Abstract
“Science” and “humanities” are usually placed in opposition. The contributions of the humanities are in areas that are not usually thought of as scientific, such as morality and values, aesthetics, and an understanding of ultimate purposes. But, like his eminent younger colleague E. O. Wilson, B. F. Skinner recognized no dividing line. Science in general, and radical behaviorism in particular, provide all the knowledge needed, he argued, to guide society into a happy and, above all, long-term, future. His confidence is widely shared. Most middle-class parents, most psychotherapists and educators, the majority of political and social theorists, whether behavior analytically inclined or not, all now share Skinner’s confident belief that what they do is grounded in science.1 They acknowledge traditional practices, but doubt they have much to learn from them. They believe that all questions are at bottom scientific questions. Science, in principle, embraces all knowledge. This view, it is not unfair to say, has become the religion of the educated elite.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Akin, E. (1999). Review of Belief and Resistance, by B. Herrnstein Smith Quarterly Review of Biology, 74, 61.
Andresen, J. (1991). Skinner and Chomsky 30 years later or: The return of the repressed. The Behavior Analyst, 14, 49–60.
Aunger, R. (Ed.) (2001). Darwinizing culture: The status of memetics as a science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bauerlein, M. (2001). Social constructionism: Philosophy for the academic workplace. Partisan Review, 2 May.http://www.partisanreview.org/archive/2001/2/bauerlein.html
Blackmore, S. (1999). The meme machine. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). A review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26–58.
Chomsky, N. (1972). Psychology and ideology.Cognition, 1, 11–46.
Campbell, D. T. (1975). On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition. American Psychologist, 30, 1103–1126.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1996). Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hayes, L. J. (1993). Reality and truth. In S. C. Hayes, L. J. Hayes, H. W. Reese & T. R. Sarbin (Eds.) Varieties of scientific contextualism. Reno, NV: Context Press.
Hocutt, M. (2000). Grounded ethics: The empirical bases for normative judgments. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levin, M. (1997). Why race matters: Race differences and what they mean. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Monod, J. (1971). Chance and Necessity; an essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology. New York: Knopf.
Popper, K. R. (1950). The open society and its enemies. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Basic Books.
Rand, A. (1985). Philosophy: Who needs itNew York: New American Library.
Shimp, C. P. (2001). Behavior as a social construction.Behavioural Processes, Behavioural Processes, 54, 11–32.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1961). Freedom and the control of men. In Cumulative record, pp. 3–18. (Original work published 1955 )
Skinner, B. F (1966). The phylogeny and ontogeny of behavior.Science, Science, 153, 1205–1213.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1976). About behaviorism. New York: Vintage Books.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences.Science, Science, 213, 501–504.
Smith, B. H. (1997). Belief and resistance; Dynamics of contemporary intellectual controversy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sokal, A. D. (1996). Transgressing the boundaries: Towards a transformative hermeneu-tics of quantum gravity. Social Text, 46/47, 217–252 (spring/summer). See also http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4.html.
Staddon, J. (1995). On responsibility and punishment. The Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 88–94.
Staddon, J. E. R., & Simmelhag, V. (1971). The “superstition” experiment: A reexamination of its implications for the principles of adaptive behavior. Psychological Review, 78, 3–43.
Staddon, J. E. R. (2001). The new behaviorism Mind mechanism and society. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience The unity of knowledge. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Wilson, J. Q. (2000). Democracy for all? Commentary, March (Internet edition).
Zuriff, G. (1998). Against metaphysical social constructionism in psychology.Behavior & Philosophy, Behavior & Philosophy, 26, 5–28.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Staddon, J.E.R. (2003). Humanism and Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism. In: Lattal, K.A., Chase, P.N. (eds) Behavior Theory and Philosophy. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4590-0_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4590-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-3405-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-4590-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive