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Varieties of parity

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Abstract

A central idea of developmental systems theory is ‘parity’ or ‘symmetry’ between genes and non-genetic factors of development. The precise content of this idea remains controversial, with different authors stressing different aspects and little explicit comparisons among the various interpretations. Here I characterise and assess several influential versions of parity.

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Notes

  1. Here are two quotes to this effect: “The theory does not deny that there are distinctions among developmental processes” (Griffiths and Gray 1994, p. 283). Oyama (2000, p. S342) wrote: “Nor does parity mean that in any particular analysis, all things are equally important or “the same,” that no distinctions can be made.”

  2. Weber objected against this form of parity that it ceases to be an empirical proposition. Its truth hinges on a general metaphysical claim about the nature of causation (section 8.4).

  3. Not all accept Millean parity. Paul Griffiths, for instance, accepts that templates are the only factors determining product sequences if mechanisms like RNA editing are absent (pers. comm.).

  4. In addition, Waters (2006) offers a methodological defence of ‘gene-centrism’, the phenomenon that genes are the focus of much research in the life sciences.

  5. Waters (2007) builds on Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist account of causation.

  6. I owe this point to Marcel Weber. See Northcott (2009) for a general objection against Waters (2007) account.

  7. This objection to Waters (2007) is not a criticism of Woodward’s (2003) analysis of causation.

  8. “If biologists were […] limited to considering the causal synthesis of a single polypeptide molecule, they would have no basis for saying that the polypeptide’s linear sequence was determined by DNA, and not by RNA polymerase. In fact, if restricted to considering a single instance (or a population of identical outcomes), it might appear that DNA was merely scaffolding for the synthesis of RNA. The causal distinctiveness of DNA is in the population. It is only in the context where polypeptide molecules with different amino acid sequences are being synthesized that it makes sense for biologist to say that DNA is not on a causal par with many of the other molecules that play causally necessary roles in the synthesis of RNA and polypeptides” (Waters 2007, p. 579).

  9. For instance, Nishimura et al. (1965) produced polypeptides containing serine and leucine in alternating order from poly-UC, describing the latter as “directing” polypeptide synthesis (pp. 314, 323).

  10. Examples are the production of polyadenylate RNA fragments from polythymidilate DNA (Falaschi et al. 1963) and of poly-UC RNA molecules from poly-TG DNA sections (Nishimura et al. 1965). The DNA fragments were regarded as “templates” for synthesising the RNA fragments (e.g. Falaschi et al. 1963, p. 3084; Nishimura et al. 1965, p. 322), whose function is to determine RNA sequences (Falaschi et al. 1963, p. 3080).

  11. Many thanks to Marcel Weber for pressing me on this point. In fact, both Judson’s (1996) account of this historical episode and the structure of Nirenberg and Matthaei’s (1961, p. 1601) paper suggest that they considered the wider set of trials as decisive for their conclusion.

  12. For instance, polyadenylic acid (poly-A) and polycytidylic acid (poly-C); table 6, ‘experiment no. 1’ in Nirenberg and Matthaei (1961, p. 1601).

  13. Poly-U served as the template. See table 8, as well as text on p. 1596, in Nirenberg and Matthaei (1961).

  14. Effects of niche construction will complicate the picture.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Marcel Weber and Paul Griffiths for their comments.

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  1. School of Divinity, History and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street, Aberdeen, AB24 3UB, UK

    Ulrich E. Stegmann

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Stegmann, U.E. Varieties of parity. Biol Philos 27, 903–918 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9331-5

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