ABSTRACT
In this chapter, Stekeler-Weithofer develops an interpretation of Hegel that aims to show how a proper understanding of the nature of speculative sentences might achieve what Kant set out to do: to vindicate our most fundamental claims to knowledge as actual knowledge, rather than mere acts of believing. To this end, Stekeler-Weithofer develops his conception of speculative geographies (or “maps”) as an interpretive tool and introduces a condensed version of his Hegelian-inspired distinction between empirical, generic, and speculative sentences. On his reading, Kant’s employment of the “boundary concept” of a noumenon is bound to fail as it needs to employ a contrast between our human point of view and that of an omniscient God—which turns out to be an aperspectival “view from nowhere” and thus an incoherent notion. Stekeler-Weithofer ends the chapter by suggesting ways in which Hegel’s logical analysis can help us to better comprehend the reflective ascent necessary to make our conceptual differentiations and typical ways of understanding intelligible to ourselves.
