

## HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF CHRISTIANITY AND RELIGIOUS ALIENATION

JON STEWART  
SLOVAK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

**Abstract.** In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel argues that the development of the religions of the world leads up to Christianity, which is the one true religion. One key element which separates Christianity from the other religions, for Hegel, concerns the issue of alienation. He claims that the previous religions all contain some form of alienation, which can be found in their conceptions of the divine. I wish to examine Hegel's view that Christianity alone overcomes religious alienation. What is it that makes Christianity so special in this regard? This is a particularly important issue given that the question of alienation is so central in the post-Hegelian thinkers such as Feuerbach, Bauer, and Marx, who all insist that, far from overcoming alienation, Christianity is guilty of causing it. I argue that this issue provides new insight into the old criticism of Hegel as a thinker of abstraction.

### I. INTRODUCTION

In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel argues that the development of the religions of the world leads up to and culminates in Christianity, which is the one true religion. For this reason he refers to Christianity as “the Absolute Religion” or “the Consummate Religion.” One key element which separates Christianity from the other religions, according to Hegel, concerns the issue of alienation. He argues that the previous religions all contain some form of alienation, which can be found in their conceptions of the divine. In this article, I wish to examine Hegel's view that Christianity alone overcomes religious alienation. What is it that makes Christianity so special in this regard? This is a particularly important issue given that the question of alienation is so central in the post-Hegelian thinkers such as Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx, Bakunin and Nietzsche, who all insist that, far from overcoming alienation, Christianity is guilty of *causing* it.

It would be impossible in this context to treat Hegel's analysis of all the world religions, and so I will confine myself to his account of Judaism with an occasional mention of Islam. When theologians approach Hegel's philosophy of religion, they tend to focus on his account of the Trinity as the key,<sup>1</sup> and this makes good sense given his use of triads and his speculative method. By contrast, for the issue of overcoming alienation, I wish to argue that the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Revelation are equally important.

---

<sup>1</sup> This work was produced at the Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences. It was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-15-0682. See, for example, Paolo D. Bubbio, “Hegel, the Trinity, and the ‘I’”, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 76, no. 2 (2014); Patricia M. Calton, *Hegel's Metaphysics of God: The Ontological Proof as the Development of a Trinitarian Divine Ontology* (Ashgate, 2001); Herbert Huber, *Idealismus und Trinität, Pantheon und Götterdämmerung. Grundlagen und Grundzüge der Lehre von Gott nach dem Manuskript Hegel zur Religionsphilosophie* (Acta humaniora, 1984); Dale M. Schlitt, *Hegel's Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection* (Brill, 1984); Erik Schmidt, “Hegel und die kirchliche Trinitätslehre”, *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 24 (1982); Jörg Splett, *Die Trinitätslehre G. W. F. Hegels* (Alber, 1965); Peter C. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford Univ. Press, 2005); Cyril O'Regan and Louis Dupré, *The Heterodox Hegel* (State Univ. of New York Press, 1994).

Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* were published in 1832 after his death by one of his students, the theologian Philipp Marheineke.<sup>2</sup> This is a profoundly rich work that ostensibly attempts to give a defense of Christianity. The text is divided into three large parts: "The Concept of Religion," "The Determinate Religion" and "The Absolute Religion." The first part examines the abstract conception of the divine. It asks simply what is God in general, without any specific analysis of any given religion. By contrast, the second section, "The Determinate Religion," gives an overview of the religions of the world and examines their different conceptions of the divine. The goal is to compare these different views with the concept of the divine in general, which was established in the first part. So one can see Part One as a *universal*, an abstract definition or idea, whereas Part Two represents an account of a diversity of concrete *particulars* that are then compared to this definition. Finally, in Part Three, "The Absolute Religion," these two things come together. This third part is Hegel's account of Christianity, which, he believes, is the one religion which actually corresponds to the adequate and correct conception of the divine that was set out in Part One. So it is here that the universal and the particular are unified, or, put differently, the particular corresponds to the universal.

## II. HEGEL'S ANALYSIS OF THE FALL

In the second part of the lectures, Hegel gives an account of Judaism in his overview of the world religions.<sup>3</sup> He sees in Judaism some of the main elements of alienation. As a part of his analysis Hegel gives a provocative reading of the famous myth of the Fall at the beginning of Genesis.<sup>4</sup> As is well known, this story is intended to explain certain aspects of the human condition and not least of all the origin of evil in the world. Hegel points out that in earlier religions the issue of evil was not a problem since these religions were polytheistic. In polytheism there are many different gods and goddesses, who have responsibility for certain spheres of the universe. There are, for example, rain gods, fire gods, harvest gods, sea gods, and so forth. These gods are limited in their power to the specific natural force that they govern. They have no power or authority over other forces that lay outside their spheres. This is not to say that their powers are equal since there are, of course, some gods or goddesses who are stronger than others depending on what natural force they represent and what their area of influence is. For example, Zeus or Jupiter are powerful gods who rule over the others, but their power is not absolute by any means. Instead, they are also limited and need to negotiate with the other gods in order to execute their plans. In this sort of world the origin of evil is not a problem since it can always be ascribed to malevolent deities. There are some good gods and goddesses who aid and assist human beings, and there are evil ones who vex them. This can be seen most clearly in the two main gods of Zoroastrianism, the god of Light and the Good, Ormuzd, and the god of Darkness and Evil, Ahriman. In this religion the origin of evil in the world is entirely straightforward — it comes from the evil god, Ahriman.

