a$'. Thus (interpreting constants and predicate letters in the natural way):

(38.1.3) $\Box_s H(s)$

(38.2.3) $\Box_{s_{Human}} A(s_{Human})$

The sentential approach has the advantage of making explicit what essence it is that the proposition states – or, in Fine's terms, what essence it is that makes the proposition true. This is especially important when it comes to relations. Consider:

(38.3.1) Socrates essentially belongs to singleton Socrates

As we know from Section 1, (38.3.1) states the essence of the singleton, not Socrates'. This, however, cannot be read off the proposition itself: it must be inferred. With Fine's symbolism, however, the inconvenience disappears:

(38.3.2) $\Box_{\{s\}} s \in \{s\}$

Practical as the sentential approach may be, however, I will not adopt it. One reason is that, for the sake of simplicity, I will mostly disregard relational universals – so that the main advantage of the approach disappears. A second, more important reason is that since my main theme is the relationship between essence and predication, it will be best for me to work with a representation of essentialist propositions that brings predication to the fore – i.e., with a *predicational* approach – rather than introducing an ad hoc sentential operator.

A third reason is that everything the sentential approach accomplishes can be accomplished just as well by the predicational approach. This treats 'essentially' in (38.1.1) and (38.2.1) as a predicate modifier (which is probably its natural reading). Let us stipulate to represent the modification by appending a subscript 'e' (for 'essentially') to the predicate. Thus:

(38.1.3) $H_e(s)$

(38.2.3) $A_e(s_{Human})$

Recall now what the distinctive advantage of the sentential approach is: that it explicitly mentions what object it is whose essence every given proposition states. But this is easily done on the predicational approach: it is enough to append a superscript to the predicate specifying the object. Thus:

(38.3.3) $s \in_e^{\{s\}} \{s\}$

In case the relevant essentialist proposition is an eidetic law such as

(38.4.1) Every possible human is essentially an animal

which states the essence of every possible human, the superscript will look as follows:

(38.4.2) $\forall x(H(x) \rightarrow A_e^{x:H(x)}(x))$

Only bound variables should be admissible in essentialist superscripts.

This is the general idea of the predicational approach. It is not, however, the version I will endorse: because as it stands it cannot represent laws about eide such as

(38.5.1) To be human is to be an animal

One problem is that the usual notation for predication – e.g. *F(a)* – is uniformly read in terms of instantiation-based predication: *F(a)* if and only if *a* instantiates (or bears) *F*, or *a* is in the extension of *F* (or in the class of the *F*s), or *a* can be subsumed under the concept *F*. This, however, is false of (38.5.1) and laws about eide in general: for, as we know from Chapter 3, Section 3, in laws about eide predication is not instantiation-based. Thus, a different notation is needed. Also because, as we know from Chapter 3, Section 2, infinitive verbal clauses (such as 'to be human') denote universals rather than attributing them; so that 'to be an animal' in (38.5.1), although it is predicated of 'to be human', is not attributed to it. But attributing universals is just what predicate letters do. Thus, predication in (38.5.1) should not be represented in the usual way.

On the basis of Bealer 1982, I propose the following notation. Let (non-logical) constants a, b, c denote particulars, (non-logical) constants v, u, w denote universals *as objects*, and (non-logical) constants $\bar{v}, \bar{u}, \bar{w}$ denote universals *in their determining capacity*.[46] (So 'u' should be read 'eidos u', while '$\bar{u}$' should be read 'to be (a) u' or 'to u'.) Let 'Δ' express the two-place predication relation (expressed by the copula in natural languages).[47] Δ may be

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[46]Notice that both u, v, w and $\bar{u}, \bar{v}, \bar{w}$ are *first-order* constants. Even though it is unusual to represent universals by first-order constants, it is possible – and indeed recommendable if, as is the case in Husserl, universals (properties and relations) are not construed as functions (or, in general, in set-theoretic terms) but rather as genuine, *sui generis* objects.

[47]Introducing the predication relation into a first-order language, such as Bealer's $\mathcal{L}_\omega$, leads to paradoxes and incompleteness; see Bealer 1982: 95. This, however, can be avoided by replacing the naive principle of predication: 'For any formula $x \Delta y$, $x \Delta y$ if and only if x is in the extension of y', which gives rise to the paradoxes, with restricted principles of predication. These are restricted in the same sense as the ZF and the GBN comprehension principles are with respect to the naive comprehension principle for sets. See Bealer

flanked by any constant (or variable) whatsoever on its left side, but only by constants denoting universals (either as objects or in their determining capacity), or of course variables, on its right side. Thus, '$a \Delta u$' is well formed, but '$a \Delta b$' is not (as particulars may not be predicated of anything).

Let also variables x, y, z range over either particulars or universals considered as objects.[48] If in a given proposition the universal denoted by a variable is to be considered not as an object but in its determining capacity, the variable will be written: $\bar{x}, \bar{y}, \bar{z}$. So that 'There is an eidos • such that to be human is to be •' will not be represented as '$\exists x(\overline{Human} \Delta x)$', but as '$\exists x(\overline{Human} \Delta \bar{x})$'. Finally, if a predication is essentialist, the predicational essentialist symbolism I set up earlier applies. For example, if 'a is u' is represented as '$a \Delta u$', 'a is essentially u' is represented as '$a \Delta_e u$'. Specifically, if s is Socrates, u is eidos Human and v eidos Animal:

(38.1.4) $s \Delta_e u$

(38.2.4) $s_u \Delta_e v$

(38.4.3) $\forall x((x \Delta u) \rightarrow (x \Delta_e v))$

Here is a table with logical representations on the left and natural propositions (with constants instead of English terms) on the right:

1982: 97. So regulated, first-order languages with the predication relation are sound and complete. Soundness and completeness proofs for Bealer's $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ may be found in Bealer 1982: 58-68. At present I have no idea whether $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ with Δ and Δ_e is also sound and complete (by which I mean that I conjecture that it is, but have not worked out a proof yet).

[48]Notice that x, y, z are first-order variables. What I pointed out for constants also applies to variables.

1. $a \, \Delta \, u \quad \longrightarrow \quad a$ is u

2. $a \, \Delta_e \, u \quad \longrightarrow \quad a$ is essentially u

3. $a_u \, \Delta_e \, v \quad \longrightarrow \quad a_u$ is essentially v

4. $u \, \Delta \, v \quad \longrightarrow \quad$ Eidos u is v

5. $u \, \Delta_e \, v \quad \longrightarrow \quad$ Eidos u is essentially v

6. $u_v \, \Delta_e \, w \quad \longrightarrow \quad$ Eidos u_v is essentially w

7. $\overline{u} \, \Delta \, \overline{v} \quad \longrightarrow \quad$ To be u is to be v

8. $\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v} \quad \longrightarrow \quad$ To be u is essentially to be v

Notice that 2 and 5 are admissible in the Finean environment but not in the Husserlian, as they state the essence of objects simpliciter, not of objects-cum-universals. Also notice that – stipulating that 'U, V' are predicate letters expressing attributively (not denotatively) eide u, v – 1 and 4 are equivalent to '$U(a)$' and '$V(u)$'.

Notice further that in the intended reading 7 and 8 are equivalent. The first, however, as I showed in Chapter 3, Section 3, also admits of non-essentialist readings. In order to avoid confusion, henceforth I will represent laws about eide as involving explicit essentialist predication, i.e., 'Δ_e' (as opposed to 'Δ').

Finally, in Chapter 6 we shall see that in Husserl's theory of predication a considerable importance is attached to the copula. This is one more reason to logically represent predication, in the Husserlian framework, with the Δ-notation.

4.4   Summary

This chapter was about Finean essentialism. First, I presented and discussed Fine's arguments against the modal account of essence, and claimed that they strengthen the Husserlian picture in that, unlike Husserl's argument from lawhood, they straightforwardly apply to all types of essentialist truths (not just to the pure general and the pure universal).

Second, I argued that both the Finean and the Husserlian essentialist accounts of necessity are best construed as global universal; and, by appealing to Hale's concept of non-transmissive explanation, that they are compatible with necessity being a necessary condition for essentiality (i.e., with the fact that the class of the essentialities is a subclass of the class of the necessities).

Finally, I proposed an (unorthodox) symbolic notation for essentialist truths based on Bealer's Δ-notation for predication, on the ground that it is more convenient for my purposes than Fine's $\square$-notation. In the following chapters I will adopt the Δ-notation.

In the next chapter I will defend the view that there are two irreducible concepts of essence: the objectual, which is instantiation-based, and the infinitive, which is not. Laws about eide, so I will suggest, state the infinitive, not the objectual essence of eide. In Chapter 6 I will embed infinitive essence into a Husserlian (or at least a Husserl-friendly) phenomenological theory of non-instantiation-based predication.

Chapter 5

Infinitive Essence

Accept that propositions of forms '$a \, \Delta_e \, u$', '$a_u \, \Delta_e \, u$', '$\forall x((x \, \Delta \, u) \rightarrow (x \, \Delta_e \, v))$', and '$\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v}$' state essences.[49] For example:

(39.1) Socrates is essentially human

(39.2) Socrates$_{\text{human}}$ is essentially an animal

(39.3) Every possible human is essentially an animal

(39.4) To be human is essentially to be an animal

In this chapter I defend the view that the essences stated by (39.1)-(39.3) on the one hand, and by (39.4) on the other, are different *in kind*. The former are cases of *objectual* essence, the latter of *infinitive* essence. In Section 1 I explain the distinction on the basis of the findings of the previous chapters; in Section 2 I reject a number of attempts at reducing one notion to the

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[49] As I said at the end of Chapter 4, I will henceforth adopt the symbolism introduced in that chapter (Section 3). In particular, I will represent predications by means of the Δ-notation and denote universals with the first-order constants u, v, w and $\overline{u}, \overline{v}, \overline{w}$.

other. With respect to the narrative of this Thesis, the reason why the view is worth defending is that if it can be made good, it provides a case for non-instantiation-based essence – the first step in revisiting the Husserlian picture and solving the problem I raised for it in Chapter 3. I will elaborate on this in Section 4, after the view has been laid out in its entirety.

Part of the view is also that, while every object has an objectual essence, it is only universals that have infinitive essences. This entails, among other things, that universals have both objectual and infinitive essences. In Section 3 I defend such a claim against three challenging arguments.

5.1 Objectual and Infinitive Essence

In order to draw the distinction between objectual and infinitive essence as neatly as possible, I propose to do so in set-theoretic terms. Accordingly, I will define two families of sets, one intended to capture objectual essence, the other intended to capture infinitive essence. Objectual essence, it will appear, is just instantiation-based essence, i.e., the notion of essence we have been working with so far. To such an extent, the set-theoretic definition of the objectual-essentialist sets is just a regimentation of something we are already well acquainted with. The definition of the infinitive-essentialist sets, on the other hand, fixes the notion for the first time. I think it does so in a sufficiently clear fashion. In the rest of the chapter, I will show why we should accept the notion thus defined.

For every object x there is a set of universals that x instantiates (or bears). Call that set $\mathcal{U}^x$. The universals that, according to essentialist propositions

like (39.1), are part of the essence of x are also instantiated (or borne) by x, and thus belong to $\mathcal{U}^x$. So that if we agree to call $\mathcal{E}_o^x$ the set of the universals essential to x (i.e., the essence of x), $\mathcal{E}_o^x$ is a subset of $\mathcal{U}^x$:

$$\mathcal{E}_o^x \subset \mathcal{U}^x$$

For every object x, there is a set $\mathcal{E}_o^x$ – a subset of the set $\mathcal{U}^x$ of all the universals instantiated by x – that is the *objectual essence* of x (hence subscript 'o').

Notice that, both on the face of it and in Husserl's view, universals too instantiate universals; and some of the universals that a given universal instantiates are also essential to it.[50] For example, the universal Human is a universal, an ideal object, a species of the universal Animal, a material universal, etc. – in fact, it is essentially all these things. Thus, for every universal u there is a set $\mathcal{E}_o^u$, subset of $\mathcal{U}^u$, that is the objectual essence of u.

There is an issue as to whether, in the case of universals, objectual essences are *improper* subsets of $\mathcal{U}^u$-sets. That is to say: do universals instantiate universals that, however, are not essential to them? I will leave this as an open question, and assume, for the sake of uniformity, that the objectual essences of universals are *proper* subsets of the set of all the universals that a given one instantiates – just as is the case with particulars. As far as I can see, however, nothing crucial hinges on this.

As we know, for Husserl (though not e.g. for Fine) it is not objects simpliciter that have essences, but objects as instances or bearers of given universals. As far as objectual essence goes, this simply means that, instead of speaking of $\mathcal{E}_o^x$-sets, we should rather speak of $\mathcal{E}_o^{x_u}$-sets, which – as their

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[50]Since it is not clear that universals have moments, i.e., non-independent parts, I will assume that they instantiate *but do not bear* universals.

superscript x_u reveals – are relative not to objects x (particular or universal), but to objects-cum-universals x_u. (Should we need to quantify over the relevant universals, we would write 'x_y', and thus refer to the sets as $\mathcal{E}_o^{x_y}$.[51])

Now consider essentialist propositions such as (39.4). They place universals in the essence of universals; for example, Animal in the essence of Human. Human, however, does *not* instantiate Animal. Assume that for every universal u there is a set of universals $v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_n$ essential to u and which, however, u does not instantiate, and call that set $\mathcal{E}_i^u$. Clearly, $\mathcal{E}_i^u$ is distinct from the objectual essence $\mathcal{E}_o^u$ of u:

$$\mathcal{E}_i^u \neq \mathcal{E}_o^u$$

because, unlike $\mathcal{E}_o^u$, $\mathcal{E}_i^u$ is *not* a subset of $\mathcal{U}^u$:

$$\mathcal{E}_i^u \not\subseteq \mathcal{U}^u$$

Indeed, the two are disjoint: for a universal v to be in $\mathcal{E}_i^u$, u must not instantiate it; whereas for v to be in $\mathcal{E}_o^u$, u must instantiate it. Therefore, no universal can be in both sets.

For every *universal* x, the set $\mathcal{E}_i^x$, which is *not* a subset of $\mathcal{U}^x$ (i.e., of the set of all the universals instantiated by x) and is therefore distinct from $\mathcal{E}_o^x$, is the *infinitive essence* of x (hence subscript 'i'). The claim is thus that propositions such as (39.4), if they are to be construed as essentialist, must be understood as spelling out the infinitive essence of universals. Accepting that universals have infinitive essences as just defined, in other words, is required in order to read propositions such as (39.4) as essentialist: because,

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[51]E.g.: For every entity x there is a universal y and there is a universal z such that x_y is objectual-essentially z.

as my arguments in Chapter 3 have shown, those propositions cannot state instantiation-based (i.e., objectual) essences. One of the main tasks of this chapter is to show that appealing to infinitive essence is not a mere *ad hoc* solution, but has its own, independent plausibility.

Let me now qualify the claim more fully. Not only am I suggesting that universals have infinitive essences, but I am also assuming that *only* universals have infinitive essences. That, however, is plausible enough – all the more so because, as I will argue in Section 2.2, seeming counterexamples (such as 'To be Socrates is to be an animal', which appears to be an infinitive essentialist proposition about a particular) are in fact objectual essentialist propositions. I will also assume that universals have *both* objectual and infinitive essences; in Section 3 I will defend this view. Finally, since the fact that, say, eidos Human instantiates eidos Ideal Object (or, indeed, any other eidos) seems irrelevant to the fact that, say, to be human is to be an animal, I take it that it is not universals-cum-universals that have infinitive essences, but universals simpliciter. Thus, there will be $\mathcal{E}_i^u$-sets, but not $\mathcal{E}_o^{u_v}$-sets.

