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20 March 2010

Theor Soc (2010) 39:451–470
DOI 10.1007/s11186-010-9116-2

Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered

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Published online: 20 March 2010

Abstract Industrial welfare history presents important challenges to developmental state theories in "late" industrialization. This article expands the debate by examining how nation-states create statutory welfare by addressing institutional variety beyond markets. It is simplistic to argue linear growth of national welfare or of states autonomously regulating markets to achieve risk-mitigation. I contend that welfare institutions emerge from the state's essential conflict and collaboration with various alternate institutions in cities and regions. Using histories of Europe, India, and Karnataka, I propose a *place-based*, *work-based*, and *work-place based* welfare typology evolving at differential rates. Although economic imperatives exist to expand local risk-pools, it is precisely the alternate institutional diversity that makes late industrial nation-states unable or unwilling to do so. This results in institutionally "thin," top-down industrial welfare. Ultimately, theories that overly depend on histories of small nations, homogenous nations, or city-states, provide weak tests of the economics of industrial welfare.

The state in late industrial welfare

The study of capital accumulation has generated the most influential state theories of the twentieth century. In most, the state is posed against markets and acts as the development institution of last resort in specifying cost structures and mitigating risks during industrial transformation. This article examines the evolution of industrial welfare during "*late*" industrial development. I analyze the historical record of how states institute welfare and regulate markets, thus managing conflicts between production and redistribution. I consider several questions: Are traditional models of linear growth of welfare institutions appropriate for late industrializing states? What is the appropriate scale of the "state": nation, city, or region? Finally,

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under what conditions can and do states incorporate pre-existing institutions in statutory systems?

My response is that it is simplistic to argue linearity of growth of national welfare institutions or to consider states autonomously regulating markets to do so. We have to look beyond classic market failure arguments. Instead, late industrial welfare institutions emerge from essential conflicts and collaborations between states and multiple alternate institutions, not markets alone. I emphasize here that while economic and actuarial imperatives exist for nation-states to expand local risk-pools, late industrial nation-states may be unable or unwilling to do so, resulting in institutionally “thin,” top-down industrial welfare.

For reasons of space, I do not visit state ‘developmentalism’ in depth, but analyze its welfare aspects in the following sections. I define industrial welfare as institutionalized modes of state-supported social provision delivered to workers in services and manufacturing, and then propose a terminology to better distinguish comparative risk-mitigation in *place-based*, *work-based*, and *work-place based* industrial welfare. These may not be exclusive domains of the state (in fact rarely are). This sets up my enquiry into state rule over institutional variety. Its actions then emerge from the trust (or lack of it) vested in it by other actors. Its legitimacy can be seen through open-ended, evolving, and contested local norms. The economics of this trust and information challenge in statutory expansion require closer scrutiny.

Nation-states continue to be dynamic variables in both theory and practice. However, the *development* aspects of nation-states remain vastly under-theorized. My task is thus more than pointing out exotic oddities from India. Rather, I consider late industrial welfare evolution and variety as presenting an important challenge to state theories. The productive side of late industrializing societies has been an extraordinarily active research area for over 30 years, but the redistributive side has largely been ignored or constituted in linear terms. This article starts to redress this imbalance.

The economics of risk and industrial welfare

> “*I propose here the view that, when the market fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some extent at least, recognize the gap, and nonmarket social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it…..*” (Arrow 1963a, p. 947)

Polanyi posed society’s dilemma as a double movement oscillating from unregulated markets (the “fictitious self-regulating market”) to social protections in order to minimize risk exposure in a fully waged economy (Polanyi 1944/1957). In his *Great Transformation*, the state responds to wage-dependence and insecurities of industrialization and urbanization, but is pulled in two often conflicting directions: between supporting market capitalism through industrial production, and instituting social protections to minimize its risks (see Table 1 below) often through a contested amalgam of local parish and poorhouse.

In principle, workers can derive personal risk mitigation and security from: (1) wage income and occupational welfare (2) private provision of savings and insurance (3) voluntary welfare (e.g., families) (4) state intervention via labor

Table 1 Work and risk

Typology of risks	Examples
Low frequency	Serious illness, emergency hospitalization, loss of spouse as care-giver or income-earner
High frequency	Minor or chronic illness, occupational hazards
Idiosyncratic (random)	Non-communicable diseases, occupational health, loss of assets (e.g., flooding, fire, looting, confiscation)
Covariate (randomly but affects individuals, households, community simultaneously)	Flooding, drought, inflation, riots, fire
Repeated shocks, risk events (covariate and repeated)	Persistent drought, repeated flooding

(Adapted from Lund and Srinivas 2000, p. 47)

markets, social structures, tax financing, and expenditures (Barr 1992). Industrial welfare has historically had incentives and information characteristics manifested in cash benefits, healthcare, education, food, housing, or other services (ibid.).

States may reduce transactions costs and mitigate risks (North 1987), attributes purported to strengthen as "development" occurs (indeed seen *as* development). However, in practice, neither states nor markets act exclusively against risks. Social institutions such as family, kinship, religion, or caste have always served as institutions of last resort. National statutory systems may mimic each other, but informal risk and care systems are regionally and culturally distinct. Nation-states must regulate markets *and* these institutions to expand coverage.

