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Faith, Language, Logic: Anselm of Canterbury and his Project of Logic of Agency

The article is an attempt to analyze Anselm of Canterbury's philosophical theory in the language of modal logic. The presented text is an attempt to confront the effectiveness of this approach in two dimensions: (1) the correctness or adequacy of the reading of Anselm's philosophical thought; hence the first historical part, which outlines the main assumptions of Anselm's philosophy, and specifically presents his concept of the theory of language in the perspective of his solutions in the field of metaphysics and theology; (2) the possibility of constructing a language of modal logic that would be able to reflect the complexity of Anselm's conception.

Anselm's philosophy of language and its theological background

DOES LANGUAGE EXPRESS THINGS ADEQUATELY?

"Whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof" (Genesis 2:19). Was the language instituted by Adam, or

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rather by God through Adam, a natural language in the sense that it allowed users to capture essences by virtue of a natural relationship between the spoken words and the things named? What we find here is a tension between biblical exegesis, which emphasized natural relationships, and Aristotelian logic, which in turn emphasized the conventionality of language. In the 12th century, Thierry of Chartres (c. 1085–1156) advanced the theory that God, by uttering words in the act of creation, gave essence to things and Adam, inspired by the Holy Spirit, used the same words to name created things. Thierry was convinced that his theory was compatible with Boethius's belief in the conventionality of spoken language. Later authors, such as Thomas Aquinas, stressed that this original endowment of words with conventional signification should be a rational and deliberate human activity, but he further suggested that this was by virtue of the inner or mental word that captured the essence of the thing named, rather than any correspondence between arbitrary sound and essence. Hence, spoken language which takes its meaning from convention results from the natural inner language, i.e., mental language.[1] The formulation of the problem as it has been presented above and different attempts at solving it come from the period of Western thought when most of Aristotle's texts had already been known and attempts were made to reconcile his conception of science and theory of language with the Christian faith. Nevertheless, the history of Christian thought from its very beginning has been marked by a tension between the letter of Scripture and the demands of rationality formulated by Greek philosophy. Different strategies for dealing with this aporia have been offered throughout history. To illustrate this problem, let us start with the famous *Ratio Anselmi* from the *Proslogion*:

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[1] E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Language and Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. by Arthur S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 83–84.

For in one way a thing is thought when the word signifying it is thought, and in another way [it is thought] when that which the thing is understood. Thus, in the first way but not at all in the second, God can be thought not to exist. Indeed, no one who understands that which God is can think that God does not exist, even though he says these words [viz., "God does not exist"] in his heart either without any signification or with some strange signification. For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Anyone who rightly understands this, surely understands that that [than which a greater cannot be thought] exists in such way that it cannot even conceivably not exist. Therefore, anyone who understands that God is such [a being] cannot think that He does not exist.[2]

Anselm introduces a distinction between the understanding of a word and the understanding of a thing itself,[3] i.e., between the level of language and that of a thing itself. To understand the essence of "id quo maius cogitari non potest" is to really understand this thing; it is not to understand the word itself, but what is "that than which a greater cannot be thought;" and by understanding this we come to understand that we cannot even think that such a being does not exist. So Anselm seems to accept the legacy of St. Augustine's (neo)Platonism that eternal ideas and truths exist. However, when formulating his directive

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[2] Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, transl., *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury* (Minneapolis: Banning, 2000), 95; *Proslogion* 4: "Aliter enim cogitatur res cum uox eam significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur. Illo itaque modo potest cogitari deus non esse, isto uero minime. Nullus quippe intelligens id quod deus est, potest cogitare quia deus non est licet haec uerba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat id non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare."

[3] The same distinction is made in *Monologion* 10.

fides quaerens intellectum, he modifies the Augustinian theological program adding logical precision, based on his readings of Aristotle's works translated and commented on by Boethius.

AN OUTLINE OF ANSELM'S SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM

So, what exactly is Anselm's scientific program? His scientific method seems to be determined by two components: (1) on the one hand, he continues Augustine's theological program expressed in the words: *credo, ut intelligam*, which can be seen in his view of theology as "understanding of faith"—*intellectus fidei*, and ultimately in the motto *fides quaerens intellectum*; this Augustinian orientation can be classified as meditatio.[4] (2) The other component is ratio, which is in some opposition to meditatio; it is the methodical explication of the content of faith to demonstrate its rationality; for Anselm, this rationality lies in the inner coherence of all the truths of faith, on the one hand, and in their perfect compatibility with the reason or the method of discursive thinking, on the other hand. The first component was deeply rooted in the patristic tradition, i.e., in the view of philosophy and theology as *scientia fidei*; whereas the other marked the beginnings of a new period—Scholasticism, the emergence of which was greatly influenced by the discovery of Aristotle's logic, i.e., the method of infallible modes of inference. Another important factor that definitely shaped Anselm's scientific method was the most serious controversy of the 11th century, the so-called dispute between supporters of dialectics and its opponents. It concerned the question of the extent to which logic could be applied to the statements and dogmas of faith. Anselm was thus challenged with, on the one hand, developing a system that would be firmly rooted in tradition (Augustine) and would not

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[4] Richard Heinzmann, *Filozofia średniowiecza* [Medieval Philosophy], transl. by Piotr Domański (Kęty: Antyk, 1999), 159.

transcend the framework of orthodoxy and, on the other hand, with developing a method that would satisfy the demands of reason or more broadly rationality that were formulated on the basis of Boethius' writings and Aristotle's texts (*logica vetus*) known at that time. How does Anselm strive to cope with the challenge of *fides quaerens intellectum*? It seems that this can be explained well if we make distinctions both within fides and within *ratio*. Anselm believes that *fides* can be found in two different forms, i.e., subjective and objective (*fides qua* and *fides quae*). The subjective perspective is that of man in his specific existential situation, in a state of fall following from original sin, man fraught with deficiencies of reason, will and the ability to achieve an understanding of God. These deficiencies can be compensated and remedied by means of faith, because faith gives an explanation and understanding. The light of faith renews man's intellect and makes him the subject of "possible theology."[5] Anselm explains:

> Indeed, no Christian ought to question the truth of what the Catholic Church believes in its heart and confesses with its mouth. Rather, by holding constantly and unhesitatingly to this faith, by loving it and living according to it, he ought humbly, and as best he is able, to seek to discover the reason why it is true. If he is able to understand, then let him give thanks to God. But if he cannot understand, let him not toss his horns in strife but let him bow his head in reverence.[6]

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[5] *Monologion* 10.