My distinction between objectual and infinitive essence is inspired by Correia's distinction between *objectual* and *generic* essence, introduced and developed in Correia 2006. The two distinctions, however, are not identical – and not as a matter of detail: they are drawn in profoundly different ways. Correia's way is the following. He takes the distinction between 'objects', by which he means particulars, and 'ways of being', by which (as far as I can tell) he means properties nominalistically construed, to induce, in and of itself, a distinction between kinds of essence: objectual essence is the essence of objects, while generic essence is the essence of ways of being. In

his words:

> Let me sort the essentialist statements into the *objectual* and the
> *generic*. An objectual [essentialist] statement is one which states
> that a given object is by its very nature so and so, and a generic
> [essentialist] statement is one which states that to be thus and
> thus is to be so and so. . . .
>
> The objectual-generic distinction parallels the subject-predicate
> distinction, and as it were embodies it in the realm of essence.
> For the function of objectual [essentialist] statements is to de-
> scribe the nature of what subjects designate, namely *things*; and
> generic essentialist statements aim at describing the essential
> features of what predicates express, namely *ways of being*. (Cor-
> reia 2006: 754)

As we shall see, this construal of the distinction allows Correia to make
claims that my own distinction does not support (in fact, forbids). One is
the claim that objectual essence reduces to generic (infinitive) essence; the
other is the claim that it is not universals, but ways of being, that have
generic (infinitive) essences. I will address the former claim is Section 2.2,
and the latter in Section 3.

Correia's distinction, however, has problems of its own. One is that
being a 'thing' – i.e., a particular – is not a necessary condition for having an
objectual essence: *prima facie*, universals too have objectual essences, and so
do many other ideal objects, such as sets, numbers and propositions. True,
Correia seems to think that at least universals have no objectual essences;

however, I will consider and refute that view in Section 3. But even if he were right, his view would still leave other ideal objects unaccounted for. Apart from that, however, it seems to me that if one admits universals (and other ideal objects) in one's ontology, then the default position should be that they do have objectual essences – against Correia's construal of the notion. If one does not admit universals in one's ontology, then the question as to whether they have an objectual essence is not so interesting to begin with.

The second problem is that being what a predicate expresses is not a necessary condition for having a generic essence – at least if 'predicate' is understood, as Correia clearly does, in opposition to 'subject'. Take Correia's paradigm generic essentialist statement, 'To be thus and thus is to be so and so'. It states the essence of what 'to be thus and thus' denotes. But in the statement, 'to be thus and thus' functions as *subject*, not as predicate. And yet it is *its* generic essence that the statement is supposed to spell out. (Of course 'to be thus and thus' is, according to the terminology of Chapter 3, a subjectless predicate, and thus, a fortiori, a predicate. Subjectless predicates, however, cannot be characterised in opposition to subjects – for they too can be subjects. Linguists, on the other hand, would not call 'to be thus and thus' a subjectless predicate at all, but simply an infinitive verbal phrase.)

For these reasons, I find Correia's own distinction unsatisfactory. There is also a terminological issue. Although in the quoted passage he deploys propositions and verbal phrases of what in my view is the right form – 'To be a u is to be a v' and the like – in the remainder of the paper he lapses

into using generics, such as 'An *F*, as such, essentially *G*s'. That, I take it, is why he calls the essence they (allegedly) state 'generic'. This, however, is just the generic approach I rejected in Chapter 3. And that is also why I prefer the phrase 'infinitive essence'.

5.2 Reductions and their Failure

In this section I reject two views: first, that infinitive essence reduces to objectual essence (Section 2.1); second, that objectual essence reduces to infinitive essence (Section 2.2). With respect to generic essence, Correia agrees on the first, but not on the second issue.

5.2.1 Infinitive to Objectual

One way to address the first issue – viz., whether infinitive essence reduces to objectual essence – is to see whether infinitive essentialist propositions can be successfully paraphrased as objectual essentialist propositions. If they can, then it is plausible to think that infinitive essence reduces to objectual essence. I shall examine four reductionist attempts and find them wanting. Since none other comes to mind, I shall take it that infinitive essence does not reduce to objectual essence. On this score, I and Correia agree – *mutatis mutandis*. Indeed, I will mostly base my discussion on Correia's – though I shall deploy infinitive essentialist versions of his own (generic essentialist) arguments. The target proposition (the one to be paraphrased) is:

(40) To be a u is essentially to be a v

Modality

I said I would examine four attempts at reducing infinitive to objectual essence. In fact, the first attempt is more radical than that, because it is framed not in terms of objectual essence, but in terms of sheer necessity. It is, in effect, an analogue of the modal account of objectual essence, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 1. The idea is that (40) should be understood as meaning:

(40.1) Necessarily, everything that is a u is also a v

The account suffers from the same sort of difficulties as its modal-objectual counterpart. Incidentally, this is one reason why in Chapter 4 I said that knowledge of the basics of Finean essentialism would be needed here.

It is uncontroversial (at least in the Husserlian and the Finean environments) that (40) entails (41.1). The converse, however, does not hold. Consider, says Correia, the necessary truth that every cat is either loved by Socrates or not. Surely, however, it is false that to be a cat is essentially to be either loved by Socrates or not. Moreover: necessarily, every cat belongs to its singleton set; my cat Maria Pocchiola, for example, belongs to the set {Maria Pocchiola}. It is clearly false, however, that to be a cat is essentially to belong to a set. Thus, the modal account of (40) is flawed. For further discussion, see Correia 2006: 757-758.

Modality + objectual essence

The second proposal supplements necessity with objectual essence:

(41.2) Necessarily, everything that is a u is also essentially a v

This rules out the problematic cases above. The account, however, has become too strict, as (40) does not entail (41.2): to be a bachelor is essentially to be unmarried; it is false, however, that necessarily every man who is a bachelor is essentially unmarried.

Modality + objectual essence + qua

Proponents of the previous account may hold their ground by saying something like this: 'Of course no man who is a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But that is just an uncharitable reading of the proposal. The correct reading is rather the following: every man who is a bachelor, considered as a bachelor, is essentially unmarried'. Thus:

(41.3) Necessarily, everything that is a *u*, *qua u* is essentially a *v*

Notice the similarity with statements of Husserlian essence and, in fact, with eidetic laws. It is a tell-tale similarity: surely there is a connection, at least in the Husserlian picture, between infinitive essentialist propositions (laws about eide) and statements of Husserlian essences, i.e, propositions stating the essence not of objects simpliciter, but of objects *qua* instances (or bearers) of universals. But the connection, which is an explanatory one, goes, in the Husserlian picture, from infinitive essentialist propositions to objectual essentialist propositions – not the other way round. In other words, it is *because* to be a bachelor is to be unmarried that every man who is a bachelor, *qua* bachelor is essentially unmarried – not the converse. This is true for Husserl, but also for Correia. As he puts it:

> The account arguably turns things upside down. By the proposed account, the fact that [to be a bachelor is essentially to

be unmarried] consists in, and so is explained by, the fact that necessarily, for every x, x-qua-bachelor is essentially unmarried. But intuitively, explanation goes the other way around: it is because bachelorhood attaches to the feature of being unmarried by virtue of what it is to be a bachelor that necessarily, qua-bachelor objects ... are essentially unmarried.[52] (Correia 2006: 760)

Objectual essence of universals

Finally, it could be proposed that (40) be accounted for in terms of the *objectual* essence of universals u and v. Correia's arguments against this proposal – the same arguments I will discuss in Section 3 – aim at showing that if one takes generic essentialist propositions to state the essence of *universals* (he calls the latter 'properties' or 'reified ways of being'), then one faces fatal difficulties. In this sense, for Correia the problem for the reduction is not that the generic essence of ways of being cannot be thought of as the objectual essence of the corresponding universals, but rather that the combination of the view that ways of being have generic essences and the view that ways of being are objects in their own right (i.e., universals) is highly problematic and should not be endorsed. Since that conjunctive view, or at least its infinitive-essentialist counterpart, is precisely the one I wish to defend, it is not surprising that I should not endorse Correia's arguments against the objectual essentialist reduction. I will rather put forward my own argument, as follows.

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[52] In square brackets: I have replaced Correia's generic essentialist turn of phrase with an infinitive essentialist one.

By definition, while the objectual essence of an object is constituted by universals that the latter instantiates, the infinitive essence of an object (a universal) is constituted by universals that the object (the universal) does *not* instantiate.[53] Now, if this is true, then there is no way in which the infinitive essence of a given universal *u* can be reduced to *u*'s objectual essence: as I showed in Section 1, the two are simply and utterly distinct. At most, one can deny that there is any such thing as infinitive essence (but then how would one account for laws about eide and, in general, for propositions of form (39.4) – providing all the other reductive accounts fail?). But if one agrees that talk of infinitive essence makes sense, then by the latter's definition the present reduction does not even get off the ground. And notice that the definition of infinitive essence I gave in Section 1 is not just 'a definition' of infinitive essence, but rather, I submit, the *only* definition that captures the notion adequately.

5.2.2 Objectual to Infinitive

Even though infinitive essence cannot be reduced to objectual essence, one might think that the converse is true (or at least plausible). Correia, for one, finds the view 'appealing' (Correia 2006: 764). I do not, and will now say why.

The view itself is quite simple. If we accept so-called *haecceities*, i.e., properties expressed by phrases like *to be Socrates*, *to be Husserl*, etc., we will be in a position to say, for example, that

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[53]Incidentally, the arguments I gave in Chapter 3, Section 3, against the competitors of the infinitive account of laws about eide support this claim.

(42) To be Socrates is essentially to be an animal

which on the face of it is an infinitive essentialist proposition, as opposed to the objectual essentialist

(43) Socrates is essentially an animal

But it seems that everything that (43) accomplishes can be accomplished just as well by (42). Why, then, not discard the former and only keep the latter – if only for considerations of parsimony?

One problem is that, in order to do so, one has to accept haecceities. But in my view this is a minor issue: I can see no reason why there should be no place for haecceities in the Husserlian framework (which does not mean that Husserl countenanced them; in fact, I conjecture, he did not).[54] The *real* problem is rather that (42) is not a genuine infinitive essentialist proposition (though it may well be a genuine *generic* essentialist proposition: Correia's definition does not rule that out – and this is why he can find the proposal appealing). Recall that the distinctive trait of infinitive essence is that the universals in the infinitive essence of a universal u are not instantiated by u. Such is the case in, say, 'To be human is to be an animal' (as the universal Human is not an animal). It is however not the case in (42): because Socrates *does* instantiate the universal Animal (as he is an animal). Thus (42) is, in effect, an objectual essentialist proposition in disguise. So even if we accepted haecceities, they would serve no reductionist purpose. I can

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[54]Traditionally, the main motivation for accepting haecceities is that they individuate their instances, and thus allow one to avoid appealing, in explaining individuation, to problematic concepts such as matter. Husserl, however, for better or for worse, thought that spatiotemporal location is what individuates particulars. So I fail to see why he would feel haecceities were needed in the first place.

see no other way in which objectual essence might be thought to reduce to infinitive essence; therefore, I shall assume that there is no such reduction.

5.3 The Essence of Universals

My view is that universals have both infinitive and objectual essences. Correia's overall view, on the other hand, seems to be that universals have no essence at all. He certainly thinks they have no generic essence, for two sets of reasons. First, because generic essence is, by Correia's definition, the essence of non-reified ways of being; so that universals, which for him are just reified ways of being (he calls them 'properties'), cannot have generic essences. Second, because that is what three arguments he offers – Commitment to Properties, Availability, Dependency – allegedly prove. Correia also seems to think that these arguments entail that universals have no objectual essences either: for the declared aim of their deployment is to counter attempts at reducing generic essences of ways of being to objectual essences of universals (properties). Now Correia's arguments *per se* are no concern of mine: because they are about generic, not infinitive essence. There are, however, infinitive essentialist versions of those arguments, which do challenge my own view. In this section, parts 1, 2, and 3, I discuss and refute them. In part 4 I examine the claim that universals have no objectual essences, and in particular I explore the question as to whether it is entailed by Correia's three arguments, and whether, in general, we should buy it.

Before I do so, however, let me elaborate on the first reason that, as

I mentioned, Correia has to reject the view that it is universals, and not ways of being, that have generic essences. The reason is, again, that generic essence is defined right from the outset as the essence of ways of being *as opposed* to the essence of objects. So that Correia never considers the view that objects – specifically, universals (properties) – may have generic essences. True, for Correia 'objects' are particulars. However, while presenting the last reductionist attempt (generic essence to the objectual essence of properties), he does admit that the notion of object can be so broadened as to apply to universals as well. Thus expanded, his and my notions of object seem to be at least extensionally equivalent. Now, I have nothing against the claim that objects are simply not the kind of thing that could have *generic* essences. My point, however, is that the claim has no *infinitive* essentialist counterpart. The reason is that, according to Section 1, it simply *is* objects – specifically, universals – that have infinitive essences; which, on the other hand, is as it should be in the Husserlian environment, which has no room for Correia's ontologically mysterious ways of being.

Having said that, if the infinitive essentialist versions of Correia's three arguments are sound, they prove that the specific view that universals have infinitive essences is flawed (or at the very least that it faces serious difficulties); and that, as a consequence, one should be wary of accepting my definition of infinitive essence. I will now defend both the view and the definition, by refuting Correia's arguments (or, better, their infinitive essentialist versions) one by one.

5.3.1 Commitment to Properties

The argument is as follows. The view that infinitive essences are the essences of universals puts ontological commitments on infinitive essentialist propositions that, however, the latter do not appear to have in and of themselves: for a proposition such as 'To be human is essentially to be an animal' is not, on the face of it, committed to the existence of the universal Human (or Animal). If the commitment is to be put on the proposition, it must be for independent reasons. But, says Correia, there are no such independent reasons: 'The view that, despite appearances, [infinitive] essentialist statements do carry commitments to properties . . . should be resisted as far as possible' (Correia 2006: 761). Therefore, the view that infinitive essences are the essences of universals should be discarded.

My response is as follows. I agree that infinitive essentialist propositions, in and of themselves, are not committed to the existence of universals. However, I contest the claim that there are no independent reasons to put on them such commitment. One can only agree with that claim if one is biased towards nominalism about universals in the first place, or, to put it more mildly, if one has nominalistic scruples of some sort. But no one says one should have such scruples. In the present, Husserlian context, in particular, one should *not*. The reason is that, in the Husserlian environment, predication is understood in terms of the instantiation of universals (in Ch. 6 I will try to modify the picture, but universals will still figure in it); essence, too, is understood in terms of universals; and the whole of Husserl's semantics is, in general, imbued with reference to

universals.

The first of Correia's arguments, then, boils down to whether one should accept universals in one's ontology. Husserl does; and, in general, the issue as to whether one should is far from settled in one sense or the other: I know of no knock-down argument against universals in the literature. Therefore, Commitment to Properties has simply no bite on its target view – especially if the latter is embedded in the Husserlian framework. To be fair, Correia knows perfectly well that Commitment to Properties is nowhere near decisive (Correia 2006: 761), and rather relies on Availability and Dependency – to which I now turn.

5.3.2 Availability

The argument is the following. There are true infinitive essentialist propositions to which, however, no universals correspond, because there are no universals that the relevant infinitive verbal phrases could denote. Take, for example, the proposition:

(44) To be a non-self-exemplifying property is to be an ideal object

Assume: a) that (44) is true; and b) that the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property does not exist – for, as we saw in Chapter 1, Section 4.3, if the existence of that property is admitted, a version of Russell's antinomy follows.[55] Now the argument is simply that the conjunction of premise a and premise b is incompatible with the claim that

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[55]Is the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property self-exemplifying? If it is self-exemplifying, then it is a non-self-exemplifying property, and thus it is not self-exemplifying: contradiction. On the other hand, if it is not self-exemplifying, then it is a non-self-exemplifying property, and it is thus self-exemplifying: contradiction.