Risk-pooling occurs when insurers aggregate similar but unrelated risks through a random selection of individuals. Private insurers often do not pool risks but cluster them to effect a desired composition of individuals and risk. Larger pools instead spread out the statistical odds against idiosyncratic risks of any individual. Moreover, states can cover risks that private markets may be unwilling or unable to provide, ensuring that welfare regimes provide efficient responses to social needs (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). The more compulsory the system, the better the risk-pooling and higher the likelihood that states can de-link premium amounts from individual risk (ibid.). Organizational delivery may be public or private. Markets or states can generate incentives and information structures to broaden insurance and risk-pooling behaviors and minimize adverse selection, moral hazard, and information asymmetries. In principle therefore, it is efficient that risk-pools and solidarity communities grow. However, social insurance implies information and political challenges because market mechanisms may be inefficient in evening out information differences among classes of people (Arrow 1963a, b; Arrow 1972). Moreover, the state's onus of persuasion and inclusion can be particularly high for compulsory social insurance, and non-insurance can have negative effects.

Social insurance expansion is further influenced by the fact that nation-states view employers as better risks than individual workers and thus focus on employer-mediated institutions to mitigate risks and boost production. This may appear as a Walrasian process in which the state matches employers to workers and thus facilitates production and market processes. Proletarianization therefore becomes not only a state-sanctioned process of waged work, but also of shifting risk, oftentimes incompletely, to different institutions over time. This incompleteness of shifting risk is compounded by the fact that markets are themselves fundamentally gender-uneven (Beneria 1999). Incompleteness can also galvanize states to subsidize alternate institutions such as family with state-funded income supports, thus deepening gender impacts (Orloff 1996).[1]

However, familiarity and locality generate their own risks. Adjacent and homogenous communities can simplify administration and generate higher voluntary subscriptions, but proximity heightens their exposure to covariate risks and repeated shocks. Factory work and factory housing historically mitigated some risks and exacerbated others through co-location. Mutual insurance was alien in some places (Platteau 1997).Consequently, risk-pooling has particular economics and financing and specific geographies and solidarities. These influence insurance failures of adverse selection (riskier individuals are selected into the pool, creating too many similar risks) and moral hazard (individuals adopt riskier behavior once insured). The state's rationing of benefits can temper these risks but over-rationing may stymie participation and ultimately undermine the state's legitimacy.

LIs contend with all risks listed in Table 1, many simultaneously, compounded by industrial development. Nevertheless, despite the economic and actuarial imperatives to expand risk-pools, it is precisely the diversity of alternate institutions that makes LI nation-states unable or unwilling to do so.

Evolutionary states

Nation-states and non-market institutions

A "logic of industrialism" (LoI) predicts institutional convergence and weakly explains the rise of social protection programs and roughly similar forms of labor representation (Cutright 1965; Collier and Messick 1975; Flora and Alber 1981). It seduces in suggesting that states linearly institute systems of social supports in response to industrial development and technological change. Emphasis is on modernization, on convergent market structures, and a rise in work-place entitlements. Although empirically weak, this technologically deterministic thesis continues to dominate assessment of and policy advice to late industrializers.[2]

However, "lateness" generates a diversity of institutional responses to economic backwardness and a greater state role (Gerschenkron 1962). LIs have adopted statutory welfare at earlier stages of economic development relative to Europe (e.g., Hort and Kuhnle 2000) but relegated this to a thin sliver of occupations and benefits. National programs have rarely arisen by fiat but through a messy institutional consolidation of local programs that rest in other risk institutions such as family,

[1] Governments pay for this "informal" social protection in early industrializers as well. Aging, childcare, women's labor market entry, and the collapse of extended family systems all affect care's costs.

[2] Variants extend from "catch-up" schools (Abramovitz 1986; Baumol 1986; Gerschenkron 1962), to modernization in social policy (e.g., Wilensky 1975; Flora and Alber 1981).

caste, and religion. These include, among others, traditional funeral arrangements, crop and savings insurance and voluntary savings schemes for weddings, sickness, and productive assets. Few scale to national levels; most remain locally effective but segmented (e.g., Lund and Srinivas 2000).

Tilly argues similarly that cities, states, and "trust networks" are often contemporaries but suffer an uneasy relationship of trust and domination (Tilly 2004, and 2010 in this issue). Four ideal types populate history: autonomous cities, city-states, centralized states, and nomadic empires (ibid.). I would argue that LI nation-states can be scrutinized in this manner. For example, East Asian "nation"-states are contestable in scale and institutional variety: Hong Kong and Singapore were essentially city-states and *entrepot* economies, Taiwan a small, homogenous, primarily agricultural nation-state.

In according supremacy to markets, development state models provide a historically impoverished institutional story. After all, even in "market failure," the state can move beyond correcting markets to creating and legitimizing them through alternate institutions. Through social insurance, LIs can potentially expand markets and build demand through both markets and other institutions. They can disproportionately shape markets through network effects, enlarging economies of scale and scope, and by regulating and supplying social services. Thus, rather than markets shaping the bounds of social protection, the latter may shape the former (Srinivas 2008a).

Nevertheless, to achieve social welfare maximization, they must politically lower costs and risks of decentralization and technological change. Further, by cross-pooling diverse groups, they must limit adverse selection and retain access to and coercive power over others. Essentially, this is an evolutionary exercise, often two steps forward and one step back. Despite theories of state autonomy, LI nation-states may not possess the means to control alternate institutions nor have goals of doing so.

Institutional integration: state rule and local rules

The state and its own institutions variously respond to this diversity and, by and large, seek power over or collaboration with local rules. Proletarianization in England and continental Europe, for example, was a process of state-induced breakdown of place-based (and especially land-based) institutions of solidarity and risk-pooling.