[6] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 267; *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* (Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, ed., *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi opera omnia*, vol. 1–2 (Edinburgh: Apud Thomam Nelson et Filios, 1946), 6–7): "Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quomodo quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur non sit; sed semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando et secundum illam uiuendo humiliter quantum potest quaerere rationem quomodo sit. Si potest intelligere, deo gratias agat; si non potest, non immittat cornua ad uentilandum sed submittat caput ad uenerandum."

Endowed with faith, man can not only get to know the truths of faith, but he should also strive to understand them; otherwise it is carelessness on his part (*negligentia*), as Anselm points out in *Cur Deus homo*:

> Just as right order requires that we believe the deep matters of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them rationally, so it seems to me to be an instance of carelessness if, having been confirmed in faith, we do not strive to understand what we believe.[7]

At this point, *fides qua*—the subject of faith coincides with the content of faith—*fides quae*, its object. Therefore, faith understood in a subjective way is intrinsically linked with the objective element, both dimensions being conditioned by and complementary to one another: the act of faith makes it possible to accept the content of faith but on the other hand, the truths of faith can be accepted through the act of faith. Likewise, the notion of *ratio* should be considered in two forms: as a specific property of man, i.e., his ability to reason and understand, and as the internal rationality of a thing, its rational constitution. On the basis of reliable and necessary rules, reason (the subjective *ratio*) is able to capture the objective *ratio*, i.e., the necessary and constitutive properties of things (*rationes necessariae*). Anselm's scientific method therefore consists in extracting the inner rationality (*rationes necessariae*) of things, by using the principles of rational conduct that man as the subject of *ratio* has. Anselm's method is perfectly summarized by R. Heinzmann:

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[7] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 300–301; *Cur Deus homo* (Schmitt, *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi opera omnia*, 48) [v. 17–20]: "Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi uidetur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere."

When a single content of faith is based on internal logic, then all faith must be based on and permeated by the necessary rationality, there must be some basis on which it is possible through deduction to prove the necessity of what constitutes the whole of faith, God in his metaphysical essence and historical acting in the world.[8]

When analyzing Anselm's work, it is therefore necessary to take into account two things: (1) his attempt to reconcile the Christian doctrine with what the reason says, i.e. in this case, the language of Scripture with the logic of Aristotle and Boethius, and what follows (2) his attempt to develop a new language or a new conceptual and logical apparatus appropriate for the interpretation or explanation of the Christian doctrine.

The Philosophical Fragments (Lambeth Fragments)

Anselm's *Philosophical Fragments* (or *Lambeth Fragments*) constitute the best example of his attempt to develop a new language or logical apparatus for the logical systematization of Christian doctrine. This is a collection of notes that were compiled and organized by Eadmer, Anselm's friend and later his biographer, shortly after Anselm's death in 1109. These notes, along with Anselm's letters, are called the *Lambeth Fragments* because the primary manuscript is preserved in the Lambeth Palace in London. The *Fragments* were published by F. Schmitt in 1936 and then again in 1969. The first edition rearranges the fragments in a more conceptually coherent way, while the second preserves the original arrangement made by Eadmer.[9] Most of the notes that make up the

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[8] Heinzmann, *Filozofia średniowiecza* [Medieval Philosophy], 160.

[9] Sara L. Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic" (PhD diss., Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, 2009), 41.

Lambeth Fragments, or at least those parts that include an analysis of *facere* (to do), *velle* (to will), and *posse* (to be able), are believed to date back to the period when Anselm was Archbishop of Canterbury.[10] The *Philosophical Fragments* are thus a kind of dictionary that explains the meaning of some terms such as: *facere*, *velle*, *posse*, *necesse*, or *debere*. Anselm's considerations contribute to a discussion at the intersection of logic and ethics concerning certain deontic notions such as "duty-obligation" or "goodness." By explicating their meanings, Anselm attempts to develop a conceptual apparatus for rational argumentation of the tenets of Christian doctrine and, more broadly, for the exegesis of Scripture. This conceptual apparatus is also applied in Anselm's philosophical considerations, for example in his discussions and conclusions concerning free will, causation, or the relation of man's free will to God's foreknowledge. In the *Lambeth Fragments*, the verb *facere* is analyzed most extensively, and this analysis and its results serve as a model for presenting other notions. In his discussion on the meaning and function of the Latin verb *facere*, Anselm identifies four types of doing and further subdivides each type into six different modes. The relationships between the four types can be placed neatly into a square of opposition. Anselm seems to be the first person to consider the modal interpretation of agency in a rigorous fashion.[11]

USUS PROPRIE VERSUS *USUS NON PROPRIE*

Anselm tried to develop the logical conceptual or, even more broadly, philosophical apparatus for the rational explication of Christian doctrine. However, it seems justifiable to ask why he undertook studies

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[10] Peter King, "(St.) Anselm of Canterbury [1033–1109]," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., forthcoming, 1, http: //individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Anselm. EP.pdf.

[11] Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff and Ming Xu, *Facing the Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

into language and logic and why he created a glossary of terms precisely determining their meanings. Well, Anselm was aware that everyday or common use of language was far from being correct, that is, precise and proper. Therefore, his main motivation can be described as methodological, or to use his own terminology, this can be expressed as the *usus proprie* versus the *usus non proprie*, drawing a clear distinction between the proper and improper usage of terms. However, in order to distinguish clearly between the proper way of using language (*usus proprie loquendi*) and the improper one, it is necessary to delineate the competences of a grammarian and logician. The task and aim of the grammarian is to explain how terms are used in everyday language (*usus loquendi*, *usus non proprie*), so his aim is descriptive, while the logician focuses on the proper usage of terms (*usus proprie*). These two ways of using language often do not overlap or can even diverge. Hence, Anselm believes that there are two reasons why the logician should be interested not only in proper use (*usus proprie*), but also in everyday speech (*usus loquendi*). The logician can ignore the *usus loquendi* altogether and make his aim strictly prescriptive by focusing on the proper, logical uses of the words involved, even when this explication seems at odds with our everyday uses of the terms. Alternatively, by participating in and making use in some way of the grammarian's work, the logician can allow his logical explication to be broad enough to cover and hence to explain to some extent the *usus loquendi*.[12] The goal, then, is to produce a logical explanation for the result of the grammarian's study of the word.[13]

This methodological motivation for explaining the ways terms are used in language is connected with another motivation underpinning Anselm's interests, which is the question of agency. It can easily be

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[12] Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 44.