(44) states the essence of the property (the universal) denoted by 'to be a non-self-exemplifying property', i.e., of the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property. Because, on the one hand, there is no such property; and, on the other, (44) is true. Therefore, (44) does state an infinitive essence, but *not* of the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property. Correia's view is that it states the infinitive (generic) essence of the *way of being* 'to be a non-self-exemplifying property', which differs from the corresponding property in that it does not exist (as ways of being as such, at least as Correia construes the notion, do not exist).

My response is that premise a, i.e., the claim that (44) is true, is false; and that, as a consequence, the argument, though valid, is unsound.

Why think that (44) is true? The main reason, I submit, is that the following is true:

(45) Every non-self-exemplifying property is essentially an ideal object

The thought, then, is that the truth of (45) (which I do not question) grants, somehow, the truth of (44). How exactly? Minimally, for the truth (45) to guarantee the truth of (44), there must be an entailment from the former proposition to the latter. As far as I can see, however, there are only two reasons to think that there is such entailment, and none of them is compelling.

One reason is that there is a general principle to the effect that instances of universal propositions 'Every u is a v' entail instances of infinitival propositions 'To be a u is to be a v'– call the latter the *infinitival counterparts* of the former. If there is such a principle, then of course it applies to (44)-(45); and

since (45) is true, (44) will also be. It seems to me, however, that the principle does not hold. To see this, consider the following pairs of propositions:

> To be a cat is to belong to a set
>
> Every cat belongs to a set

> To be a Londoner is to be distinct from the Eiffel Tower
>
> Every Londoner is distinct from the Eiffel Tower

> To be a cat is to be coloured
>
> Every cat is coloured

All the second propositions, but none of the first, are true. For belonging to a set has nothing to do with what it is to be a cat, nor has being distinct from the Eiffel Tower anything to do with what it is to be a Londoner, nor being coloured with what it is to be a cat. These, I submit, are counterexamples to the alleged principle.

This, of course, does not rule out that there may be pairs of propositions such that one of them is a universal truth that entails its infinitival counterpart. The following pair

> To be human is to be an animal
>
> Every human is an animal

is a case in point. Thus, although (45) cannot be said to entail (44) in virtue of some general principle, it might be said to do so for specific reasons. The best reason I can think of is the following. (45) — unlike, notice, any of the counterexamples above – is a universal *essentialist* truth. In particular,

it is an eidetic law. As such, according to Husserlian essentialism, it is grounded on a law about eide. It is just natural to think that such a law is the infinitival counterpart of (44), i.e., (45) – just as, in the last pair, the eidetic law 'Every human is essentially an animal' is grounded on its own infinitival counterpart, the law about eide 'To be human is essentially to be an animal'. This may suggest a version of the general principle discussed above *restricted* to pairs {eidetic law, law about eide}. But the main point is that if (44) is the ground of (45), and (45) is true, then (44) must also be true. I will now argue that (44) is not the ground of (45), and that, as a consequence, there is no reason to think that the former is true because the latter is. If my argument is sound, it will also establish a counterexample to the restricted version of the principle – to the effect that, even though every eidetic law is grounded on a law about eide, the latter need not be the infinitival counterpart of the former.

Now, (45) is indeed both an eidetic law and, as such, grounded on a law about eide (on an infinitive essentialist proposition); but the thought that the relevant law about eide (the relevant infinitive essentialist proposition) is (44), natural as it may be, does not stand scrutiny. I submit that there are other, more plausible candidates to the role of ground of (45). To see what those candidates may be, notice that although it is true that every non-self-exemplifying property is essentially an ideal object, the fact that the property is non-self-exemplifying is *irrelevant* to its being essentially an ideal object. What counts is that the property is a property. Following the Finean criticism of the modal account of (objectual) essence, we have learnt to be suspicious of essentialist claims that involve irrelevant attributions.

(Yet another reason why it was worth making the acquaintance of Finean essentialism in Chapter 4.) It is thus more plausible to think that (45) is, in fact, grounded (not on (44) but) on

(46) To be *a property* is to be an ideal object

If, however, it is in fact (46), and not (44), that grounds (45), the truth of (45) is no guarantee of the truth of (44): the former can very well be true without the latter being true. There is thus no need for one to hold premise a – i.e., the claim that (44) is true – to be true.

Similar considerations dispose of other, slightly more problematic infinitive essentialist propositions, such as:

(47) To be a non-self-exemplifying property is to be an non-self-exemplifying property

I say that (47) is more problematic than (44) because, unlike in the latter's case, it seems as though it *had* to be grounded on an infinitive essentialist propositions about *the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property* (and not, say, about the property of being a property). However, it only seems so. Why think that (47) is true? As before, because the following is true:

(48) Every non-self-exemplifying property is a non-self-exemplifying property

And what could ground (48) if not (47)? Thus, if (48) is true – and it clearly is – then (47) must also be.

As before, there is a more convincing explanation, and thus a more plausible ground, for the truth of (48). To see this, notice that, arguably,

the content of (48) is irrelevant to the truth of the proposition. In other words, granted that every non-self-exemplifying property is essentially a non-self-exemplifying property, it is equally true that every human is essentially human, or that every prime number is essentially a prime number. I propose that *all* these propositions are grounded on the following infinitive essentialist truths:

(49) For an object to be self-identical is for it to have the same properties as itself

(50) To be an object is to be self-identical

(49) is a law about the formal eidos Identity, and, at bottom, states the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: if two objects are numerically identical, then they must be indiscernible with respect to their properties (i.e., they must have the same properties). (50) is a law about the formal eidos Object. Now, every object instantiates the eidos Object; by (50), every object will also be self-identical. Thus it will also instantiate the relational eidos Identity; and (49) will thus kick in and guarantee that the object, from the sheer fact that it is an object, will have the properties that it has.[56] Propositions such as (48) will follow. Therefore, their truth does not entail the truth of (47); and thus, as before, the claim that (47) is true can be rejected.

There are, however, further problems. As we know, subjectless predicates denote universals. But then, if there is no property of being a non-self-

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[56]One could argue that, in the Husserlian picture (see Chapter 1, Section 3), what instantiates the relational eidos Identity is not every object, but every relevant *Sachlage* or 'situation'. Yet, every such situation will have to involve only one object; and it is not clear how the latter should be distinguished from the former.

exemplifying property, how can (44): a) have a truth-value?; b) regardless of its being true or false, be *meaningful*?

As for the first question, it is not a problem for my argument: because all I need is that (44), or indeed (47), be *not true*. If (44) is false, my argument goes through; but notice that while presenting the latter I never said that (44) was false: I merely said that it is not true (or, better, that there is no reason to think that it is true). If (44) lacks a truth-value, it is not true (although it is not false either) – which is enough for me. Moreover, the very claim that a proposition involving a non-denoting term *must* lack a truth-value is false. Many philosophers have argued that propositions involving non-denoting terms do not lack a truth-value; but apart from philosophy, logicians have shown that one can coherently reason with propositions involving non-denoting names and terms (in so-called *free logics*: see for example Bencivenga 1986).

As for the second question, it is not obvious that if a proposition involves a terms that lacks a referent, then the proposition is meaningless.[57] In fact, even the relevant non-referring term need not be meaningless. That must be so: for, after all, we perfectly understand the proposition that the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property does not exist – or, say, the proposition that the greatest prime number does not exist. The question is how these propositions can be meaningful – especially on Husserl's view.

The first thing to say in this connection is that for Husserl not every

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[57]On Davidsonian theories of meaning, meaning depends on truth-value. In this sense, a proposition that lacks a truth-value also lacks a meaning. The fact that, as I have pointed out, propositions involving non-referring terms need not lack a truth-value (from both a philosophical and a logical standpoint) takes care of Davidsonian worries of this sort. For more discussion, see for example Bealer 1982: 158.

linguistic expression is supposed to denote in the first place. In *FTL*, for example, he distinguishes such expressions as 'white', 'paper', 'justice', which are, as he puts it, related to subject-matter, and expressions like 'is', 'or' and 'because', which are not so related (*FTL*, Appendix I, §2: 297). True, these expressions might be read, as Fregeans do, as referring to second-order concepts; but it is unclear whether Husserl would take up that option. This point, however, will be discussed at length in Chapter 6; so I shall leave it to one side for the time being.

Second, and more importantly, an expression's being meaningful is for Husserl independent of its having a referent. It is impossible properly to expound this without embarking in a full-fledged discussion of Husserl's doctrine of what he calls *noematic sense* (*noematisch Sinn*); so I will have to put it very roughly and rely, at least to some extent, on the presentation of Husserl's theory of predication from Chapter 1, Section 3.1.

For Husserl, linguistic expressions are meaningful if they express the noematic sense corresponding to some underlying intentional performance (the one which is being expressed linguistically). Noematic senses, recall from Chapter 1, are components of *noemata* (sing.: *noema*). In turn, a noema is the correlate of an intentional act, and is defined by Husserl as 'the object intended in the way in which it is intended'. This rather winding turn of phrase means that when intentional objects are present to consciousness, they are never present simpliciter, but always in a determinate manner. This determinate manner is the noematic sense; and the reason why it is a component of the noema is that it accompanies every presentation of the object. Importantly, as we know from Chapter 1, the question whether the

latter exists or not (as I put it there: the question as to whether a given intentional object is also an entity) is irrelevant to the intentional act being or not being directed to an object, and thus also irrelevant to there or there not being a noematic sense through which the object is intended. But then, if in order that a linguistic expression be meaningful it simply has to be the expression of a noematic sense, whether the corresponding intentional object exists or not is irrelevant to the expression's meaningfulness. For further details, see Simons 1995: 125-129; Drummond 2007: 56-60; and Drummond 1990 for an outstanding book-long treatment of the issue.

The following analogy might help. The Husserlian doctrine of noemata and noematic sense is akin, to an extent, to the Fregean doctrine of senses. So much so, that it has been proposed to assimilate the former to the latter: see for example Smith and McIntyre 1982. For a series of reasons (best put forward in Drummond 1990, Ch. 5; but see also Simons 1995: 128-129), I think that that interpretation is incorrect: Husserlian noemata are not Fregean senses. Still, as far as the present issue goes, it will do no harm to think of Husserlian noematic senses as performing the same (or a very similar) role as Fregean senses, i.e., presenting objects in determinate ways, regardless of the existence of such objects.

I should say, in this connection, that according to some interpretations of Frege (Evans 1982, McDowell 1984, McDowell 2005) senses are object-dependent: no reference (*Bedeutung*), no sense. The rough argument is that the closest thing to a definition of sense one finds in Frege is as a 'mode of presentation' (*Art des Gegebensein*, literally: mode of being given) of an object; and that, as a consequence, if there is no object to be presented, there

is no question of its being presented in any mode. To discuss these interpretations of Frege is way beyond my purposes. I wish to point out, however, that whatever their merits, they have no bearing on Husserl. Specifically, what Husserl calls *Sinne* – noematic senses – may well be deemed object-dependent, but only as long as by 'object' we mean 'intentional object'. Evans and McDowell's position, translated in Husserlian language, is that senses are *entity*-dependent; which, as we have seen, for Husserl is certainly false. If Evans and McDowell are right about Frege, this is one of the points where the analogy between Husserl's noematic senses and Frege's senses breaks down.

Let us go back to the original problem: how can a term such as 'to be a non-self-exemplifying property', not to speak of the propositions in which it occurs, be meaningful if the object it purports to denote does not exist? The point, from the Husserlian perspective, is simply that it is meaningful so long as it purports to denote, i.e., so long as it presents, an intentional object in a determinate way, i.e., expresses a noematic sense. And surely 'to be a non-self-exemplifying property' does present an intentional object in a determinate way (expresses a noematic sense). Even though the object presented – the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property – does not exist.

5.3.3 Dependency

Correia's third argument consists in a derivation, from what he considers uncontroversial premises, of a problematic conclusion. The premises are

the following (I will give my infinitive essentialist versions – hence the starred labels – instead of Correia's generic essentialist ones):

(M*) To be human is to instantiate the universal Human

 (T*) If *a* is essentially a *u*, and if to be a *u* is essentially to be a *v*, then *a* is essentially a *v*

(M*) is an infinitive essentialist proposition about the universal Human, while (T*) is a plausible transitivity principle. If one accepts both, it seems that one is in a position to draw the following conclusion:

 (C*) If *a* is essentially human, then it essentially instantiates the universal Human

According to Correia, however, (C*) is problematic. The reason is that it commits one to the claim that *a* ontologically depends on the universal Human: because, so he argues, if an object *x* is in the essence of an object *y*, then *y* ontologically depends on *x*. But one should not be forced to hold that Socrates, say, depends on the universal Human on the sheer ground that he is essentially human.

The strength of the argument lies in the fact that if one understands infinitive (generic) essence as the essence of universals (properties), then one simply must agree that a property is truly predicated of an object if and only if the latter instantiates the former – which is what (M*) states – and thus, with (T*) in place, to draw the problematic conclusion. Therefore, since the conclusion is problematic, one had better renounce the general notion that infinitive (generic) essence is the essence of universals, and rather agree

that it is the essence of ontologically neutral, non-instantiation-committed, ways of being.

I have two objections. The first is based on considerations similar to those I put forward in discussing the previous argument. It is as follows. Why think that (M*) is true? The best possible reason, I submit, is that the following is true:

(51) An object is human if and only if it instantiates the universal Human

As was the case with the Availability argument, the truth of (51) is then supposed to guarantee the truth of (M*). Not because the two propositions are identical or equivalent, for they are not. It can only be because (M*) is the ground of (51): if the latter is true, then the former must also be (precisely because it is its ground). But is (M*) the ground of (51)?

My objection is that (51) is not, in fact, grounded on (M*); that, as a consequence, there is no reason to regard (M*) as a true infinitive essentialist proposition; and that, therefore, the whole argument rests on a false premise and is thus unsound.

To see this, notice, for one thing, that the claim that (M*) states the infinitive essence of the universal Human is suspicious: because the fact that the universal in question is Human, as opposed to Animal or Dog, is irrelevant to the truth of (M*). What counts is that it is a universal. Hence, I propose, it is more plausible to think that (51) is grounded not on an infinitive essentialist proposition about the universal Human, but on an infinitive essentialist proposition about the formal eidos Predication:

(52) For a universal to be truly predicated of an object is essentially for the

> object to instantiate the universal

Importantly, (52) only applies to the kind of predication that abides by (2*) – which, however, is the kind that features in Correia's argument. If one finds (52) confusing, one can read it as follows: 'For a universal to be truly *(2*)-predicated* of an object is essentially for the object to instantiate the universal'.

Now, (52) grounds (51), as well as 'To be an animal is to instantiate the universal Animal', 'To be a dog is to instantiate the universal Dog', and so forth. If this is true, then there seems to be no plausible reason to think that (M*) is true. If one of the premises of Correia's derivation goes, however, the whole derivation, and in fact the whole argument, go with it.

The second objection is as follows. In general, Correia is right in pointing out that one should not be forced to claim that Socrates essentially instantiates the universal Human by the sheer fact that he is essentially human; nor should one be compelled by the same fact to hold that Socrates ontologically depends on the universal. If, however, one works within a framework in which predication (at least of the kind in question) is based on instantiation, then one will gladly subscribe to the claim that to be essentially human is to essentially instantiate the universal Human. Similarly, if one buys into Correia's (and Fine's: see Fine 1995b) construal of ontological dependence, but also thinks that objects have a certain feature or belong to a certain kind if and only if they instantiate (or bear) the relevant universal, one will not be troubled by the claim that the objects depend on the universal. The Husserlian framework is a case in point; therefore, (C*), and Correia's argument,

should not trouble us at all.

5.3.4   The Objectual Essence of Universals

Do Correia's arguments entail the claim, which he seems to endorse, that universals have no objectual essences? And what should we make of that claim in general?