For early industrializers, three primary *national* varieties of welfare capitalism exist (Esping-Andersen 1990). Liberal regimes prioritize unregulated labor markets, individualize risks and depend heavily on market mechanisms to regulate the economy. They extol "self-help" and are least likely to provide wide citizenship entitlements (e.g., the United States and United Kingdom). Social democratic regimes-classically Nordic—passively regulate labor markets by means such as unemployment insurance but limit market scope and use the nation-state as bulwark of entitlements. They offer wider socialization and coverage of risk (ibid.). "Conservative-corporatist" regimes espouse passive labor market regulation, but use mixed markets where necessary to advance Bismarckian, occupationally (not citizenship)-based social insurance. They entail compulsory risk-pooling and strong familial ties (e.g., Germany and Austria).

However, national typologies hide variation. Evidence indicates that national welfare effectively amounts to pay-as-you-go in several countries; most people who use the system more than pay for it. Thus, an immense cross-pooling effort by nation-states is less essential to welfare states than is often portrayed (Shaikh 2003).[3] Moreover, LI dependent variables of 'social security effort' and per capita GDP hide the risks in economic dynamism of some cities and regions (even in important studies such as Pierson 2004; Chang 2002; Mkandawire 2004) and the local roots of social citizenship and social rights (e.g. Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990).[4] This is crucial today because non-state actors are shaping welfare in dramatic ways (Lund and Srinivas 2000; Barrientos 2004; Wood and Gough 2006). Local institutions for identity, settlement, and work-status registration are especially crucial during urban densification and can reveal channels for technological dynamism in LI production. This introduces a localized bi-directionality into the usually posited causal link between industrial development and welfare states.

A glance at LI cities and regions indicates that the *ex-post* national language derived from early-industrializing examples offers limited insights for industrial planning. Entirely new Indian, Chinese, or Korean townships have emerged for iron ore, textiles, and automobile production while older mercantile cities have been simultaneously reworked. Most LI nation-states have been poor at collaboration and decentralized planning, instead resorting to coercion and the withholding of benefits, failing to match up with any of the three standard national models. Even those East Asian states depicted as strategic omniscient planners, rested their growth in coercion, central economic controls, feminization of labor, dormitory systems, union repression, and over-reliance on family welfare (e.g., Standing 1999).

Emergence and evolution: threads of the nation

Work, place, work-place

Although productivity increases and industrial upgrading potentially lead to robust industrial welfare, benefits have not always evolved from upgrading, nor do work-place benefits guarantee better industrial performance. The blurring of welfare strands possibly lies in work's essence: labor is not only different from other commodities: "*labor power has to go home every night*" (Harvey 1989, p. 19). Alternate social institutions share workers with industrial production in distinct ways. A focus on work-place benefits therefore distorts or even overlooks completely their evolutions, and the definition, physical location, separation (or not) of home and work, and risks shared between both. For instance, in the United States, Katznelson argues that workers "*… act not on basis of the shared solidarities of class at work, but on that of ethnic and territorial affinities in their residential communities*" (Katznelson 1981, p. 19).

[3] Nations can be economically draining, even parasitic; an "economics of secession" might capture this.

[4] Single measures are misleading. Countries with almost 100% healthcare coverage may still reimburse hospital costs to only 50 percent (Beattie 2000).

Yet, nation-states have been especially tempting analytical units, yielding over-simplified aggregates of populations and industrial capabilities. Jamie Peck argues that it is vital not to discard local labor market variations *" . . . as quirky deviations from the universal competitive model by orthodox economists or as "noise" around a prevailing national model by political economists*" (Peck 1996, p. 12). Moreover, nation-state versus market debates often gloss over land and housing, intriguing omissions because, in the end, not nation-states, but city and regional states that usually remain closest to action and political repercussions. It is not "national" capital accumulation costs in assisting firms, designating and regulating workplaces, linking work and home, and combining transactions of land, labor, and capital; city and regional states control and collaborate with other institutions to mold migration, housing, transport, and sanitation infrastructure for future industrial transformation. Singapore and Hong Kong (and several Nordics) used housing as an essential component of industrial welfare. China's cities have contained and encouraged swells of workers with combined regulation of migration, transportation, and factory housing.

However, in addition to the state, firms in these regions nevertheless bear work-place costs in transitioning their workers from secondary to primary status (Doeringer and Piore 1971). Yet, these costs are lowered when alternate risk-mitigating or pooling institutions such as state, caste, family, or religion exist (Srinivas 2009). As state regulation shifts, or given market volatility and uncertain demand, firms find ever-evolving local optima to off-load risks to workers who then turn repeatedly to existing ties outside their work-place. No general equilibrium can be determined *ex-ante;* optima may unpredictably co-evolve from local iterations (Sabel 1994; Srinivas 2008b, 2009), or vertical risk-mitigation from patronage (e.g., Platteau 1995). These result in oscillating degrees, not absolutes, of proletarianization.

Therefore a distinction in terminology is worthwhile. Building on Table 1, a taxonomy of risk coverage can institutionally demarcate (a) territory (*place*) (b) labor status (*work*), (c) employer-dependent benefits (*work-place*). These describe the state's relationships to firms and their *regional risk ecology* (see Srinivas 2009). The three categories therefore advance evolutionary and testable paths and timelines for the emergence and change of institutions and can make more evident gender disparities. They offer distinctive policy lenses for economic downturns when work-place benefits decline or disappear. The terms can be mulled over: national insurance based on residence or citizenship is *place-based* even if administered through work-places. French nineteenth-century municipal welfare lends itself to *place-based* analysis mingled with some employer-driven benefits (*work-place*); contemporary U.S. challenges are to expand beyond *work-places;* India's rural employment guarantees are *work* entitlements, which may (or not) eventually combine contributory benefits independent of places and work-places.

