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Ritual in the Xunzi: A Change of the Heart/Mind

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Abstract

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi’s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi’s moral psychology.

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Notes

  1. All reference numbers, except otherwise noted, are to the chapter and line numbers in Xunzi yinde 荀子引得. In providing my own translation, I have in general consulted Knoblock’s translations. All references to the English translations of the Xunzi are to chapter and section, volume, and page numbers in John Knoblock’s translation. Other than the terms I explained, my translations of other Chinese terms are only tentative.

    My reference to Xunzi’s thought is to the ideas presented in the Xunzi text. Assuming that the ideas expressed in the text are consistent, I will explicate certain implicit positions or assumptions Xunzi would have adopted in order for his claims to remain consistent. It is possible that Xunzi himself might not have thought through the problems I posed or be fully aware of the implications I draw from my analysis of the text. Nonetheless, I take these positions to be what Xunzi would have adopted in order for him to remain consistent.

  2. See Chen Da-qi, Xunzi xueshuo, Taibei: Zhongyǎng wenwu gongyingshe, 1954, Chapter 9.

  3. Kurtis Hagen, The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction, Chicago: Open Court, 2007, p. 66 n24.

  4. Wei Zheng-tong, Xunzi yu gudai zhexue, Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1992, p. 8.

  5. See Antonio Cua, ‘The Problem of Conceptual Unity,’ In Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005, pp. 99–120.

  6. For example, while the function of fēn is most of time attributed to lǐ-yì in the text, there are also instances where the function of fēn is attributed to lǐ. Compare, for example, Xunzi 5/28 and Xunzi 18/20.

  7. For example, in the expressions ‘giving order to lǐ-yì 治禮義’ (3/21) ‘exalting lǐ-yì 隆禮義’ (8/95) and ‘accumulating lǐ-yì 積禮義’ (8/114), the focus is not on applying lǐ in action, but on carrying out actions to promote lǐ-yì. It is also in this broader sense that Xunzi speaks of the transforming effect lǐ-yì has on human nature (23/40). See Cua’s ‘The Problem of Conceptual Unity’ for elaborate discussions of instances where these terms seem to be used interchangeably.

  8. For a position similar to this, see, for example, Philip Ivanhoe, ‘A Happy Symmetry: Xunzi’s Ethical Thought.’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59.2: 309–322. Knoblock’s translation of 19.1a also suggests that ritual is concerned with allocating goods in the society.

  9. See Antonio Cua, ‘Dimensions of Lǐ (Propriety)’; T.C. Kline ‘Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi’ in T.C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 135–175, and ‘The Therapy of Desire in Early Confucianism: Xunzi,’ Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5.2: 235–246.

  10. See David Wong, ‘Xunzi on Moral Motivation,’ in T. C. Kline III and Philip, J. Ivanhoe, eds., Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi; Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics: Concepts and Arguments, Chicago: Open Court, 2007, Chap. 7.

  11. According to Xunzi, ‘yu is the response of qing’ (22/63). The distinction Xunzi draws between qing and yu suggests that there is a difference between feelings one naturally has and the state of being drawn to a particular object. See p. 7 for Xunzi’s definition of qing.

  12. According to Xunzi, it is only through lǐ-yì devised by the sages that one’s problematic nature can be modified and adorned, ordered, and transformed (23/40).

  13. In this article, I take for granted that the heart/mind, for Xunzi, is a defining capacity of the person; hence, a description is tantamount to a description of the person. I set aside the issue whether xin constitutes personhood for Xunzi.

  14. For a more elaborate argument on the heart/mind’s natural preference for lì, see my paper ‘Yu in the Xunzi: Can Desire by Itself Motivate Action?’

  15. For instance, one’s material possessions such as emolument or grains are considered as one’s lì (11/78-80). It is occasionally used in a broader and more positive sense to denote whatever that is beneficial to the general public (e.g., 9/72; 18/19). When Xunzi speaks of one’s natural inclination, the term ‘li b’ is used in the narrower and negative sense.

  16. ‘Lì 利’ is frequently associated with concepts related to material possessions such as huo 貨 (goods, commodities), cai 財 (valuables, wealth), fu 富 (wealth, abundance), gong 功 (achievements, good results), and quan 權 (authority, political power) (e.g., 5/18, 8/90, 10/8, 4/19). Elsewhere, it is also said that humans all yu to have the entire kingdom, good food, big palaces, achievement, and admiration of the people (e.g., 11/74-76).

  17. One recurring idea, for example, is that wu in the world are inadequate to satisfy yu. See, for example, Xunzi 4/72 (K 4.12/1/195), 10/5 (K 10.1/2/120), 19/3 (K 19.1a/3/55).

  18. I understand the term ‘quan 權’ in this context to refer to political or social power held by authority and influential people. Xunzi adopts this sense of quan when he uses the compound expression ‘quan lǐ 權利’ (e.g., 1/49) and ‘quan shi 權埶 (e.g., 6/36). The usage of quan in this passage is therefore different from the sense of weighing options discussed here.

  19. I am grateful to Peter Wong for helping me to make clear this distinction.

  20. I have also argued elsewhere that, for Xunzi, the source of ethical failure lies in the heart/mind and what Xunzi means by human nature is bad is that xin has predisposed inclination to seek the objects of desires for oneself in a way that disregard others. See Winnie Sung, ‘Yu in the Xunzi: Can Desire by Itself Motivate Action,’ forthcoming in Dao 11:4.

  21. It should be noted that there is a distinction between the quality of firmness displayed by someone who abides by Dao and one’s rigidity in action. It is exactly because of this firmness in abiding by Dao that one has to be flexible in action. For example, a filial son is required to disobey his father where appropriate because following yì is more important than following his father (29/3-6). Hence, what Xunzi finds problematic is not one’s being flexible in actions as such but one’s being flexible in a way that is not grounded in Dao.