[13] *Ibid*., 45.

noticed that Anselm's thinking and writing has always been motivated by his interest in religion and theological problems. To ignore the *usus non proprie* is a mistake on the part of the logician, because the use of terms in Scripture is often improper. Since it is everyone's responsibility to seek a better understanding of Scripture, it follows that logicians should be interested in providing logical explanations for the improper use of terms. Thus, a medieval logician should be interested in providing an explanation and grounding for the improper or non-logical usage of terms, and a theory of agency that Anselm proposes needs to be able to explain why *facere* is used the way that it is in Scripture. An explication of agency which does not make sense of scriptural usages of *facere* is not adequate for Anselm, because just as *usus loquendi* is very broad, so too is scriptural use. Anselm specifies this in *Fragmenta Lambeth*[14] and again in *De veritate*, when he writes: "He wanted us to understand the verb "to do" not only as standing for what is properly called a doing, but also as a substitute for every other verb..."[15]

Anselm's choice of the verb *facere* seems to be motivated by both theological and philosophical reasons or, broadly speaking, it has theoretical justifications as this term can be used for any agency or causation, i.e., it can replace any verb.[16]

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[14] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, p. 28: "...non sine omni ratione 'facere' uerbum aliquando usu loquendi pro omni uerbo ponitur, et omne uerbum facere dicitur. Siquidem et dominus in euangelio ponit 'facere' uel 'agere'—quod idem est—pro omni uerbo..."

[15] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 170; *De veritate*, S I, p. 182, 10–11: "Facere autem non solum pro eo quod proprie dicitur facere sed pro omni verbo dominus voluit intelligere..." Anzelm further specifies (S I, p. 182, 18–19): "Usus quoque locutionis hoc habet, ut et pati et multa alia dicat facere, quae non sunt facere."

[16] Serene questions the possibility of such a substitution: Anselm believes that this analysis will apply to predication in general, since he holds that any predicate whatsoever can be paraphrased by means of "facere" plus the specification of some outcome. He provides two lines of reasoning in support of this extension of his analysis to predication in general; while a full discussion of these arguments is beyond our present purview, a brief indication of their character is in order. Surprisingly, the first is an "ordi-

We have the practice of using the verb "to do" in place of every other verb, whether finite or infinite, and regardless of its signification. (We even use "to do" in place of "not to do.") For when we ask about someone "What (How) is he doing?": if we consider the matter carefully, [we see that] here "doing" is used in place of any verb that can be given in reply; and every verb given in reply is used in place of "doing." For to one asking "What (How) is he doing?" there is not rightly given in reply any verb in which there is not understood the doing which is being asked about. For example, when we reply "He is reading" or "He is writing," it is the same as saying "He is doing this, viz., reading" or "He is doing this, viz., writing".[17]

Anselm states here that "to do" operates as a modal variable for any action whatsoever. If the philosophical theory of agency can provide an explanation of the *usus loquendi*, then we will also have an explanation of the theological usage of the word, because the two add to and complement each other, i.e., both *usus non proprie* and *usus proprie* are necessary to explain the theological meaning. The attempt to give

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nary language" argument which rests on the claim that for each predicate there is at least one context in which it serves as an acceptable reply to the question "What is he doing?" Naturally this claim makes sense for action-verbs used in the active voice, but it is hard to see how Anselm could have considered it applicable to predicates with verbs in the passive voice, or to existential verbs such as "to be" or "to become" [Eileen F. Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being*, ed. by Simo Knuuttila (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 121].

[17] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 392; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, p. 25, 14–22: "Verbum hoc, quod est 'acere', solet poni pro omni uerbo cuiuslibet significationis, finito uel infinito, etiam pro 'non facere'. Cum enim quaeritur de aliquo: Quid facit? si diligenter consideretur, ponitur ibi 'facere' pro omni uerbo, quod responderi potest, et quodcumque uerbum respondetur, ponitur pro 'facere'. Non enim recte redditur ullum uerbum interroganti: Quid facit? in quo non intelligitur facere, de quo interrogatur. Nam cum respondetur: Legit aut scribit ualet idem ac si dicatur: hoc facit, scilicet legit aut scribit."

an adequate account of the scriptural usage of *facere* is not just a futile exercise in logic and grammar. Since the concept of agency is closely related to the issues of responsibility for one's actions, and hence culpability and sin, an explanation of the proper conditions under which agency can be ascribed will have implications for ethics as well as logic. After all, the gospel formulates specific directives about what to do and what not to do, which form the basis for God's judgment based on what people did or what they did not do.[18] Understanding correct ascriptions of agency, both in terms of proper usage i.e., *usus proprie* and common usage, *usus non proprie*, is important, as it gives us knowledge concerning salvation or condemnation. It is worth noting that Anselm, unlike modern agency theorists who focus on explaining the formula "*x* does," where *x* is an active agent, extends the formula of agency or rather of causation, and writes that "every cause ... is said to do something, and everything which is said to do something is called a cause."[19] This means that his concept of agency encompasses more than just human agency. The advantage of Anselm's theory lies in its breadth and scope; it encompasses the entire spectrum of the world, not just strictly human agency. For example, based on this view, if I trip over a tree which has fallen across the path, then it is perfectly plausible to ask, "What did the tree do?" and respond, "It tripped me." Even though Anselm generally uses cases of human agency as

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[18] A similar opinion is expressed in *De casu diaboli*, S I, p. 234, 6–9: "Non solum ille dicitur facere aliquid esse aut aliquid non esse, qui facit ut sit quod non est, aut ut non sit quod est sed etiam ille qui potest facere ut non sit aliquid et non facit, dicitur facere esse; et qui potest facere ut aliquid sit nec facit, dicitur facere non esse." [Not only is he said to cause something to be (or something not to be) who causes-to-be what is not (or causes-not-to-be what is), but also he who is able to cause something not to be and does not is said to cause-to-be (and he who is able to cause something to be but does not is said to cause-not-to-be)] (Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 216).

