Abstract
The early formal logicians (Frege, Russell, Peano et al.) were worried about differentiating logic from psychology. As a result, they interpreted logic in the most abstract way possible: as a theory about inference patterns whose terms lacked descriptive content. Such a theory was also acontextual. What they did not realize was that psychological concepts like expecting someone, doubting, pain etc. each had their own logic, a logic that had two features: it was contextually oriented and its concepts had a restricted sensible application. This is still a recognizable sense of logic but broader in scope than the conceptions that Frege and Russell had in mind.
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Stroll, A. Broadened Logic. Topoi 22, 93–104 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022112116339
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022112116339