Commitment to Properties is based on the idea that we should not accept universals in our ontology in the first place. In this sense, it does seem to entail that there are no such things as the objectual essences of universals. But the objection that served me to refute the argument with respect to infinitive essence also serves to refute it with respect to objectual essence: Husserl's ontology simply does include universals. Besides, unlike infinitive essentialist propositions, objectual essentialist propositions about properties do carry an ontological commitment to properties (otherwise it is not clear what they would be stating). So the argument does not get off the ground.

What about Availability? It turns on the idea that there are true infinitive essentialist propositions which, however, are such that there is not universal they could be about. This, however, is not the case with objectual essentialist proposition. Consider the following: 'The property of being a non-self-exemplifying property is essentially an ideal object'. Since, as a matter of necessity, there is no such property, we are in a position simply to say that the proposition is false. (As I pointed out in Section 3.2, there is no pressure on us to admit that the proposition has no truth-value.)

Finally, Dependency. Providing the relevant construal of the relations between essence and ontological dependence is accepted, it follows that if universals have objectual essences, they depend on other universals (those which constitute their essences). Dependencies among universals, however, are countenanced by Husserl (see Chapter 1, Section 4.1). Moreover, surely the notion that universals depend on universals is less problematic than the notion that particulars depend on universals – or indeed, as is the case with Husserl, not problematic at all.

In general, short of scepticism about essence or nominalism about universals, I fail to see any reason why one should reject the idea that universals have objectual essences. Therefore, I maintain the view that universals have both objectual *and* infinitive essences.

5.4 Infinitive Essence and Husserl's Problem

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, bringing infinitive essence into the picture is the first step towards a resolution of the problem I raised for Husserl in Chapter 3. The latter, recall, was the following.

Laws about eide are the most fundamental element of the Husserlian account of necessity. They are essentialist truths about eide, and are of form '$\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v}$'. Laws about eide, however, falsify the principle that, in the Husserlian picture, governs essentialist predication, namely:

(4**) A predicate 'F' is essentially true of an object-cum-universal a_G, be it a particular, a pure universal or an arbitrary instance or bearer of a pure universal, if and only if

(a) *a* either instantiates or bears *F*, and

(b) *F* is in the genitive essence of a_G.[58]

Here is why they falsify it. Take clause (a) first. A necessary condition for there to be a true essentialist predication of *F* of *a* is that *a* either instantiate or bear *F*. But consider the proposition that to be human is essentially to be an animal: it is true, and yet eidos Human neither instantiates nor bears eidos Animal. In fact, if the proposition is to be true, Human *must not* instantiate (or bear) Animal: if Human were an animal, it would not be an eidos (in fact, not even an empirical universal), but a particular (for animals are particulars); thus, it would be neither instantiable nor bearable; and a question such as 'What is it to be Human?' would simply make no sense. Clearly this is true of any proposition of form '$\overline{u}\,\Delta_e\,\overline{v}$'.

Importantly, (4**) is, in effect, a special case of

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

(a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival universal or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal, or

(b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* an adjectival universal.

This is the principle, entailed (as I showed in Chapter 1, Section 3) by Husserl's theory of predication, according to which predication is instantiation-based, i.e., always involves instantiation. Thus, falsifying (4**), laws about

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[58]Out of considerations of uniformity, I preferred not to alter (4**) according to the new symbolism of Chapter 4, Section 3. The same goes for all previously-stated principles, in particular (2*).

eide also falsify (2*).

Consider now clause (b). It gets falsified in two ways. First because, recall from Chapter 1, Section 1 and Chapter 2, Section 1, in order that a universal be in the essence of an object the latter must either instantiate or bear the former. As we have seen, however, that is not the case in propositions such as 'To be human is to be an animal' – or, in general, in propositions of form '$\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v}$'. Second, notice that essentialist propositions of form '$\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v}$' do not state the essence of objects-cum-universals – as (4**) instead requires – but of objects simpliciter. That is to say, while Husserl defines essence for instances or bearers of universals (i.e., for objects on condition that they instantiate or bear some given universal), laws about eide, being of form '$\overline{u} \, \Delta_e \, \overline{v}$', state the essence of objects (of universals) regardless of the universals that the latter instantiate. The claim that to be human is to be an animal, for example, does not contain any mention of the universals that Human instantiates.

In order to solve the problem, one has: 1) to show how there can be predication – essentialist or non-essentialist – without instantiation; 2) to show that there is a sense of essence such that a universal can be in the essence of an object – specifically, a universal – without the former instantiating the latter. Bringing infinitive essence, which is a non-instantiation-based notion of essence, into the picture is a way (the best I can think of) to carry out the second task.

Also notice that not only is infinitive essence not based on instantiation – which is what 2) requires – but it is also defined as being the essence not of universals-cum-universals, but of universals simpliciter (though consid-

ered in their determining capacity). Which, as we have seen, is the second way in which laws about eide falsify (4**), clause (b). That is as it should be: for the fact that, say, Human instantiates this or that universal is irrelevant to the fact that to be human is to be an animal.

Laws about eide, then, should be thought of as *infinitive* essentialist truths about eide. Even if we do so, however, we still have to address point 1) above, i.e., to show how there can be predication without instantiation. Notice that, in a sense, solving this problem is required *in order* to accept infinitive essence: because the assumption I have worked on throughout this chapter is that propositions such as 'To be human is essentially to be an animal' are genuine propositions. Although I have shown that they are indeed genuine in the sense that they do not reduce to objectual essentialist propositions, it remains to be seen how they are to be made sense of from the standpoint of the theory of predication – especially from the standpoint of *Husserl's* theory of predication. That is the theme of next chapter.

5.5 Summary

This chapter was about defending the view that there are two kinds of essence, objectual and infinitive. The former is instantiation-based, the latter is not. A number of proposals aimed at reducing one notion to the other were scrutinised and rejected. Moreover, three argument challenging the view were refuted. The view was also compared with Correia's theory of generic essence, and found distinct from – and, with respect to some points, superior to – it. Finally, the relevancy of infinitive essence to the

wider narrative of this thesis (i.e., its being the first step towards a resolution of the problem raised for Husserl in Chapter 3) was pointed out.

Chapter 6

Infinitive Predication

In Chapter 1, Section 3, I gave the following Husserlian definition of predication:

 (10) A predication is a linguistic and logical objectivity expressing the enrichment that the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive syntheses

The idea, recall, is that predications, as linguistic and logical objectivities, express the achievement or the result of some underlying intentional performances, referred to in (10) as 'cognitive syntheses'. These performances, as also we have seen in Chapter 1, are part of a comprehensive three-stage process. Specifically, cognitive syntheses happen at stage 1; they are based on stage-0, non-cognitive syntheses; and on them is based the constitution, at stage 2, of predications as linguistic and logical objectivities. I have presented the details of stage-0, non-cognitive syntheses in Chapter 1, Section 3.1; and since they are not immediately relevant to what I will say in this chapter, I will henceforth leave them to one side. I will, however, say something about the relations between stage-1 cognitive syntheses and stage-2

achievements, by way of general introduction to the chapter. It is a fairly long introduction; think of it as the run before the final jump.

Stage 1: An intentional system (i.e., a system of intentional acts) brings to consciousness the connection between an object x and some determination d. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Section 3, x is given to consciousness in a determinate way, and thus with what Husserl calls a noematic sense. This may be represented, for illustrative purposes, as a set of determinations $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n\}$. When the connection of x with d is brought to consciousness, d becomes included in x's sense, which thus becomes one determination richer: $s_x = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n, d_{n+1}\}$. This is what Husserl calls 'enrichment of sense', and is the core achievement of intentional synthetic processes. Stage-1 enrichments of sense are 'cognitive', as (10) states, because what in them counts as a determination – both as a determination in the initial sense of x and as the determination which is subsequently included in that sense – is universals. This is where stage-1 syntheses differ from stage-0 syntheses, in which determinations are particulars (those that, according to (2*), instantiate the universals involved in the corresponding stage-1 syntheses).

Stage 2: In cognitive syntheses, new objectivities become available to be directed upon by consciousness. Specifically, for Husserl the synthetic process itself, along with its result, can become the object of a higher-order act. This is how predications (i.e., predicative propositions) are constituted as linguistic and logical objectivities; in our (schematic) example, the proposition that x is d (remember that d, in this case, is a universal). What higher-order, stage-2 acts do, in other words, is to bring to consciousness the

stage-1 acts (the components of the intentional system), their own objects (*x* and *d*), and their synthesis and its result (the enriched sense of *x*) *as one single object*. They make, so to speak, a singularity out of a plurality. This singularity is the new object: the proposition *that x is d*.

Interestingly, even though the one I have presented is Husserl's mature theory of predication (developed from the 1920s onwards), the idea that propositions are constituted in virtue of a higher-order act extracting, so to speak, a single object out of a intentional system and its correlates, is expressed clearly by Husserl at least as far back as in *Ideas 1* (1913). Recall from Chapter 1, Section 3, that Husserl calls intentional systems 'polythetical syntheses'. He writes:

> To every . . . polythetical constitution of synthetical objectivities
> . . . there belongs the possibility of *converting what is intended in*
> *many rays* [i.e., in many acts] *into what is intended simply in one*
> *ray* [i.e., in one act], the possibility of "making objective" in a
> "monothetical" act . . . what is [first] constituted synthetically.
> . . . The plural consciousness . . . can become converted into
> a singular consciousness which draws the plurality from the
> plural consciousness as *one* object, as something single.
>
> . . . This is evinced in logic by the *law of nominalisation* (*Gesetz*
> *der „Nominalisierung"*); according to this law, something nominal
> corresponds to every proposition . . . ; to the proposition itself,
> '*S* is *p*', corresponds the nominal that-proposition (*der nominale*
> *Daßsatz*) [i.e., the propositional abstract, as I called it in Chapter

2, *that S is p*]. (*Ideas 1*, §119: 285-286)

Summing up, the definition may be glossed as follows:

> stage 2   ⟶   A predication is a logical objectivity expressing
>
> stage 1   ⟶   the enrichment that the sense of an object un-
>   dergoes in predicative syntheses

Husserl's theory of predication is ultimately an account of which proposi-
tional forms, or predicative structures, stem from which types of predicative
syntheses, and how.

In Chapter 1 I presented Husserl's official theory of predication as it is
set forth in *EJ*. I also argued that the theory entails the following principle:

(2*) A predicate '*F*' is true of an object *a* if and only if:

(a) *a* instantiates *F*, for *a* an individuum and *F* a substantival univer-
sal or *a* a moment and *F* an adjectival universal, or

(b) *a* bears *F*, i.e., *a* has a moment which instantiates *F*, for *a* an
individuum and *F* an adjectival universal.

This, as I have repeatedly pointed out, is problematic, in that it leaves no
room for making sense of infinitive essentialist predication – in fact, of
infinitive predication as such (regardless of its being essentialist or not). To
see this, recall that infinitive essentialist propositions are of form 'To be a *u*
is to be a *v*' (where *u, v* are universals) – for example, 'To be human is to be
an animal' – and that, according to the view I defended in Chapter 3 (the
'infinitive approach'), they are essentialist propositions about universals: in
this case, about the universal Human. Notice that, despite (2*), the universal

Human does not instantiate or bear the universal Animal; and yet the latter is predicated of the former. Infinitive essentialist propositions, then, falsify (2*). The reason why this is a problem is that infinitive essentialist truths, in the guise of laws about eide, are the most basic element in the Husserlian account of necessity in terms of essence; and even regardless of necessity, they are the most basic essentialist truths, those grounding all the others (notably, all eidetic laws). In this chapter I try to amend Husserl's theory of predication in order to solve the problem.

In order to do so, I first of all suggest that we distinguish, in the theory as Husserl presents it, between *principles* and *paradigms*. The distinction is not clearly drawn by Husserl, and in Chapter 1 I followed him in this respect (because I wanted to present his official theory). Nevertheless, it can and should be drawn. In Section 1 of this chapter I present the principles of the theory in its most mature version, i.e., with reference to *FTL* and *EJ*. Section 2 is a sort of interlude, in which I try to familiarise the reader with the principles of Husserl's theory of predication by comparing the latter with David Wiggins' and Richard Gaskin's positions with respect to the so-called problem of the unity of the proposition. This, among other things, allows me to discuss Husserl's stance vis-à-vis the (dominant) Fregean understanding of predicates as referring to (not universals but) unsaturated entities, and in particular to a special class of functions, which Frege refers to as 'concepts'. It has been suggested that Husserl, who did not subscribe to the Fregean view, instead should have (Sowa 2007, 2010); the discussion in Section 2, I think, proves that false (or at least highly debatable). In Section 3 I argue that what sustains (2*) is actually not the principles of Husserl's

theory – which, as I will show, if slightly amended sustain equally well infinitive predication – but rather the particular selection of paradigms. By focusing on non-paradigmatic cases – viz., infinitive predications – we will open the space for amending the principles and accommodating infinitive predication.

6.1 The Principles of the Theory

For Husserl, the connections brought to consciousness by predicative syntheses at stage 1 are represented at stage 2 by the syntax of propositions, whose job is indeed to hold together, and in the right ways, the elements of a proposition. Incidentally, by analogy Husserl also calls 'syntactic' the stage-1 connections between the object and its determinations. He also calls them 'categorial', because they involve the object and what is predicated of it (i.e., the object and its *kategorai*). The questions I will be concerned with are: What is the nature of syntactic connections? And what is the nature of that which they connect, i.e., of the elements of the syntactic structure? These questions, notice, relate to both stage 2 and stage 1: in the first case, they are questions about the nature of the syntax and the elements of propositions; in the second case, they are questions about the nature of the connections between objects and their determinations as they appear in the predicative synthesis, as well as the nature of those objects and determinations themselves insofar as they are so connected. In what follows, I will switch between stages 1 and 2 as I see fit; that should not, however, result in confusion.

In *FTL*, Appendix I, Husserl distinguishes two types of elements of predicative structures: those that connect and those that are connected. The former, which Husserl refers to as 'moments of pure form' (*Momente des reinen Form*), are that in virtue of which a predication is a unity. The chief moment of pure form in any predication is for Husserl the copula; to which at stage 1 corresponds the basic operation of enrichment of sense. (Other moments of pure form are, for example, articles, prepositions, and, in complex propositions, the logical connectives.) Importantly, moments of pure form in propositions merely express the intentional operations that, at stage 1, bring to consciousness the relevant connections between object and determinations. In this sense, moments of pure form do not bring about the unity of the predicative structure: they merely express it in language. And since moments of pure form represent at the logical level the subjective operations in virtue of which the connections between object and determinations make their appearance in consciousness, and thus correspond neither to the object nor to its determinations, then, Husserl points out, they have 'no relatedness to subject-matter' (*FTL*, §2: 297); which is another reason for him to call them 'moments of pure form'. To clarify: consider the chief moment of pure form, the copula; for Husserl, it is somehow (and we shall see how) expressive of the way in which the object and its determinations are connected, but does not refer to anything to be found among the object and its determinations, or to some additional object. This is what Husserl means by saying that it does not relate to the subject-matter of the proposition.

What, on the other hand, has a bearing on the subject-matter of the

proposition, and is also what syntax (moments of pure form) connects, is *syntagmas* (*Syntagmen*, sing.: *syntagma*), to which, at stage 1, correspond the object and its determinations. Syntagmas are also called by Husserl, in opposition to the moments of form, 'material-' or 'stuff-moments' (*stofflichen Momente*).

Both types of components of the predicative structure are, says Husserl, 'moments'. As we have seen in Chapter 1, a moment is a non-independent part of a whole. The relevant whole, here, is the predicative unity itself (*'a* is *u'*). Its parts are, for Husserl, *all* non-independent: 'All members [of the predicative unity] . . . are non-selfsufficient under all circumstances; they are what they are in the whole' (*FTL*, Appendix I, §1: 295). It is important to understand this claim correctly, because on this hinges a correct understanding of what type of unity the predicative structure is for Husserl.

