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“From the Phenomena of Motions to the Forces of Nature”: Hypothesis or Deduction?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Howard Stein
Howard Stein*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Extract

There is a passage in Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that I have always found striking and rather charming. It concerns a metaphysical theory that Hume regards as bizarre; and he offers two philosophical arguments in its confutation. It is the first of these that I have in mind:

First, [he says,] It seems to me, that this theory… is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience.

Type
Part V. Deduction From the Phenomena
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 209 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1991

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References

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