Journal of the American
Psychoanalytic
Association
http://apa.sagepub.com/
Book Review: A Question of Time: Freud in the Light of Heidegger's
Temporality
Robert D. Stolorow
J Am Psychoanal Assoc 2013 61: 1251
DOI: 10.1177/0003065113510038
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PSYCHO-PHYSICAL, AESTHETIC, PHILOSOPHIC, BIBLICAL
REFERENCES
FEDER, S. (1992). Charles Ives: “My Father’s Song.” New Haven: Yale
University Press.
OSTWALD, P., & ZEGANS, L., EDS. (1993). The Pleasures and Perils of Genius:
Mostly Mozart. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.
STEINBERG, M. (1984). Liner notes, Mozart Piano Sonatas, Alfred Brendel
(CD). London: Philips, p. 2.
Aaron H. Esman
115 East 86th Street
New York, NY 10028
E-mail: ahesman@earthlink.net
____________ ____________
A QUESTION OF TIME: FREUD IN THE LIGHT OF HEIDEGGER’S TEMPORALITY. By Joel Pearl. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013, x + 226 pp.,
$70.00.
DOI: 10.1177/0003065113510038
Joel Pearl teaches philosophy at the Academic College of Communication, Rishon LeZion, Israel; he is also a psychoanalytic psychotherapist
and has been a candidate member at the Tel-Aviv Institute for Contemporary Psychoanalysis. His research and publications, of which the volume
under review is a prime example, have focused on phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and their intersection. A Question of Time: Freud in the
Light of Heidegger’s Temporality is a magnificent piece of interdisciplinary scholarship, one that warmed my own post-Cartesian psychoanalytic
heart.
Like Binswanger (1946) and Boss (1963) before him, Pearl proceeds
from the “top down”—that is, he begins with the philosophical presuppositions implicit in Freudian theory and with the fundamental existential
structures delineated by Heidegger, and then goes on to show how the
latter can (and should) transform psychoanalysis. Such an approach contrasts with one, such as my own (Stolorow 2011), that proceeds from the
“bottom up”—that begins with clinical phenomena and an effort to rethink
the psychoanalytic process phenomenologically and then finds philosophical support for this endeavor in Heidegger’s existential analytic.
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Book Reviews
The aim of Pearl’s study is to rethink the fundamentals of Freudian
theory in light of Heidegger’s conception of the essential temporality of
human existence. In Part 1 of the book, which is essentially a philosophical introduction, Pearl presents an overview of the contrasting
visions of the human subject offered by Descartes and Kant, on one hand,
and Heidegger, on the other. In Part 2 he shows how the Freudian psyche
incorporated uncritically the Cartesian and Kantian conception of time.
Finally, in Part 3, he offers his view of a psychoanalytic theory transformed and enriched by Heidegger’s conception of temporality. I take up
each part in turn.
Part 1. Pearl’s philosophical overview is reader-friendly and quite
comprehensive. He explicates the Cartesian/Kantian subject as both isolated from its world (the infamous subject-object split) and standing
outside of time. Drawing on Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time
(1927), supplemented by remarks from his less opaque 1927 lecture
course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Heidegger 1975), Pearl
outlines how Heidegger showed that the existing human being is inseparable from both its world and its lived experience of time.
Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time was to elucidate the basic structures of the human kind of Being, which he called existence—a Heideggerian term of art referring to how we are intelligible to ourselves as
human beings.
The first half of Being and Time (Division I) is devoted primarily to
an elucidation of our “average everyday” way of existing and understanding ourselves. The second half (Division II) is devoted to authentic existing and its relation to our temporal constitution. Because he seeks to
rethink Freudian psychoanalysis from the standpoint of Heidegger’s
conception of temporality, Pearl places much greater emphasis on the
psychoanalytic relevance of Division II. I, in contrast, see Division I as
also holding enormous importance in providing a philosophical foundation for psychoanalysis’s movement toward more relational perspectives.
Let me explain briefly.