The unity of predication, says Husserl, is the 'self-contained unity of one function', and thus a 'functional unity' (*FTL*, Appendix I, §5: 299). In this sense its elements are such – i.e., they are *its elements* – only insofar as they have a functional role in the predication. The role of a moment of pure form as such, for example, is to connect; the chief moment of pure form, the copula (at stage 1, the enrichment-of-sense intentional operation), is indeed 'what gives unity to [all] the elements of predication' (*FTL*, Appendix I, §5: 300). The role of syntagmas – given that a predication is ultimately the saying of something about something – is, very crudely, to be either that which is said of something (a determination), or that about which something is said (the object). Therefore, when Husserl says that the elements of the predication are its non-independent parts he means that, for every

element x, if we suppress its functional relations with all the other elements $y_1, \ldots, y_n$, x ceases to be an element of the predication: precisely because the latter is a functional unity (a functional whole), and nothing can be its element without having a functional role in it.[59] Importantly, Husserl does not mean to say that if we suppress the predicative structure – the functional connections between its elements – we thereby suppress the elements *themselves*. Take the predication 'The tomato is red'. If we suppress the syntactic connections between *the tomato* and *red*, these do not cease to exist: they simply are not a subject and a predicative adjective anymore. This tallies with Husserl's claim, to be discussed later on in the section, that syntax is not the ultimate level to be reached in accounting for predication.

This leads us to the first crucial distinction in Husserl's theory of predication: that between the *syntactic form* (*syntaktisch Form*) and the *syntactic stuff* (*syntaktisch Stoff*) of syntagmas (*FTL*, Appendix I, §7: 304). The syntactic form of a syntagma is the functional role that the latter has in a given predication; the syntactic stuff is the syntagma once its syntactic form (its functional role) is abstracted away. At stage 1: the syntactic form of objects and determinations is the relations they have to one another insofar as they are connected in the predicative synthesis; the syntactic stuff is objects and determinations themselves, i.e., apart from their being involved in a predicative synthesis. Let me clarify with some examples.

Consider, for example, the predication (i.e., the proposition) 'The tomato is red'. It has a moment of pure form – the copula – and two syntagmas: *the tomato* and *red*. Each has a functional role, and thus a syntactic form.

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[59]For a discussion of functional wholes, see for example Simons 1987: 342-349

The tomato is what, in the predication, is determined (as red): the *substrate* or subject (recall from Chapter 1, Section 3). *red*, on the other hand, is the determination that, in the predication, is attributed to the substrate: the *predicate* (*FTL*, Appendix I, §7: 303).

The syntactic form of the predicate comes for Husserl in two species: *property* (such as *red*) and *relation* (*FTL*, Appendix I, §7: 303). Consider: 'The tomato is bigger than the cherry'. Here we have a moment of unity – the copula *is* – and three syntagmas. One is *the tomato*, the substrate. Then, *bigger than*, which is the relational predicate. Finally, *the cherry*, which – and this is a further syntactic form – is a *relative object*. Obviously, whenever a relational predicate is involved, at least one relative object must be present. The number of relative objects depends on the specific nature of the relational predicate. Thus we see that a predicative synthesis (stage 1) does not necessarily involve simply an object and its determinations: more objects may be involved, and several types of determinations.

Yet other syntactic forms are available, though I will not be concerned with them in any substantial way. Consider, for example, 'The red tomato is tasty'. For Husserl, it should be parsed in the following way:

<div style="padding-left:3em">

is $\longrightarrow$ moment of pure form (copula)

the tomato $\longrightarrow$ substrate

tasty $\longrightarrow$ predicate (property)

</div>

The adjective *red*, on the other hand, is an *attribute*: its role is to determine the substrate, but not in a predicative way. Compare the grammatical distinction between adjectives functioning as noun modifiers and adjectives functioning as attributive predicates (i.e., as they function in adjectival

predication). I think Husserl is on to something here: for in the proposition under discussion the predicate *tasty* determines not simply the substrate (*the tomato*), but the substrate as already determined as red (i.e., *the red tomato*). This 'already determined as' is, for Husserl, the essence of the functional role (the syntactic form) of the attribute, which is precisely to do its determining job before the relevant predication (in this case, 'is tasty') takes place.

All these syntactic roles or forms have their counterparts at stage 1 in predicative syntheses. The form of the substrate is the role of the object in its connection with its determinations, which is to support them, to be that which is determined by them; and the determinations have the role of determining the object (the substrate), and thus have the form of the predicate. And so on.

Every syntagma can, however, be considered apart from its functional role in the proposition. So considered, it is not a syntgama properly so called, but the syntactic stuff of a syntagma. Such are, for example, *tomato*, *cherry*, *red*, *bigger than*, etc.

This leads us to the second crucial distinction in the theory: that between core forms and core stuffs.

Syntactic stuffs may be thought of as the cores of syntagmas. Such cores are for Husserl not raw items, so to speak, but themselves unities of form and stuff. Their form, however, is *not* syntactic: because when we reach the level of syntactic stuff, syntax has already been abstracted away. Husserl calls the form of a syntactic stuff, *core form* (*Kernform*), and its stuff, *core stuff* (*Kernstoff*). Not only are core forms non-syntactic; for Husserl, syntax

presupposes core forms. That is to say, for a syntactic stuff to be able to take on a syntactic form, it has to have a core form (in other words, having a core form is a necessary condition for having a syntactic form). As he puts it:

> The stuffs entering into the element-forms [i.e., the syntactic stuffs taking on syntactic forms], and presupposed by them, likewise have ... a certain *forming*; but it is of *quite a different ultimate sort*. In other words: the forms belonging immediately and syntactically to the unity of the predication, as an is-unity, a copular unity, presuppose *forms of an entirely new style* in the ultimate stuff. These forms do *not* belong to the *syntax* of the proposition itself. (*FTL*, Appendix I, §11: 307-308)

Later on I will propose a Husserlian argument for the view that syntax presupposes core forms. If the view is correct, however, as I believe it is, notice that it confirms the claim, which I made earlier, that in Husserl's theory the elements of the predicative structure are not *themselves* carved out of the structure (i.e., that they do not come into existence in predications): only their functional role is (does).

I said that unities of core form and core stuff are syntactic stuffs; this, however, must be qualified. Since having a core form is a necessary but not sufficient condition for having a syntactic form, it should be possible to talk about unities of core form and core stuff *regardless* of their being members of a syntactic (predicative) structure, and therefore regardless of their being syntactic stuffs. Husserl is aware of this; indeed he agrees, and has a term for such unities considered apart from their having to do with

any syntax at all: *core formations* (*Kerngebilde*; see *FTL*, Appendix I, §12: 309). Core formations, says Husserl, are structures that are 'deeper than any predication whatever' (*FTL*, Appendix I, §11: 309).

It is not straightforward, however, to come to grips with the notion of core form. Husserl's favourite way is through comparison. I will follow him there. I will also start from language (stage 2) and gradually work my way to consciousness (stage 1); and, in particular, I will focus on the lexical categories of adjective, verb, and noun, and their relation (or lack thereof) with syntax.[60]

Adjectives

As we have seen, adjectives can take on two syntactic forms: noun modifier (what Husserl calls attribute) and predicative adjective (what Husserl calls property). I will disregard the former, for the sake of simplicity. Consider:

  (i) The tomato is red

red here refers to a universal, Red, and, as I shall put it, represents it as a determination – the determination that, in the proposition, is predicated of the substrate (a given tomato). Now take:

  (ii) Red is a type of colour

Red here still refers to the universal Red; however, it does not represent it as a determination, but as an object. Indeed, *Red*, unlike *red*, is a noun rather than an adjective – or, better, it is a nominalised adjective. In English, the

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[60]I borrow this style of exposition, which I find particularly helpful, from Kuroda 2013: 92.

natural way of signalling the nominalisation of an adjective is by means of suffixes, as in red*ness*, or phrases such as *the property of being red*. Another way, which I employed throughout this thesis, is to capitalise the initial: *Red*.

This phenomenon is, for Husserl, to be understood in terms of identity of core stuff (the universal Red) and difference in core form – where a core form is a 'mode of apprehension' (*EJ*, §50b: 210) of core stuffs, i.e., a way in which core stuffs are presented, or represented, in consciousness: in this case, first as a determination, then as an object.[61] Notice that if core forms are mode of apprehension of core stuffs, core stuffs, *per se*, are simply objects (by which I mean intentional objects): this follows from the fact that, for Husserl, everything that is presented or apprehended by consciousness in any way is precisely an intentional object. However, an intentional object such as a universal, for example, can be apprehended either as an object or as a determination. In the first case, it will have the core form of *substantivity* (*Substantivität*). See *FTL*, Appendix I, §11: 308. In the second case, it will have the core form of *adjectivity* (*Adjektivität*), which comes in two species: *propertiness* (*Eigenschaftlichkeit*), which is the relevant one in this case, and *relationality* (*Relationalität*).

Importantly, as I have already stressed, for Husserl the difference between *red* (adjective) and *Red*, *redness*, etc. (nominalised adjectives) is not induced by syntax. On the contrary, the latter 'presupposes', as a neces-

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[61]Here I am reading Husserl as using 'apprehension' (*Erfassung*) as synonymous with 'intention'. Drummond suggests this may be done with *Auffassung*, yet another Husserlian term for apprehension. See Drummond 2008: 39-40. I am using 'presentation' and 'representation' in the same way. Thus, a 'mode of apprehension' (*Weise der Erfassung*) is simply a way of intending, or presenting, or representing, an object.

sary condition, the former. I am now ready to make the claim precise and propose, as I promised, an argument for it. The idea is that *red*, in order to function as a predicate (i.e., in order that it take on the syntactic form of the predicate), must already be representing a determination rather than an object, i.e., have the core form of adjectivity (of propertiness) rather than that of substantivity. In general, for an object to take on a given syntactic form, it must already have taken on a core form, and, in fact, the right one. To see this, consider lexical categories – which, just like core forms, are normally taken to be independent of, and presupposed by, syntax. Suppose that, instead of saying 'The tomato is red', I said: 'The tomato is the cherry'. The only plausible reading of the latter, one may point out, is as a (false) identity statement – not as a predication properly so called (which, instead, the former is). Why so? Because *is*, in 'The tomato is the cherry', is flanked by two singular terms, and therefore cannot be a copula, but only an identity. Otherwise, *the cherry* would have to function as a predicate – which it cannot. The question, however, is why *the cherry* cannot function as predicate. And it seems that *this* question cannot be answered by appealing to the syntactic role of *the cherry* – for the latter is precisely that of which an account is asked for. The point, it seems to me, can be generalised: there can be no merely syntactic account of predication, because talk of predication *just is* talk of the syntactic role of the elements of the predicative structure, and this is therefore precisely what an account of predication should account for. P.F. Strawson makes a similar point against Quine in Strawson 1968:

> Quine's explanation [of the difference between definite singular

terms and general terms in predicative position] ... is supposed
to be a description of a contrast in grammatical *roles*; the di-
chotomy of terms that Quine is concerned with is supposed to
be "clarified" by this description of roles.

... The explanation raises, rather than answers, questions.
... What is it that *accounts* for these differences [between gram-
matical roles]? Unless we can answer this question, we shall
certainly not fully understand the distinction; indeed we shall
scarcely know what predication is. We cannot give up the ques-
tion and be content with talk of verbs and substantives, of gram-
matical subjects and predicates. (Strawson 1968: 96-101)

Husserl's proposal is that *the cherry* cannot function as predicate because
cherry, as it occurs in it, has the wrong core form: in order even for it to
make sense to pair *cherry* with the determinate article *the*, the former must
be understood not as representing a universal as a determination, but as
representing a given cherry as an object – which prevents it from being
available to take on the syntactic form of the predicate (a given cherry
cannot be a determination). Things are different with *a cherry*: it changes
sense completely if *cherry* is taken to refer to some (unspecified) cherry or
to the universal Cherry considered as a determination. In the latter case,
but not in the former, *a cherry* can function as predicate. However, more
about nouns – such as *cherry* – and nominal predication below.

Finally, the stage-1 relations between syntactic and core forms may be
put as follows: in order that a given universal y be connected with a given

object *x*, so that the former functions as a determination of the latter, and this as the substrate of that, *y* must *first* be present to consciousness as a determination, and *x* as an object. Because if *y* is present to consciousness as an object – which is possible: see proposition (ii) above – it will not be in a position to be connected to *x* in the relevant way.

I will now show how all this applies to other lexical categories, such as verbs and nouns.[62]

Verbs

We have just discussed adjectives and adjectival predication, and later on we will discuss nouns and nominal predication. Verbal predication, however, is somewhat peculiar, in that, at least on the face of it, it does not involve the copula. For example: 'Socrates runs'. Aristotle famously pointed out that propositions without the copula may be paraphrased into propositions with the copula: in this case, 'Socrates runs' becomes 'Socrates is running' – where *is running* is not a verbal predicate (in the present continuous tense), but an adjectival predicate composed by the copula *is* plus the adjectival participle *running*. Aristotle needed this, because his own view of predication centered on the copula – as does Husserl's. Husserl is not indifferent to the Aristotelian proposal (he mentions it in *EJ*, §2: 15); but whatever the latter's merits or faults, he need not subscribe to it – in fact, he need not subscribe to any proposal involving the idea that non-copular predications be paraphrased into copular ones. The reason is that, although Husserl claims that the copula is that in virtue of which predications (stage 2) as such

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[62]Prepositions and articles, I think, are best thought of as moments of pure forms. As for adverbs and pronouns, I will leave them to one side.

are unities, that claim, as I pointed out earlier on, must be read correctly: strictly speaking, the copula does not bring about the unity of object and determination, but merely expresses the relevant stage-1 predicative synthetic processes. *The latter* do the connecting; and, as Husserl acknowledges (*EJ*, §50c: 217, footnote 5), there is nothing to prevent them from taking place without being expressed at stage-2 by copular propositions. The fact that some languages simply have no use for the copula (i.e., have no copular propositions) supports this. To such an extent, verbal predication as such (no Aristotelian paraphrases) can be accommodated within the principles of Husserl's theory: a verbal predication (stage 2) stems from a predicative synthesis in which a certain action is connected with its agent, and the latter is thereby, in a broad sense, determined by it.

Verbs typically occur in predicate position, i.e., have the syntactic role (form) of the predicate. Such is the case in our example:

(iii) Socrates runs

Like adjectives, according to Husserl they refer to universals (a type-action, in this case). Also like adjectives, they present the universals to which they refer as determinations rather than as objects. However, they can be nominalised – again, just like adjectives. For example:

(iv) Running is a way of moving

Now *running*, a gerund, is somewhat ambiguous. It can refer to a specific running episode, or it can refer to running as such. In both cases, however, it represents its referent not as a determination, but as an object. If it refers to running as such, i.e., to the relevant type-action (the relevant universal),

then *running* and *runs* will be two different presentations of the same object. In fact, two different types of presentation of the same object. The first is the core form of substantivity, the second the core form of adjectivity. However, they will be forms of the same core stuff.

Nouns

Nouns may take on different syntactic roles (syntactic forms): substrate, relative object, object of the verb, predicative nominative. For example:

   (v) The tomato is red

  (vi) I am going to eat the tomato

 (vii) The cherry is smaller than the tomato

(viii) This is a tomato

Let me leave (viii) aside for the time being; I will come back to it later. In (v)-(vii), *tomato* refers to some given tomato, and represents it as an object – i.e., with the core form of substantivity. This, notice, seems to be the only possible way in which tomatoes may be represented in order to enter a predicative synthesis. That is to say, there appears to be no sense in which a tomato – a given spatio-temporal particular – could be represented as a determination, and be allowed to function as the predicate in a predication. It will, however, be able to have all the roles that substantive core formations can take on: substrate, as in (v); object of the verb, as in (vi); and relative object, as in (vii).

