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Jeanine Grenberg, Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological AccountCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 Pp. x + 300 ISBN 9781107033580 (hbk) $99.00

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2014

Martin Sticker
Martin Sticker*
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews and Stirling University email: ms752@st-andrews.ac.uk
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Type
Reviews
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , July 2014 , pp. 315 - 318
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2014 

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References

1 Grenberg only mentions Rousseau in a footnote (87).

2 Grenberg contrasts the Second Gallows Case with the most hardened scoundrel in Groundwork, 4: 454–5 (see especially ch.7). From these two cases ‘very different conclusions’ (178) can be drawn.

3 See for instance 4: 403, 4: 421–3, 5: 27, 5: 36, 5: 44, 5: 69.

4 This claim also does not sit well with certain passages in the second Critique in which Kant states that respect for the moral law has no epistemic function (5: 76. 16–23). Overall, textual evidence in the second Critique for the epistemic function of respect is, admittedly, ambiguous.