[19] S36, p. 29: "omnis tamen causa, sicut dixi, facere dicitur et omne, quod facere perhibetur, causa nominatur."

examples of the logical properties of the theory, this is done only for pragmatic reasons.[20] This point needs to be emphasized, since Anselm's theory of agency covers every cause, as has been illustrated by the example above. We need to carefully separate the logical aspects of the theory from those aspects, which—in general terms—can be called "application aspects."[21]

To summarize this section, it should be stated that there are two reasons why the logician should be interested not only in the proper usage of terms (*usus proprie*), but also everyday speech or improper usage of terms, namely: a) the proper usage of terms (*usus proprie*) can be used to explain the use of terms in everyday language (*usus loquendi*, *usus non proprie*); b) the usage of terms in Scripture is often improper, hence the logician can provide instruments, or a logical basis for Biblical exegesis, i.e. for theological speculations.

FACERE AS A MODAL TERM

In the *Lambeth Fragments*, Anselm presents a general analysis of predication, which includes his project of the uses of modal terms. As mentioned above, Anselm extends the concept of modality beyond merely "necessity" and "possibility" to include such notions as "duty-obligation" and "agency," in order to provide a logical and rational conceptual apparatus for the Christian doctrine. It is possible to define the main features of Anselm's modal semantics based on *Lambeth Fragments* and his other works. Anselm believed that a general theory of predication could be built on an analysis of the possible bases for the ascription of the verb *facere*— to do. The combination of *facere* and predication was based on the view that in some sense the subject

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[20] S36, p. 32: "Haec quidem exempla, quae posui de 'facere esse' et de 'facere non esse', de causis efficientibus assumpsi, quoniam in his clarius apparet, quod uolui ostendere."

[21] Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 47.

can be considered a cause of its predicate.[22] The next step was to distinguish between efficient and non-efficient causes. Allowing for non-efficient causation enabled Anselm to develop the causal theory of predication.[23] As Anselm writes:

> Let us now understand doing (causing) in terms of a classification. Since a doing (causing) is always either in relation to being or in relation to not-being, (as has been said), we will be obliged to add "to be" or "not to be" to the distinct modes of doing (causing) in order for them to be clearly distinguished. Accordingly, we speak in six modes about causing [to be]: in two modes when a cause (A.1) causes to be, or (A.2) does not cause not to be, that very thing which it is said to cause [to be]; and in four modes when it (A.3–A.6) either does or does not cause something else to be or not to be. For, indeed, we say of any given thing "It causes something to be" either because it (1) causes-to-be the very thing which it is said to cause [to be], or because it (2) does not cause this very thing not to be, or because it (3) causes something else to be, or because it (4) does not cause something else to be, or because it (5) causes something else not to be, or because it (6) does not cause something else not to be.[24]

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[22] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, p. 26: "Denique omne, de quo aliquod uerbum dicitur, aliqua causa est, ut sit hoc, quod uerbo illo significatur; et omnis causa usu loquendi 'facere' dicitur illud, cuius causa est. Quare omne, de quo uerbum pronuntiatur aliquod, facit, quod eodem significatur uerbo."

[23] Simo Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, ed. by Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 124.

[24] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 395–396; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 29, 20–30: "Comprehendamus nunc 'facere' sub aliqua diuisione. Quoniam autem semper est facere aut ad esse aut ad non esse, sicut dictum est, oportebit nos ad singulos modos faciendi, ut aperte distinguantur, addere 'esse' aut 'non esse'. Sex ergo modis 'facere' pronuntiamus; duobus uidelicet, cum facit idipsum esse aut non facit idipsum non esse causa, quod facere dicitur; quattuor uero, cum aut facit aut non facit aliud esse

Anselm's analysis of the direct and non-direct modes of agency can be expressed well as follows: A subject *A* may be said to bring about a state of affairs s directly or through other states of affairs (*m*, *n*, *o*, *r*) causally related to *s* only if at least one of these six conditions is satisfied:

(1) *A* directly brings about *s*;

(2) *A* directly fails to prevent *s* from occurring;[25]

(3) *A* brings about *m*, and *m* causally contributes to *s*'s occurring;

(4) *A* fails to bring about *n*, and *n*'s not occurring causally contributes to *s*'s occurring;

(5) *A* prevents *o* from occurring, and *o*'s not occurring causally contributes to *s*'s occurring;

(6) *A* fails to prevent *r* from occurring, and *r*'s occurring causally contributes to *s*'s occurring.[26]

Anselm claims that a verb is properly ascribed (*proprie utitur*) if the subject directly brings about/causes what is ascribed to it.[27] In all other cases the ascription is improper (*non proprie usus*). So, Anselm

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uel non esse. Dicimus namque rem quamlibet facere aliquid esse, aut quia facit idipsum esse, quod facere dicitur, aut quia non.facit idipsum non esse; aut quia facit aliud esse, aut quia non facit aliud esse, aut quia facit aliud non esse, aut quia non facit aliud non esse."

[25] Serene explains the reason for including mode 2 in the direct mode in the following way: The reason for including mode two as a direct mode may not be so clear, unless we recognize that under some circumstances we do ascribe causal responsibility to a person who fails to prevent an outcome. Since Anselm's plan is to enumerate an exhaustive list of the possible bases for ascriptions of agency, he must then include mode two. Because it is possible for such an ascription to be based only on the person's omitting to act, rather than on any particular alternative act he performs, mode two seems to count as a direct mode (Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 123).

[26] Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 123–124.

[27] "Anselm holds that an ascription of a predicate is 'proper' if and only if its basis is that the subject directly and literally does what is ascribed to him. This criterion involves several assumptions, the most fundamental of which is the view that every predicate has exactly one clear-cut direct signification ... Anselm further assumes,

assumes that drawing a distinction between efficient and non-efficient causation/agency and determining the proper and improper uses of terms have important philosophical implications. The differences between proper and improper uses of terms can be easily verified when a term is applied to a genus and its species, a cause and its effect, or a whole and its parts.[28] Anselm also believes that *debere* and *posse* can be analyzed in the same way as *facere*.[29]

> The same principle of classification which I cited for to-cause-to-be and to-cause-not-to-be obtains for whatever verb "to cause" is similarly con-joined with—as, for example, when I say "I cause you to do something" or "I cause you to write something," or "I cause something to be done" or "I cause something to be written." These modes which I have cited for "to cause" ("facere") are in a certain respect found in other verbs too. Although not every mode is found in every verb, nevertheless one or more are found in each verb—and especially in those verbs (such as "ought to" and "is able to") which are transitive to verbs. Indeed, when we say "I am able to read" or "I am able to be read [through my writings]" or "I ought to love" or "I ought to be loved," then "able to" and "ought to" are transitive to verbs.[30]

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safely enough, that we can generally tell whether the basis for an ascription is in the first mode or one of the others." (Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions,", 124).