What about (viii)? Here, at least in the intended reading, *tomato* functions as the predicate. The proposition is, indeed, a nominal predication.

From the point of view of lexical categorisation, *tomato* is still a noun, because it shares the grammatical properties of all nouns. (This is actually what makes (viii) a case of nominal, rather than adjectival or verbal, predication.) However, unlike *tomato* in (v)-(vii), it does not refer to, or represent, a given tomato, but rather the universal Tomato; which is indeed what, in the proposition, is predicated of the substrate (i.e., of whatever it is that *this* refers to). However, it does not represent the universal as an object, but as a determination. In that, too, it differs radically from its counterparts in (v)-(vii). This twofold difference – in reference (a given tomato, the universal Tomato) and in way or representing (as object, as determination) – is to be understood, in the Husserlian theory, as a difference both of core stuff (a given tomato, the universal Tomato) and in core form (substantivity, adjectivity).

Summing up, then, for Husserl every syntagma is a unity of syntactic form (the role it has in the predicative structure) and stuff. The stuff of a syntagma – which, considered apart from its relation to syntax, is called a core formation – is itself a unity of form and stuff. The stuff of a core formation is any (intentional) object whatsoever. The form of a core formation is the way in which the object (the stuff) is apprehended by consciousness: as an object or as a determination (property or relation).

The principles of Husserl's theory of predication, as I have presented them, are illustrated in the following diagram:

Here is how the diagram should be interpreted. Syntagmas are constituted of syntactic form and syntactic stuff. Syntactic form comes in at least three species (for the sake of simplicity, I have omitted some syntactic forms, such as object of the verb, attribute, etc.): subject, predicate, relative object. On the other hand syntactic stuffs, i.e., core formations, consist of core form and core stuff. Core forms are mode of apprehension of core stuffs. They also come in two varieties: substantivity and adjectivity. Core stuffs with the core form of substantivity may take on the syntactic forms of subject and relative object; while core stuffs with the core form of adjectivity may take on the syntactic form of the predicate.

Before we proceed to the Section-2 interlude (the problem of the unity of the proposition), and then to Section 3 and the account of infinitive pred-

ication, there are a few things to be said about Husserl's official definitions of the two core forms, substantivity and adjectivity. Specifically, we know what core forms are for Husserl (modes of presentation of objects); but what distinguishes one form (substantivity) from the other (adjectivity)? When I introduced the notions, I put things in terms of apprehension as object in the first case, and apprehension as determination in the second case. These, however, are not Husserl's official definitions. On the other hand, the official definitions are, I think, misleading if not positively misguided. So that, in the end, I recommend my own characterisations. In the rest of this section I will show why.

Husserl defines the core form of substantivity as the apprehension of an object as ontologically independent, and the core form of adjectivity as the apprehension of an object as non-independent. See *EJ*, §50b: 210. Why is this misleading or even misguided? Let us start with substantivity. For an object (a core stuff) to take on the core form of substantivity, it has to be apprehended by consciousness as ontologically independent. Substances (such as tomatoes), which are inherently independent, pose no difficulty; nor, as far as I can see, do universals. Things are less straightforward with objects that are inherently non-independent, such as, for example, moments (which are non-independent parts of objects). It is uncontroversial that, say, the red-moment of the tomato is able to take on the core form of substantivity: for, since we can say things about it, it can take on the syntactic form of the substrate, and a necessary condition for its taking on the syntactic form of substrate is that it take on the core form of substantivity. And according to Husserl's official defintion of substantivity, for the red-moment of the

tomato to have the core form of substantivity is for it to be apprehended as an independent object. In general, when non-independent objects take on the form of substantivity they are apprehended as independent. But the question is: does their being apprehended as independent bar or cancel, so to say, their being in themselves non-independent? It should not, because otherwise we would not be in a position to say that the red-moment of the tomato is a non-independent object. Therefore, when a non-independent object is apprehended as independent, and thus takes on the core form of substantivity, it must nevertheless maintain its non-independent nature. But it then becomes hard to see what its being apprehended as independent really amounts to. The same is true for non-independent objects that are not moments, such as actions (which depend on, but are not parts of, agents), events (which arguably depend on, but are not parts of, participants), processes, and the like.

Adjectivity is even more problematic. If we assume Husserl's definition, when the universal Red is predicated of a given tomato the former is apprehended as a non-independent object. But this seems to be false. To say that the universal Red is represented as non-independent is to say that it is represented as depending on something else. But what would this 'something else' be? Surely not the tomato: for in predicating the universal of the tomato I am in no way saying, or implying, that one depends on the other. True, in so far as the predication is true, the tomato bears the universal, and thus has a red-moment. In this sense, at least adjectival predication always involves indirect reference to a non-independent item. But this item is not the core stuff of the core formation *red* – it is not what takes on the core

form of adjectivity: the universal Red is. Things are even more complicated
when nominal predication is taken into account. Consider: 'This tomato is
a vegetable'. As before, in saying that the tomato is a vegetable we are in no
way saying, or implying, that the universal Vegetable is a non-independent
part of the tomato. Moreover, in this case, and in nominal predication in
general, no non-independent item is even involved. For it is not as if the
tomato had a vegetable-moment instantiating the universal Vegetable: if
that were the case, then the universal would be adjectival rather than sub-
stantival (i.e., recall from Chapter 1, it would have moments rather than
substances as instances) – which, for Husserl, it is not.

It seems best to me, therefore, to understand core forms as modes of
apprehension not 'as independent' or 'as non-independent', but 'as object'
or 'as determination'. Apprehension as object is wholly unproblematic: for
everything that can be apprehended simply *is* an object (i.e., an intentional
object). Husserl refers to this circumstance as the 'pre-eminence of the
substantival category' (*FTL*, Appendix I, §13: 310): for every core stuff
that has the core form of adjectivity, there is an 'essential possibility' to
substantivise it, i.e., a possibility that the stuff takes on the core form of
substantivity. This, I submit, is because the stuff itself is an object, i.e., an
intentional object. On the other hand, apprehension as determination (i.e.,
adjectivity) is the representation of an object as something that determines
something else (it is hard for me to put it in more basic terms – nor, actually,
am I sure we should seek to put it in more basic terms). Notice that not
every object, for Husserl, can take on the core form of adjectivity: some
objects are 'absolute substrates' (*EJ*, §29: 133-134). And this makes sense,

as not every object can be represented as a determination: tomatoes, for example, and every substance, cannot.

This concludes the presentation of the principles of Husserl's theory of predication. As I said, my overall argument in this chapter is that these principles, with some slight tampering, can accommodate equally well Husserl's perceptual paradigms, which abide by (2*), and laws about eide, and infinitive predications in general, which do not abide by (2*). The reason why we need to accommodate laws about eide, and therefore slightly tamper with the principles of the theory, is that if we do not, then Husserlian Essentialism is bereft of its most basic element. What justifies the tampering, on the other hand, is that, as I shall argue in Section 3, although the perceptual paradigms entail (2*), the principles in themselves, tampered or not tampered with, do *not*. But if the principles of predication *per se* do not entail (2*), since we need to account for non-paradigmatic cases of predication which do not abide by (2*), it seems a legitimate and a reasonable thing to do to modify the principles so that they account for the non-paradigmatic cases. It will, of course, be a matter of modifying the principles in a way that makes phenomenological sense. That I will try to do in Section 3. Before I get to that, however, I will attempt to familiarise the reader with the principles of the Husserlian theory by discussing the so-called problem of the unity of the proposition.

6.2 The Unity of the Proposition

Husserl's theory of predication (specifically, its principles as set forth in Section 1) will probably strike some readers as odd; and, compared with what is currently on the market, especially in the analytic tradition (and it is difficult to find theories of predication elsewhere), it is certainly unorthodox. One reason is the central role of consciousness in the theory. Another reason is the importance Husserl puts on what he calls 'pure form', the prime example of which is the copula. Nowadays the idea of pure form tends to be downplayed in favour of a loosely Fregean function/argument model of predication, according to which subject and predicate are not connected by a moment of pure form (e.g., the copula), but simply combine the way a mathematical function and its argument(s) do.

As for the first point, however, it is worth mentioning that even in the analytic tradition some approaches to the philosophy of language may be made out which trade heavily on the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of thought. Gareth Evans is a case in point. See for example the following passage from Bermúdez 2005:

> Evans holds that an account of what it is to understand refer-
> ring expressions should be formulated in the context of a more
> general account of what it is to think about individuals. Our
> language contains referring expressions because we think about
> objects in certain ways, and those expressions work the way they
> do because of how we think about the objects that they pick out.
> In this sense, then, he thinks that the philosophy of language

should in the last analysis be answerable to the philosophy of

thought. (Bermúdez 2005: 3)

As for the second point, the discussion I will develop in this section shows both that Husserl is more part of a minority than an isolated case, and that in this particular connection the minority is actually at no obvious disadvantage with respect to the majority.

The section has five parts. In the first, I introduce the problem of the unity of the proposition. In the second, I present Frege's solution to it (at least, an interpretation of such solution). In the third, I discuss the latter and point out some of its difficulties. In the fourth, I present what I call the Wiggins-Gaskin solution. In the fifth and last part, I elaborate on the Wiggins-Gaskin view and compare it with Husserl's theory as presented in Section 1.

6.2.1 The Problem of the Unity of the Proposition

A proposition is a unity in a sense in which a mere list is not. A list is a sequence of words or phrases, and its job is merely to mention the latter's referents. Objects are mentioned in propositions, too, because all the components of propositions refer to some object – or so we will assume at this stage. A proposition, however, mentions objects not merely to list them, but to affirm things about them, or to affirm them (if the objects mentioned are universals or concepts) about other objects – in general, to express the fact that some objects are determined thus and so, or are thus and so related to other objects, and so on. The members of a proposition,

then, are connected in a way in which the members of a list are not. The problem is how this connection should be understood.

A natural way of doing so is the following. Unlike the list '*a, u*', the proposition:

 (53) *a* is *u*

expresses the fact that *a* (i.e., the object mentioned, or referred to, by '*a*') *instantiates u* (i.e., the object mentioned, or referred to, by '*u*'). What accounts for the unity of the proposition on this view is then ultimately the instantiation relation. One need not appeal to the instantiation relation in particular: other relations are available that could do the job, such as subsumption or the like. The choice between saying that the subject instantiates the predicate, or that it falls under the predicate, or that it is in the relevant class, etc., depends, as far as I can see, on how much of a realist or a nominalist one is about properties and relations. Thus, given Husserl's leanings in this connection, in what follows I will only speak of instantiation. But whatever one's relation of choice is, the point is that in endorsing the view under discussion one appeals to some relation, expressed in propositions but not in lists, in order to explain unity.

Unfortunately, the view faces a version of Bradley's regress.[63] In order to explain the unity of the proposition, we appeal to the instantiation relation, which then serves us as a sort of propositional glue (this is Gaskin's metaphor) holding together the elements of the proposition (in our example, *a* and *u*). Thus, the proposition that *a* is *u* turns out to be grounded

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[63]The original argument is put forward by F.H. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality* to show that, as he put it, relations are unreal. See Bradley 1893, Ch. 3.

on the proposition that *a* instantiates *u*. This, however, merely shifts the problem: because now we have to explain how the proposition:

(54) *a* instantiates *u*

is different from the list '*a*, *u*, instantiation relation'. According to the view, the explanation must be that *a* and *u* instantiate the instantiation relation. Thus, in effect, we appeal to a further instantiation relation to explain how *a*, *u* and the first instantiation relation hold together. The proposition that *a* instantiates *u*, therefore, turns out to be grounded on the proposition that *a* and *u* instantiate the instantiation relation. Again, the problem is merely shifted: because now we have to explain the unity of the proposition

(55) *a* and *u* instantiate the instantiation relation

– and so on, *ad infinitum*. As Gaskin puts it:

> The basic idea of the regress is the following: if we analyse the connection between object and property (or objects and relation) as the obtaining of a further relation of instantiation of the property by the object, or participation of the object in the property, we are launched on an infinite regress, because we shall have to analyse the introduced relation of instantiation (participation) as the obtaining of a yet further relation of instantiation (participation), connecting object, property and instantiation. And so on. (Gaskin 1995: 161)

6.2.2 Frege's Solution

According to Frege, the regress arises because the view fails to recognise the difference between the type of entity that subjects refer to and the type of entity that predicates refer to. Consider:

(56) Socrates is human

Words such as *Socrates* refer to saturated entities, which Frege calls 'objects', by naming them; while words such as *human* refer to unsaturated entities, which Frege calls 'concepts', but do not name them. Some people call this second reference relation 'expressing'. The distinction between saturated and unsaturated entities should be understood, for Frege, in terms of the distinction between argument and function. Alternatively, saturated entities may be thought of as complete entities, while unsaturated entities may be thought of as entities in need of completion. For Frege, only complete entities (objects) can be named; unsaturated entities (concepts) can be referred to (expressed), but not named. In this sense, notice, for Frege it is actually misleading to say that the concept *human* is expressed by the word 'human' – which looks too much like a name. Since concepts are functions, and concept-words functional expressions, it is better to say that the concept *human* is referred to by 'x is human'.

Armed with that distinction, Frege is in a position to explain the unity of the proposition without appealing to the instantiation relation (in fact, to any relation between subject and predicate). Indeed, due to the nature of objects and concepts, the former immediately (i.e., without mediation) complete the latter – and that is the connection needed to make out the

difference between a proposition and a list: since the latter is a sequence of names, it involves no completion of concepts by objects. As Gaskin puts it (quoting from Frege's *Posthumous Writings*):

> Frege sought to undermine Bradley's regress by drawing a distinction between object and concept. . . . The unsaturatedness of the concept, its yearning for completion, is just what guarantees the unity of the proposition, and thereby foils Bradley's regress:
>
> > In the sentence 'Two is a prime' we find a relation designated: that of subsumption. . . . This . . . creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element supervenient upon the object and the concept. This is not the case: the unsaturatedness of the concept brings it about that the object, in effecting the saturation, engages immediately with the concept, without the need of any special cement. Object and concept are fundamentally made for each other, and in subsumption we have their fundamental union.
>
> . . . Frege's response . . . is [thus] to insist on the unique status of the concept, its unsaturatedness, before the regress can get off the ground: we do not even move to the first stage of appealing to a relation of subsumption, instantiation or participation. (Gaskin 1995: 162-163)

6.2.3 A Difficulty in Frege's Solution

Frege's solution is elegant; however, it faces a difficulty known as the paradox of the concept *horse*.

Being a concept, the concept *horse* is an unsaturated entity. As such, on Frege's theory it cannot be referred to by a name, but only by a concept-word, such as '*x* is a horse'. This, recall, is in Frege's view what prevents propositions from degenerating into mere lists. But the move appears to throw away the baby with the bathwater, because now we simply cannot say anything *about* the concept *horse*: for, in doing so, we would have to name it – and that we cannot do. In other words, the expression 'the concept *horse*', being a name, if it refers at all, refers to an object; thus, if the phrase 'the concept *horse*' refers, as it would seem, to the concept *horse*, the latter will not be a concept, but an object. (All this, notice, assumes that in order to say something about something, we have to name the latter. Both Gaskin and Wiggins accept this, but others may not. As far as I can see, however, Husserl would.)

