Abstract
In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed.
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Notes
One can see on this point what Putnam maintains by associating the Metaphysical realism perspective with the God’s Eye point of view. According to Putnam, adopting Metaphysical Realism would imply that we look at reality from the standpoint of God, which is unavailable to us: “On this perspective [i.e., the perspective maintained by metaphysical realism], the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things. I shall call this perspective the externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a God’s Eye point of view.” (Putnam 1981, p. 49) And then he goes on by adding: “There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.” (Putnam 1981, p. 50). Putnam uses this argument to criticise Metaphysical Realism and to support his internal realism; we think that independently from the alternative metaphysical proposal, Metaphysical Realism is subject to this critique.
Sellars himself notices that science itself to be totally legitimised would need a ground that could be immediately given. However this ground is one of the forms in which the Myth of the Given has found its expression, because it is something that it is never achieved: “One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims – particular and general – about the world.” (Sellars 1997, pp. 68-69).
See also Schlick, who commenting on Lewis’ “realistic” hypothesis, adds: “we must admit the impossibility of verifying it, but the impossibility is merely empirical” (Schlick 1936, p. 367).
In his analysis of the concept of objectivity, Agazzi (2016, pp. 357-360) clearly distinguishes between objectivity in a weak sense interpreted as intersubjectivity (i.e., the agreement in the use of a notion by a certain scientific community), and objectivity in a strong sense as a description of what is “inherent in the object” or independent of the subject. However Agazzi (2016, pp. 359-60) also claims that “operations”, as defined in different scientific practices and belonging to the praxis of different sciences, can “break the circle of subjectivity”. We agree on the crucial distinction between the intersubjective character of the scientific activity and its intentional direction to a ground, but according to us it is precisely the latter that can never be grasped, and operations precisely for their “practical” nature are artefacts that can never transform their subjective status into a bridge to attain the ground (i.e., the objectivity in its strong sense).
The fact that objective reality is always beyond one’s reach seems to be confirmed also by the fact that no statement can be considered as definitive, i.e., definitively proved. If, indeed, it is proved, it can only be proved on a logical basis, but then, being a tautology, does not say anything about observable facts. If, instead, it refers to observable facts and corroborates them, then it is not proved by logic, for corroboration is not a definitive verification and has only a statistical-probabilistic validity. Even the process intended to clarify the meaning of concepts (which represent a unity of a multiplicity of entities) amounts to abstracting from the observed reality and thus amounts to cutting oneself off from it.
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Stella, A., Ianulardo, G. Metaphysical Realism and Objectivity: Some Theoretical Reflections. Philosophia 46, 1001–1021 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9951-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9951-3