[28] Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 123–124.

[29] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 28: "... non sine omni ratione 'facere' verbum aliquan-do usu loquendi pro omni verbo ponitur, et omne verbum facere dicitur ... Male quidem agit, qui facit, quod non debet, aut non facit, quod debet; quod similiter intelligitur de omni verbo."

[30] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 402; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 33:30: "Isti modi, quos dixi in 'facere', in aliis quoque uerbis per quandam similitudinem inueni-untur; etsi non omnes in omnibus, aliquis tamen aut plures in singulis et magis in illis uer-bis, quae transitionem faciunt ad uerba, ut sunt 'debere' et 'posse'. Transitiua quippe sunt haec ad uerba, cum dicimus: 'possum legere uel legi, debeo amare uel amari'."

[31] Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," 125.

"Is necessarily something" properly ascribes a constraint to its subject, and "is possibly something" properly ascribes a capability or power to a subject.[31] It can therefore be assumed that modal terms in their proper senses refer to characteristics or properties of things. If modal terms are used in some other way, they are used improperly. Something is necessary in an improper sense on account of the causes that cannot be eliminated or prevented;[32] something in turn is impossible on account of the causes that cannot bring it about.[33] The analysis of the notions of "necessity," "possibility" and "impossibility" was required by certain specific solutions in some theological doctrine. Hence, it was necessary for Anselm to distinguish between the proper and improper sense of modal terms for "necessity" and "impossibility," a distinction that was also applied in his analysis of *facere*—"to do" as a modal term in the *Fragmenta Lambeth*. A good example here may be God's attribute of being necessarily truthful when the notion of "necessity" is used in an improper sense. God's truthfulness is necessary in the sense that there is nothing that could bring about a situation where He does not declare the truth. Likewise, while God cannot do things that can be done only through impotence, there is no proper impossibility in the sense of the inability of God.[34] As it was pointed out by Simo Knuutilla, Anselm not

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[32] *Cur Deus homo* 2, 17: "Nec dicimus deum necessitate facere aliquid, eo quod in illo sit ulla necessitas, sed quoniam est in alio, sicut dixi de impotentia, quando dicitur non posse. Omnis quippe necessitas est aut coactio aut prohibitio; quae duae necessitates conuertuntur inuicem contrarie, sicut necesse et impossibile ... quemadmodum quod necesse est esse impossibile est non esse, et quod necesse est non esse impossibile est esse, et conuersim."

[33] *Cur Deus homo* 2, 17: "... ut dicatur res aliqua posse,non quia in illa, sed quoniam in alia re est potestas; et non posse, non quoniam in illa, sed quia in alia re est impotentia."

[34] Anselm gives a characteristic example of a man who can overcome and be overcome: "Dicimus namque: iste homo potest uinci, pro: aliquis potest eum uincere; et: ille non potest uinci, pro: nullus illum uincere potest. Non enim est potestas posse uinci, sed impotentia; nec uinci non posse impotentia est, sed potestas. Nec dicimus deum necessitate facere aliquid, eo quod in illo sit ulla necessitas, sed quoniam est in alio, sicut dixi de im-

only distinguishes between the proper and improper sense of modal terms, but also believes that full potencies or possibilities are combinations of various partial potencies or possibilities.[35] As an example, he analyzes somebody's ability or possibility to see a mountain. In his analysis presented in Chapter 3 of the *De libertate*, he indicates four components that are necessary for someone to see or catch sight of a mountain: 1) the power of seeing in one who sees; 2) the power of the thing to be seen; 3) the potency or power that helps the sight—light; 4) the power consisting in the fact that nothing obstructs the view. So, in fact partial possibilities are not genuine possibilities because they cannot be actualized as such. Anselm believes that a full possibility is a sum of partial possibilities, but does not explain how to keep full possibility and actuality separate.[36] Anselm's distinction between proper and improper modalities and the idea of possibility (potency) seem to be insufficient enough to construct the senses of modal judgments, as shown by the problems arising from the issue of full and partial possibilities.

TYPES OF *FACERE* (DOING/CAUSING) ACCORDING TO ANSELM

Now, whatever is said to do (*facere*) either causes (*facit*) something to be or causes something not to be. Therefore, every doing can be said either (A) to cause to be or (B) to cause not to be. These two are contrary affirmations whose negations are (C) "not to cause to be" and (D) "not to cause not to be.[37]

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potentia, quando dicitur non posse." (*Cur Deus homo* 2, 17); Cf. also Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," 126).

[35] Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," 126.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 395; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, p. 29: "Quidquid autem facere dicitur, aut facit ut sit aliquid, aut facit ut non sit aliquid. Omne igitur facere dici potest aut 'facere esse' aut 'facere non esse'; quae duo sunt affirmationes contrariae. Quarum negationes sunt: 'non facere esse' et 'non facere non esse.'"

How can we understand this passage? As suggested by D. Henry, it can be explained as follows: "For all x, if 'x does' is true, then x does so that something either is so or is not so actually. Hence, the analysis of 'doing' will in fact be an analysis of x's doing so that p, and of x's doing so that not-p (where 'p' is a clause describing a state of affairs, and 'not-p' is short for 'it is not the case that p')."[38] Therefore, doing will always be the result of something being or not-being the case. Something can either be or not be (in a given case) because it is either caused or not caused. But Henry's analysis presupposes (as Segerberg indicates), "that *facere* is to be understood as a propositional concept. It has the effect of suggesting that Anselm's ideas can be accommodated within some propositional logic by the adoption of nonclassical propositional operator."[39]

Henry's abovementioned explanation gives us 4 types of agency:

A: *facere esse*   B: *facere non esse*
C: *non facere esse*   D: *non facere non esse*

Relations between different types of "doing/causing"— *facere* and "not-doing/causing" —*non facere* can be represented by means of a square of opposition. Relations between types of agency:

A: To cause to be.   B: To cause not to be.
C: Not to cause to be.   D: Not to cause not to be.

Types A and B are called affirmatives, they are contraries. Types C and D are called negatives, although Anselm does not state it explicitly, these are also sub-contraries, because contraries *sensu stricto* cannot be both true, and sub-contraries cannot be both false. The implication relationship between these four types of agency forms a square of opposi-

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[38] Desmond Paul Henry, *Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 124.