2 G.W.F. Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols 1.-3." In *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe, Vol. 1-18*, ed. Ludwig Boumann et al. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832-45) English translation: G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1-3*, ed. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson (New York, NY: The Humanities Press, 1962).

3 For secondary literature on Hegel's treatment of Judaism, see Timo Sloomweg, "Hegel's Philosophy of Judaism", in *Hegel's Philosophy of the Historical Religions*, ed. Bart Labuschagne and Timo Sloomweg (Brill, 2012); Peter C. Hodgson, "The Metamorphosis of Judaism in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion", *Owl of Minerva* 19, no. 1 (1987); Cyril O'Regan, "Hegel and Anti-Judaism", *Owl of Minerva* 28, no. 2 (1997); Nathan Rotenstreich, "Hegel's Image of Judaism", *Jewish Social Studies* 15, no. 1 (1953); Emil L. Fackenheim, "Hegel and Judaism: A Flaw in the Hegelian Mediation", in *The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium 1970*, ed. J. J. O'Malley et al. (Springer Netherlands, 1973); Emil L. Fackenheim, *Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Philosophy: A Preface to Future Jewish Thought* (Basic Books, 1973), 81–126; Yirmiyahu Yovel, *The Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche and the Jews* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1998).

4 Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols 1.-3." in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke*; G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1-3*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert F. Brown (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1984-87). 448n-442n. In what follows all references will be to this new edition of Hegel's lectures, which does not use Marheineke's edition as its textual basis. See Christopher Anderson-Irwin, "But the serpent did not lie: Reading, History, and Hegel's Interpretation of Genesis Chapter 3", *Clio* 35, no. 1 (2005).

The problem of evil arises in Judaism since it is a monotheistic religion. There is only one God, Jehovah or Yahweh, and he is supposed to be all-powerful and good. If this is the case, then some explanation must be given for how evil arose in the world since this God could not have created it since he is good. Moreover, if he is all-powerful, he could have prevented it from arising. So the story of the Fall is presented as a way to understand the origin of evil in the universe. In addition, it gives etiologies or explanations for other fundamental facts of human existence.

According to the story in Genesis, the first human beings Adam and Eve lived in a paradise, a garden, where all of their needs were met. They were in complete harmony with nature and God. They had a specific nature as created beings just like the animals and the other natural objects. There was in the garden a tree with the knowledge of good and evil, and God forbade Adam and Eve to eat from it. Seduced by the serpent, they defied this prohibition and took fruit from the tree. This then caused a change in their nature, and they suddenly realized that they were different from the animals and for the first time were ashamed of their nakedness. Angered by this defiance, God issued punishments for both Adam and Eve, which their descendants also had to bear. God further exiled them from the garden, and they then had to find what they needed to survive for themselves. Humans have mourned this lost paradise ever since.

Hegel thinks that this familiar story contains certain hidden philosophical truths, although they are expressed in a mythological and pictorial form. At first, humans are natural beings. They live like animals in nature. But then a change occurs, and humans develop what Hegel calls “spirit,” that is, a rational or reflective side that animals do not have. In this sense humans step out of nature. Spirit is what makes it possible for humans to develop culture in all of its many forms: science, history, art, religion, philosophy, and so forth. Humans are thus different from nature.

An important part of this difference is the awareness of good and evil. We do not think of animals or small children as either good or evil. They do not have the capacity for reflective thought, and so these categories simply do not apply to them. They act on their immediate natural impulses. In Hegel’s language, they have not yet separated themselves from nature. Truly human action means that we are aware of good and evil, and that we freely choose the one or the other. So to be truly human means to exercise free will in this manner. Therefore, Hegel claims that evil consists not in leaving the natural state as represented by the garden but rather in remaining in it. In this state we are the victims of our natural drives, which dictate our actions. But it is only when we have the freedom to overcome these natural impulses that we step out of nature and enter the human sphere.

The idea in the story of the Fall is that this notion of freedom is precisely what Adam and Eve were lacking in the Garden. They were like the animals, not knowing good and evil. They did not know that they were naked and felt no shame. It was precisely the knowledge of good and evil that was forbidden to them. God issued this prohibition since this knowledge was reserved for him. Indeed, the serpent points this out when he tempts Adam and Eve by saying that if they eat from the tree, then they will become like God. After they do so, God himself confirms this by recognizing the change that has taken place in them and saying, “See, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil.”<sup>5</sup> The idea here is that this knowledge is something divine, and humans are not supposed to have it. God knew that humans would be unable to manage the temptations of evil and were thus better off without this knowledge of good and evil, and this is one of the reasons why he issued the prohibition in the first place. When Adam and Eve become aware of their nakedness, they become self-conscious for the first time. Only then can they see themselves from the perspective of the other and feel a sense of shame. Thus the very idea of self-consciousness is closely related to what, in biblical language, is described as the knowledge of good and evil.

Hegel is, however, critical of the moral interpretation of the story as it appears in the Hebrew Bible. He argues that it lies in the very nature of human beings to be free. Thus, as long as one lives in the garden with the animals, one will never lead a fully human life. To be human means to have free will, and this means to have the possibility of choosing both good and evil. This, however, implies that the possibility of evil is

5 Genesis 3:22. See Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, p. 338n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 439n.

part and parcel of what it is to be human. This possibility must exist for freedom to be meaningful. There is, however, one unfortunate result of this: there will always be some people who choose evil over good. This is the price that we pay for freedom. For this reason, freedom is always a two-edged sword.<sup>6</sup> But, for Hegel, the loss of the paradise of Eden is not something to be lamented, but rather it is a natural part of human development. We have to leave paradise behind us to become fully human.