The evolution of early industrializers

Seventeenth-century English transformation of labor markets and trade was fundamentally a town and city phenomenon where proletarians assembled in cities of different sizes (Hohenberg and Lees 1984; Tilly 1984; Mikkelsen 2005). Other parts of Europe witnessed more rural industrialization, thus physical location overall was vital in determining the political pressures of urban-rural, religious, and ethnic divides (Mikkelsen 2005). Work-place benefits have variously depended on these other institutions. Nordic "third sector" voluntarism grew out of state accommodation, subsidization, and often encouragement, of voluntary organizations as sites of 'bridging social capital' (Kangas and Palme 2005). These resulted in centralized wage-bargaining but locally influenced by sector: lowered profits through relatively high wages in declining productivity sectors and low wages in higher productivity, fast paced sectors, and thus increased profits (Moene and Wallerstein 2006). Moreover, increasing populations and urban re-structuring (slums, factories, townships, universities, and hospitals) fueled the shifts among place-based, work-place based, and more universal (and national) measures of work. Over a hundred-year period, German social insurance developed from small voluntary insurance schemes to state-supported and regulated compulsory insurance (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). Although U.S. welfare was anomalous in many respects, its cities too provided density of insurance coverage and benefits. However, the instituting of the Medicare Social Security Act made it more difficult to promote programs outside work-places, resulting in distrust between unions and other organizations (Berkowitz and McQuaid 1980; Rosner and Markowitz 2003). Place-based systems then ceded to work-place systems but not to further universal coverage.

Three trends are visible over approximately 400 years: changes in place-based systems of care, reduction in the gaps among three types of entitlements, and a centralization of welfare administration. Yet, European rules of settlement and registration continued to provide vital eligibility and mobility missing in LIs.

1. *Place-based welfare.*

European place-based care systems pre-date local government. Various aspects of territorial community were more congruent with government before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Wollmann 2006).[5] Local self-governments in medieval England and Sweden were closely aligned with rural communities where full-scale feudalism was less common. Ecclesiastical parishes and "quasi-republic" towns in England and Germany had free status within monarchic territories and retained the freedom to define settlement and welfare (ibid.).

In medieval times, the institutional complex of family, church, and growing emphasis on individualism, led to the rise of "corporations" (Greif 2005). These took on diverse regionally-based solidarities and organizational forms such as fraternities, mutual insurance guilds, universities, communes, military orders, and city-states (Greif 2004, 2005). The shift to nuclear families alongside enabled the rise of self-governance, individualism, and relatively arms-length relations among non-kinsmen. Thus regional risk-pooling gradually tended towards non-kin risk-sharing. The nuclear family's dominance by the late medieval period and the fall of extended families and tribes lent impetus to new economic transactions and social solidarity

[5] As Wollmann (2006) emphasizes, English "*government*" alludes to parliamentary and policy-making bodies and at the same time to executive and implementation. Since the nineteenth century, government refers to central and local authority. However, German *Regierung*, and French *gouvernement*, refer to central sovereign power, not local exercise of authority, and local government is primarily administrative, not political.

(Guichard and Cuvillier 1996; Razi 1993). In this process, many corporations preceded European states. States, acting on shared interests with corporations, established the basis for statutory provision.

2. *Closing institutional and geographic gaps.*

Medieval outcomes influenced later settlement rules and allegiances. English fraternities, monasteries, mutual-insurance guilds, and customary poor laws provided solidarity against sickness, disability, famine, and unemployment (Richardson 2005). Buttressed by crop diversification and grain storage, they provided fairly continuous coverage in the interstices among work, place, and work-places.

This was crucial because mobility of entitlements did not always accompany labor mobility. A relatively seamless social security system was established by the mid-seventeenth century in towns, regions, and parishes of England and Wales. By contrast, even in progressive Holland, social security was patchy and largely restricted to towns (Solar 1995; Szreter 2006). Old English Poor Law and settlement rules sped up proletarianization, galvanized labor mobility, and reined in famine-related mortality (Szreter 2006). English urbanization thus *combined* institutions of settlement and registration (including thirteenth century English law of alienability of land and identity registration) to provide unique risk-mitigation. Workers could move, largely assured of some security (Solar 1995).

3. *Centralization and nationalization rooted in settlement.*

Industrialization and urbanization eventually forced local governments of Britain and Germany into multifunctional forms, creating diverse "local welfare states" before any centralization or nationalization project emerged (Wollmann 2006).

Legal traditions were partly responsible; British local councils contained no community equivalent to the continental *commune, kommune*, or *collectività* (ibid.). However, modern local government in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries diverged from local government embedded in local community; rather it emphasized citizenship resting in *property-dependent* rights and residence. By the late nineteenth century, Britain had entirely marginalized parishes, overhauled the scope of local government, and "*… had a long-term effect, in attenuating, if not extinguishing, the emotional and cognitive ties between the local population and the newly established local authorities in England*" (Wollmann 2006, p. 1423). This heralded in both England and the continent a disjuncture between territorial community and local states. Thus, increasingly, risk-mitigation formerly undertaken by local governments for local community became centralized and nationalized.