[39] Krister Segerberg, "Getting Started: Beginnings in the Logic of Action," *Studia Logica* 51, no 3/4 (1992): 347–378.

tions. In Anselm's work, there is no graphical representation of the
square, but the verbal description of the relations clearly points to such
a square.[40]

PROBLEMS WITH THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITIONS[*]

However, there are some problems with this square of oppositions.
Anselm states:

> Now, notice that although "to cause to be" and "not to cause not to be" are
> used for each other, nevertheless they are different from each other. Thus,

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[40] These four types are separate, but in everyday speech (*usus loquendi*) we often
use one type when in fact what we have in mind is another one, as Anselm notes in
Fragmenta Lambeth, S36, 32,6 and 36,3: "Et nota, quia licet 'facere esse' et 'non facere
non esse' pro inuicem ponantur, tamen differunt. ... Dicimus etiam nos 'non debere pec-
care' pro 'debere non peccare'." Anselm develops his apparatus of deontic senses of
facere, based on his analysis of the language used in the Bible.

[*] I would like to thank Professor M. Lechniak for consulting and revising my for-
malizations in this section and the next.

properly speaking, he causes to be who causes there to be what previously was not. But "not to cause not to be" is said of him who neither causes to be nor causes not to be—as well as of him who causes to be.[41]

This statement shows that in the proper use mode A is not equivalent to mode D (and respectively B to C). If we treat the square for acting as a square of oppositions, we should take the bottom of the square as *subcontrarietas* i.e., as something like possibility ("to allow that *p* happens") and the top of the square as something like necessity. So, if we abbreviate (at the top) "to do" (to cause) as δ and at the bottom as Δ ("to allow that *p* happens") we have a typical square for modal concepts in which δ p→Δ p , but not conversely and δ ¬p→Δ¬p (and not conversely)—laws of subordination.[42] So, the mutual replacement "to cause to be" and "not to cause not to be" is permitted in *modus loquendi*, but not in modus proper. Thus, we can suppose that an expression "not to cause not to be" may be treated as "it is possible to cause to" as is suggested in the following passage:

In the second mode the only example I have for "causing to be dead" is that of someone who would be able to restore a dead man to life, but who would be unwilling to do so. In this instance, the one who is unwilling would be said to cause the other's death by virtue of not causing him

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[41] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 32,6; Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 225.

[42] The expression ¬δ ¬p may require some elucidation. A paraphrase would read, "*a* fails to bring it about that not-*p* obtains," or "*a* allows *p* to happen." The resultant sense of agency is weaker than δp, i.e., if we have it that δp then we have it that ¬δ ¬p, but not conversely. Hart and Honoré discuss the case of Hardcastle v. Bielby, IQ.B. 709, 1892, where a distinction is made "between 'causing' a heap of stones to be laid upon the highway and 'allowing' it to remain there at night, to the danger of persons passing thereon." (Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart and Tony Honoré, *Causation in the Law* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), 330). The first case requires proof that the stones were laid by the accused, whereas allowing the stones to remain, it was ruled, required no positive act.

not to be dead. ... We say that someone causes the occurrence of the evil which he could have caused not to occur but does not cause not to occur.[43]

Segerberg writes about this passage:

The square of opposition would collapse if this (i.e. abovementioned replacement) were always permissible. On the other hand, if it is not always permissible, one would like to know when it is. It is natural to think that a necessary condition for being able to use an affirmative form in place of a negative one is that the agent be active.[44]

It would be sufficient if he were active with respect to p:
$(\delta\ p \vee \delta\neg p) \Rightarrow (\neg\delta\neg\ p \rightarrow \delta\ p)$ (where $\Rightarrow$ is a sign of entailment (??))"
If the agent is not active, he only is able to do (possibility) in mode D (and C).

But Segerberg's remark does not remove the problem because (from CPC) $(\delta p \vee \delta\neg p) \equiv (\delta\neg p \vee \delta p) \equiv (\neg\delta\neg p \rightarrow \delta p)$ i.e. Segerberg exactly expresses Anselm's claim "not to cause not to be" is said of him who neither causes to be nor causes not to be—as well as of him who causes to be," i.e. $(\neg\delta p \wedge \neg\delta\neg p) \vee \delta p \equiv \neg(\delta p \vee \delta\neg p) \vee \delta p$. If we want to get $\delta p \equiv \neg\delta\neg p$ we must assume that $\neg\neg(\delta\ p \vee \delta\neg p)$.

PROBLEMS WITH RELATIONS
BETWEEN SIX MODES OF AGENCY

Each of the four types of agency can be further subdivided into six modes, each of them picking out a different way in which the main type of action can be brought about.[45]

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[43] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 29,31; Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 222.

[44] Segerberg, "Getting Started: Beginnings in the Logic of Action," 350.

[45] Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 48.

Accordingly, we speak in six modes about causing [to be]: in two modes when a cause (A.1) causes to be, or (A.2) does not cause not to be, that very thing which it is said to cause [to be]; and in four modes when it (A.3–A.6) either does or does not cause something else to be or not to be. For, indeed, we say of any given thing "It causes something to be" either because it (1) causes-to-be the very thing which it is said to cause [to be], or because it (2) does not cause this very thing not to be, or because it (3) causes something else to be, or because it (4) does not cause something else to be, or because it (5) causes something else not to be, or because it (6) does not cause something else not to be.[46]

Anselm further states:

To-cause-not-to-be receives the same classification. For whatever is said to cause something not to be is said [to do so] either because it (B.1) causes that very thing not to be, or because it (B.2) does not cause that very thing to be, or because it (B.3) causes something else to be, or because it (B.4) does not cause something else to be, or because it (B.5) causes something else not to be, or because it (B.6) does not cause something else not to be.[47]

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[46] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 396; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 29: "Sex ergo modis 'facere' pronuntiamus; duobus uidelicet, cum facit idipsum esse aut non facit idipsum non esse causa, quod facere dicitur; quattuor uero, cum aut facit aut non facit aliud esse uel non esse. Dicimus namque rem quamlibet facere aliquid esse, aut quia facit idipsum esse, quod facere dicitur, aut quia non facit idipsum non esse; aut quia facit aliud esse, aut quia non facit aliud esse, aut quia facit aliud non esse, aut uia non facit aliud non esse."

[47] *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 30: "Eandem recipit diuisionem 'facere non esse'. Quidquid enim dicitur facere non esse aliquid. aut ideo dicitur, quia facit hoc ipsum non esse, aut quia non facit hoc ipsum esse aut quia facit aliud esse aut quia non facit aliud esse aut quia facit aliud non esse aut quia non facit aliud non esse."