As I am sure Pearl would agree, traditional Freudian theory is pervaded by the Cartesian “myth of the isolated mind” (Stolorow and
Atwood 1992, p. 7), which bifurcated the experiential world into inner
and outer regions, severed both mind from body and cognition from
affect, reified and absolutized the resulting divisions, and pictured the
mind as an objective entity that takes its place among other objects, a
thinking thing that has an inside with contents and that looks out on an
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PSYCHO-PHYSICAL, AESTHETIC, PHILOSOPHIC, BIBLICAL
external world from which it is essentially estranged. The Freudian
psyche is fundamentally a Cartesian mind in that it is a container of contents (instinctual energies, wishes, representations, etc.), a thinking thing
that, precisely because it is a thing, is ontologically decontextualized,
fundamentally separated from its world. Heidegger, by contrast, sought
to refind the unity of our Being, split asunder in the Cartesian bifurcations, by unveiling the basic structure of our average everyday existing as
a rich contextual whole—Being-in-the-world—in which human Being is
saturated with the world in which we dwell, just as the world we inhabit
is drenched in human meanings and purposes. In Heidegger’s vision, our
Being and our world in their indissoluble unity primordially and constantly contextualize one another. Especially important for contemporary
psychoanalysis is Heidegger’s emphasis on the primacy of affectivity in
disclosing our context-embeddeness. Heidegger’s ontological contextualism, as explicated in Division I of Being and Time, provides a solid
philosophical grounding for a psychoanalytic phenomenological contextualism (see Stolorow 2011).
Part 2. I found Part 2, in which Pearl unveils what he calls the temporal lacuna in Freud’s methodology and theorizing, to be particularly
illuminating. According to Pearl’s fascinating historical account, this
lacuna derived from Freud’s studies with the proto-phenomenologist
Franz Brentano over the course of a three-year period and Freud’s subsequent wholesale incorporation of Brentano’s metaphysical conception of
time into psychoanalytic method and theory, where it remained unchanged.
This conception, which actually harks back to Aristotle’s metaphysics
and was carried forth by both Descartes and Kant, pictures time as an
infinite succession of “nows” unfolding in linear fashion. (Interestingly,
another of Brentano’s students, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl,
developed an alternative to Brentano’s linear time, which was later further radicalized by Husserl’s student, Martin Heidegger.) In addition to
being characteristic of average everydayness, linear time is the conception of time that underlies scientific method, because it locates the succession of nows in the external world where they can be counted and
calculated and the intervals between them measured by a subject who
stands outside the time being objectified and studied. Thus, his adoption
of linear time was consistent with Freud’s wish for his psychoanalysis to
attain the status of a natural or objective science.
Pearl demonstrates that the linear conception of time adopted by
Freud conceals the temporal fabric of human existence itself, as it shows
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up in the patient-analyst encounter. In some beautiful psychoanalytichistorical scholarship, Pearl exposes this concealment of temporality in
Freud’s interpretive method, first in the famous case of Dora, and then in
four of Freud’s major works spanning the period from 1905 to 1937.
Within the framework of time conceived as a linear succession of present
moments—what Heidegger called a metaphysics of presence—transference, for example, could be interpreted only as a temporal disruption and
the unconscious as a container of experiences derailed from the timeline
by repression, and these and other clinical phenomena could not be
grasped as manifestations of our temporal constitution itself. For anyone
interested in the making of psychoanalysis’s “philosophical unconscious”
conscious, the scholarship in Part 2 alone makes A Question of Time a
very worthwhile read.
Part 3. The third part of the book, “Psycho-Ontology,” is the
most ambitious one. Here Pearl seeks to reformulate key concepts in
psychoanalysis as manifestations of the temporality at the heart of our
existence, rather than being derived from objectively assessable processes positioned along a linear timeline. It is here that Pearl draws heavily on Division II of Being and Time, wherein Heidegger developed his
claim that human existence in all its modes is intelligible or makes sense
only on the basis of its temporal constitution. Heidegger, in essence,
argued that the whole structure of human existence had to be brought into
view—namely, that it could be authentically intelligible only in terms of
its stretching along between birth and the possibility of death. In contrast
to the linear notion of time, the temporality revealed in this stretching
along is a unity of past, present, and future, with each dimension always
transcending itself and pointing toward the other two. However, since for
Heidegger authenticity entailed an owning-up to the ever present possibility of death, leaning into future possibilities attained particular prominence in his account of our temporal constitution.
