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Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Recently, several philosophers have challenged the view that evolutionary theory is usefully understood by way of an analogy with Newtonian mechanics. Instead, they argue that evolutionary theory is merely a statistical theory. According to this alternate approach, natural selection and random genetic drift are not even causes, much less forces. I argue that, properly understood, the Newtonian analogy is unproblematic and illuminating. I defend the view that selection and drift are causes in part by attending to a pair of important distinctions—that between process and product and that between natural selection and fitness.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Thanks to Robin Andreasen, André Ariew, John Beatty, Vincent Bergeron, Bruce Glymour, Daniel Hausman, Selman Halabi, Katriina Ilves, Tim Lewens, Mohan Matthen, Anya Plutynski, Alex Rosenberg, Steve Savitt, Elliott Sober and Denis Walsh for helpful comments and discussion. Thanks also to Lisa Lloyd for her comments on an earlier version of this paper at the 2003 Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

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