Abstract
This note proposes a principle of liberalism which is a simple and plausible variant of Sen's principle of ‘minimal liberalism’. The former principle is shown to be incompatible with the weak Pareto principle; and this impossibility result is not dependent on the preference-aggregating rule being restricted by any collective rationality condition.
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Subramanian, S. A Paretian liberal dilemma without collective rationality. Theor Decis 37, 323–332 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079914
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079914