^{page 233 note 1} Wiener, Norbert, God and Golem, Inc.: A Comment on Certain Points Where Cybernetics Impinges on Religion (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964). I have taken the liberty of extending this analogy a bit more than Wiener actually does.Google Scholar

^{page 233 note 2} I do not wish to become embroiled in the issue of whether human intelligence is paralleled in every essential respect by computing machines which we now have or which we may conceivably have in the future. It is sufficient for my purposes to have it granted that some skills, such as checker-playing (an example cited by Wiener), can be performed by machines at least on a par with human beings, and in many cases better than humans can perform them.

^{page 233 note 3} Op. cit., p. 17. By a ‘significant game’, Wiener means one in which there is some objective criterion of merit—some way of evaluating the performance of the players, and of computing real gains and losses.Google Scholar

^{page 234 note 1} Cf. Heim, Karl, The Transformation of the Scientific World View (New York: Harper and Bros. 1953), Chapter IV.Google Scholar

^{page 234 note 2} Jung, among others, has also pointed out that the erosion of the church's authority and teachings in the modern world is now yielding a bitter harvest in the form of widespread neurosis and psychosis (especially in Protestantism.) Theologians may think that science has rendered belief in Evil Powers obsolete, Jung notes, but the human psyche knows otherwise: the unconscious, especially that of the mentally ill, is aware of something that the conscious mind cannot or will not admit, viz. that there are negative or evil forces in the universe which influence human behaviour in various subtle ways. Cf. Jung, C. G., Psychology and Religion: East and West, trans. Hull, R. F. C. (New York: Pantheon, 1958), pp. 43–9Google Scholar. See also Custance, John, Wisdom, Madness, and Folly (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1952).Google Scholar

^{page 234 note 3} In his book The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York: Anchor Books, 1964), Professor Wiener uses just this analogy.Google Scholar Cf. also Zaehner, R. C., Matter and Spirit (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 138 ff., where it is noted that the Ahriman of Zoroastrian theology ‘corresponds exactly to what thermodynamics calls entropy, the vis interiae that tends to drag all evolution back into a meaningless and “dead” uniformity.’ (p. 141)Google Scholar

^{page 235 note 1} Lewis, C. S., A Preface to Paradise Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942).Google Scholar

^{page 235 note 2} Cf. e.g. Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, Person and Reality, ed. Bertocci, Peter A., et al. (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1958), pp. 331 ff. Brightman is a bit vague about the nature of what he calls ‘the Given’, but in addition to such things as the laws of logic it includes ‘the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of “surd evil”’ (op. cit., p. 341).Google Scholar

^{page 236 note 1} This analogy also has its limits, of course. The Bible, somewhat anthropomorphically, does depict God as being free to ‘change his mind’, or to destroy what he has made (as in the Flood) and begin again. This freedom, however, does not extend to the destruction of persons.

^{page 236 note 2} Op. cit., p. 17.Google Scholar

^{page 236 note 3} Just what ‘losing’ would involve is hard to specify, but it would presumably include having some of God's wishes (e.g. that all men repent) frustrated.

^{page 236 note 4} Cf. Custance, op. cit., p. 205. Custance is willing to allow that the Devil has ‘perhaps even a fifty-fifty chance’ of frustrating God's plans, although he immediately adds that, according to Christian belief (which he shares) Satan's chances are no longer as good as they once were.Google Scholar

^{page 237 note 1} Op. cit., p. 17. Wiener points out that the ascription of infinite power, goodness, etc., to God is perhaps rash, given the paradoxes surrounding the notion of infinity in mathematics. We would be far wiser, he suggests, to confine ourselves to assertions (e.g. that God is ‘very powerful, etc.’) to which clearer meaning can be given.Google Scholar

^{page 238 note 1} Cf. von Hügel, Baron Friedrich, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion: First Series (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1921), pp. 220–1: ‘It is true that by any and every acceptance of this doctrine [of Hell] we allow that God's will or God's power does not, or cannot, effect, within the realm of human souls its own entire triumph—a triumph which evidently consists in the subjectively free and objectively right self-determination of all awakened human souls.’Google Scholar

^{page 238 note 2} Op. cit., pp. 332–3. I. do not mean to ascribe to Brightman a belief in Hell, however understood. Brightman would (I think) emphatically reject such a doctrine, if only because it seems to rule out any further ‘self-fulfillment’ for some persons.Google Scholar

^{page 239 note 1} Barring the possibility that we could make machines so nearly in our own image that they would produce ‘moral’ responses because we had given them this capacity.

^{page 240 note 1} Cf. MacKay, Donald M., Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 240 note 2} MacKay argues this point very cogently, showing that there is strictly speaking no ‘information’ that someone with foreknowledge of another's future could transmit to the latter and which the latter would be obliged, or even in a position, to accept.

^{page 241 note 1} Mind, LXIV, No. 254 (April, 1955), pp. 200–12.Google Scholar

^{page 241 note 2} Loc. cit., p. 210.Google Scholar

^{page 241 note 3} Loc. cit., p. 212.Google Scholar

^{page 242 note 1} MacIntyre, Alasdair C., Difficulties in Christian Belief (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 36 (italics mine).Google Scholar

^{page 242 note 2} Cf. Bohm, David, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (New York: Harper and Bros.; Torchbook, ed., 1961).Google Scholar

^{page 243 note 1} MacIntyre, , op. cit., p. 18.Google Scholar