To avoid this, Frege is forced to deem phrases like 'the concept *horse*' misleading or improper. At most, he says, we can, and should, speak of the concept-*word* '*x* is a horse'. This, however, as Gaskin points out (following Wiggins 1984), makes it impossible to quantify over concepts – that is, to talk about concepts in any significant sense.[64] So the Fregean picture

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[64]Both Gaskin and Wiggins think of quantification over concepts as second-order quantification. That is a mistake: second-order quantification is quantification over *sets* (subsets of the domain of discourse). Quantification over concepts will be second-order only if concepts are construed as sets (or functions-in-extension, i.e., at bottom, graphs). If, however, concepts are not construed as sets (or functions-in-extension), then quantification over concepts will not be second-order. Bealer's $\mathcal{L}_\omega$, for example, is a first-order language

would be one in which concept-words refer to items of which, however, we can say nothing at all – even that they are what concept-words refer to, or, indeed, that they are concepts! (As before, there is a substantial assumption operative in this line of reasoning, namely, that quantification is referential in character. But this is not the only view of quantification available. The substitutional view, for example, sees quantification as based not on relations between language and objects, but on relations between linguistic expressions. On that approach, quantification does not entail naming. For a survey of substitutional theories of quantification, see Hand 2007.)

The view was supposed to be an explanation of the unity of the proposition. If, however, as Wiggins and Gaskin think, the paradox is a fatal difficulty for it, the view turns out not to be a good explanation. Moreover, the paradox, if it is sound, shows that if we want to talk about concepts, we cannot insist on their unsaturatedness. In Gaskin's words:

> What Frege's paradox shows is that one cannot both talk about
> concepts (in a sense which admits quantification over them) and
> continue to insist on their essentially unsaturated ... nature.
> One of these commitments has to be abandoned. If we wish,
> as we surely do, to talk about concepts (in the above sense),
> then it cannot be those very concepts which account, by being
> unsaturated, for the unity of the proposition. (Gaskin 1995: 166)

that quantifies over properties, relations and propositions, and so is my own symbolic representation of essentialist predication (which is based on Bealer's $\mathcal{L}_\omega$).

6.2.4 The Wiggins-Gaskin Solution

By 'the Wiggins-Gaskin solution' I mean the logical product (the overlapping) of Wiggins' and Gaskin's own solutions to the problem of the unity of the proposition. In setting it forth, I will follow Gaskin 1995. I will then say to what extent Gaskin's own view departs from Wiggins'.[65]

The Wiggins-Gaskin solution is 'to take seriously the contribution made to the unity of the proposition by the copula' (Gaskin 1995: 171). Specifically, Wiggins and Gaskin agree with Frege that the unity of the proposition should be explained in terms of the saturatedness-unsaturatedness conceptual pair. Given the Fregean paradox, however, unsaturatedness should not be attributed to concepts: *both* objects and concepts should rather be thought of as saturated or complete entities – i.e., as *bona fide* Fregean objects – and thereby referred to by names. It is rather the copula that should be treated as the unsaturated component of the proposition, and thus as 'the glue which supports the assertoric function of a proposition and prevents it from degenerating into a mere list' (Gaskin 1995: 171).

This solves the Fregean conundrum, while preserving the advantages of the underlying Fregean idea: the unity of the proposition stems from two names (referring to two saturated entities) immediately saturating the copula. For this to be a solution to Bradley's regress, however, and for it not to incur in a 'paradox of the copula', a further move is required. Indeed, if the copula refers to an unsaturated entity, then there is the problem as

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[65]The view defended in the more recent Gaskin 2008 is, so far as I can tell, by and large similar to that of Gaskin 1995 – barring some differences which, however, are irrelevant to the present discussion.

to how we can say something about that entity. If, however, it is claimed that the copula is itself unsaturated, but refers to a *bona fide* object, the instantiation relation, then Bradley's regress is still an issue. The move is then to claim that the copula *does not refer* – and, in particular, that it does not refer to the instantiation relation. As Gaskin puts it:

> If now we wish to avoid Bradley's regress, we shall have to take the further step of denying that the copula designates a relation. This further step is explicitly taken by Wiggins. In that case, the right thing to say will be that the doctrine of sense and reference simply does not apply to the copula, which has no referent . . . . (Gaskin 1995: 172)

And:

> On Wiggins' view of the role of the copula, the regress does not arise, because although the regress certainly arises for analyses which appeal to relations such as 'falls under', 'instantiates', 'participates in', 'is subsumed under' and so on, it does not arise for *the copula*. . . . If, with Wiggins, we deny that the copula designates a relation, it will follow that . . . 'instantiates' and so on do *not* give the meaning of the copula: the copula, on this view, designates nothing, i.e., it is not its job to designate. It is mere propositional form. (173)

This, however, as we shall see presently, is where Wiggins and Gaskin fall out. Before we get to that, however, it is important to realise that to say that concepts are objects is not, *per se*, to say that there is no difference

between concepts and other types of objects, such as individuals. This is where, as Gaskin puts it, the traditional distinction between universals and particulars is vindicated (Gaskin 1995: 173): specifically, every object can be named by a linguistic subject, but it is only universals that can be named by predicates.[66]

6.2.5   The Wiggins-Gaskin Solution and Husserl

The Wiggins-Gaskin solution and Husserl's theory of predication overlap in important respects. Just like Wiggins and Gaskin, Husserl is sceptical of the Fregean assimilation of concepts to functions. See for example the following passage (about the quantity of propositions):

> It is not true that all judgements have arguments, or that they imply in themselves a function that, so to speak, would be endowed with a value according to its universal or singular validity. (*Logik 1917/18*, §32e: 149)

But even apart from explicit pronouncements, in Husserl's semantics as it is laid out in *FTL* and *EJ* there is simply no indication that functions or function-like objects have any role outside mathematics. Indeed, for Husserl, as well as (as we have seen) for Wiggins and Gaskin, concepts are rather *bona fide* objects: universals.

Moreover, Husserl too explains the unity of the proposition in syntactic (rather than in ontological) terms: what holds together the elements of the predicative structure is, recall from Section 1, the synthetic function

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[66]Incidentally, this is also Bealer's view. See Bealer 1982: 87-88. See also Bealer 1989.

of the copula. True, the nature of the objects involved has, for Husserl, a bearing on syntax: it is only universals that, in virtue of their nature, can function as predicates. However, whereas for Husserl being a universal is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for functioning as predicate (for universals may also function as substrates, relative objects, etc.), being a Fregean concept is a necessary and sufficient condition for functioning as predicate: due to the paradox, Fregean concepts can never be substrates in Husserl's sense.

Connected with the last remarks is the question as to whether the copula refers. Here Wiggins and Gaskin disagree. Gaskin does endorse Wiggins' move of taking the copula to be what, due to its unsaturatedness, accounts for the unity of the proposition. However, he emphasises that one should endorse the further move of denying that the copula refers *only* on condition that one wishes to avoid Bradley's regress. In fact, however, Bradley's regress, so Gaskin argues, is not vicious; indeed, it is for him what grounds the unsaturatedness of the copula. Therefore, we should not seek to avoid it. See Gaskin 1995: 176. It is not clear to me, I have to say, what Gaskin is up to here. But what is important for the present discussion is what the view, whatever its details, entails: that there is no need to claim that the copula does not refer, and, in particular, there is no need to claim that the copula does not refer to the instantiation relation.

In fact, for Gaskin the claim that the copula does not refer (to the instantiation relation) is not only unnecessary, but pernicious – for two reasons. First, because it puts one in a condition of having to explain why, of all the members of the proposition, the copula is the only one that does not refer;

not, notice, one that lacks a reference, but one whose job is simply not to refer. This, however, is for Gaskin an *ad hoc* solution (Wiggins, he says, 'simply legislates' that the copula does not refer) – and, notice, to what, in his view, is a false problem (as, again, according to Gaskin Bradley's regress is not vicious). Second, because if the copula does not refer, then for Gaskin, even if we have an explanation of the unity of the proposition, i.e., of predication, we are bereft of an account of 'predicative being'– that is, of the unity not of subject and predicate, but of an object and its determinations. To possess such an account, however, is a 'philosophical need' (Gaskin 1995: 175) that must be satisfied somehow. Therefore, the copula must refer – it must, so to speak, have a counterpart in the world. And since Bradley's regress is not vicious, or so Gaskin argues, the notion that the copula refers – to the instantiation relation – is not problematic. Moreover, for Gaskin it is the copula, *not* the instantiation relation, that is unsaturated – which warrants the possibility that the instantiation relation be quantified over, and thus properly talked about.

Husserl is more on Wiggins' side. As we have seen, for him too the copula does not refer – or, at least, not as syntagmas do. Indeed, the copula is a moment of unity, and thus a moment of pure form: it has 'no relatedness to subject-matter'. However, his position is not *ad hoc* (unlike, I am inclined to agree with Gaskin, Wiggins'). For Husserl the copula does not refer because it merely signals, at the level of logic and language (i.e., at stage 2), the synthetic activity of predicative consciousness (stage 1). Moreover, if the Husserlian picture has to accommodate infinitive predication, not only must the copula not refer, as Gaskin would have it, to the instantiation

relation, but it must be *independent* of substrate and predicate being in that relation. More about the last point in Section 3.

Notice that the fact that Husserl accounts for the unity of the proposition in terms of consciousness rather than in ontological terms does not entail that, for him, there is no ontological basis for a predication being true or false – i.e., as Gaskin would put it, that Husserl has no account of predicative being. In the case of a perceptual proposition, non-cognitive, stage-0 syntheses are such a basis: if a predication expresses the actual result of those syntheses, then the predication is true; otherwise it is false. One could observe that this merely shifts the problem: since non-cognitive syntheses too are subjective, the question arises as to whether they have an ontological basis. Moreover, if there are – as I will indeed argue in the next section – cognitive syntheses that are not based on non-cogntive ones (such as those underpinning infinitive predications), the problem cannot even be shifted to the non-cognitive ground. This is one place where Husserl's idealism becomes relevant. Because, being an idealist, Husserl is in a position to allow both cognitive and non-cognitive syntheses, and thus predications, to have an ontological basis *and* to cash out the latter *itself* in terms of consciousness and intentional performances (i.e., in terms of what in Chapter 1, Section 4.3, I called the total harmonization of intersubjective experience).

A final remark. First, one could point out that precisely because the copula expresses the synthetic activity of predicative consciousness, for Husserl it refers to that activity. If this view is to be maintained, however, it must first be qualified. It is important, specifically, that even if the synthetic

activity of predicative consciousness is the referent of the copula, it should not be allowed to appear in the proposition itself or in its nominalisations. Consider, for example, the proposition 'The tomato is red' and its nominalisation, 'The proposition that the tomato is red'. Suppose that *is* refers to the synthetic activity of predicative consciousness. Will then *is* be substitutable *salva veritate* with *enters a predicative synthesis with the universal Red*? The answer must be that it does not: because if the two were substitutable, then the copula would, contrary to Husserl's theory, bear on the subject-matter of the proposition. I propose, therefore, to reject the view altogether, and rather think of the relationship between the copula and the synthetic activity of predicative consciousness not in terms of reference, but in terms of grounding: the fact that a is u is grounded on the fact that a and u enter a predicative synthesis. More precisely, since their entering that synthesis does not depend on the particular subject that operates the synthesis, but is rather grounded on the specific characteristics of a and u, my considered proposal is the following:

(57) The fact that a is u is grounded on the fact that it is possible that a and u should enter a predicative synthesis

Summing up, then, the principles of Husserl's theory of predication allow Husserl to take a stance vis-à-vis the problem of the unity of the proposition that is similar to the Wiggins-Gaskin solution. In particular, Husserl, like Wiggins and Gaskin, analyses the predicational structure at stage 2 in terms of two names being connected by (in Husserl's language) a moment of pure form, which, apart from cases of verbal predication, is

the copula. We have seen that this kind of view, though minoritarian if compared to the Fregean functional approach, is in no obvious way inferior to the latter. Husserl, however, is closer to Wiggins than to Gaskin with respect to the question as to whether the copula refers. Whereas Gaskin's view is that the copula refers to the instantiation relation, Husserl's and Wiggins' view is that it does not refer at all; and if it can be argued, as Gaskin does, that it is not clear what Wiggins' reasons are to hold that view, Husserl holds it because, as we know from Section 1, for him the copula is expressive of the synthetic activity of cognitive consciousness (to which, according to (57), it is related not in terms of reference, but in terms of grounding). Finally, although Husserl accounts for predication in terms of consciousness, he does not leave what Gaskin calls 'predicative being' (i.e., the ontological basis, or counterpart, of predication) unaccounted for: because for Husserl being is itself to be understood in terms of consciousness. This is also expressed in my proposal, (57).

6.3   Infinitive Predication

In this section I defend the view that predication, in the Husserlian framework, does not necessarily involve instantiation. This is required in order to make full sense of infinitive essentialist predications (laws about eide), which place universals in the essence of other universals without the latter instantiating the former. Husserl's official theory of predication, as set out in *FTL* and *EJ*, has no room for non-instantiation-based predication; indeed, as I showed in Chapter 1, Section 3, and mentioned in the introduction to

this chapter, the theory entails principle (2*), according to which predication as such is instantiation-based. I submit, however, that the theory can be liberalised so as to accommodate cases of predication that do not abide by (2*).

6.3.1 Preliminary Remarks

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, we should distinguish between the principles and the paradigms of Husserl's theory of predication. The principles are those that I presented in Section 1 of this chapter. The paradigms are the perceptual cases that Husserl relies on in working out the full-fledged theory I presented in Chapter 1, Section 3. The position I will defend here is that (2*) is indeed entailed by the paradigms, but *not* by the principles. More precisely, the principles *as Husserl presents them* do entail (2*); but the reason why Husserl presents them as he does, is that he has in mind the paradigms right from the beginning. Once we start looking at the paradigms *not* as paradigms, but as cases among other cases, the principles become available for liberalisation and able to accommodate non-instantiation-based predication.

Husserl has his reasons for being interested in what he takes to be the paradigms of predication, namely, in predications based on perceptual experience. In order to give those reasons, let me introduce Husserl's distinction between 'static' and 'genetic' phenomenology. Static phenomenology studies, for any type of intentional object, what kind of intentional performances constitute (bring to consciousness) objects of that kind. Genetic

phenomenology, on the other hand, studies the preconditions for those intentional performances to take place, and thus for intentional objects of the relevant type to be constituted. In other words, according to Husserl, for certain types of intentional object to make their appearance in a subject's conscious life, the subject must first have undergone certain other experiences; the latter, in this sense, function as a necessary condition, or precondition', for the former. Genetic phenomenology traces every type of intentional performances back to its preconditions. Importantly, genetic phenomenology is not psychology: on the contrary, it is as eidetic and *a priori* as static phenomenology. Indeed, what Husserl is interested in as a genetic phenomenologist is the preconditions that *the nature* of a given act-object correlation prescribes. As A.D. Smith puts it:

> What Husserl is concerned with in his genetic enquiries are *essential compossibilities* that are determinable a priori. Certain forms of experience and comportment necessarily exclude others, and necessity can attach to the *order* in which they make their appearance in a conscious life. Husserl believes he can attain transcendental clarity even with respect to such genetic issues. (Smith 2003: 119-120)

Now, of all types of experience, Husserl thinks, perception is the most fundamental – in the genetic-phenomenological sense that it is a precondition for every other kind of experience. That is why, when it comes to predication and predicative consciousness, the most basic, and thus, for Husserl, the paradigmatic cases are of *perceptual* predication and predica-

tive consciousness. That is also why his official theory of predication is worked out solely on the basis of perceptual cases.

This attitude is clearly discernible in *EJ*, the main source for Husserl's mature theory of predication. *EJ* is a book about the genetic relation between perception ('Experience') and the predicative intentional performances based thereon ('Judgement'); and the theory of predication put forth in it is so constrained by the initial choice of subject matter that even when Husserl deals with abstract thought and free imagination, as he does towards the end of the book, he has always in mind abstract thoughts and free-imaginative episodes *about perceptual contexts*. One might point out that, given the subject of *EJ*, it is not surprising that Husserl should only discuss perception-based predication in it, and that this hardly shows that Husserl's *general* theory of predication is biased towards perception in any way. This is reasonable – *except* that the same biased attitude is present in *FTL*, even though *FTL* is a book not about the relations between predication and experience, but about formal logic. The reason why the attitude is so pervasive, as I have already pointed out, is that since Husserl takes perception to be the fundamental kind of intentional performance, for him all phenomenological and transcendental analyses must ultimately lead back to it.

Again, the reason why Husserl's bias towards perception is a problem is that in the field of perception no counterexample will be found to (2*) – at least, none that I can think of. And, indeed, as I argued in Chapter 1, the Husserlian theory limited to its paradigms does entail (2*). If, however, we broaden the scope of the investigation and look at non-perceptual cases,

then we do encounter counterexamples to (2*): laws about eide. The point, notice, is not simply that, if Husserl's theory of predication does not take into account non-perceptual predications such as laws about eide, then it is a bad theory of predication in that it is not comprehensive enough. It is rather that Husserl *needs* to account for laws about eide: for if laws about eide are not accounted for, Husserlian Essentialism is groundless.

One might object that in *EJ* Husserl does take essentialist truths into account – and in great detail, for that matter (at least in *EJ*). That is true, but he focuses on eidetic laws, not on laws about eide. And notice that even if laws about eide had been incorporated by Husserl in the *EJ* theory, they would have been disguised as generic propositions – for Husserl, as we saw in Chapter 3, endorses the generic account of laws about eide – and thus would not have counted for Husserl as counterexamples to (2*). The generic account of laws about eide, however, was rejected in Chapter 3 in favour of the infinitive account. And laws about eide construed according to the latter definitely are counterexamples to (2*).

We thus need a way to account for laws about eide, and infinitive predication in general, from within the Husserlian theory, but without being taken in by Husserl's reliance on perceptual paradigms. In what follows, then, I will ignore the paradigms and only focus on the principles of the theory; and show that these admit of a straightforward expansion that, in turn, allows them to accommodate infinitive predication. In other words, once the over-emphasis that Husserl puts on paradigms while elaborating his overall theory is exposed, the logical space is open for liberalising the principles so that they can accommodate infinitive predication. Neglecting

the paradigms, notice, is not incompatible with Husserl's claim that the most basic form of predicative consciousness – the one from which all other forms stem – is perceptual. What it is incompatible with, is the claim – which, however, to my knowledge Husserl never explicitly makes – that all predication behaves exactly like the perceptual paradigm.

6.3.2 A New Core Form

The problem with infinitive predication is that propositions such as

 (58) To be a *u* is to be a *v*

are true only if the subject, denoted by *to be a u*, does not instantiate the predicate, denoted by *to be a v*, and are thus incompatible with (2*) – which, in turn, is entailed by Husserl's theory of predication. I said that, in order to solve the problem, we should focus on the principles rather than on the paradigms of Husserl's theory. And focusing on the principles does indeed show that non-instantiation-based predication is possible in the Husserlian framework.

Consider our Husserlian definition of predication:

 (10) A predication is a logical objectivity expressing the enrichment that
       the sense of an object undergoes in cognitive syntheses

Apart from the stage-2 objectification, the one condition for there to be a predication is that there be a predicative synthesis resulting in the enrichment of the sense of the relevant object. This, *per se*, does *not* entail that the enrichment should consist in the connection of the object with a universal that it instantiates or bears. All that matters is that connections be

brought to consciousness between an object and something which, in virtue of this connection, somehow determines the object. If one tends to focus on Husserl's perceptual paradigms, one is likely to conflate the two things. But laws about eide – infinitive essentialist truths – have made us sensitive to the difference. Surely a proposition such as 'To be human is to be an animal' does express a synthesis, or a connection, between the universal Human and the universal Animal – one, in fact, that results in the sense of the former to be enriched by the universal Human being connected in the relevant way with universal Animal, even though Human does not instantiate Animal. If it does (as I will assume), then although, in Husserl's theory, predication restricted to perceptual paradigms may well entail instantiation, predication in and of itself does *not* entail instantiation. The question is: how are universals connected in infinitive predication, if not in terms of instantiation?

Before answering the question – in fact, in order to see how it should be answered – another issue needs to be addressed: even though (58) is compatible with the Husserlian definition of predication, it seems to be incompatible with Husserl's classification of core forms, which is itself part of the principles of the theory.

Consider *to be a u*: what core form does it express? That is, how is the universal *u* presented by it? Since *u* is the substrate of the proposition, according to the Husserlian theory its core form should be substantivity. If that is so, however, then *to be a v* will also present *v* with the core form of substantivity. For *to be a u* and *to be a v* seem to present two different objects (universals *u* and *v* respectively) in exactly the same way. But then

v, as presented by *to be a v*, will not be able to take on the syntactic form of the predicate: because it is only objects with the core form of adjectivity that can function as predicates. True, there is a way in which an object with the core form of substantivity can figure in a predicate: by being not the predicate, but a relative object. The only sense in which (58) can be said to feature a relational predicate, however, is to think of the latter as the relation of parthood (or partial identity). But that view has already been rejected (Chapter 3, Section 3). No: *to be a v* is a property-predicate, and *v* in it must therefore have the core form of adjectivity (in fact, of propertiness). But since *to be a v* clearly presents *v* exactly in the same way in which *to be a u* presents *u*, if the latter has the core form of substantivity, the former has it too. Therefore, *to be a u* cannot express the core form of substantivity.

Consider now *to be a v*. Since it is a predicate, and indeed a property, it must present *v* as a determination, and thus as having the core form of adjectivity (propertiness). And yet, how can it? *v* is presented in *to be a v* in exactly the same way as *u* is presented in *to be a u* – so that if the former has the core form of adjectivity, the latter must also have it. But then *u*, as presented by *to be a u*, will not be able to take on the syntactic form of the substrate: because, according to Husserl's theory, it is only objects presented as objects – i.e., having the core form of substantivity – that can function as substrates of predication. Therefore, *to be a v* cannot express the core form of adjectivity.

I see two reactions available. First, to challenge Husserl's definitions of either adjectivity or substantivity, perhaps on the basis of the charge that they are biased towards perceptual and thus instantiation-based predica-

tion, and propose new definitions able to accommodate (56). Alternatively, to accept Husserl's definitions of the two core forms, but then define, and make phenomenological (i.e., stage-1) sense of, a *new* core form, expressed in language (i.e., at stage 2) by infinitive verbal phrases. Supposing that both options yield the desired results, the second is more conservative with respect of Husserl's theory: because, unlike the first option, it does not reject, nor does it challenge, any of the principles of the theory – it merely adds a component. Thus, all things being equal, it should be preferred. In the next part of the section I will suggest how it can be implemented.

6.3.3 Determining Capacity

For an object to take on a core form is for it to be apprehended by consciousness in a specific way. The core form of adjectivity, for example, is apprehension as a determination, and is expressed, at stage 2, by adjectival, nominal or verbal phrases such as *red*, *human*, *(an) animal*, *runs*, etc. The core form of substantivity, on the other hand, is apprehension simply as an object, and is expressed in language by nominal phrases such as *Socrates*, *humanity*, *the property of being red*, *the universal Animal*, and so on. My view is that there is at least one additional core form, i.e., one additional mode of apprehension, expressed in language by infinitive verbal phrases such as *to be human*, *to be an animal*, *to run*, and the like. In Chapter 3 I characterised infinitive verbal phrases – 'subjectless predicates', as I also called them – by saying that they denote universals' considered in their determining capacity'. Here I will develop that very idea, and make a case for the existence

of the core form of *determining capacity*.

At a first approximation, the core form of determining capacity is the apprehension of an object neither as a determination nor simply as an object, but as a *potential* determination, viz., as an object that could be apprehended as a determination. Thus:

(59) For an object to take on the core form of determining capacity is for it to be apprehended as an object that could be apprehended as a determination

It follows, among other things, that the only objects that can be apprehended in their determining capacity are universals, because they are the only objects that could be apprehended as determinations.

As I said, however, (59) is only an approximation of the nature of determining capacity as a core form: there is more to it. The reason why, in fact, there *must* be more to it if the notion is to make sense, is that (59) by itself does not explain how a universal apprehended in its determining capacity could, by functioning as predicate in a predicative synthesis, enrich the sense of another universal similarly apprehended. That is to say: if *to be human* and *to be an animal* merely represented the universals Human and Animal as objects that could be represented as determinations, then what would the predication 'To be human is to be an animal' express? In what sense could *to be an animal* be said to enrich the sense of *to be human*? The question, notice, is all the more important because infinitive verbal phrases, and thus the new core form, appear virtually only in propositions of this type (or in questions the answers to which are such propositions).

I propose that the apprehension of a universal in its determining capacity includes, in addition to the status of the universal as a potential determination, the consciousness of what I will be calling the universal's specific *way of determining*. This is the way in which the universal would determine an object if and when, apprehended as a determination, it entered a predicative synthesis with the role of the predicate. In other words, *to be human* does not merely present the universal Human as an object that could be apprehended as a determination, but also presents it as an object that, apprehended as a determination, would determine objects in a certain specific way. Here is a way to illustrate the proposal:

determining
capacity

status as a potential
determination
liability to be apprehended as a
determination = liability to take on the
core form of adjectivity

$+$

specific way of determining
way in which the universal would determine
if it were apprehended as a determination
(= if it took on the core form of adjectivity)

Now, my view is that infinitive predication consists in the enrichment of the sense of a universal considered in its determining capacity and with respect to its specific way of determining, achieved through the connection, in predicative synthesis, of the universal, functioning as substrate, with another universal, functioning as predicate, considered in its determining

capacity and with its own specific way of determining. Every time we wish to spell out a given universal's way of determining, i.e., enrich its sense with respect to its way of determining, we engage in infinitive predication. That, I submit, is what 'To be human is to be an animal', and indeed all infinitive predications (among them, the essentialist ones: laws about eide), are ultimately all about.

The assumption is, of course, that objects with the core form of determining capacity may take on both the syntactic form of the substrate and the syntactic form of the predicate. But that, I think, is plausible. For one thing, universals presented in their determining capacity are presented not as determinations, but as objects; to that extent, there is nothing to prevent them from functioning, in a predicative synthesis, as substrates. After all, infinitive verbal phrases can function as grammatical subjects. However, universals presented in their determining capacity are not presented *simply* as objects: they are presented as objects that could be apprehended as determinations *and* as having a specific way of determining. To that extent, I submit, they can take on the role of predicate as well. And that is how it should be: for infinitive verbal phrases can be grammatical predicates. The fact that the nature of the core form of determining capacity allows universals that have it to function both as substrate and as predicate is therefore what makes it possible to predicate, say, *to be an animal* of the universal Human considered in its determining capacity – and, in general, what explains infinitive predication. The proposal is illustrated in the following diagram:

This is just like the diagram of Section 1, except that a new core form has been added, determining capacity. The yellow arrows connecting it to the syntactic forms express the fact that core stuffs with the core form of determining capacity may take on *both* the syntactic form of the subject and that of the predicate. As I said above, the fact that the core form of determining capacity allows for this is precisely what explains infinitive predication. In turn, that fact is explained by what the core form of determining capacity is: the apprehension of a universal as, first of all, a potential determination, and secondly, with its specific way of determining. Finally, the reason why what the core form of determining capacity is explains the fact that the core stuffs that have it may be both subjects and predicates is the following. It makes no sense either to predicate an object apprehended

simply as an object of another object apprehended simply as an object, or to predicate a universal apprehended as a determination of another universal apprehended as a determination: because either way the two will not be connected in such a way that the predicated item be able to enrich the sense of the other item. Indeed, in the first case there is no determination to be added to the sense of the subject; while in the second case there is no object (i.e., no object considered as an object) whose sense could be enriched. It does make sense, however, to predicate a universal apprehended in its determining capacity of another universal apprehended in its determining capacity: because the universal functioning as subject *is* apprehended as an object (albeit not simply as an object), and, on the other hand, the universal functioning as predicate *is* apprehended as a determination – albeit only as a potential one. And the way in which the sense of the subject is enriched by the predicate is with respect to the subject's way of determining, which is connected, in the predicative synthesis, with the way of determining of the predicate.

Notice that the account is framed in phenomenological terms, i.e., in terms of stage-1 intentional operations and achievements; therefore, it has all the credentials for being a *bona fide* extension of Husserl's own theory of predication. Let me also stress that if the details of the account – or, indeed, the account in its entirety – are rejected, the need will remain to extend (or challenge) the Husserlian theory so as to accommodate infinitive predication.

If the proposal is viable, however, infinitive predication in general is accounted for. Let me now wrap up things with respect to infinitive *essentialist*

predication.

Of the universals that, considered in their determining capacity and put in a predicative synthesis with a given universal u also considered in its determining capacity, enrich the sense of u by spelling out its specific way of determining – of those universals, some are *essential* (i.e., infinitive-essential) to u, while others are not. In the first case, the relevant predication will be an infinitive essentialist one; in the second case, it will not. For example, 'To be human is (essentially) to be an animal' is an infinitive essentialist predication about the universal Human, and the universal Animal is in the latter's infinitive essence – i.e., recall from Chapter 5, in the set $\mathcal{E}_i^{\text{Human}}$. The infinitive essence of a universal u is thus constituted by the universals that, considered in their determining capacity, are liable to enrich in an essential way the sense of u with respect to its way of determining. Such enrichment of sense is what laws about eide express. Notice that according to Husserlian (and Finean) Essentialism the difference between the essential and the non-essential cases cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, and should rather be treated as primitive. Now consider 'To be English is to have influence, to dominate a larger political body and yet have a separate cultural identity'. It is not an infinitive essentialist predication about the universal English, because having influence, dominating larger political bodies, and so on, do not spell out the universal's essential way of determining. It is, however, an infinitive predication in every respect.

Importantly, for a universal v to be in a position to enrich the sense of a universal u with respect to u's way of referring, *u must not instantiate v*. The way of referring of the eidos Ideal Object, for example, does not and cannot

enrich the sense of the eidos Human with respect to its way of referring, but rather the sense of Human as an object. Indeed, while it is true that the universal Human is an ideal object, it is false that to be human is to be an ideal object.

Finally, the reason why a law about eide such as 'To be human is to be an animal' grounds the eidetic law 'Every possible human is an animal' is that the former expresses the fact that, to put it slightly crudely, determining something as human is determining it also as an animal – so that every thing that is determined as human (and thus, notice, instantiates Human) is also determined as an animal (and thus also instantiates Animal).

If this proposal is accepted, laws about eide are finally accounted for – thanks to what, after all, is a minor intervention in Husserl's theory of predication. Specifically, the sense in which laws about eide are predications is now accounted for, and so are the sense in which they are essentialist predications and the sense in which they ground eidetic laws. Their role in Husserlian Essentialism is therefore secured.

6.4   Summary and Conclusive Remarks

The task of this chapter was to provide a non-instantiation-based account of predication that could complement Husserl's instantiation-based one. This was needed in order to fully account for laws about eide, by embedding the notion of infinitive essentialist proposition (a notion introduced, defended and identified with that of law about eide in Chapter 5) in a Husserlian theory of predication.

Central to the non-instantiation-based account was the introduction, in the Husserlian theory, of a new core-form, which I called the form of 'determining capacity'. I argued that the core form is genuine and that it does a good job explaining infinitive predication in general and infinitive essentialist predication in particular.

The chapter also featured a discussion of the so-called problem of the unity of the proposition, and in particular of Wiggins' and Gaskin' view, with the main purpose of familiarising the reader with the Husserlian theory by showing how the latter may fare in recent debates.

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