Hegel is also attentive to the important element of work. One of the punishments that God issues to Adam and Eve is that human beings will have to work hard in order to earn a living, or as it is put in Genesis: “cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you. . . . By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread.”<sup>7</sup> In the Garden Adam and Eve could readily find whatever they needed to satisfy their natural needs. They had immediate access to the food and water that they needed to sustain themselves since this was provided directly by God, just as he provides it to the other animals. But after the Fall this has changed. Now humans must work for this themselves and cannot expect to receive it as a free gift. In the story in Genesis this is portrayed as a terrible punishment, but Hegel argues that this misrepresents the situation. To work and to make one’s living by means of one’s own skills, abilities and intelligence is exactly what it is to be a human being. This is what makes us higher than the animals that are unable to do this. For this reason, we naturally take pride in things that we have created or jobs that we have done well. This sense of pride in our work constitutes a part of the truly human side of our nature. Therefore, to conceive of the need to work as a punishment, a terrible curse, and something to be lamented, as in Genesis, is a misunderstanding, according to Hegel.

### III. THE FALL AS A STORY OF ALIENATION

The story of the Fall is a story of alienation. Hegel explains that it is a mistake to think of the narrative of Adam and Eve and the apple as some contingent, accidental event that might or might not have happened. Rather, he claims, this represents the “eternal history and nature of humanity” in general.<sup>8</sup> In other words, all humans are like Adam and Eve. When we are small children, we are like the animals, acting on our immediate natural drives and instincts. Then as we grow, we develop out of this condition and learn how to control our natural side with the mind. We learn the difference between right and wrong, good and evil. So in a sense the story of Adam and Eve is repeated in every human being.

According to the biblical story, humans are created with a specific nature in the same way as the animals are. Human nature was initially in some ways similar to the nature of the animals, and for this reason Adam and Eve lived in harmony with nature. But with the Fall and the original sin, a split or rupture appeared. Now the first humans were suddenly separated from their original nature. They no longer felt at home in their world, and a sign of this is that they realized for the first time that they were naked. Human nature had become divided. Humans continued to have a natural side, but now they also had another side, a rational side, that Hegel refers to as “spirit.” This is the side that they share with God. Humans are thus thought to occupy a special place in the universe. They are not wholly like the animals, although they share a natural element with them. Nor are they wholly like God, although they share a rational element with him. Instead, humans are alone in having a divided being. The Fall is thus the story of how humans became separated or alienated from their own nature. But, as Hegel critically points out, this mistakenly implies that the true, but now lost nature of man is to be like the animals.

There is also another form of alienation that the story describes. Initially, Adam and Eve were the special creations of God. Just as they were in harmony with nature, so also they were in harmony with the divine. God created them and their essence, and so long as they lived in accordance with this, there

<sup>6</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 339n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 439n: “Cognition or knowledge is this two-sided, dangerous gift.”

<sup>7</sup> Genesis 3:17-18. See Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, p. 340n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 439n-440n.

<sup>8</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, p. 339n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, p. 439n.

was no problem. But by defying God's prohibition, they committed a grave crime that forever separated or alienated them from God. God then punished them and banished them from the garden. From that moment on human beings were on their own and had to make a living for themselves.

As a result of this division, the notion of sin plays an important role in Judaism. One is eternally vexed by one's own moral unworthiness. One forever dwells on the seemingly infinite separation from God that Hegel sketches in his analysis of the unhappy consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The Old Testament is full of stories that depict the Jews falling away from the correct faith and subsequently being punished by God. Hegel points out that the Psalms contain many laments about the human condition of sinfulness and the great distance to God.<sup>9</sup>

While it is true that some forms of reconciliation do take place when God makes a covenant with the Jews and gives them laws, Hegel emphasizes that these are never fully adequate forms of reconciliation, and the obsession with sinfulness and separation from God are constant features of Judaism that are not fundamentally changed by this. So, for Hegel, Judaism represents a religion of alienation. According to him, there was a movement from an initial harmony, that is, in the time before the Fall, to a separation or alienation, that is, in the time after the Fall. These can be regarded as two steps in a developmental process, which, however, is not yet complete.

His positive view is that the condition of alienation is not permanent and irresolvable, but rather a new and higher harmony can be achieved.<sup>10</sup> He argues that Christianity represents the third step of reestablishing a harmony with God. But this harmony is, of course, different from the initial harmony. The third step is not simply a reversion to the first one. We cannot go back and become like animals again, and even if we could, this would hardly be desirable. Instead, we can enter into a harmony with God by means of what we have in common with him: spirit. With the rational faculty of the human mind, we can choose the good and reject evil. We can embrace the higher part of our nature and exercise our freedom fully by rejecting evil and the temptations from our natural or selfish side.

Today we tend to think of alienation as a contingent fact of modern culture. We feel alienated from modern society due to, for example, the way in which goods are produced or administrative structures function today. But it is often thought that this is just an unfortunate result of modern life that could certainly be different if society were organized in a different manner. In contrast to this view, Hegel's analysis of the Fall shows that he believes that alienation is a necessary and fundamental fact of human existence. It is not something that is accidental or contingent. It is a basic truth of human nature that we are self-divided and therefore self-alienated. We have one part nature and one part spirit, and this is what it is to be human. The conflict between these two elements is what it means to be free. Throughout their lives, humans must forever struggle with the natural or irrational side of their nature, which leaves them no rest. For this reason the idea of an original harmony sounds initially attractive. But the fact that we have this inner struggle is indication that we have the ability to make the choice to control our natural side and act in accordance with reason. This is a higher form of life than the original harmony of animals who act immediately on natural desire.

