Notes
The exception is Alexander Miller’s chapter (‘Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning’) which is critical of Wittgenstein about the truth conditions of sentences. The argumentation is rigorous and dense, but one problem is that the chapter focuses mostly on Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein (KW) rather than Wittgenstein (W) himself. Much of the analysis assesses whether a particular interpretation of KW as rejecting classical realism but remaining a factualist about meaning can be overcome with a non-factualist position. Miller’s conclusion that KW’s sceptical argument still raises some hard questions may lead readers who are not at least minimally conversant with Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein to conclude that this chapter does not provide an easy and accessible point at which to enter the debate.
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Sullivan, G.B. Daniel Whiting (ed.): The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Int J Semiot Law 26, 247–252 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9257-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9257-x