Drawing on the work of Loewald (1980), who studied with Heidegger, Pearl argues, much too complexly to be captured in this review,
that Freud’s structural theory is undergirded by the temporal relations
among past, present, and future, with the future taking precedence as in
Heidegger. More interesting to me is the way Pearl, returning to the case
of Dora, applies the unitary structure of our temporality to an interpretation of clinical phenomena, such as transference and repression. Rather
than being seen as a disturbance in the normal (i.e., linear) structure of
the mind, as Freud would have it, transference is grasped as a return of
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PSYCHO-PHYSICAL, AESTHETIC, PHILOSOPHIC, BIBLICAL
the past into the present pointing to the future, a manifestation of the
temporal motion inherent to human existence itself. Similarly, repression,
in barring access to aspects of the past, also closes off aspects of the present and future that depend on that past, thereby fracturing temporality’s
unitary structure.
The vision of the psychoanalytic encounter that emerges from Pearl’s
rethinking of Freud in the light of Heidegger’s temporality is a distinctively intersubjective one, in which the analyst dwells in the temporal
world of the patient, and the patient inhabits the temporal world of the
analyst. I found myself wishing that Pearl had shown us how he is guided
by this vision in his own psychoanalytic work, rather than just applying
it to a reconceptualization of one of Freud’s cases. In my own bottom-up
approach, I began with the experience of emotional trauma (my own,
actually) and worked my way up to Heidegger’s existential analytic
(Stolorow 2011). I found that trauma devastatingly disrupts the average
everyday linear conception of time and exposes the unitary structure of
our temporal existence, even as it fractures it. Experiences of emotional
trauma become freeze-framed into an eternal present in which one
remains forever trapped, or to which one is condemned to be perpetually
returned through the retraumatizations supplied by life’s slings and
arrows. In the region of trauma all duration or stretching along collapses,
past becomes present, and future loses all meaning other than endless
repetition. Traumatic temporality is a variant of authentic temporality,
disclosed in our traumatizing confrontations with human finitude.1
I am grateful to have encountered Pearl’s highly illuminating topdown explication of what Heidegger’s conception of temporality has to
offer Freudian psychoanalysis. His interdisciplinary synthesis and my
own seem to complement each other nicely.
REFERENCES
BINSWANGER, L. (1946). The existential analysis school of thought. In Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, ed. R. May, E.
Angel, & H. Ellenberger. New York: Basic Books, 1958, pp. 191–213.
BOSS, M. (1963). Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, transl. L. Lefebre. New
York: Basic Books.
HEIDEGGER, M. (1927). Being and Time, transl. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson.
New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
1
Interestingly, Heidegger (1975) interprets the idea of an infinite succession of
nows as an inauthentic temporality that “forgets its own essential finitude” (p. 273).
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HEIDEGGER, M. (1975). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, transl. A.
Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
LOEWALD, H. (1980). Papers on Psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
STOLOROW, R.D. (2011). World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and PostCartesian Psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge.
STOLOROW, R.D., & ATWOOD, G.E. (1992). Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Robert D. Stolorow
2444 Wilshire Boulevard, #624
Santa Monica, CA 90403
E-mail: robertdstolorow@gmail.com
____________ ____________
LE MALÊTRE (THE MALAISE). By René Kaës. Paris: Dunod, 2012,
vii + 278 pp., €26.00.
DOI: 10.1177/0003065113510042
In his new book, Le Malêtre, René Kaës, a French scholar and analyst
who collaborated with Didier Anzieu, proposes a contemporary revision
of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents. The choice of a neologism for
the title, malêtre, literally the antonym of well-being, is significant of
Kaës’s need to reformulate the new manifestations of malaise and psychic suffering in contemporary societies.
This book is the culmination of his lifelong clinical and theoretical
research on intersubjective transmission in groups. Kaës has been a prolific author, and it is unfortunate that only one of his books is now available in English translation, Linking, Alliances, and Shared Spaces:
Groups and the Psychoanalyst (2007). In addition, an exhaustive review
of Kaës’s work by Lewis Kirshner was published in JAPA (2006).
Kaës postulates that theoretical changes in psychoanalysis since
Freud are intertwined with the mutations of contemporary societies (technological and biotechnological changes, transformations in family structure, migrations of populations, and terrorist activities). Malêtre relates to
the difficulty of being and existing among others in society. Thus it is not
only a feeling like malaise, but a topographic term identifying different
pathologies present at the intersection of intrasubjective and intersubjective life. For Kaës, the bedrock of psychic existence derives not only from
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