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Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

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Abstract

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.

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Notes

  1. There is, of course, the logical possibility that an individual has knowledge about the nature of her own beliefs but fails to ascribe false beliefs to others. In this case, this individual would have the relevant understanding of truth and still fail the false-belief task, because the task only demonstrates whether a subject can ascribe false beliefs to others. I leave this possibility aside here, because I consider the possibility that all the members of a species have this knowledge regarding their own beliefs, but fail to transfer this knowledge to conspecifics a mere logical possibility that seems empirically highly unlikely.

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  1. Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Robertstr 5-7, 51105, Köln, Germany

    Tobias Starzak

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  1. Tobias Starzak
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Correspondence to Tobias Starzak.

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Starzak, T. Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference. Philosophia 40, 473–482 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9359-9

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