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Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

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Abstract

The paper will show how one may rationalize one-boxing in Newcomb’s problem and drinking the toxin in the Toxin puzzle within the confines of causal decision theory by ascending to so-called reflexive decision models which reflect how actions are caused by decision situations (beliefs, desires, and intentions) represented by ordinary unreflexive decision models.

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Correspondence to Wolfgang Spohn.

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I dedicate this paper to Karel Lambert, a first version of which I have presented on the conference on occasion of his 75th birthday at UCI in April 2003. And I am indebted to the thoughtful remarks of an anonymous referee.

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Spohn, W. Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box. Synthese 187, 95–122 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0023-5

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