Abstract
The main previous analyses of punishment by Hart, Feinberg and Wasserstrom are considered and criticized. One persistent fault is the neglect of the idea that in punishment the person subjected to it is represented as having no valid excuse for wrongdoing. A new analysis is proposed which attempts to specify in what sense punishment by its very nature is retributive, as Wasserstrom has asserted. Certain problematic cases such as strict liability offenses and pre-trial detention are considered in light of the new analysis.
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Sverdlik, S. Punishment. Law Philos 7, 179–201 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144155
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144155