It should be noted that Hegel is ultimately a thinker of reconciliation who seeks to harmonize conflicting or contradictory elements. While humans cannot escape their natural drives completely, these are appropriated by spirit and given a higher content in the sphere of culture. While humans share with the animals, for example, the basic hunger drive and the need to nourish themselves with food, they act on this in a different way. Eating becoming incorporated as a social act in the human sphere. In short, humans learn the rules of table etiquette and eat calmly and with refinement in contrast to the animals who unceremoniously gulp down their food. In this way humans transform the fulfilment of a natural

<sup>9</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 341n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 441n.

<sup>10</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 339n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 439n: "This original natural state must be the starting point, but the separation that then occurs must also in turn be reconciled."

drive into an act of spirit. Of course, much could be said about Hegel's specific understanding of the importance of reconciliation that only takes place with Christianity, but this is a broad topic unto itself.

#### IV. JUDAISM AS A LORDSHIP-BONDAGE RELATION

Hegel characterizes the God of the Hebrew Bible, Yaweh or Jehovah, as a master who rules over the Jewish people tyrannically.<sup>11</sup> The basic relation of the Jews to their God, he claims, is one of fear. God is the absolute, infinite power over the universe and human beings. He regularly punishes the people for their sinfulness and even wipes out other peoples, such as the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah.<sup>12</sup> Given this, it makes sense that the Jews live in terror of Jehovah's wrath.

Hegel quotes from Psalm 111:10, as he did in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."<sup>13</sup> He refers to this as a "wise fear" and argues that this is the *beginning* of freedom.<sup>14</sup> His claim here is that the fear of the slave or bondsman is an important stepping-stone on the way to freedom. A child fears punishment from its parents, and this fear motivates it to control the natural desires that it would otherwise immediately act on. Over time in the course of its upbringing, the child learns to regulate these inner desires itself, and it is no longer a great struggle to overcome them. Thus the child surpasses the immediate natural state and becomes fully human. Fear makes this possible. Similarly, the slave must live with fear daily, and in so doing he comes to develop an inward discipline. This allows him to master his natural desires and drives and to come to regard his natural side as nothing. In this way, the slave gradually overcomes his fear and becomes independent of the things of nature. So when the master threatens to deprive him of these things or the satisfaction of his needs, the slave no longer thinks of this as a serious or threatening matter. Hegel explains that the wise fear "is not a particular fear of the particular but just the positing of this particular fear as null, emancipating oneself from fear."<sup>15</sup> So just as with the lordship and bondage relation, this fear is in fact a reversal. In any case, the emphasis in the psalm that Hegel quotes is on the "beginning" of freedom. The fear is not the freedom itself, but in order to reach a state of freedom, one must experience a stage of fear and overcome it.

Hegel thus describes the ancient Jews as living in a condition of servitude to their God. Like the unhappy consciousness from the *Phenomenology*, they regard God as the infinite, the absolute, and themselves as nothing and worthless. In order to get closer to God, one must eliminate all of the negative and sinful aspects of oneself. One's *only* justification lies in this relation to God, but this is not a positive kind of justification since it requires one to regard oneself as having no value or as sinful.

According to Hegel, one can see the tyrannical nature of the God of the Hebrew Bible in his commands and the kind of obedience that he demands.<sup>16</sup> Today, in the state or in different institutions or even families there are instances where obedience is required. In these cases, there are rational laws or customs that demand our compliance. When, as rational adults, we examine these with our critical faculty, we come to see the rationality in them, and we gladly give our consent to them. In these cases we choose to act on the shared universal and not on our selfish desires, which would be in contradiction with this. In this scenario obedience presupposes an inward sphere of human rationality and reflection. The assump-

11 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 339-345; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 441-445.

12 Genesis 19.

13 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 343n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 445n. See G.W.F. Hegel, *System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807), 125; Georg W. F. Hegel and J. N. Findlay, *Phenomenology of spirit* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), 117f.

14 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 343n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 445n.

15 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 343n.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 445n.

16 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 348-351; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 449-451.

tion is made that we are all rational adults, who are capable of this, and so we can, each on our own, reach the conclusion and find the rationality of the laws and customs in question. But this is not the kind of obedience that the God of the Old Testament is asking for. Instead, he demands an absolute and immediate compliance without any consent. His demand is that one comply or face the consequences of terrible punishment. He does not care if the Jews agree with him or not or find his laws and regulations correct. Their opinion on the matter is entirely irrelevant. Their duty is simply to obey and ask no questions. This is the form of command that Hegel refers to as “positive.” It is not based on any deeper system of rationality but is simply an arbitrary command.