Yet, although the settlement and registration system came close to collapse from immense migration and the rise of urban factories that challenged cottage production, new actors initiated a return to local institutions. Independent chapels separated themselves from existing church and registers, and new classes emerged: "*… growing commercial and property-owning classes in society were sufficiently well aware that identity registration was of vital importance to their dynastic economic interests…. they wanted a much improved, comprehensive, and accessible national registration system established to serve their needs*" (Szreter 2006, p. 77). This state-supported national system built on these uniquely English local institutions, provided a powerful boost to labor and capital markets and a distinct advantage for capitalism and knowledge transmission (North 1981; Szreter 2006). Thus, locality proved essential.

Late industrializers

Effective demand-no rising tide

Although England's industrial welfare evolved from strong place-based institutions and the continent from more work-place orientation, both had far more in common than with LIs in merging institutional variety. Late industrial institutional diversity led to "thinness"; states constituted statutory programs but usually through anemic entitlements, off-loading risks to families and women.

Keynes contended that laissez-faire economies generated insufficient demand. Social insurance thus paved the European road to demand and higher consumption. However, this proved more problematic in LIs. Technological prowess and the pace of industrial transformation often raised risks, but preceded widespread systems of social insurance, and provided little effective demand or consumption. Kaleckian insights were more relevant to demand under state-targeted imperfect competition during import-substituting industrialization. However, weakened by low risk-coverage, low wage rates, fragmented power-sharing, and with no greater omniscience than private actors in estimating demand, the LI state instituted or substituted for existing welfare to a very limited degree. This piece-meal approach provided little of the effective demand seen in Europe. Although early relative to their per capita income "stage," LI welfare was limited to public sector benefits and exclusionary industrial relations.

Variation—the thinning out of institutions

Late industrializers have followed various paths to social insurance. In Japan, community health programs, *Jyorei*, were vital to risk-mitigation in the post-Meiji period and to eventual national insurance. The early eighteenth and middle nineteenth centuries marked the spread of these place-based voluntary programs, high participation rates, and grain payment options (Inoue 1979; Ogawa et al. 2003). Much later, the nation-state consolidated these century-old programs, and initiated a national community health insurance in 1933 in specific regions, later opened to all of Japan in 1935. Administration shifted to city associations and payments converted to cash. In 1961, approximately 200 years after the first *Jyorei* began, insurance became mandatory and universal coverage achieved. The family-corporatist hybrid welfare state now uses national community health insurance for those outside employer-driven health insurance, i.e., self-employed, farmers, shopkeepers, and the unemployed (Ogawa et al. 2003; Campbell and Ikegami 1998).

The Korean state moved from productivist social policies to more universal and redistributive goals after 1980 (Peng and Wong 2008). Decades of urbanization and population growth spurred identification and registration (Carrin and James 2005). Voluntary insurance commenced in 1966 (urban populations at 36.6% of total population), grew by 1975 (48.4%) 2 years before the introduction of compulsory social health insurance. The year 1977 marked the first social health insurance for corporate workers, and state supports for older and younger family members to pool income and reduce risks; 3 years later (1980), urban populations were 57.3% of total (Carrin and James 2005).

In both Korea and Taiwan, statutory policies offloaded risk to families and women (see Kwon 1998). Taiwanese wage-employment provided occupational risk-pooling but was far from seamless. Small urban states such as Singapore and Hong Kong sourced foreign (and often illegal) labor and hence circumvented domestic pressure for residence-based protections, resulting in productivist approaches focused on work-places.

What did this set of historical transformations mean for LIs? Most, like Japan, subordinated social policies to economic development and coerced other institutions to bear development's costs and risks. The state's supports of labor segmentation and control hierarchies allowed it to defray expenses through private markets resulting in lower state-spending in social security, healthcare, and public education (Jacobs 2000; Pierson 2004). Where priorities dovetailed as in Taiwan or Korea, conflict was relatively absent (Kwon 1998). In other instances, such as India (see below) of state conflict and fragmentation between multiple developmental goals—economic, security, and industrial welfare—the theoretical *problematique* of late industrial development remains (Boyd and Ngo 2005; Srinivas 2008a).

It may be that states that retained informal social protections alongside rapid industrial transformation built more robust statutory welfare (Japan), in contrast to contexts where both states *and* informal programs were fragmented (India). Culturally homogenous nations may therefore result in more rapid consolidation of alternate institutions, although as Anderson points out, nationalism of the homogenous form retains a certain philosophical poverty and incoherence (Anderson 1983). Still, even where statutory programs have emerged through consolidation of "lesser" programs, rarely have they been instituted through constitutional fiat. Most commonly, evolution remains stunted and local, not merging into any grand ocean of national solidarity and industrial welfare.

Tilly echoes this: "*Only rarely and (on the whole) recently have such arrangements as social insurance and labor unions connected risky, valued, popular collective enterprises directly with cities and states. Indeed, prudent members of trust networks have generally tried to insulate them from predation or incorporation by cities and states*" (2010 in this issue). But late industrialization challenges and extends his typology as a special form of evolution between cities, city-states, and nation-states. The challenge arises from the unexpected combinative strands of industrial welfare in LIs that had such systems well before the nation came into being (Srinivas 2008a), and where, unlike in Europe, many colonial nations preceded nation-states (Chatterjee 1986/1999).

