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This will imply that someone who is not overburdened by such a provision will have an obligation to provide the relevant goods.
Again, this will imply that someone who is not overburdened by such a provision will have an obligation to provide the relevant goods.
As it should be, these moral requirements apply to us as well as to God, although our ability to prevent is obviously different.
This is because they think that it may be logically impossible for God to prevent the evil consequences of both such actions.
In the course of my argument, I propose to do just that.
Which then makes it a case to which Moral Evil Prevention Requirement III applies.
This is because theists think that there may be no logically possible alternative way for God to provide for such goods that is morally unobjectionable.
In the course of my argument, I propose to do just that.
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Sterba, J.P. Is a good god logically possible?. Int J Philos Relig 87, 203–208 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09755-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09755-x