Hegel points out that this fails to recognize the sphere of inwardness and reflection that exists in mature human beings. This is close to the model of how parents discipline small children, where the assumption is that they are too young to exercise rationality and reflection and are thus incapable of giving rational consent. Likewise, this is how we tend to discipline animals which are unable to be reasoned with. They merely understand their role as a subordinate in a hierarchy, and this role must be established and maintained by the threat of force. In such cases, the only recourse is threats, coercion and violence. So, according to Hegel, the Jews do not follow the laws as free individuals who grant their consent, but rather as “servants.”<sup>17</sup> He illustrates this with a long list of God’s threats which are intended to force compliance.<sup>18</sup>

By contrast, he believes, Christianity recognizes and develops the inward side of the human being. Jesus is critical of the blind obedience to the law as followed by the scribes and the Pharisees. He argues that the law is not something outward but rather an inner principle that dwells in the hearts of each human being. Thus the idea of the new law in Christianity is one that is based on the notion that humans have a rational inward side that involves conscience and moral sentiment. Given this, there is no need for force, coercion and violence. Likewise, the relation of Christians to the divine has a different character from that of the Jews to Jehovah.

## V. HEGEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF CHRISTIAN REVELATION: GOD AS SELF-CONSCIOUS

After having given a long account of the development of the world’s religions, Hegel now presents Christianity as the final, complete and true form of religion. So in this sense one can see Hegel playing the role of a Christian apologist and fulfilling his stated goal at the outset of the lectures, namely, to provide a firm foundation for Christianity at a time when its basic dogmas and beliefs were all being called into question.

In his introductory comments about Christianity,<sup>19</sup> Hegel explains that it lies in the very concept of God to be a self-conscious entity. While earlier religions might have worshipped objects of nature, these physical things do not correspond with our understanding of God. For God to be God, he must be self-consciousness. But it was shown in the “Lordship and Bondage” section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that in order for one to be self-conscious, one needed to be in interaction with another self-conscious subject. Only when one can see oneself from the perspective of another, can one become self-conscious. This also holds true of God. If God is to be a self-conscious deity, this implies that he must be determined by other self-conscious beings, for example, his worshippers.

<sup>17</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, p. 350; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 450.

<sup>18</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 2, *Die Bestimmte Religion*, vol. 4a, 350f.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, 450f. Hegel quotes from Leviticus 26:15-20.

<sup>19</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, 99-105; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 163-170.

Hegel believes that the idea of God as a self-conscious subject is seen most clearly in the Christian doctrine of the Revelation, and for this reason he refers to Christianity as “the *revelatory* religion.”<sup>20</sup> The traditional doctrine of the Revelation, of course, states that God became incarnated in human form in the person of Jesus Christ and thus revealed himself to the world. So in Christianity there are initially two different conceptions of God: one as the all-powerful creator of the universe who is omnipresent and beyond nature, and the other as a concrete particular human being. Judaism and Islam share with Christianity the first conception of God as the creator of the universe, but then stop there and reject the Christian idea of the Revelation and the Incarnation. The God of Judaism and Islam remains abstract, and this, for Hegel, is a major defect. Since there is no doctrine of revelation, this God never becomes concrete and never takes on any concrete content. But with Christianity the life and teachings of Christ provide a rich particular content. Without this content, the notion of God remains an abstraction, an empty universal. For something to have content, it must come out of the realm of mere thought and become an object in actuality.<sup>21</sup> In Hegel’s language, it must *objectify* itself.

The doctrine of the Incarnation makes it possible for God to become fully self-conscious since only when God appears as a concrete, incarnate being does he enter into contact with other human beings. Only in this way can the dialectic of recognition take place, which, according to Hegel, is essential for the development of self-consciousness. As long as God remains a transcendent being, he cannot develop as self-consciousness. So the idea of the Incarnation is not something accidental or contingent as is often thought.<sup>22</sup> Instead, it lies in the very nature of God, *qua* self-conscious, to become concrete. Thus the Incarnation is necessary for God to become a fully self-conscious entity. As Hegel puts it, “A spirit that is not revelatory is not spirit.”<sup>23</sup>

This issue is relevant for the theme of alienation. The notion that God is something fundamentally external and other to us is the point of departure for different forms of alienation. Alienation is always about a split or division between two things: in this case God and human beings. When other peoples believed that the gods were something radically different or separate from them, they had a sense of alienation from them. Hegel believes that even Christian theologians mistakenly follow this model in their conception of the divine:

At first sight, what theology is about is the cognition of God as what is solely objective and absolute, what remains purely and simply separate from subjective consciousness. Therefore God is an external object — like the sun or the sky — but still a thought-object. An external object of consciousness exists where the object permanently retains the character of something other and external.<sup>24</sup>

This was in many ways the problem of the unhappy consciousness, who always conceived of God as being transcendent and infinitely distant from himself. But Hegel believes that, in contrast to the other religions, Christianity overcomes this problem since it suggests that there is a “unity of this object,” that is, God, “with the subject.”<sup>25</sup> Reconciliation is only possible if the two terms are not conceived as radically separate and distinct from the start, and this means that human subjectivity must be understood to be a part of the nature of God.<sup>26</sup>

It should also be noted that Hegel uses a special term in his description of the movement from the first to the second person of the Trinity, that is, God the Father in contrast to God the Son, or God as

20 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 177, 179; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 250, 252.

21 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 103f.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 168.

22 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 105; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 170.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

25 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 101; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 166.

26 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 144f.; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 213.



transcendent creator of the universe in contrast to God as incarnate human being. He explains that God *externalizes* himself in order to create the universe and then to create another self-conscious entity, the Son. This follows the model that Hegel used to describe self-consciousness itself, whereby one individual starts with himself, and then, when another person appears, the individual must, so to speak, go out of himself and see himself from the perspective of the other. His understanding of himself is thus necessarily bound up with the other. The word Hegel uses for this is “*Entäusserung*,” which means “separation” or “externalization,” but this term has also been translated as “alienation.” It will be noted that this is a slightly different sense of the term “alienation” from the one we have been working with so far. The notion of alienation, understood as a feeling of estrangement from another person or a community, corresponds to the German word “*Entfremdung*.” But in any case what is at issue are two things considered fundamentally separate from one another. Thus, Hegel uses two different terms to capture two different senses of the English word “alienation.”