  22. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for prompting me to address this point more clearly.

  23. There is one reference to the ‘qíng of yì 義之情,’ but the usage of qíng in this instance is different from its usage in relation to lǐ and Dao (16/79).

  24. Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 184. See, idem, pp. 184–5 for a detailed discussion of the usages of qíng in the classical texts.

  25. See the Appendix of A.C. Graham’s ‘The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,’ Ching-hua hsueh-pao (Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies) 6: pp. 215–271.

  26. See also Xunzi 27/45.

  27. The early usages of wen are mainly used in the sense of decorative forms or adornment (e.g., Guoyu Zhouyu 26; Zuozhuan B12.7). When contrasted with ‘zhi 質,’ which roughly means substance or supporting material, wen takes on the connotation of a form that gives its content expression (e.g., Lunyu 6.18, 12.8).

  28. I am indebted to Karyn Lai for helping me to clarify this analogy.

  29. In both the Xunzi and other early texts, jing is associated with an attitude one should assume towards Heaven and the spirits (e.g., Shijing 3.2; Xunzi 3/16). The impression that jing is concerned with the attitude towards those above oneself is further intensified by the references to jing as the attitude a younger brother has towards his elder brother (e.g., Zuozhuan 32/11; Xunzi 12/21).

  30. In contrast to qu, bei 卑 is always used in a negative sense by Xunzi to denote low moral standing. This is probably due to the difference between abasing oneself and adopting a perspective that sees oneself as being below others.

  31. In this sense, concepts such as jing (reverence), zhong (loyalty), and cirang (deference) have a reflective dimension for Xunzi because they can only be attained by first counteracting natural inclination. For example, zhong (devotion/loyalty) is different from pre-reflective loyalty because, while the latter can be a raw natural affection one has towards those who stand in special relationship to oneself, zhong requires mental effort to countervail natural tendencies to satisfying self-interest.

  32. Note that in another instance Xunzi says lǐ-yì is the marker of Dao (27/10-11). This is another example that shows Xunzi occasionally uses lǐ and lǐ-yì interchangeably.

  33. Xunzi also understands yì 義 (propriety) in terms of jie, the person within, and jie, the thousand things without (17/78). The subsequent line says that a person who jie will ‘produce peace 安’ for the ruler above and create a ‘fine-tuned balance 調’ for those below (16/78-9).

  34. See also Xunzi 19/74.

  35. Xunzi also correlates appropriately measured happiness and anger with order of the four seasons and the movement of the stars (19/25-28).

  36. I am indebted to Kwong-loi Shun for helping me to think through this point and for letting me consult his forthcoming publication, ‘Early Confucian Moral Psychology.’

  37. See Chen Da-qi, Xunzi xueshuo.

  38. See Kurtis Hagen, ‘Artifice and Virtue in the Xunzi,’ Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, p. 90.

  39. This pattern can well be one that aligns with a cosmological pattern. Xunzi also correlates appropriately measured happiness and anger with the order of the four seasons and the movement of the stars (19/25-28). There is also a clear connection between Dao and lǐ a in the Xunzi. According to Xunzi, those who only have partial knowledge of Dao are shut off from the great lǐ a. In the opening passage of the ‘Jie Bi’ chapter, it is said that ‘All people suffer from being obscured (bi 蔽) by one bend (qu 曲) and are shut off from the great li a (21/1)’; while in another passage, Xunzi criticizes the understanding of other thinkers for being obscured by one aspect (bi) and says that those who know the bend see things from one corner of Dao (21/21-24). In addition, there is also a correlation between how well one knows Dao and how well one puts things into order. The superior person who is guided by Dao is able to lǐ a Heaven and Earth without uncertainty (12/28; K12.3/2/179). There is another passage that says the Heaven and Earth are not lǐ a if there is no superior person (Xunzi 9/65-6).

  40. Wing-tsit Chan, ‘The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept Lǐ as Principle,’ Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, p. 123. The term appears in the Shijing in the sentence ‘wo qiang wo lǐ a 我疆我理’ in Shijing (2/6/6). In the Zuozhuan, the ancient kings are also said to lǐ a the land in accordance with what is suitable for its produce (Zuozhuan 797).

  41. As Wing-tsit Chan notes, both the Yinwenzi and the Hanfeizi understand jade as a piece of crude stone that has been dressed. See Chan ‘The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept Lǐ as Principle,’ p. 128.

  42. In the Mencius, for example, lǐ a is used to mean the harmonious pattern of music (Mencius 5B:1). And in the Xunzi, li a is used in one occasion to refer to the pattern of a face (Xunzi 21/55).

  43. For an example of this view, see Paul Goldin, Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi, Chicago: Open Court, 1999, Chap. 3.

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Acknowledgments

I am particularly indebted to Kwong-loi Shun and Karyn Lai for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, to Jeffrey Riegel for his suggestions on my reading and interpretation of the Xunzi, and to the reviewers for their critical comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Philosophy Department seminar series at the National University of Singapore in March 2012. Some of the ideas presented in this paper were also discussed in various reading groups on early Chinese texts. I am very grateful to the participants in the seminar and the reading groups for their helpful questions and comments. I owe special thanks to the following people for their helpful questions and comments: Kim-chong Chong, Chenyang Li, Hui-Chieh Loy, So-Jeong Park, Siu-fu Tang, Peter Wong, Yuting Zhang, and Zemian Zheng.

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    Winnie Sung

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Sung, W. Ritual in the Xunzi: A Change of the Heart/Mind. SOPHIA 51, 211–226 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0313-5

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