These six modes can be illustrated with an example "to cause to be dead:"

Killing directly / to cause to be—*facere idipsum esse*—A1

Not making not dead—*non facere idipsum non esse*—A2

Making the killer have arms—*facere aliud esse*—A3

Not arming the victim—*non facere aliud esse*—A4

Making the victim not armed—*facere aliud non esse*—A5

Not making the killer not armed—*non facere aliud non esse*—A6[48]

The abovementioned modes can be collected using the table:[49]

per se The agent brings about the effect himself	positive (*killing directly*) (A1)	*A* directly causes/ brings it about that *p* (*facere idipsum esse*); directly bringing it about	δ p
	negative (*non making not dead*, e.g. *not raising the dead man to life, should one have power so to do*) (A2)	*A* directly fails to prevent *p* from occurring (does not cause that non-p); (*non facere idipsum non esse*), not bringing it about	¬δa ¬p

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[48] Henry gives the following ways of reading these modes:

E1: *x*'s killing N directly;

E2: *x*'s not taking steps of which he is capable in order to ensure that *A* is not dead, e.g. Not restoring life to the dead, should one possess this (miraculous) power;

E3: *x*'s providing the killer of *A* with arms, or denouncing *A* to one who will kill him;

E4: *x*'s not taking steps to provide *A* with arms, or to remove *A* from the killer's reach;

E5: *x*'s having deprived *A* of arms;

E6: *x*'s not having deprived the killer of *A* of his arms (Henry, *Logic of Saint Anselm*, 126–127).

[49] In this table, the sign ⤳ designates a causal implication; Uckelman ("Modalities in Medieval Logic," 56) gives simplified formalization of acting *per aliud* without relativization effects of agent's acting to someone's acting; for example acting *per aliud* positive and proximal Uckelman writes as δ q∧(q ⤳ p)—it is, as it seems to us, too big a simplification of Anselm's modes.

per se — The agent brings about the effect himself	positive, proximal, per aliud (*making the killer have arms*) (A3)	*A* brings about *q*, and *q* causally contributes to *p*'s occurring; (*facere aliud esse*) bringing about some state of affairs *q* such that (*q* = the killer has arms)	$\delta\, q \wedge (q \leadsto p)$
	negative, proximal, (*not arming the victim*) (A4)	*A* fails to bring about *q* and the non-occurrence/non-happening of *q* causally contributes to *p*'s occurring/ happening; (*non facere aliud esse*) failing to bring about some *q* such that somebody else (*q* = the victim has arms)	$\neg\delta\, q \wedge (\neg q \leadsto p)$
per aliud — The agent causes some other state of affairs to bring about the effect	positive, distal (*making the victim not armed, disarming the victim*) (A5)	*A* fails to prevent *q* from occurring/happening, and the occurrence of *q* causally contributes to the occurrence of *p* (*facere aliud non esse*) bringing it about that some *q* fails to obtain where *q* is such that somebody else ... (*q* = the victim has arms)	$\delta\, \neg q \wedge (q \leadsto \neg p)$
	negative, distal (*not making the killer not armed (not disarming the killer)*) (A6)	*A* fails to prevent *q*, and the non-occurrence of *q* causally contributes to *p*'s occurring/happening; (*non facere aliud non esse*) not bringing it about that some *q* fails to obtain where *q* is such that somebody else kills the victim (*q* = the killer has arms)	$\neg\delta\neg q \wedge (q \leadsto p)$

Each of the four types of agency can be expressed in each of the 6 modes, which means that we have potentially 24 types of agency. Within each type, the 6 modes are completely independent; they can neither be defined by each other, nor do they imply each other. Anselm's thesis is that any "doing" will be one of these twenty-four forms, but that in everyday usage, the twenty logically distinct forms are often used interchangeably, as if they were not distinct but equivalent. He notices that in *usus loquendi* we often use affirmative sentences as a shorthand, when what we really mean is the negation of the contrary.[50]

> Now, the affirmation (A) "to cause to be" is sometimes used in place of the negation (D) "not to cause not to be"; and, conversely, "not to cause not to be" is sometimes used in place of "to cause to be." Likewise, (B) "to cause not to be" and (C) "not to cause to be" are used in place of each other. For example, sometimes the reason someone is said to cause evil things to be is that he does not cause them not to be; and sometimes the reason he is said not to cause evil things not to be is that he causes them to be. Likewise, sometimes the reason someone is said to cause good things not to be is that he does not cause them to be; and sometimes the reason he is said not to cause good things to be is that—he causes them not to be.[51]

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[50] "Types (A1) and (C2) are identical, and likewise (C1) and (A2), and the same for (B1) and (D1), and (B2) and (D2). The other sixteen combinations of modes and types are all logically independent, hence the result is twenty distinct ways that agentive statements can be expressed" (Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 50).

[51] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 395; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 29: "Sed affirmatio 'facere esse' ponitur aliquando pro negatione, quae est 'non facere non esse'; et conuersim 'non facere non esse' pro 'facere esse'. Similiter 'facere non esse' et 'non facere esse' pro inuicem ponuntur. Dicitur enim facere mala esse aliquando aliquis idcirco, quia non facit ea non esse; et mala non facere non esse, quia facit ea esse; et facere bona non esse, quia non facit ea esse; et non facere bona esse, quia facit ea non esse."

In this way, Anselm seeks to prove how the ordinary usage of the terms (*usus loquendi*) can be explained, at least partly, through their logical definitions and relations between them. In the same way, he uses his explication of "*facere*" as a model for an analysis of *esse*, *habere*, and *debere*.