For Hegel, the doctrine of the Revelation represents the idea that humans can see and recognize God in person, and with this recognition God becomes who he is as a self-conscious entity. This implies that human beings play a role in determining what God is, or, put differently, they are a part of God. This is a counterintuitive idea and has given rise to debates about the orthodoxy of Hegel’s ultimate view on Christianity.<sup>27</sup> We just recalled that Hegel’s official position is that he wishes to defend Christianity as the one true religion. This is the side of his thought that the right Hegelians emphasize. But his claim about the self-conscious nature of God can also be interpreted in a way that points in a different direction. When he says that for God to be a self-conscious entity, God must be recognized by other self-conscious entities, this can be taken to imply that if God is not recognized in this way, then he would not exist. In other words, if self-conscious human beings did not think of God, then there would be no God since God only exists in the minds of the religious believers. In short, God is just a figment of the collective human imagination. This is the interpretation of Hegel that some of his critics raised and that gave rise to the left Hegelian school.

## VI. HEGEL'S ANALYSIS OF CHRISTIANITY: THE ELEVATED VALUE OF THE HUMAN BEING

Hegel also claims that Christianity is the religion of freedom in contrast to earlier religions. What he means by this is that it is the one religion that recognizes the infinite value of each individual. This is a result of the doctrine of the Incarnation. When God is conceived merely as an abstract being in some transcendent beyond, then there is a radical split between human beings and the divine. This is the point of departure of the unhappy consciousness, who believes that God is infinite, unchangeable and absolute, and, by contrast, regards himself negatively as finite, changeable and contingent. If God dwells beyond this world, then the implication is that this world has no deeper meaning or value, and this also holds for the inhabitants of this world. This world is thus devoid of truth. This leads to the negative, self-deprecating sense of self that one finds in the unhappy consciousness or, according to Hegel, in the Psalms.

But when, with the Incarnation, God enters the world, he shows that the divine can also exist in the finite, mundane sphere that we are familiar with. The truth and the absolute are not reserved for some beyond but rather dwell in the same world as we do. The world is now invested with a new importance, and so also are human beings. When God comes down from the heavens and appears in the real world as a specific individual, he shows that the world itself has value and legitimacy. This in turn means that the believers who dwell in it have some importance. Now for the first time, “subjectivity is absolutely essential....this standpoint elevates subjectivity into the essential characteristic of the whole range of

27 See, for example, William Desmond, *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* (Ashgate, 2003); Ioan A. Tofan, “On How God Does not Die in the Idea: The Hegelian Project of the Philosophy of Religion”, *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 8, no. 22 (2009).

the religious relationship.”<sup>28</sup> In the form of Christ, God is in principle able to enter into a relation with each specific human being. There is a recognition of every single believer. There is something of infinite value in every human being. This has major implications not just for one’s self-image but also for social institutions, ethics, and legal relations. For example, since Christianity regarded each individual to have some special value, something divine in them, it opposed the long-standing practice of slavery in the Greco-Roman world.

This issue is also related to the question of our knowledge of the divine. Hegel believes that it is a characteristic view of his own day that people, in the wake of the Enlightenment criticisms of religion, deny that God can be known. The idea is that God far surpasses our finite human abilities to understand the world. He dwells in some transcendent sphere that we can never have access to. So the only recourse that we have is to look into ourselves and our own beliefs. In other words, since no objective knowledge about God is possible, the only thing left is our subjective disposition. We just need to make sure that we believe in our hearts, but the actual content of that belief is left entirely open.

Hegel has a mixed assessment of this modern view. He thinks that there is something wrong about the idea that we cannot know God. The doctrine of the Revelation is all about knowing the divine. God entered the world as an incarnate human being in order to reveal himself, that is, in order to show human beings who he was. The whole point is that God should be known and that after the Revelation we have no excuses for saying that we do not know him. When God enters the world with the Revelation, he shows that the truth can exist in the world and can be known by human beings. It no longer exists only in some transcendent sphere from which we are cut off.

But Hegel also thinks that there is something correct about the focus on subjectivity. At the beginning of the history of human culture, the idea of subjectivity or the individual was not something that had any value or merit. The truth was considered to be something external in the world, for example, the oracle of the gods or the established custom of one’s community or family. In this context, the personal ideas and wishes of the individual did not matter at all. People had to follow the directions of the oracle or the dictates of their families or communities. But in the modern world, we have come to realize the importance and legitimacy of the individual. In the course of time, the idea of human rights was developed, which acknowledged the value of each person. So there is something right and very important about this view.

For Hegel, there is, however, a real danger in the modern view that we cannot know God but must instead focus on our inward subjectivity. If we cannot know God, then, he claims, our subjectivity is arbitrary. One can believe in many different kinds of things in an authentic, subjective or inward manner, but this is wholly formal and has no content. This means that in practice, the abstract, undetermined idea of God can be filled with any number of different beliefs and practices, many of which may be absurd, contradictory or even destructive. Instead, the true form of subjectivity is one that also recognizes an objective truth and uses this as the point of departure. For Hegel, there is thus both a *subjective* and an *objective* element in truth. We have the right to use our reason and make our own judgments, and in this sense we exercise our subjectivity. But this is not entirely satisfying unless the content of our judgments and beliefs is something shared and recognized by others. But for the content to be shared by others, it must be something fixed and determinate. Otherwise, different people would not necessarily be sharing the same content of belief but rather be believing in different things. It might be useful here to think of Hegel’s conception of the ethical sphere of *Sittlichkeit*, which contains concrete customs, practices, and institutions. These are specific and concrete, existing in the sphere of actuality, and they are shared by everyone in the community who participates in them.

