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Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory

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Notes

  1. See Daniel Boisvert, “Expressive-Assertivism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 89, no. 2 (2008); see also David Copp, “Realist Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (2001); Michael Ridge, “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege,” Ethics vol. 116, no. 2 (2006); Ridge, “Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?” in Rush Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 2 (2007); Mark Schroeder, “Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices,” Ethics, vol. 119, no. 2 (2009).

  2. See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Mineola, N.Y: Dover, 1952), pp. 102–114; see also Simon Blackburn, “Attitudes and Contents,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

  3. See Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see also J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977).

  4. Mackie, op. cit., p. 35.

  5. See Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23–24.

  6. See Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 75.

  7. Ibid., p. 79.

  8. See Paul Horwich, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

  9. See James Dreier, “Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism,” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 1 (2004).

  10. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

  11. See Peter Geach, “Imperative and Deontic Logic,” Analysis, vol. 18, no. 3 (1958); see also Geach, “Ascriptivism,” Philosophical Review, vol. 69, no. 2 (1960); Geach, “Assertion,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 74, no. 4 (1965); John Searle, “Meaning and Speech Acts,” Philosophical Review, vol. 71, no. 4 (1962).

  12. Geach, “Assertion,” p. 463.

  13. See ibid., p. 449.

  14. See Blackburn, Spreading the Word, pp. 189–196; see also Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

  15. See Blackburn, Spreading the Word, p. 195.

  16. See ibid., pp. 195–196.

  17. Mackie, op. cit, p. 35.

  18. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 266.

  19. See Shafer-Landau, op. cit., p. 125.

  20. Ibid.

  21. See ibid., pp. 125–127.

  22. See Mackie, op. cit, p. 35; see also Joyce, op. cit., p. 9.

  23. See Joyce, op. cit., p. 5.

  24. See Mackie, op. cit., pp. 42–46.

  25. See ibid., p. 43.

  26. I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, Thomas Magnell, for offering very helpful comments on this article. I am indebted also to David Agler for providing careful and insightful commentary on an early draft.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 240 Sparks Building, University Park, PA, 16802, USA

    Toby Svoboda

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Svoboda, T. Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. J Value Inquiry 45, 37–48 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-011-9259-z

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