Indian welfare

India's 5-Year Plans (1951-present) presupposed long-term sectoral wage stabilization, targeted social assistance, growing factory-labor with work-place benefits, and an anti-urban bias for rural uplift. Yet today mandatory social insurance covers only 30 million (3% of the population) and is largely the domain of union ("organized") labor. Although India has recently instituted historic changes to industrial welfare (in

2005 by extending rural employment guarantees and in 2008 by passing a Social Security Bill covering 350 million "unorganized" workers), work-place expansion have effectively stalled. In part, this is due to stunted manufacturing employment, an explosion in low-entry urban services, growing self-employment and "informality." Place-based settlement security is absent, urban land prohibitively costly, and housing and healthcare options highly constrained. It is unsurprising that various actors have advocated universal entitlements based on work-status rather than place or work-place. Institutionally and administratively however, this has proved problematic, explainging the rapid, fragmented growth of for-profit insurance, community programs and "micro-insurance" instead.

1. *Liberalism and the Indian Republic.*

In Gandhi's remarkable interpretation of local autonomy and self-government that so fired the imagination of Indian nationalism, risk mitigation occurred primarily *without* the state. Although he rejected western institutions of European urbanization and industrialization, Gandhi was no Luddite; his distrust of European history stemmed from the belief that technological dynamism and social welfare were closely woven. He saw Europe as attempting a false secular negotiation of instruments of equality and justice derived from rationality and science with little embedding in social realities (Nandy 1987).

In contrast, Gandhi's republicanism was liberal and anti-state. "Self-rule," *Swaraj,* was existentially and pragmatically rule by the Self, freed from the state or large collective institutions of regulation. Villages were to be governed by internal laws and logics of truth or *satya*. These ideas derived in large measure from a unique amalgam of Hindu philosophies of self and social organization, western enlightenment, and pastoralism (Iyer 2000). Self-help was self-reliance, but risk was socially embedded and morally shared. Gandhian republics would likely have warranted industrial welfare in dense, localized areas rather than welfare capitalism driven by nation-states. Yet modern rural *Panchayati Raj* based broadly on Gandhi's ideas and expanded by the 73rd Indian Constitutional Amendment, remained with strong state and political party influence.

Neither Indian socialist rhetoric nor market capitalism was thus deeply embedded and the extent of proletarianization was contentious. In Europe, population density revealed links between large production units and urbanization (Mikkelsen 2005), but this was less obvious in India. The Indian self-employment to wage labor transition was also less critical than transitions between various forms of proletarianization with distinctive regulations over settlement (Lucassen 2005; Krishnamurthy 1983; Kumar 1992). Factory work averaged less than 10% of the population and the working majority was always rural where agricultural patronage politics often provided "vertical" risk-mitigation against worker famine (Platteau 1995).

2. *Secularization of non-secular risk mitigation.*

While priests, pastors, and fraternities influenced Europe's welfare alongside state-instituted programs, the Indian constitution stepped worriedly away from religious identities. Registered industrial firms provided the primary state-recognized route to industrial welfare and the state continued to be a formidable employer. Yet, ironically, affirmative action-type "reservation" policies based on caste and religious quotas formed the core of industrial welfare, resting in Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, and Other Backward Classes of Hindus (OBCs).

Despite the secular Constitution statutorily over-writing variation into a language of solidarity and welfare for six post-independence decades, alternate institutions persisted through caste, *jati*, religion, language, gender, and unions. Each had important occupational and technological effects: concentration of caste by sector, skills transmission through caste and family, and language hewed to geography.[6] Group rights often subsumed individual labor rights, and caste created substantial limits on mobility (Kumar 1992). Gender and religion curtailed access to statutory programs and limited the spread and mobilization in home-based occupations and piece-rate work such as in garments and *agarbatti* (incense).

A fully capitalized wage-based economy therefore poorly describes late nineteenth and twentieth century Indian labor. Urban wage-dependence was bounded by ties to neighborhoods, rural life, caste, *jati,* language, and religion. In the industrial metropolises of Bombay and Madras, workers depended on pragmatic risk-sharing and mitigation. From overlapping living spaces to healthcare, borrowed money, social and moral supports, and the distribution of work, water, food, even building materials, unregulated ties provided a modicum of security (Das Gupta 1994). The configuring of an urban proletariat was thus partial, distinctive, and by no means inevitable.

Indeed, nation and class were not sole fulcrums of mobilization. Marxist work-place and class discourse imperfectly corresponded to social hierarchies and inevitably, new movements emerged, e.g., the *Arya Samaj*, the *Brahmo Samaj*, Baden-Powell's Scouts, and the more militant *Rashtriya Seva Samiti* (Watt 2005).[7] Most situated *"seva"* (service) beyond the exclusive scope of work-places. However, unlike European "corporations" from which firms, guilds, and eventually class solidarities took root, and despite surmounting religious, occupational, and physical segregation, neither they nor the nation-state offered a convincing universalism.[8] The Backward Classes Movement emerged by the time of the 1901 and 1911 censuses objecting to the state awarding superiority to groups through caste structure counts (Srinivas 1967). Alongside, other caste associations formed the charge against the state for "reservations," affirmative-action quota privileges in public employment. The nation-state thus rooted industrial welfare in public work-place benefits, preferentially accessed through caste and religion.

3. *Royal Mysore and Republican Karnataka: contestation and stagnation of work-place entitlements.*

Southern histories of the autonomous princely states demonstrate further variation in place-based and work-place welfare. Kerala, for example, emphasizes path-dependency:

[6] E.g., the diamond sector with the *Jains* has extended family systems of welfare, skills transmission, specialized global business practice, and gender roles.

[7] The earlier *Bhakti*-movement's religious figures similarly urged against caste distinctions. Musicians and saints preached love and devotion and dramatically different discourses of universalism and service.