The true subjective element lies in the fact that each individual is enjoined to consent to the truth in their own conscience. They are not coerced or commanded but rather give their consent freely and willingly since they recognize the content to be rational. This is what true freedom amounts to. One can

28 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 103; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 167f.

give recognition and acknowledge the truth freely based on one's own intuitions. Hegel believes that this is what the Christian religion makes possible. It uncovers the important realm of subjectivity and the value of the individual, but since the incarnate God is concrete and has a concrete content, this prevents the realm of subjectivity from slipping into arbitrariness and relativism. According to his view, both the subjective and the objective get their due.

## VII. THE DOCTRINE OF THE GOD-MAN AND ALIENATION

With regard to the issue of alienation, the Incarnation means that human beings no longer perceive the world around them as “something alien.”<sup>29</sup> Christianity offers reconciliation that overcomes the deep-seated sense of alienation that humans feel. As we have seen, initially there was “God, who confronts a world that is estranged from him, and a world that is estranged from its essence.”<sup>30</sup> This is the notion of the transcendent God or creator, which resulted in the unhappy consciousness, who was infinitely separated and thus alienated from the divine. But the unhappy consciousness also represents a form of self-alienation or self-estrangement since it regards itself as wholly worthless and without meaning or value (in contrast to the divine). In Judaism there is an alienation from oneself and a deep sense of sinfulness and inner worthlessness. In Islam there is also an alienation from the world, which is believed to have no value or meaning at all. But, unlike Judaism or Islam, Christianity presents a reconciliation that overcomes the separation from the divine and the radical split between God and the world.<sup>31</sup>

Hegel believes that Christianity, in contrast to other religions, offers this reconciliation due to the fact that it conceives of God as a concrete human being. In earlier religions where the divinities were conceived of as animals, for example, it was impossible to experience a sense of recognition in this relation. One cannot receive meaningful recognition from an animal. But when God appears as a concrete human being, then it is possible for individuals to enter into a relation to him and for genuine recognition to take place. When one sees God in human form, one sees oneself, *qua* human, in God. One realizes that the true form of the divine is that of a human being. One sees that there is a “unity of divine and human nature,”<sup>32</sup> which Hegel refers to as “spirit.” This is the culmination of the development of the world religions.

## VIII. CHRISTIANITY AS THE RELIGION OF FREEDOM

Hegel emphasizes that Christianity is also the religion of freedom, which seems to imply that the other religions of the world do not allow their devotees to be free. He defines freedom as spirit being at home with itself or more specifically having itself as its object. This means that when we are confronted with an external entity in the world, it does not strike us as something “other” but rather is a reflection of ourselves. So in this sense alienation or having a relation to something different or foreign to oneself is connected with the ability to be free.

For Hegel, this relation is not something static but is always dynamic. So freedom refers to the process of overcoming the difference or alienation with the other thing.<sup>33</sup> In Hegel's language, this difference must be *negated*. This recalls the analysis of the lord and the bondsman, where initially the relation was one of alienation. Each party was confronted with a self-conscious other, who was different from himself. When one looked at the other and saw oneself reflected in the eyes of the other, the picture of oneself was

29 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 106; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 171.

30 Ibid.

31 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 107; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 172.

32 Ibid.

33 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 106; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 171.

something foreign. This is what needs to be negated in order for the individual to assert his own view of himself. Only when his view is seen reflected in the eyes of the other does he attain self-certainty and freedom. As we saw in that discussion, for Hegel, freedom is therefore necessarily bound up with self-conscious recognition.<sup>34</sup>

When this is applied to the realm of religion, this means that Christianity is the religion of freedom since here the believers have overcome alienation and are at home in the world. They can see themselves recognized as free by their God. The divine is no longer something alien or separate but rather is the same as the believer: spirit. So here the individual finds his self-conception mirrored in and confirmed by God. This point comes into focus when we recall the other conceptions of God that Hegel discusses. For example, the God of Judaism commands obedience but does not recognize the inward value and rationality of each individual. Thus the recognition that one receives from this deity is like the recognition that the slave receives from the master. In the eyes of the master, the slave is not fully human. By contrast, in Christianity each individual is recognized as infinitely valuable. God recognizes the rationality of all human beings and appeals to it. The God of Christianity teaches a doctrine of love and does not threaten dire punishments for disobedience. So, for Hegel, only the recognition that one receives in Christianity leads to a fully developed sense of human freedom.