> We also say that we are not-obliged-to-sin in place of saying that we are obliged-not-to-sin. Yet if the matter is properly considered [we see that] not everyone who does what he is not obliged to do sins. For, indeed, just as to-be-obliged is the same as to-be-under-obligation, so not-to-be-obliged is nothing other than not-to-be-under-obligation. Now, it is not always the case that a man sins when he does what he is not under obligation to do. For, indeed, a man is not under obligation to marry, for he is permitted to maintain his virginity. It follows, then, that he is not obliged to marry. And yet, if he does marry he does not sin. Therefore, it is not always the case—provided "not obliged to" is properly understood—that a man sins when he does what he is not obliged to do. Nevertheless, no one denies that a man ought to marry. Therefore, he is both obliged and not obliged. Now, if you recall what has already been said, then [you will see that] just as we say "not to cause to be" in place of "to cause not to be," so we say "not to be obliged to do" in place of "to be obliged not to do." And so, where "to be obliged not to sin" is found, "not to be obliged to sin" is said in place of it. Our custom [of speaking] has adopted this latter expression to such an extent that nothing else is understood by it than "to be obliged not to sin."[52]

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[52] Hopkins and Richardson, *Complete Treatises*, 405; *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, 36: "Dicimus etiam nos 'non debere peccare' pro 'debere non peccare'. Non enim omnis, qui facit, quod non debet, peccat, si proprie consideretur. Sicut namque debere idem ist, quod debitorem esse, ita non debere non est aliud quam debitorem non esse. Non autem semper peccat homo, quando facit, quod non est debitor facere. Siquidem uir non est debitor ducere uxorem, quia licet ei seruare uirginitatem. Unde sequitur, quia non debet

What must be remembered, however, is that although we may use the locutions interchangeably, they are still different,[53] and only the first mode of each type represents the *usus proprie*.[54]

Conclusion

What follows from Anselm's theory of agency? Can it be applied successfully to his philosophical and theological doctrine? There are two aspects which have been mentioned at the beginning, namely the logical and theological one. It seems that Anselm's distinction between the *usus proprie* and *usus non proprie* of "*facere*" and his purely logical theory of agency were insufficient to explain the theological use of terms, so they served merely as a tool of higher order theory. In other words, this was a stage on the way to the explication of deontic concepts, which can be found in the *Lambeth Fragments*. By combining (logical) analyses of the theological usage of the word *facere* with certain statements that Anselm makes about obligations, we get a formal analysis of the common usage of these terms (*usus communis*) via their

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eam ducere? et tamen, si ducit eam, non peccat. Non ergo semper peccat uir, quando facit, quod non debet, si proprie intelligitur 'non debere'. Nemo tamen negat uirum debere ducere uxorem. Debet igitur et non debet. Sed si memores eorum, quae supra dicta sunt, sicut dicimus 'non facere esse' pro 'facere non esse': ita dicimus 'non debere facere' pro 'debere non facerc'; et ideo, ubi est 'debere non peccare', dicitur pro eo 'non debere peccare'. Quod in tantum obtinuit usus, ut non aliud intelligatur, quam 'debere non peccare'."

53 *Fragmenta Lambeth*, S36, p. 32.

54 Uckelman ("Modalities in Medieval Logic," 51) notes that Serene holds a different view, namely that "only ascriptions made in mode one are 'proper', since this is the only mode in which the agent's action directly causes the outcome ascribed to him. Ascriptions in mode two are 'improper' because the directly relevant factor is the agent's failure to act rather than his directly doing what is ascribed to him." (Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 123).

proper usage (*usus proprie*). Such an analysis gives a formal justification for Anselm's arguments that improper uses of agentive and deontic terms in Scripture can be grounded in proper, logical usage.[55] This formal analysis can provide a framework for his views on, for example, grace and sin or free will as presented in the *De libertate arbitrii*. In this latter treatise, Anselm defends a normative conception of freedom according to which an agent is free when two conditions are jointly satisfied: 1) she has the ability to perform a given action, 2) that action is the one she ought to perform, that is, it is objectively the right action and hence the one she ought to want to perform—roughly, that an agent is free when she can act as she ought, regardless of alternatives. One of the aims of *Fragmenta Lambeth* was to explore and build connections among ascriptions of ability, responsibility, and the causes of an action.[56]

When one applies logic to analyzing Anselm's texts, it is necessary to address the fundamental question concerning the relation between philosophical theories and logical systems. There can be two main approaches to this topic:

- logical reconstruction of a philosophical theory (evaluating and controlling the validity of inferences in a theory)—"logic for philosophy"
- philosophical theory as a source of knowledge which may serve as the substantive basis for developing a system of logic—"philosophy for logic."

In the first approach we try to express, for example, the main claims of a philosophical theory, to reconstruct its concepts, to examine the validity of its key arguments etc., by means of modern logic (i.e., applying those systems of logic that exist now). In the other one, a

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[55] Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 61.

[56] King, *(St.) Anselm of Canterbury [1033–1109]*, 6.

philosophical theory serves as a source of inspiration for developing a new system of logic. Therefore, in each approach, the application of logic to an analysis of philosophical theories has a different purpose:

A. reconstructing the logical structure of a philosophical theory, e.g., Anselm's philosophical theory—the question is whether the logical representation adequately expresses the philosopher's claims.

B. reconstructing a theory of a certain objective domain—the question is whether the logical representation is adequate for the area of extra-subjective reality.

The difference between approaches A and B can be considered in relation to Anselm's theory of agency. The first approach is taken by D. Walton and S. Uckelman, and the analyses in this article focused on just such an attempt to reconstruct Anselm's theory in the language of logic, so this was the formula of approach A; however, the article does not verify the presented logical representation in formula B. The language of logic allows for certain clarifications and prevents one from getting entangled in errors, but it does not allow one to express the entire richness of the metaphysical issues of Anselm's theory. Anselm's intention, however, was a certain precision, not a logicalization of language, and in this sense Anselm's project achieved its intended goal.

Faith, Language, Logic: Anselm of Canterbury and his Project of Logic of Agency

SUMMARY

The Philosophical Fragments (*Lambeth Fragments*) of St. Anselm of Canterbury are a kind of dictionary that explains the meaning of certain terms, such as: *facere*, *velle*, *posse*, *necesse*, *debere*, or *agere*. They include a discussion, conducted on the intersection of logic and ethics, of such deontic concepts as "oblig-

ation" and "goodness." Through the explication of meanings, Anselm attempts to create a conceptual apparatus for rational proofs of the main tenets of the Christian doctrine and, even more broadly, for the exegesis of Scripture. In addition, this new apparatus allows him to examine some purely philosophical topics, including free will, causation, and the relationship between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Recently attempts have been made (by D. Walton at the level of syntax and by S. Uckelman at the level of neighborhood semantics) to reconstruct the logic of agency presented in the *Philosophical Fragments*.

The article will briefly introduce the main issues discussed in the *Philosophical Fragments*. The paper shows that the description and analysis of the verb "*facere*" mainly in the *Philosophical Fragments*, but also in Anselm's other treatises, can be well described within the Aristotelian logical square; however, the article shows some problems in trying to describe the concepts of causation, agency, and action in the language of logic. Thus, the article examines the thesis of the applicability of logic to the fundamental problems of metaphysics, namely causality, especially in the context of human free will and God's action.

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