[8] Greif (2005) defines corporations as "intentionally created, voluntary, interest-based, and self-governed permanent associations. Guilds, fraternities, universities, communes and city-states are some of the corporations that dominated Europe. Businesses and professional associations, business corporations, universities, consumer groups, republics and democracies are some of the corporations in modern economies" (2005, p. 1).

advances emerged not during democratic Communist rule but from nineteenth century welfare expansion instituted by Cochin and Travancore monarchs (Desai 2005). Keen to ward off British annexation, unlike Malabar under direct British rule, they unwittingly created new solidarities of radical caste and class movements that built momentum for wider redistribution.

Mysore was seen as equally socially enlightened, but its welfare much less secure. Industrial transformation followed Mysore (capital Mysore) under the Wodeyar dynasty, the kingdom's accession under Jayachamarajendra Wodeyar to India in 1950, linguistic and political re-consolidation under the States Reorganization Act (as State of Mysore) in 1956, and further reconsolidation in 1973 (renamed Karnataka, capital Bangalore, 2008 pop. 53 million). It distinctively sowed a middle industrial path, emphasized public universities and research institutes, and generated substantial technological advances. Unlike Kerala (social exemplar), its social protection record was poor and industrial dynamism high; unlike Tamil Nadu its anti-Brahmin movement was less violent and linguistic politics less jingoistic; unlike Andhra Pradesh, it suffered less Maoist militancy and agrarian unrest.

The early Wodeyars observed a secularist rule. Yet, Mysore introduced caste-based quotas in the nineteenth century, due in part to wider anti-Brahmin mobilization, the aristocratic *Arasu/Urs* caste's support for peasant politics, and its unease with the Brahmin-dominated bureaucracy and *Dewanship* (Björn 1979; Sugitha 1982).[9] Although inequality increased, Chamarajendra Wodeyar established the Mysore Representative Assembly in 1881, providing a forum for Brahmins, and "backward" but dominant Lingayats and Vokkaligas. In the absence of independent middle peasantry and despite reigning landlords, the symbolic *Dasara* festival Assembly also expanded, serving to air discussion and to limit agrarian unrest (Made Gowda 1983; Sugitha 1982).

The late industrial surge instigated by *Maharaja*, chief advisory *Dewan* and engineers, resulted in a series of modernization shifts and partial stabilization of social relations. Significant capitalist transformations were underway by the early 1900s propelled by British commercialization of Mysore's agriculture, resulting in expanded domestic and export markets and increased risks to farmers (Made Gowda 1983). The *Dewan* and landlords instituted agribusinesses in sugar manufactories and iron foundries (ibid., p. 197). Large agrarian populations arose in rural farm and non-farm work, general labor, and earth and masonry work. These technological changes did little, however, to dislodge the power of royals and landed gentry toward landless labor; *Holageris* (farm workers) were pushed further to town outskirts and *coolies* (head-loaders) although sometimes provided government housing, were altogether outside towns such as Chikkamagalur (ibid.).

Meanwhile, non-Brahmin groups had mobilized and instituted alternate avenues to public (especially civil-service) appointments, e.g., the Mysore *Lingayat* Education Fund in 1905 and the *Vokkaligara Sangha* in 1906 (Manor 1977). By 1919, the British Miller Committee redefined public recruitment quotas and designated as "backward" all but Brahmins, Europeans, and Anglo-Indians, a characterization that continued until 1956 (Miller 1919; Sugitha 1982).

[9] The southern anti-Brahmin movement was especially intense, aggravated by British divide-and-rule strategies.

Royal support for the Miller recommendations leeched momentum away from mass-based industrial politics. First in mining and plantations, then textiles and steel, proletarianization emerged by 1920 mainly through migrant Tamils and hill tribes in Mysore and Bangalore districts (Sugitha 1982). Agitations for wider welfare emerged much later from the involvement of the Indian National Congress party with the Mysorean nationalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, and their eventual confluence with regional trade union movements.[10] The Trade Union Act of British India in 1926 had had limited impact and strikes continued through the 1930s and 1940s in mining and textiles. By the 1940s, World War II had boosted public industrial production in textiles, gold, and heavy industry in Bangalore and Badhravathi, yet the state (a dominant employer) determinedly ignored unions and welfare.

Mysore bequeathed technological and scientific infrastructure and organizations to Karnataka and Bangalore, yet caste-based groupings remained solidly intact in the new republic. Based on elite mobilization and quota policies of the prior period, neither national nor regional states were able to re-consolidate power. Partial land reform in the 1970s provided some new impetus to re-stratification, but class politics and unionization were increasingly sidelined even after widespread public sector strikes in the 1980s (Assadi 2006). Lingayats and Vokkaligas came to dominate politics (the latter although dominant by numbers had ‘backward’ status and benefits). Conservative, incremental changes, prevented dramatic social changes and pitted several “disadvantaged” and OBC groups against each other (Manor 2007; Assadi 2006). By the 1990s, 90% of Karnataka’s population was effectively slotted into “reserved” and ‘backward’ classes (Assadi 2006). In factories, a class model of antagonism or cooperation had broken down, and alternate urban organizing sites emerged (Roy Chowdhury 2003). Sluggish unions allowed an uncontested stand-off between two dominant political coalitions, the MOVD (Muslims, OBCs, Vokkaligas, and Dalits) and the LIBRA (Lingayats and Brahmins) (Assadi 2006). Despite policy continuity, this stand-off resulted in welfare stagnation and widespread corruption (see also Kadekodi et al. 2007).