Hegel begins by recognizing the notion of common sense that claims that we all as individuals are separate from one another. Each of us is unique with our own abilities, interests and personalities. We all as individuals exist on our own, independent of others. According to this view, it is absurd to say that two different people can be one. Hegel argues that there is a deeper truth about human relations that this common sense view fails to see. He points out that in our most important relations of love and friendship, we in fact willingly give up a part of ourselves. When we are in love, we freely put aside our personal wishes in order to help the one we love or in order to commit to the relation of love. When we do this, we do not feel like we are giving up a part of our freedom, and we do not regret this since we are happy to be in the love relationship. It is in this relation that I find myself again at a higher level. So also with a relation of friendship, I might be required to do something to help my friend that I might otherwise not have been inclined to do, but out of friendship, I do so willingly and gladly. Again, in this kind of a case, I give up a part of myself in order to gain a higher conception of myself in the relation of friendship. With examples like these it is easier to see what Hegel means by finding oneself in the world and how this can be understood as an expression of freedom. In a relation of love or friendship I feel immediately at home with the other person, and I do not have to sacrifice myself.<sup>35</sup> Even though I do make certain compromises or do things that I might not otherwise do, I do not regard these as sacrifices or something foreign to myself. So this conception of freedom means overcoming one's immediate selfish impulses and attaining a higher relation with other people.

## IX. CONCLUSION

Hegel is often saddled with the idea that he is the thinker of abstraction *par excellence*. This is the repeated objection issued by Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx and others. Lost in a world of abstract ideas, Hegel, it is claimed, has nothing meaningful to say about the real world in which we live. He has forgotten that he is a living and breathing human being in actuality. The present analysis shows that this objection is misguided. Hegel is in fact himself in an active polemic precisely against abstraction. This point holds the key to his analysis of Christianity, which, in contrast to Judaism and Islam, has a concept of God which has a concrete element.

<sup>34</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 108; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 173.

<sup>35</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Part 3, *Die vollendete Religion*, vol. 5, 127; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 3, *The Consummate Religion*, 194.

The movement from abstract ideas (universals) to particulars (particulars) is essential for Hegel's thought. To remain in the abstraction of ideas is to remain in a condition of separation and alienation. In order to overcome this, the idea must be realized in the real empirical world. This might all sound very abstract, but this is a movement that we are all very familiar with. We always have ideas that we then act upon, and thus realize in the real world. I can have the idea of building a house, writing an article, or going to the movies. At first this is just an idea, but I only gain true satisfaction when I realize it, that is, when my idea becomes instantiated in action in the real world.

With the Christian ideas of Incarnation and Revelation we can see a similar movement: the abstract becomes concrete. This is the key, for Hegel, for overcoming the alienation that we see in Judaism and Islam. Hegel's account of Christianity as overcoming alienation thus gives us rich insight not just into his philosophy of religion but also into the nature of his philosophy in general with respect to the old criticism of him as an abstract thinker. It shows that he too realized and appreciated the importance of the concrete and the actual. To his mind, abstract systems of thinking are precisely forms of alienation.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson-Irwin, Christopher. 2005. "But the serpent did not lie": Reading, History, and Hegel's Interpretation of Genesis Chapter 3". *Clio* 35, no. 1: Clio.
- Bubbio, Paolo D. 2014. "Hegel, the Trinity, and the 'I'". *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 76, no. 2: 129–50. doi:10.1007/s11153-014-9451-8.
- Calton, Patricia M. 2001. *Hegel's Metaphysics of God: The Ontological Proof as the Development of a Trinitarian Divine Ontology*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Desmond, William. 2003. *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Fackenheim, Emil L. 1973. *Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Philosophy: A Preface to Future Jewish Thought*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- . 1973. "Hegel and Judaism: A Flaw in the Hegelian Mediation". In *The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium 1970*, edited by J. J. O'Malley et al., 161–85. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
- Hegel, G.W.F. 1807. *System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt.
- . 1832-45. "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols 1.-3." In *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe, Vol. 1-18*, edited by Ludwig Boumann et al. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.
- . 1962. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1-3*. Edited by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson. New York, NY: The Humanities Press.
- . 1984-87. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1-3*. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson and Robert F. Brown. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press.
- Hegel, Georg W. F., and J. N. Findlay. 1977. *Phenomenology of spirit*. Oxford [England], New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Hodgson, Peter C. 1987. "The Metamorphosis of Judaism in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion". *Owl of Minerva* 19, no. 1: 41–52. doi:10.5840/owl198719122.
- . 2005. *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Huber, Herbert. 1984. *Idealismus und Trinität, Pantheon und Götterdämmerung. Grundlagen und Grundzüge der Lehre von Gott nach dem Manuskript Hegel zur Religionsphilosophie*. Weinheim: Acta humaniora.
- O'Regan, Cyril. 1997. "Hegel and Anti-Judaism". *Owl of Minerva* 28, no. 2: 141–82. doi:10.5840/owl19972829.
- O'Regan, Cyril, and Louis Dupré. 1994. *The Heterodox Hegel*. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press.
- Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1953. "Hegel's Image of Judaism". *Jewish Social Studies* 15, no. 1: 33–52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4465125>.
- Schlitt, Dale M. 1984. *Hegel's Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection*. Leiden: Brill.
- Schmidt, Erik. 1982. "Hegel und die kirchliche Trinitätslehre". *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 24: 241–60.
- Slootweg, Timo. 2012. "Hegel's Philosophy of Judaism". In *Hegel's Philosophy of the Historical Religions*, edited by Bart Labuschagne and Timo Slootweg, 125–55. Leiden: Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004228153\_008.
- Splett, Jörg. 1965. *Die Trinitätslehre G. W. F. Hegels*. München: Alber.
- Tofan, Ioan A. 2009. "On How God Does not Die in the Idea: The Hegelian Project of the Philosophy of Religion". *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 8, no. 22: 89–114.
- Yovel, Yirmiyahu. 1998. *The Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche and the Jews*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.



DRAFT