Overall then, between royal and republican state changes, a remarkable regional industrial transition was underway. Yet, caste—and religion-based coalitions geared to public employment access and benefits significantly slowed work-place or other entitlements.

4. *National rules to local discretion and quasi-rules.*

Today, the new social security Bill has made local inspection and registration rules for firms and workers vital to industrial gate-keeping (Srinivas 2008b, 2009). Karnataka’s technological changes have fueled a services boom underscoring the increasing limitations of the Factories and Boilers Act for work-place regulation. The state’s bureaucracy seeks new legitimacy and partners outside a stagnating formal economy. Although street-level bureaucrats operate amidst the contradictions of successive regulations bequeathed from British, Mysorean, and the Indian state, the ironic result of these contradictions is considerable autonomy and discretion in deciding whether (and which) workers receive industrial welfare (ibid.). The quasi-rules they

[10] Arguably, the Mysore national movement comprised three periods: 1885–1920 (mobilization without organization), 1920–1937 (elite mobilization), and 1937–1947 (mass mobilization) (Björn 1979, p. 179).

must construct for daily functioning make welfare expansion complex and uncertain. In the absence of convincing and predictable statutory rules on the ground, there persists a constant ebb and flow of workers to alternate risk-mitigating institutions such as family, caste, religious group, even political parties. This regional ecology may be evolutionary but not necessarily progressive.

Karnataka's caste allegiances have crystallized the state's strategy towards fragmentation rather than domination over and consolidation of other institutions. Industrial welfare has emerged in a messy overlay not of "traditional" princely Mysore versus "modern" Karnataka, but rather of two versions of institutional modernization for industrial development, first in royal, then republican periods.

India's social insurance, unlike Europe's, has therefore been strangely dislocated from local institutions. The nation has been unable or unwilling to extend its statutory umbrella and permeate webs of local risk-mitigation or pooling. Yet, European models diffused by the ILO have further shaped Indian efforts at Bismarck- and Beveridge-inspired factory-, military- and civil-services-welfare. The remaining social assistance for the majority has little traditional risk-mitigation or participatory and contributory benefits of social insurance.

Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered

Although the "abstract rules" of western societies tie in philosophically with the notion of the invisible hand, arms length in market relations and arms length in industrial welfare are very different. While national social insurance can impersonally pool widely disparate groups and use market mechanisms, it has unevenly evolved from more personalized rules of social grouping, monitoring, continuity, and sanction. Even when states drive the process, deeply ingrained trust and welfare come neither cheaply nor, always, democratically. After all, European fascism led to durable industrial entitlements while democratic India continues without.

Nations therefore are not only imagined, they thrive on existing trust, cost- and risk-sharing. Their territorial holds must be debated. Necessity and trust make workers oscillate between allegiances to the state and other regional institutions, many older than nation-states. These may undermine the state's control, legitimacy, and efficiency. Rapid late twentieth and early twenty-first century urbanization and industrialization appear antithetical to the straightforward consolidation of these institutions.

Accounts of industrial history often seek convergence; the seductive draw of nation-states is that they tell large, glorious stories of displacement and consolidation. However, satisfying though national pension accounts and health spending may be as measures, they provide no deeper analysis of institutional variety. As the state's delicate (and often failing) balancing act between production and redistribution, industrial welfare can best be locally judged. The city or region can fade as a second-order variable in some analyses, while remaining as first-order in others. Parts woven into whole fabric are to be judged at the whole, but parts unwoven and threads pulling apart have a different story to tell. The larger the whole, the bigger the holes and the more contested the tensile strength of the composite. The dynamics of industrial welfare must be judged ultimately through cities and regions, the weave of nations. "Informal" risk-pooling institutions and organizations may have shielded themselves from states where necessary, but many threw in their lot with nation-states. Understanding the weave of diverse skeins into the fabric of nationality and citizenship will require new approaches to technological change and to the shifting economics of risk-pooling.

Economic linearity will thus not take us far. Late industrialization has dwelt theoretically in this tension, never fully acknowledging that the institutional diversity of latecomers might be better represented by parts rather than whole nation-states; how else to tell the uneven stories of late industrialization? No coincidence that the emphasis of such theories has rested in small nations, homogenous nations, and city-states. Ultimately however, these provide weak litmus tests for states, other institutions, and the founding economics of industrial welfare.

Acknowledgments Chris Tilly was a marvelous editor and I thank him and Mike Hanagan for their invitation. I'm delighted to participate in this volume that emphasizes Charles Tilly's inspiring intellectual legacy. This article represents my ongoing research and two broader projects on comparative social protections and industrial governance at the Technological Change Lab (TCLab) at Columbia University. It is funded from Columbia's Graduate School for Architecture, Planning, and Preservation (GSAPP), and has been recently awarded a grant from the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP) at Columbia University. Both sources are very gratefully acknowledged. Some materials here are from the ISERP proposal. Several sub-themes were earlier presented at the following conferences and workshops: Universalizing Social Protection in Asia, New Delhi, Feb. 2007, Association for Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP), Fort Worth, Oct. 2007, ILO Global Production Networks and Decent Work workshop, Bangalore, Nov. 2007, Sloan Industry Studies conference, Boston, April 2008. I have benefited from questions and discussions at these venues and, in India, from scholars, managers, government officials, union members, and other workers. I thank Dr. Krishnamurthy, chief librarian, University of Mysore, Dr. Frederick Weber for his comments, and Matthew Crosby, Kyle Gerry, Mike Kolber, and Sonal Shah for compiling data for TCLab.

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